




The City of New York
Department of Investigation
MARGARET GARNETT
COMMISSIONER

180 Maiden Lane
New York, NY 10038

May 10, 2021

Greg B. Smith
THE CITY
35 W. 31 St.
New York, NY



Re: Freedom of Information Law Request

Dear Greg Smith:

This is in response to your March 4, 2021, FOIL request seeking transcripts of DOI's interviews with New York Police Commissioner Dermot Shea and Chief of Department Terence Monahan conducted as part of DOI's December 18, 2020, report.

Your request is granted in part. Please note that some redactions have been applied for the following reasons:

- (1) Where disclosure of the underlying information is prohibited by statute, including where a criminal action has been terminated in favor of the accused. See Public Officers Law § 87(2)(a) and N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law § 160.50;
- (2) Where disclosure of the underlying information would result in an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, including the disclosure of arrest and medical information. See Public Officers Law § 87(2)(b) and 89(2)(b); and
- (3) Where disclosure of the underlying information could endanger the safety of NYPD officers. See Public Officers Law § 87(2)(f).

Please note that DOI has sought to produce these records largely unredacted and has not invoked any additional exceptions beyond those mentioned above because of several distinguishing factors.

This investigation was prompted by Mayoral Executive Order 58, which required DOI to conduct a review and evaluation of the New York City Police Department's planning and response to the protests and to make factual findings related to the evidence obtained. As part of its final report, DOI chose to specifically identify and attribute statements to both Commissioner Dermot Shea and Chief of Department Terence Monahan for several reasons. Among them, that the interviews were compelled and that both interviewees were not interviewed solely in their personal capacity, but rather primarily as representatives of the New York City Police Department—as such, both interviewees were represented by NYPD attorneys rather than personal counsel. Given this representation, DOI concluded that most, if not all, statements made by these two interviewees represented the testimony of an agency rather than the statements of individuals.

DOI makes every effort to safeguard the confidentiality of witnesses to ensure that witnesses speak with full and open candor, to protect a witness that chooses to cooperate with DOI's inquiries, to protect the identities of complainants, and to ensure that allegations are not levied against an individual who has not had the opportunity to face such allegations in a fair trial or impartial adjudication. After review and consideration, DOI concluded that none of these concerns were present in these two interviews.

For the reasons and principles above, your request is granted in significant part. The responsive records have been provided via email.

This correspondence represents our complete response to your request. Should you wish to appeal this determination, you must submit a written appeal addressed to Deputy General Counsel John Carroll within 30 days. You may send this appeal by regular mail to the address indicated below, or via email to FOILAppeals@doi.nyc.gov.

Sincerely,

Christopher Tellet
Assistant General Counsel

1 Mr. Brunsten: Hi, I'm Andrew Brunsten, I'm one of the Inspectors General at
2 DOI.

3 Mr. Tellet: My name is Chris Tellet; I'm an Assistant General Counsel with the
4 General Counsel's Office here.

5 Mr. Richardson: Hi, I'm Justyn Richardson; I'm a Senior Policy Analyst.

6 Mr. Garcia: Hey Chief, my name is Mike Garcia; I'm an Assistant Inspector
7 General at DOI.

8 Ms. Charles: Mariah Charles, Confidential Investigator at DOI.

9 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, my name is Arturo Sanchez; I'm an Assistant Inspector
10 General here at DOI. And today is October 28th, it is 1029 hours.
11 You've met our team. And Chief, before we begin, we're gonna go
12 ahead and issue the interview warnings. I've got a copy here for
13 you.

14 Chief Monahan: Thank you.

15 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, this statement is being taken by the Department of
16 Investigation of the City of New York, pursuant to Chapter 34 of the
17 New York City Charter. You're gonna be asked a number of
18 specific questions concerning the performance of your official
19 duties. You have the option to remain silent, although you may be
20 subject to removal from the employment with the City if you fail to
21 answer material or relevant questions related to the performance of
22 your duties as an employee. The interview furnished and any
23 information or evidence resulting therefrom may be used in the
24 course of civil or administrative proceedings. Neither your
25 statements nor any information or evidence derived therefrom will

1 be used against you in subsequent criminal prosecution other than
2 for perjury or contempt arising from such testimony. If at any time
3 during this interview you wish to consult with your attorney, just say
4 so and we will give you an opportunity to do so privately. Chief,
5 thank you for acknowledging what I've just read, and if I could just
6 administer the oath please, --

7 Chief Monahan: Yes.

8 Mr. Sanchez: -- please raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear or affirm
9 that the statements you are about to make in this interview shall be
10 the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

11 Chief Monahan: I do.

12 Mr. Sanchez: Thanks very much. Alright. Chief, you know that we have asked
13 you to come here today pursuant to a directive from the Mayor's
14 Office, through Executive Order 58, which has asked the
15 Department of Investigation and the Corporation Counsel to conduct
16 an independent investigation of NYPD's handling of protests that
17 began in late May, all the way through June 30th. That's the purview
18 of our review. And in the course of our investigation we have asked
19 the department to furnish documents to us, and we have had the
20 opportunity to interview several members of the service at various
21 ranks. And the purpose of today is to help us learn from you. You
22 know, you are situated in a very unique place in the department as
23 Chief of the Department, and your perspective is invaluable to us.
24 More than anything, it's going to also help us, you know,
25 contextualize the information we have been reviewing and also the

1 statements that we have been taking and information we learned and
2 gleaned through those interviews. And then I ask that you please
3 keep in mind as we are asking questions; please note the basis of
4 your knowledge. In other words, if I ask you about a specific topic,
5 it's important for us to distinguish if that is firsthand knowledge you
6 have gained or if it is something that you have heard others discuss.
7 At the same time, I also ask that, you know, if -- if I am asking
8 questions, if you could please distinguish if those positions are your
9 opinion. We are going to be asking you for your opinion, or if those
10 -- if it's the department's stance. Because, both of those are also
11 important to us. And, again, I just want to reiterate if at any point
12 you want to chat with your counsel, not a problem at all, please feel
13 free to interrupt at any time and we can find a private area for you
14 to discuss. And that's -- that's all I have for the moment before we
15 begin. And we're going to have a couple of different sets of
16 questions, dealing with lots of different issues and I'm going to also
17 turn to my team after every section to see if they have any specific
18 questions related to those categories, and also I'm going to give the
19 team an opportunity to chime in at the end with follow-up questions.
20 Thank you, Chief. So we can go ahead and start with: How long
21 have you been at the NYPD?

22 Chief Monahan: I have been on just short of 39 years now. Came on October 25,
23 1982.

24 Mr. Sanchez: Seen a thing or two, I suppose.

25 Chief Monahan: Yeah. Been around.

1 Mr. Sanchez: And when were you promoted to Chief of Department?

2 Chief Monahan: January 18th of 2018.

3 Mr. Sanchez: Last year. If you could explain to us, what does the Office of the
4 Chief of Department do for the Department?

5 Chief Monahan: Alright, Chief of Department is in charge of all operational functions
6 of New York City Police Department. Reporting directly to me, I
7 have the Chief of Patrol, the Chief of Housing, the Chief of Transit,
8 the Chief of Detectives, and the Chief of Transportation.

9 Mr. Sanchez: How large is that -- the shop, Chief of Department's Office,
10 roughly?

11 Chief Monahan: How large is the what?

12 Mr. Sanchez: How many -- how many employees under the umbrella of the Chief
13 of Department?

14 Chief Monahan: I -- I would roughly -- 18 to 20 in Patrol, another 7 in Detectives,
15 SO -- I also have the Chief of Special Operations under me also.
16 Probably close to 30,000.

17 Mr. Sanchez: That's a --

18 Chief Monahan: Direct -- Directly responsible -- give or take, somewhat (unclear).

19 Mr. Sanchez: (Unclear) --

20 Chief Monahan: Yeah.

21 Mr. Sanchez: -- ballpark -- I appreciate it. You know, the NYPD has a lot of
22 experience in the department specifically dealing with large-scale
23 protests: Thomson -- Thompkins Square Park, '88; Crown Heights,
24 '91; Washington Heights, '92; RNC in 2004; Occupy Wall Street.
25 Was there anything that made this summer's protests stand out from

1 the others you've have had experience with?

2 Chief Monahan: So now I was on the scene for Crown Heights, I was a captain in
3 Washington Heights during the Washington Heights incidents, the
4 World Economic Forum; I was inspector on the scene for those.
5 During the RNC, I was the Commander -- the Deputy Chief -- I was
6 the Commander of the Mobile Field Forces for the entire RNC. And
7 the events that happened in May of this year were unlike anything I
8 had ever experienced before in my career. It was unprecedented.
9 What we went through was unlike any other demonstration or riot
10 that we've had in the City before.

11 Mr. Sanchez: Can you (unclear) that a little bit? What -- what specifically made it
12 stand out this time?

13 Chief Monahan: The physical attacks on police officers that were persistent, that even
14 when arrests were being made, attacks continued. Prolonged attacks
15 on the police officers, with every sort of object thrown at them.
16 Starting heavily at the Barclays Center on -- on that Friday night. It
17 was something that was unexpected, completely unexpected by us.
18 We were hit with just about every sort of object that could have
19 possibly been thrown at us, sprayed at us. I have never seen that
20 before. When teams move in to make arrests in the past, once arrests
21 were made, people usually started to disperse. They didn't. As you
22 tried to make arrests with people who were throwing things, it was
23 organized events to prevent us from getting to the people behind,
24 like people joining arms preventing us to get to the people that were
25 throwing the things. I just had never seen that before.

1 Mr. Sanchez: Thank you, Chief. What was your role with respect to this summer's
2 protests?

3 Chief Monahan: I was -- I was in command. I was in command of operations
4 throughout the City.

5 Mr. Sanchez: And as -- in that position you would have specific supervisory
6 responsibilities?

7 Chief Monahan: Yes.

8 Mr. Sanchez: Were you involved in any of the following regarding these protests:
9 response planning?

10 Chief Monahan: Yes.

11 Mr. Sanchez: The implementation and execution of those plans?

12 Chief Monahan: Yes.

13 Mr. Sanchez: And were these -- was this taking place from 1PP or from the field
14 or both?

15 Chief Monahan: We had meetings in 1PP and then a lot was being done from the
16 field. I was out on the scene, I tried to make out -- I tried to respond
17 to as many incidences that were going on throughout the entire days.
18 I was basically doing 18-hour tours.

19 Mr. Sanchez: (Unclear).

20 Chief Monahan: Yeah, yes. They were long days.

21 Mr. Sanchez: And did -- were there any post-protest briefings that were happening
22 day by day?

23 Chief Monahan: Yes.

24 Mr. Sanchez: And who was involved in those conversations?

25 Chief Monahan: Myself, the Commissioner, our Operations Division, Chief

1 Pichardo. Tommy Galati.

2 Mr. Sanchez: When did you first become personally involved in the oversight of
3 these protests?

4 Chief Monahan: From the beginning. On Thursday -- Thursday evening at Union
5 Square Park.

6 Mr. Sanchez: Are you always personally involved with protests?

7 Chief Monahan: Once they become larger scale, yes. Small-scale ones are usually
8 handled by the boroughs, but once it starts to become large scale,
9 then I get myself personally involved.

10 Mr. Sanchez: And what -- what is the threshold between small scale and large
11 scale?

12 Chief Monahan: As you spoke, Washington Heights, Thompkins -- (unclear) things
13 that you remember --

14 Mr. Sanchez: Yeah.

15 Chief Monahan: -- things that are national news, things that are extremely large in
16 scope.

17 Mr. Sanchez: Gotcha. And it's just not a number of participants or anything like
18 that, it's just --

19 Chief Monahan: No. The number and the violence, if at all, involved.

20 Mr. Sanchez: Okay. How does your role differ when you are on the ground versus
21 when you are working from 1PP or another place?

22 Chief Monahan: When I'm on the ground it gives me that personal perspective of
23 what's happening. I would do the same function of talking to
24 commanders on the scene; the commander on the scene of the
25 incident is in charge of the incident that is taking place. I confer

1 with them, I see what they need, same thing I would be doing if I
2 was in headquarters calling them. But now I have that personal, in-
3 the-face conversation of what's going on.

4 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, how effective was the communication structure that was in
5 place regarding the protests?

6 Chief Monahan: It was good. The conversations I was having regularly with
7 Intelligence, with my field commanders, as incidents were
8 happening anywhere within the City, I was able to contact them. I
9 had Pichardo, and me and Pichardo would be in different areas,
10 making sure that we had eyes on everything that was going on.
11 Chief Harrison in the Detective Bureau, if there was anything going
12 on, and coordinated all through Eddie Mullane, who's running
13 Operations.

14 Mr. Sanchez: And, you know, as Chief of Department, how do you insure that
15 information is commu-- communicated effectively between those
16 key players?

17 Chief Monahan: We all talk. We all call. Calling back and forth to one another,
18 making sure that if Tommy Galati gave me information about
19 something that was going to be happening in Brooklyn North, then
20 I'm reaching out to Jeff Maddrey and Fausto Pichardo, making sure
21 they have that same information, Eddie Mullane in Operations has
22 it too, and that he is disbursing it to all the field commanders.

23 Mr. Sanchez: And the field commanders would be the ones relaying it to the --
24 disseminating it to the rest of the rank and file?

25 Chief Monahan: Exactly.

1 Mr. Sanchez: Is protest response policy generally commanded from a central
2 location?

3 Chief Monahan: Generally, no. It's according -- again, this is -- the massive size of
4 this protest caused it. We have protests in New York City every day
5 that are handled just on a local level. There was nothing of this
6 scope -- I don't think there has ever been anything of this scope in
7 New York City before, so that had to be handled on a centralized
8 level.

9 Mr. Sanchez: How do you account for discrepancies and how similar protests were
10 handled in different parts of the City?

11 Chief Monahan: Everything was based on violence or potentiality of violence in
12 those locations. Each commander who had eyes on the scene was
13 given the authority to make decisions that had to be made at that
14 point in time. It's impossible to sit in headquarters and truly
15 understand what's going on when you're not out there seeing it, so
16 we allowed those commanders to make that decision. So, every
17 borough commander who's working was given that authority to
18 make decisions on what he had to do at each one of these protests.

19 Mr. Sanchez: I understand. Chief, how many protests did you attend personally
20 between May 28th and June 20th?

21 Chief Monahan: Every day I was at a different one. Quite a few.

22 Mr. Sanchez: Yeah.

23 Chief Monahan: I -- I don't even know. I can't give you a number. I'd have to sit
24 here for a while, counting.

25 Mr. Sanchez: But you -- you would say every day or pretty close to it?

1 Chief Monahan: Every -- every day at multiple. Yeah.

2 Mr. Sanchez: And were you the supervisor on the scene?

3 Chief Monahan: Supervisor on the scene was the borough commander or his XO that
4 was there. I was there to see what was going on and to see what other
5 resources may be needed and have those addressed.

6 Mr. Sanchez: Thank you, Chief. Before we move on, we're going to move onto
7 planning and strategy section here. Before we do so, did anybody
8 have any questions regarding protest operations? Okay. I think
9 we're alright. Chief, we are going to move onto planning and
10 strategy. What was the strategy -- and this is, you know, going to
11 be an important one we are going to tackle a little bit. What was the
12 strategy within the NYPD about how to police these protests? I
13 mean, you know, both prior to May 28th and as they were unfolding.

14 Chief Monahan: The strategy changed day by day, as things unfolded. The original
15 strategy on Thursday was we were just going to have the borough
16 handle it. There was a protest in Union Square Park that we weren't
17 overly concerned with. Steve Hughes, the Borough Commander,
18 was in charge. I responded there, and as I got there, I saw this wasn't
19 typical. They were lined up -- our cops were in the street, trying to
20 keep distance from the protestors. Protestors were lined up right at
21 the cops. They attempted to keep a lane open and the protestors kept
22 advancing towards the cops, which is something, you know, just
23 didn't seem right. As they attempted to move the people back, cops
24 started to get assaulted. I observed John Connolly, a captain for the
25 9th Precinct -- as he moved in, someone attempted to steal his gun.

1 At that point, arrests were being made, and that's when at first we
2 really saw a lot of the de-arresting tactics. Anytime that they tried
3 to grab someone in that crowd, they got pulled back. People jumped
4 in, they jumped in the way of cops and they were pulling people
5 away, using the technique to get them away. And it happened quite
6 a few times in the park. At that point, I said this is different, I'm
7 gonna stay around. They started to march, heading down to City
8 Hall. A telephone -- window on a telephone was broken and I
9 already attempted to make an arrest. One of my sergeants that was
10 in my detail ran after the guy and he ended up getting knocked out.
11 He was taken to the hospital for a concussion, [REDACTED].
12 There was an incident with the crowds where a lieutenant, I believe
13 it was, got hit with a garbage can or something that was thrown at
14 him. And at that point this was a disorderly group and the SOT
15 started to make arrests. As they were making arrests, at every area
16 -- they had gone on the West Side. Orange cones that are there, that
17 were blocking traffic were getting picked up, thrown at the cops. As
18 they attempted to make arrests, again de-arresting techniques kept
19 happening where you make some arrests 'cause some people as you
20 tried to grab them for throwing at the cops, you watch them get
21 pulled away. Whole bottles of water were being thrown at the cops
22 as we were walking, so there were various arrests made throughout
23 that area. Finally, I think around 15 or 20 were made on the West
24 Side Highway, then the crowd started to -- to disperse. So, it was at
25 that point we understood that this may be different as we move

1 forward, planning early the next morning, then. As we moved into
2 Friday we know we needed more resources. There were protests
3 planned. Based on what happened Thursday night, we wanted to
4 increase the amount of cops that we had. There was protests earlier,
5 I think it was in Foley Square, and we had meetings, planning
6 meetings at headquarters, and I believe we went over to City Hall
7 also to discuss the increase in plans that we had.

8 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, I'm sorry to interrupt you, but you had -- you stated earlier
9 that for that first week or so --

10 Chief Monahan: Yeah.

11 Mr. Sanchez: You want to use this as a guide?

12 Chief Monahan: Sure. So, I'm on the 29th, so. So we had the afternoon meetings
13 where we discussed putting out the personnel.

14 Mr. Sanchez: And who -- who's at this meeting, just to be clear?

15 Chief Monahan: I know this was a meeting with the Commissioner. Pichardo...
16 Galati was there for the in-house meeting, I don't think he was in
17 the one with the Mayor. Miller -- John Miller came over to the
18 Mayor's meeting, and again we just discussed the deployment that
19 we had, what we were building up to on Friday, which was a large
20 increase from what we had on Thursday, based on the actions that
21 we saw Thursday.

22 Mr. Sanchez: And what was the increase that brought you (unclear)?

23 Chief Monahan: It was large. Exact numbers --

24 Mr. Sanchez: Okay.

25 Chief Monahan: -- we can get you the exact numbers. I -- I had them but I --

1 Mr. Sanchez: Yeah.

2 Chief Monahan: Yes. It increased daily as we moved forward. And it increased as
3 the incidents happened during the day. Again, the information we
4 had that day was that the demonstration, a large gathering at Foley
5 Square and people would gonna march over to Barclay Center. That
6 there were gonna be some groups marching for 3:00 that rallied at
7 the Barclay Center. We didn't have any information that the Barclay
8 Center was gonna be that large, just that it was going to be another
9 protest area there. We watched some of the groups marching to the
10 Barclay Center. I was actually out after we finished the meetings. I
11 walked with -- walked -- I rode around with some of the groups and
12 they were fine, marching -- you know, no problem getting to the
13 Barclay Center. When I got to the Barclay Center, it was crowded.
14 That whole inside area of the Barclay Center was filling and people
15 were still coming, and coming and coming. It got to the point that
16 there was no more room within the -- inside of the Barclay Center.
17 People were crowded across the streets, we were looking at
18 resources at that point where we really didn't have enough. So we
19 had to call Operations to start getting more resources over to the
20 Barclay Center. We had electeds that were there, I know I spoke to
21 Jumaane Williams. As it was getting more crowded, he just left and
22 that's when I got called to the front. So where we had our cops,
23 there was a small area between the barriers and the front of the
24 Barclay Center. And that's where we had cops, mainly Community
25 staff in there. As I got there, that's when the stuff started to get

1 thrown at cops. That's around 6:30 or so at night. Numerous bottles
2 being thrown, they were trying to pick the barriers up, push them at
3 the cops. The cops were doing what they could to hold the barriers
4 back, zip-typing barriers together so they couldn't break them apart.
5 At that point, I called for more resources from Operations, more
6 SRG 'cause we didn't have enough personnel there to try and stop
7 this crowd from doing what they were doing. As we're getting some
8 more resources, there was a over-hang over tread which we had
9 Transit there -- transit station. Up on top, people are taking that
10 over, so they were now above our cops who were at the transit
11 station, above the crowd. So we had one SRG force that we utilized
12 to go in there and remove the people from there. And then as they
13 were trying to, fights ensued, people struggling with the cops. Some
14 arrests were made there while the front was still getting bombed.
15 And I'm talking about bottles were coming from all over the crowd,
16 rocks, all sorts of objects coming at them. We got SRG there, John
17 D'Adamo and his crew came up, and at that point we asked them to
18 start disbursing the crowd and get the disorderly crew and make
19 arrests. That's -- at that point, they started going into the crowds,
20 tried to get people out. We started to make some arrests. Fireworks
21 were shot at our cops -- I know Tommy Galati actually made an
22 arrest of the guy shooting the fireworks at the police officers. And
23 that ensued for a while. We kept calling Operations that we needed
24 to get more personnel. That's when they started doing their
25 mobilizations and we set up a mobilization point in that -- just off

1 that particular area so we could get more cops. And that went on at
2 the Barclay Center for hours. Tried it -- every time we cleared it --
3 we were able to clear the Center, but then they gathered on the
4 streets. And, again, stuff continued being thrown at us. This went
5 from 11:30 -- from 6:30 at night to 11:30 at night with stuff being
6 thrown. We had Intel about -- and at that point, Fausto Pichardo had
7 been in -- in Manhattan and he had issues down in Foley Square,
8 where they had to make some arrests over there -- again, bottles stuff
9 being thrown at them. That had subsided. So he came over to where
10 we were and that's when we had information that people were going
11 to march and then try and take over the 88 and the 79 Precincts, so
12 Pichardo went over there. I sent him over there with Jeff Maddrey,
13 the Borough Commander of Brooklyn North. I had Brian Conroy,
14 who was on scene with Timmy (Unclear) over at the Barclay Center.
15 At around 11:30, finally, with the arrests that were made, the
16 Barclay Center was empty, and then Pichardo was handling stuff
17 over at -- at the other precincts. It was during this time that I talked
18 to Operations and told them that we had to build up, start going back
19 to the old Field Forces that we had used in the past. I wanted to get
20 30 Field Forces put together. So that's when they started to put
21 together the increase in personnel. They couldn't get the field forces
22 set up for Saturday, took them till Sunday to be able to organize that.
23 We had mobilized all night long, you know, holding the third
24 platoon, bringing people in. We get through that night. That's when
25 our planning on Saturday occurs. We sit down early and we have

1 discussions internally, we have Operations, we're planning how
2 long it's gonna take to get the field forces up, where else we can pull
3 resources from for Saturday for whatever is going to occur. So
4 Operations started getting numbers, our numbers increased
5 dramatically, then we held the day tour over and utilized a lot of
6 third platoon resources for the demonstrations that we were gonna
7 have on Saturday. We had a meeting, again at City Hall with the
8 Mayor, myself, Shea, Miller, I think Ernie Hart might have been
9 there too. And Pichardo -- Pichardo had to leave 'cause there were
10 instances going on on the highway, so we wanted him out there. A
11 couple of highways got shut down. Actually got a phone call from
12 the ACLU saying you better get some cops out here, the cops are
13 getting assaulted. I mean, it was -- it was kind of crazy, so Pichardo
14 went out there. We discussed with the Mayor strategies; one of the
15 things he had suggested was utilizing elected officials and
16 community people to try and de-escalate the crowds.

17 Mr. Sanchez: And "community people" -- like community organizers or
18 Community Affairs?

19 Chief Monahan: Community organizers. Electeds. So it was that day, at Bedford
20 Avenue in Brooklyn a little while later after we finished the meeting,
21 that one of our RMPs gets surrounded with the commanding officer
22 of the precinct in there. They call for a 13, they cleared the blocks
23 out, but there's a lot of people -- they don't clear, they pushed people
24 off the corners. There are a lot of protesters still out there, a lot of
25 cops on the scene. I'm getting calls from City Hall, "Yo, what's

1 going on out there?" So I shoot out there. Mayor's Office people
2 are there, Jumaane Williams is there, Senator Perkins was there and
3 the God Squad from the 67 Precinct was there. So, I speak to
4 Jumaane, I speak to Perkins; alright, let's try this. I had cops lined
5 up against the protestors, same thing. I step my cops back and I said,
6 "Jumaane, do me a favor, go in there and talk to them. See what
7 they want, we'll work with you." He went up and down the line
8 talking to them. He got a lot of their views back as he was doing it.
9 So he tells us, "Alright, they just want to go down this one way,"
10 where we had all our cars parked. So, we pulled -- 'cause we were
11 surrounded. We were in the middle and people were all around us
12 on the side. Jumaane and Perkins felt maybe if we pulled back and
13 allow them to go the way they want to go, it will be okay. So we
14 pull a move, where I pull all my cops back, and now I'm just trying
15 to clear the cars out so that none of the cars get damaged. Jumaane,
16 I put him in front of all of my cops, so, it's my cops, it's Jumaane
17 Williams and Perkins trying to talk. The God Squad left 'cause he
18 said none of these people from my community, I don't know them.
19 They are speaking to them, he's not getting anywhere. I now give
20 them -- they wanted to go, I think it's North on Bedford, I'm not
21 sure exactly -- they wanted to go where all the cars were. I set up a
22 line where I just had cops standing by my cars where they could go
23 right down the middle of the street. We opened it up for them.
24 "Jumaane, get -- tell them to keep going." They locked their arms,
25 they didn't want to move. Told Jumaane, you know, that they

1 weren't going to do anything. Jumaane just kept telling me,
2 "They're not listening to me, they're not listening to me." At that
3 point, the crowd just turned around, ran down the other direction.
4 There was a couple of cars parked right down the block; they trashed
5 them. We went down, we had to make a few arrests over there. I
6 mean, completely wrecked the cars. The community people out
7 there spoke to the people on the block, were cursing at these guys.
8 "These ain't from our community, they ain't here --"

9 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, this is Brooklyn?

10 Chief Monahan: This is Brooklyn.

11 Mr. Sanchez: Okay.

12 Chief Monahan: Bedford Park. The 67. So we make some arrests, make a couple
13 of arrests over there, I know the Mayor came out to that scene, met
14 with Jumaane, Jumaane told him, "There's nothing I could do."
15 That, you know, "they didn't want to listen to me." You know,
16 "Maybe no cops should be here at all" is the answer that he was --
17 he was giving us. Later that night -- again, this was now -- we had
18 events going on all over the city. At Bedford, again, way later, I met
19 -- Brian Conroy was on the scene. As I get to the scene on Bedford
20 and -- I forget the cross street, this is hours later. It's nighttime. We
21 have an RMP van that's burnt out on the scene, City buses that are
22 abandoned in the middle of the street, a couple of trash fires going
23 on, and cops basically surrounded by a crowd. And we didn't have
24 enough cops at this point here. When I got there, it was Brian Conroy
25 and -- and what he had from Brooklyn South, but there just weren't

1 enough cops to confront the crowd there so we were holding them
2 back, and cinder blocks this size were getting thrown at the cops.
3 We were occasionally able to move in, make a couple of arrests, but
4 we had to retreat right away, because as we moved in, we'd make
5 an arrest or two, they would run, then they'd all come back and start
6 throwing things again. That went on for a couple of hours. I had
7 reached out to Operations again to get more resources for them;
8 there just weren't any at that point. Everything was engaged in other
9 places throughout the City. Finally, after about an hour and a half
10 we were able to get a couple of field forces out there. And at that
11 point we were able to move the blocks, move 'em out, we made a
12 bunch of arrests and it cleared up, but that was hours of -- of -- It --
13 it was a scene that I've never seen before. Just burning cars, City
14 buses abandoned in the street, people jumping on top of the City
15 buses dancing, it was an unreal scene that I had never witnessed.

16 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, I'm sorry to interrupt you. You had mentioned that at one
17 point you decided to put 30 field forces --

18 Chief Monahan: Right.

19 Mr. Sanchez: -- together. Like, how does that come to -- You know, how -- how
20 does that happen? Who are you pulling from where?

21 Chief Monahan: Operations does that, so they're looking throughout the entire job.
22 Every nook and cranny, whoever is working, detective bureau,
23 administrative bureaus, you know, federal task forces, cops that
24 haven't maybe been in their uniform in years, getting them back into
25 uniform, getting them back out on the street. So, it was everyone

1 that was working anywhere by Sunday is what we had.

2 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, let me ask you, obviously the strategy was changing on the -

3 - on the move.

4 Chief Monahan: Right.

5 Mr. Sanchez: When did you first begin to strategize for -- for protests? When did

6 those begin? At -- after the first day?

7 Chief Monahan: No, we started talking, obviously, after the Floyd incident.

8 Mr. Sanchez: Yeah.

9 Chief Monahan: We were talking with Intel, we saw it happened in other cities. We

10 weren't seeing it; we didn't have the intel that looked like it was

11 going to be that bad here. Didn't expect it. We strategized the

12 Thursday protests, which didn't seem that large, and we thought this

13 was all we were going to deal with, groups of 500 or so that were

14 protesting. Never did we expect to see groups of thousands upon

15 thousands that we saw starting on Friday and then Saturday. That --

16 I -- I just -- I had never seen that before and this was how we had to

17 re-strategize as we were moving along, and that's why we had to

18 start pulling resources. And, again, we're in a weekend. And,

19 traditionally, on a weekend, a lot of your administrative staff, all the

20 people that you would pull, that aren't on patrol, they're off. So, we

21 didn't have that whole pool of people to pull from quickly. So, it

22 was a major effort by our Operations Division, Eddie Mullane, to

23 try and get bodies out to us as quickly as he could, as many cops as

24 he could while still maintaining the entire City. 'Cause I can't pull

25 everything out of, you know, Queens, where they weren't protesting

1 but there's still radio runs, 911 calls happening. So we have to
2 maintain our presence throughout the City. Plus be able to pull in
3 from Manhattan, into Brooklyn for what was going on.

4 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, you and the department, this task was creating the strategy;
5 you're mentioning some of the same names in these -- similar
6 questions I have been asking. But, you know, you're in these
7 conversations, the PC's in there, Pichardo's in there, Galati's in
8 there, Miller's in there. Are these -- would you say this -- this is the
9 crew of individuals at the department that makes the strategy --

10 Chief Monahan: Yes.

11 Mr. Sanchez: -- that creates the strategy?

12 Chief Monahan: Yes.

13 Mr. Sanchez: And you mentioned -- you have answered some of these questions
14 already in terms of the resources that you were pulling from -- from
15 the Department. SRG was there?

16 Chief Monahan: Yes.

17 Mr. Sanchez: Mobile Response, Precinct --

18 Chief Monahan: Yes.

19 Mr. Sanchez: -- obviously --

20 Chief Monahan: Yes.

21 Mr. Sanchez: -- was involved. Terror, legal?

22 Chief Monahan: Yes.

23 Mr. Sanchez: You mentioned Community Affairs at Barclay, specifically. There
24 was -- we've got some questions specific to Union Square a little
25 bit, but Community Affairs was out there?

1 Chief Monahan: Yes.

2 Mr. Sanchez: You mentioned a couple of meetings with the Mayor's Office. What
3 was -- what were some of those conversations? Specifically, what -
4 - You know, obviously you were providing specific information to
5 the Mayor, was the Mayor responding?

6 Chief Monahan: The first day, the first one that we talked about was just what were
7 our plans for going into Friday. Recap of what happened on
8 Thursday. What we were expecting on Friday. They were
9 concerned about Foley Square, 'cause as we were sitting there, a
10 protest was beginning in Foley Square. So there was a lot of
11 concerns -- you know, allow them to -- to speak, you know, as long
12 as they are not causing any violence or anything we allow, you
13 know, free speech. You know, so that -- that was the messaging
14 coming out on Friday. And then on Saturday, after everything that
15 happened Friday night, it was, what were our -- again, what were
16 our plans? And as I stated before, the idea of utilizing electeds and
17 community people to try and engage the -- the crowds to de-escalate.
18 That was a lot of the messaging that we were sending out for the
19 Saturday. Again, you know, we can't allow violence, we can't allow
20 the burning of -- the night before, what we had -- Friday night when
21 we had the Molotov cocktails at the police cars. We lost -- quite a
22 few cars got burnt that night. That we have to control the violence,
23 allow for free protests and try to utilize community or any electeds
24 we can up front.

25 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, were you in communication with the Mayor on a daily basis?

1 Chief Monahan: The Mayor and / or his people. Dave Goldin.

2 Mr. Sanchez: Yeah. And what --

3 Chief Monahan: His people were on the scene quite a few times.

4 Mr. Sanchez: Right.

5 Chief Monahan: So, the Mayor's people were on scene at a lot of different incidents.

6 Mr. Sanchez: Yeah. What direction did you all -- did you all get from the Mayor's

7 Office, if any?

8 Chief Monahan: He was looking more for what was going on -- at least for me --

9 about how we were handling it. Biggest direction I got, again, I'll

10 keep saying, the idea of trying to utilize the electeds.

11 Mr. Sanchez: You said Jumaane Williams and Perkins? Anybody else that you

12 see from --

13 Chief Monahan: That -- the only ones that I was able to try and utilize. They were

14 the ones that were on scene at that time.

15 Mr. Sanchez: And, Chief, you have gotten through Saturday on your schedule.

16 And I don't want to, you know, nitpick every little aspect of the --

17 of recap of your schedule. You know, obviously you're -- figure

18 busy individuals in the department, but I did notice that Nilda

19 Hoffman was in a couple of those meetings. To what extent was

20 Chief Hoffman in these meetings? What was her role in these

21 conversations?

22 Chief Monahan: Not that much. Not that much. I got -- do I recall it? I don't even

23 recall her being there.

24 Mr. Sanchez: No, no, I'm just curious --

25 Chief Monahan: She may have -- she may have been there -- no.

1 Mr. Sanchez: Nothing stands out?

2 Chief Monahan: Nothing stands out.

3 Mr. Sanchez: Okay. Chief, before we move on, I wanted to turn to the team to see
4 if anybody had any questions regarding the planning and strategy.

5 Mr. Tellet: Hey Chief, I just had one question. I believe you said -- was it
6 Thursday or Friday that you received a call from the ACLU saying
7 to get cops out there because they were being assaulted? Do you
8 remember who you had that conversation with?

9 Chief Monahan: Chris Dunn called Lieutenant (unclear) from my office as we were
10 in the Mayor's Office, saying that cops were being surrounded
11 somewhere in -- in midtown Manhattan, that we needed more cops
12 out there.

13 Mr. Tellet: Okay. And then just, I believe it was Friday you had indicated that
14 you received information about people trying to take over the 79 and
15 88 Precincts? Who -- who did you get that information from?

16 Chief Monahan: Intel. I think it was Courtney Nilan.

17 Mr. Tellet: Okay.

18 Chief Monahan: Inspector Nilan.

19 Mr. Tellet: Thank you.

20 Chief Monahan: Okay.

21 Mr. Sanchez: Alright, thank you, Chief.

22 Chief Monahan: Sure.

23 Mr. Sanchez: Now we're going to move onto curfew. How was that decision to
24 implement the curfew made?

25 Chief Monahan: That came down from City Hall. I wasn't involved in that

1 discussion. So I would rather not (unclear) curfews.

2 Mr. Sanchez: And when -- when the department first heard about this, what was -
3 - what was your position on it?

4 Chief Monahan: At that point it -- it could help. If this is something that, you know,
5 the amount of people that were running out on the street during the
6 looting, instead of waiting for them to actually break through a store,
7 because that is what we had to get away, if you caught them within
8 the stores or coming out of the stores, you were able to at least get
9 them off the street and they knew it that once that 11 o'clock curfew
10 came, that night that ended the looting that night. It was -- it was
11 crazy, running around, but once we were able to implement the
12 curfew, then start making arrests after 11, we were able to stop the
13 looting.

14 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, how did the department pass down this curfew-related
15 directives or that information to the members of services?

16 Chief Monahan: We told everyone -- so, again, we went to the field forces 'cause at
17 that point we had the field forces out and the field forces turned out
18 of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] So we had all of the cops called into one location
19 and we were able to instruct them before they turned out, let them
20 know that this is the rules tonight, that there was a curfew in effect
21 at 11 o'clock. At 11 o'clock on the field, all the field commanders
22 were telling people that were out there, the other supervisors, 11
23 o'clock, you can start making arrests for curfew, you can start
24 making curfew arrests. People had been making numerous arrests
25 as well that day on -- on the burglaries. This was what day -- my

1 days get a little mixed up. That's Sunday night? I think the curfew
2 was on Monday night. I think Monday night.

3 Mr. Sanchez: Yeah, June 1st -- June the 1st, I believe.

4 Chief Monahan: Yeah. Yeah, Monday night. Yeah. So that's -- we were able to
5 spread the word out to the people on the ground. I know I was doing
6 the midtown area, Pichardo was down there in the Soho area, and
7 we were just making sure every team that we passed, we talked,
8 reminded them "11 o'clock curfew, 11 o'clock curfew." And at 11
9 o'clock that's when it finally cleared up.

10 Mr. Sanchez: And there was at some point a FINEST message that went out to --

11 Chief Monahan: Yes.

12 Mr. Sanchez: Did these go to all members of the service?

13 Chief Monahan: Yes. It goes to their phones.

14 Mr. Sanchez: Okay. Here -- I (unclear) two that I want to discuss here in
15 particular, and I have highlighted them. One is on this one page and
16 this one is on the second page. One's from June 1st and the other
17 one is from June 3rd I believe. Who -- who composes FINEST
18 messages for the department?

19 Chief Monahan: This would be done through Operations. So it would have been
20 Eddie Mullane or someone in his office which work directly for him.

21 Mr. Sanchez: Ops?

22 Chief Monahan: Right.

23 Mr. Sanchez: Then all -- you said all rank and file. All members of service through
24 their phones?

25 Chief Monahan: Yes.

1 Mr. Sanchez: (Unclear). You get an alert on your phone? How does that work? If
2 a -- might -- if the PC wanted to relay a message, does the FINEST
3 --
4 Chief Monahan: It comes up as an Ops -- an Ops message. [phone chimes] So, it will
5 pop up on your phone, have a little thing like you just heard.
6 Mr. Sanchez: (Unclear), I think the PC heard you. So aside from the FINEST
7 messages, and obviously the field forces that will relay -- you know,
8 relay that information in real time, is there any other way to
9 disseminate that information to others?
10 Chief Monahan: That's -- again, that -- that's the way we were doing it.
11 Mr. Sanchez: Was there any direction provided to the COs of those field forces
12 with regard to the curfew?
13 Chief Monahan: At 11 o'clock on the first night was to enforce it in areas that there
14 were problems, that you had to use discretion, but discretion was
15 something that was pushed out. This isn't just anyone walking out
16 on the street, and that was directly the Mayor telling us this, and we
17 pushed it out to all of our people that, yeah, utilize discretion, watch
18 what you're doing. If there were areas that were being looted, that
19 were being targeted, at that point we used different discretion, but
20 make sure this isn't everyone on the street. I know personally we
21 saw people who were just walking out of their building, knew that
22 they were not involved, they were let go, they just left right away,
23 as opposed to the kiddies that were running around from building to
24 building. Those were the ones that we looked to grab.
25 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, if I can point your attention to the June 1st FINEST messages

1 regarding the curfew. You know, this section says, “instruct
2 officers to provide curfew reminders and several warnings before
3 arrests.” How were officers expected to provide those reminders to
4 -- to the crowd?

5 Chief Monahan: They were supposed to go to -- again, utilizing discretion, as a cop
6 on the scene, you see what’s going on. You see someone who’s just
7 standing on the street, as opposed to what we were seeing were
8 crowds of hundreds running around together, when they see the
9 cops, running in the other direction. Those were handled differently
10 than your normal person walking down the street. It -- it was quite
11 obvious to anyone on the street if you saw what was going on.

12 Mr. Sanchez: And Chief, those warnings were given from person to person, there
13 wasn’t on a -- using a loudspeaker or anything like that?

14 Chief Monahan: Not -- not during -- not during that night. Not during the 11 o’clock
15 night, not in the area where I was, but we were looking to clear
16 everyone. It was crowds that were actively looting at this point in
17 time. And the looters had other people that were just running with
18 them. It was a scene that I had never seen in midtown Manhattan
19 before in my life.

20 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, I’m sorry to interrupt this.

21 Chief Monahan: Sure.

22 Mr. Sanchez: We lost --

23 Chief Monahan: You lost them all, huh?

24 Mr. Sanchez: See what’s going on here.

25 Mr. Tellet: I think we can hear you and see you. So that’s good.

1 Mr. Sanchez: Okay, we can't see you. Thank you, Chris, for confirming that.

2 Mr. Tellet: You're not missing much, so...

3 Mr. Sanchez: Thanks, Chris. We will continue. Please, if you could give me a
4 call on my cell phone if something were to change, please.

5 Mr. Tellet: Sure, you got it.

6 Mr. Sanchez: Alright, Chief. Sorry about that.

7 Chief Monahan: Sure.

8 Mr. Sanchez: Were there any further instructions from 1PP or -- or commanders
9 as to the instructions of how the COs on the -- on the ground were
10 to direct the rank and file to enforce curfew?

11 Chief Monahan: Told all the commanders on the ground the curfew was to be
12 preventory --

13 Mr. Sanchez: Yeah.

14 Chief Monahan: -- prevent violence. This wasn't a -- to utilize discretion when
15 you're doing it and to have supervisors present.

16 Mr. Sanchez: Right.

17 Chief Monahan: This wasn't just any cop on the street stopping people, this was
18 supposed to be team-led enforcement. Captains running -- running
19 with their teams as they did it.

20 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, if I can point you to the second piece of paper, for the June
21 3rd curfew, FINEST message? This one, you know, goes straight to
22 the issuance of C-summonses for people violating curfew, no
23 warnings. Who made the call to provide no instructions -- or
24 warnings prior to summonses? This would be in the latter part.

25 Chief Monahan: This would have been done in consultation with -- with Legal.

1 Mr. Sanchez: Legal?

2 Chief Monahan: Yes.

3 Mr. Sanchez: I mean, 'cause this one, this has been -- a slightly different message
4 than the first curfew FINEST message basically saying, you know,
5 if you see something give some warnings, you know, let this go
6 down, versus the June 3rd FINEST message basically saying go
7 straight for the C-summons.

8 Chief Monahan: That's after two days of heavy looting in the City. That's why it
9 went from 11 o'clock to 9 o'clock. It was at that point that half of
10 Manhattan had been looted that they decided that they wanted a
11 stricter enforcement.

12 Mr. Sanchez: Understood. And who makes that call?

13 Chief Monahan: That would have been done through City Hall, I believe.

14 Mr. Sanchez: Thank you, Chief. Before we move onto curfew, away from curfew,
15 does the team have any questions? Team that we cannot see.

16 Mr. Tellet: I've got one. So, as the curfew shifted day-by-day, did you receive
17 different feedback or instructions from City Hall?

18 Chief Monahan: The City Hall instructions were, we had -- [phone rings] excuse me
19 -- was that we had to control the looting. That's to utilize the curfew.
20 We had told them that the 11 o'clock curfew the night before helped
21 us suppress the looting that was going on. So that's why they made
22 that decision to move it to 9 o'clock because so much looting had
23 taken place prior to 11 o'clock that day. So they were to continue
24 telling us to continue to utilize the curfew, but again to continue to
25 use discretion.

1 Mr. Tellet: Got it. So I -- we know that you were in communication with the --
2 with the Mayor's Office, did you have any communication with the
3 Governor's Office?

4 Mr. Sanchez: The only time I had communication from there was a phone call
5 from... Delarosa? And that was just saying how, you know, the
6 Governor really didn't mean it when he hated -- said he hated the
7 cops. That he just hated City Hall. That was -- that was the only
8 communication I got from the Governor's Office.

9 Mr. Tellet: Got it. That's it for me.

10 Mr. Brunsten: Hi, this is Andrew. I have a couple of questions as well. So Chief,
11 you mentioned that the direction to have the curfew came from City
12 Hall. So, I am just asking to confirm. It is my understanding that
13 no one from NYPD first suggested having the curfew before City
14 Hall made that direction?

15 Chief Monahan: That came -- I -- I -- exactly how it came, whether it was from the
16 Governor's Office, City Hall, I really don't know. I know that the
17 Governor and then the Mayor mentioned that they were having
18 discussion about it. How it actually came about, I don't know.

19 Mr. Brunsten: Okay. And -- and that may apply to this question too, but I'm just
20 gonna ask just to confirm. Do you happen to know if, to the extent
21 that City Hall or the Governor's Office or one of those offices may
22 have directed the curfew, do you happen to know whether they
23 solicited the agreement or advice from NYPD as to whether the
24 curfew was a good idea or not, or -- or should be implemented?

25 Chief Monahan: Not -- not with me. Whether or not they did with the Commissioner,

1 I'm not sure.

2 Mr. Brunsdn: Okay. Thank you. And then one more question about something
3 you mentioned. I think on the first night of the curfew, you
4 mentioned that Field Forces may have had a meeting with further
5 instructions about the curfew possibly on [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is that
6 correct?

7 Chief Monahan: Yeah, actually the Field Forces were all turning out of [REDACTED]
8 [REDACTED] as of Sunday, so when they were able to have a large roll call
9 where everyone could be instructed as to what was going on that
10 night, and the idea of a curfew could be given to all the cops that
11 were working.

12 Mr. Brunsdn: Okay. And -- and did that meeting happen each night from that point
13 forward?

14 Chief Monahan: Yes. Well, not -- it wasn't a meeting, it was a roll call. So (unclear)
15 where they turned out --

16 Mr. Brunsdn: I'm sorry.

17 Chief Monahan: -- it was a turn-out location for all the Field Forces was [REDACTED]
18 [REDACTED] Staggered times for each team, for each, you know, group
19 and there would be a roll call and there'd be roll call instructions
20 given whatever was going on.

21 Mr. Brunsdn: Okay. And were you in attendance at those roll calls?

22 Chief Monahan: No, I was not.

23 Mr. Brunsdn: Okay. Do -- do you know who would have been in attendance at
24 those roll calls or -- or if there was sort of one or two or some
25 collection of -- of commanding officers who may have been --

1 Chief Monahan: It would have been people from the SRG, whether it was John
2 D'Adamo would have been at some of them, his XO may have been
3 at others. Or captains from the SRG. And then I think we had a
4 couple of chiefs that were assigned to the Field Forces, I think Joe
5 Gulotta may have been one of them, so they would have been the
6 ones turning them out.

7 Mr. Brunsdon: Okay. Thank you, Chief. Those are my questions on that.

8 Chief Monahan: Okay. Keep looking up at the screen.

9 Mr. Sanchez: Yeah, you and me both. (Unclear) --

10 Mr. Tellet: So Arturo, just so you know, I -- I emailed Ed real fast to see what's
11 going on with the screen, maybe it's just an idle thing, so --

12 Mr. Sanchez: Thanks very much, Chris, there's a couple of options I see here, to
13 turn this into a doc view, but I don't want to mess with it if it's still
14 recording. If you can see us and it's recording, that's the more
15 important issue.

16 Mr. Tellet: Yeah, we're -- we're good for now. We may need to fix it in a bit,
17 but just so you know, if Ed knocks on the door, that's why.

18 Mr. Sanchez: Appreciate it very much, Chris.

19 Mr. Tellet: You got it.

20 Mr. Sanchez: [phone rings] That might be him calling. It's not, it's my mom in
21 Texas. It is. Please excuse me. This is Arturo. Yeah, we're -- we're
22 right in the middle of the interview and we've got a quick launch
23 screen on the -- on the big screen. Can I just put it in doc view,
24 would that fix it? Will that give me back (unclear)? Good to go.
25 Thanks very much, I really appreciate it. Good to go.

1 Chief Monahan: Oh, there you go.

2 Mr. Sanchez: Gentlemen, sorry about the technical --

3 Mr. Garcia: Ed --

4 Mr. Sanchez: -- difficulties here.

5 Mr. Garcia: I just have one -- I just have one additional question about the
6 curfew, actually. During those early days about the conversations
7 about the curfew, was there any discussion about who, if anyone,
8 was exempt from the curfew? Either, was there any internal
9 conversations within the NYPD about that or any direction from the
10 Mayor's Office?

11 Chief Monahan: I wasn't involved in those conversations. It may have been
12 conversations with the Commissioner. I'm not sure.

13 Mr. Garcia: Was any of that information -- did -- did the Commissioner relay
14 any of that information to you after those meetings?

15 Chief Monahan: When we spoke about the curfew, we spoke about the discretion.
16 Obviously, we listed a bunch of discretionary moves in the FINEST
17 report. So yeah, we had conversations afterwards and it was -- it
18 was that this wasn't to just grab everyone off the street, this was to
19 tamp down the looting that was going on.

20 Mr. Garcia: Thank you.

21 Mr. Richardson: And -- and real quickly, you described how initially the curfew was
22 at 11 and then it got bumped up to 8 or 9 because of you noticing
23 when the looting was happening, correct?

24 Chief Monahan: Yeah.

25 Mr. Richardson: So --

1 Chief Monahan: The looting -- again on that -- that Monday, the 11 o'clock curfew
2 night, the stores had been demolished by 11 o'clock at night, there
3 had been so much looting that had taken place already.

4 Mr. Richardson: So was it that City Hall reached out to NYPD and they were asking
5 how can we better control this and NYPD gave a suggestion of that
6 time? Like, can you explain a little bit how that back-and-forth
7 occurred?

8 Chief Monahan: That may have been a conversa-- I wasn't involved in that
9 conversation. I did have conversations with the Commissioner
10 saying that once the 11 o'clock came into effect, we were able to
11 tamp down the looting. Whether or not he had the conversation with
12 City Hall, I'm not sure, but I know we came up with a 9 o'clock on
13 the next day.

14 Mr. Richardson: Okay. Thank you.

15 Mr. Sanchez: Thank you, Chief. We're going to move onto to intel. What type of
16 information or intelligence did the NYPD gather immediately before
17 its start date, before May 28th? In those first few days? (Unclear).

18 Chief Monahan: Intel -- Intel does that, they -- you know, they work directly for the
19 Police Commissioner. I know you spoke to Tom Galati already. He
20 informed me how they get their information. Stuff was relayed to
21 us as to their feelings on various protests or what was going on, such
22 as information that they were looking to march on the 79 and 88
23 Precincts, and we would be getting information such as that
24 throughout the course of the -- of -- of the events.

25 Mr. Sanchez: Did you -- do you recall anything specifically prior to the protests

1 on May 28th? Do you remember receiving any information or
2 anything that stands out as, you know, we gotta watch out or we
3 need to be --

4 Chief Monahan: The original information was that this was going to be the people
5 who we deal with on regular protests all the time. Our antennas were
6 not raised up on the 28th before that Thursday. It was after the events
7 of Thursday that we became raised up.

8 Mr. Sanchez: And when the Intel Bureau is pushing information out to different
9 parts of the department, how do they do that? It's, you know, got in
10 so much information, you know, there's binders, sitreps, there's
11 safety orders, tactical assessments, how is that pushed out and how
12 does that reach you and -- from the moment that information is
13 collected to the individuals that it's actually affecting out in the
14 streets, how does that happen?

15 Chief Monahan: I talk to Tommy Galati on a daily basis, multiple times in the course
16 of the day, especially with events like this. Or, John Hart, or on the
17 street with Courtney Nilan. They were the ones who were re-writing
18 everything they got in real time. They put out -- like you said, the
19 sitrep, they put out all these things. They're on everyone's phone,
20 you know, you go on the Intel site and you can -- you can look at it,
21 if you feel it was something that we felt was very heavy, it would be
22 pushed out into Ops, you know, any concerns that the Mayor had.
23 A lot of it is done through briefings. So, Galati would brief us, or
24 Miller would brief us, and we would brief our personnel for what
25 we could give them. What to be -- what can be shared with -- with

1 different people. And that's how it works for us.

2 Mr. Sanchez: In those briefings, is it usually the same group of individuals in those
3 briefings, or -- or did that change as well?

4 Chief Monahan: It's usually the same -- same group. It was that same meeting that
5 we were having with the Commissioner, Pichardo and myself,
6 Galati Miller. We'd bring Operations up into it, so they would know
7 what was going on. And then they would have separate briefings
8 with the Operations Division.

9 Mr. Sanchez: And in terms of the binders that were disseminated to, you know,
10 NYPD executives, did the binders encapsulate most of the intel
11 information that was being disseminated though the portal or other
12 places?

13 Chief Monahan: Yes.

14 Mr. Sanchez: So the binder would be like the -- the more comprehensive of those
15 --

16 Chief Monahan: Right.

17 Mr. Sanchez: -- intel. And the binder goes to who exactly?

18 Chief Monahan: That would go to Operations. They would have it, they would
19 disseminate what was needed to whatever commands may be
20 affected.

21 Mr. Sanchez: SRG, I would imagine?

22 Chief Monahan: Yes. Yeah.

23 Mr. Sanchez: But not necessarily an MOS in the field?

24 Chief Monahan: No.

25 Mr. Sanchez: And who was responsible for distributing this material?

1 Chief Monahan: That would be Intel.

2 Mr. Sanchez: And it would be Miller, Galati that makes that call?

3 Chief Monahan: Yeah.

4 Mr. Sanchez: As the Chief of the Department, I would imagine that you would get
5 most, if not all of the Intel gathered by the department. Is that --
6 Would that be fair to say?

7 Chief Monahan: Yes.

8 Mr. Sanchez: You just mentioned briefings with PC, Galati, Miller, Pichardo --
9 maybe in these conversations --

10 Chief Monahan: Yes.

11 Mr. Sanchez: -- as well? What about discussions or briefings with not that group
12 but, you know, maybe other CO, other borough commanders or
13 incident commanders? Were those briefings also taking place?

14 Chief Monahan: They would be taking place. Pichardo would have been running
15 them with his borough commanders.

16 Mr. Sanchez: Do you recall taking part in any of those briefings with borough
17 commanders or any other lower-level supervisors?

18 Chief Monahan: No.

19 Mr. Sanchez: To your knowledge, was there any standardized guidance from the
20 department on how officers were to respond to the intel information
21 that they were receiving? In other words, the information that was
22 disseminated to the rank and file, any guidance that -- as to, "Hey
23 listen, you know, we might have a situation where in another city
24 there was this used or this tactic" -- you know, any guidance
25 regarding any of the intel that was collected?

1 Chief Monahan: The guidance was for officer knowledge so that an officer would
2 understand this is what happened, this is something to look out for,
3 this is something to be aware of.

4 Mr. Sanchez: Okay. Do you recall any of the intel received, that you received
5 directly that addressed the threats or risks to officers?

6 Chief Monahan: Off the top of my head, I don't recall. We had so much different
7 things.

8 Mr. Sanchez: But there was -- you recall certain things?

9 Chief Monahan: Yeah.

10 Mr. Sanchez: Yes?

11 Chief Monahan: Yes.

12 Mr. Sanchez: Would you say that the department strategy was driven by the intel?

13 Chief Monahan: No. I would say the department strategy was driven by what we
14 observed on the ground and what was happening on a day to day.
15 Intel was there, we had it, but there's nothing better than actually
16 seeing what was going on and understanding what's on the intel, like
17 talking about it and actually seeing it in -- in play when you're right
18 out on the street.

19 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, you touched on this a little bit earlier on in protest operations,
20 but say, at a particular protest, you know, whoever was in charge of
21 that team saw something that needed to be related to you. How
22 would that go? How would that reach you? Would it be a direct
23 call --

24 Chief Monahan: Yes.

25 Mr. Sanchez: -- to you?

1 Chief Monahan: Yes.

2 Mr. Sanchez: It wouldn't go through a chain of people, it would just go straight to
3 you.

4 Chief Monahan: Yeah. I was dealing with the borough commanders on scene.
5 Sometimes it would go through Pichardo to me. That would be the
6 only one who had (unclear).

7 Mr. Sanchez: But you're on the phone a lot it seem -- it would seem?

8 Chief Monahan: Yeah.

9 Mr. Sanchez: Was there ever an instance where the intelligence collected by the
10 department did shape the strategy?

11 Chief Monahan: Most of the intelligence was used for just knowledge. I wouldn't
12 say it shaped the strategy. Again, our strategies were based on -- Intel
13 would be -- would shape it by how big a response we may need to a
14 location. So if we got information that there was going to be a
15 problem at -- at a certain location, we would have a bigger response
16 to that location, and we would be more aware or more keen of what's
17 going on. And it could determine how lenient we were or weren't in
18 the course of a demonstration.

19 Mr. Sanchez: So it was -- it was a little impactful?

20 Chief Monahan: Yeah, it was, yeah. In particular at that point.

21 Mr. Sanchez: You know that Commissioner Shea provided some testimony to the
22 Attorney General, and during that testimony the Commissioner
23 mentioned that there was inclusion of outside agitators at these
24 protests. What -- what is an "outside agitator," exactly?

25 Chief Monahan: An outside agitator would be someone who is trying to direct crowds

1 to do things. Who were trying to get protestors to act in a certain
2 way, or trying to direct them to do things. You know, we had
3 information -- as you looked around the country, similar tactics were
4 used in New York that were used elsewhere. So we -- we believed
5 and -- and from Intel that there was sources out there that was
6 sharing information between what was happening in Portland, what
7 was happening in Seattle, what was happening throughout the
8 country, [coughs] excuse me, and New York.

9 Mr. Sanchez: Did you personally have conversations with folks here and other
10 departments in other cities?

11 Chief Monahan: No, I did not.

12 Mr. Sanchez: And alright, before we move away from intel, I wanted to see if the
13 team had any questions regarding the intel?

14 Mr. Brunsten: One follow-up, Chief, this is Andrew Brunsten again. I -- I think
15 you partly answered this question, but I just wanted to follow up on
16 it. I think you may have said that, you know, when asked about, you
17 know, discussions that may have happened with officers in the field
18 or officers that were responding about the intel, that they would be
19 provided with messages, such as, you know, "this is something to
20 know about" or "this is something to be aware of," and I -- I was
21 wondering whether you, or anyone else who you might be familiar
22 with in the department or in leadership, provided any instruction or
23 guidance to commanding officers as to how to message or how to
24 guide officers in terms of how to interpret or understand that
25 intelligence?

1 Chief Monahan: All according to what the intelligence was. A lot of the intelligence
2 was tactics that had been utilized throughout the country, whether
3 it's a de-a-- de-arresting tactics that we had seen, different objects
4 that were being thrown, the idea of hiding bricks along a route that
5 a march was going to go. This was so our cops would have a
6 knowledge to look for these sort of things when they were out there,
7 so it was incumbent upon our supervisors to relay this to the cops.

8 Mr. Sanchez: Do you want water? I'll get you some.

9 Chief Monahan: [coughs] Excuse me. Excuse me.

10 Mr. Brunsdn: No problem, we'll give you a minute.

11 Chief Monahan: Whenever I talk for an hour or --

12 Mr. Brunsdn: Yes, I know whenever I talk for an hour or two straight, without
13 water --

14 Chief Monahan: All of a sudden I get, if I don't have any water the throat just dries
15 up.

16 Mr. Brunsdn: Absolutely. Understood.

17 Chief Monahan: Beautiful. Thank you.

18 Mr. Sanchez: Not a problem.

19 Chief Monahan: Thank you very much.

20 Mr. Sanchez: Okay.

21 Chief Monahan: Much better.

22 Mr. Brunsdn: Okay, great. And so, just following up on that question -- and thank
23 you. Thank you for that. So -- so what -- what would be your --
24 your impression as to the, you know, the kind of impact of the type
25 of intelligence that was, you know, that was -- that was collected

1 and then -- and then provided to MOS in the field. You know, what
2 -- what was sort of the impact or effect of that information on, you
3 know, the mindset of officers in terms of what they were going to
4 be responding to, you know, and given particularly some of what we
5 talked about, about how, you know, some of the intel showed, you
6 know, various information about real or potential threats of
7 violence.

8 Chief Monahan: I don't know if it had that much of an impact because anyone who
9 was out there was observing the violence. Everyone who worked
10 from day one observed what was going on. All the intel did was tell
11 you other things to look for while you were out there to make sure.
12 I mean, from the day at Barclays, like I said, we started getting
13 pounded that day. It had everyone, who even wasn't on the scene,
14 all they had to do was turn on the TV and they were able to see it.

15 U/M: (Unclear).

16 Mr. Sanchez: I hope not.

17 Chief Monahan: Are you guys still there?

18 Mr. Brunsdn: Yup. Yup.

19 Chief Monahan: Okay.

20 Mr. Brunsdn: Thank you. Thank you.

21 Mr. Tellet: Do -- do we keep losing you, Arturo, because of an idle thing?

22 Mr. Sanchez: Yeah.

23 Mr. Tellet: Alright, that makes sense.

24 Mr. Sanchez: Yeah.

25 Mr. Tellet: You need me to move around more?

1 Mr. Sanchez: I think I need to keep this mouse active.

2 Mr. Tellet: Sure.

3 Mr. Sanchez: But you can still see us?

4 Mr. Tellet: Yes.

5 Mr. Sanchez: Perfect. Before we move on, is there anything else?

6 U/M: There you go.

7 Mr. Sanchez: Alright, I think we're -- we're good to move. Next section is going
8 to be dealing with, you know, policies, NYPD policies, practices
9 and a little bit of training questions. Chief, would you say that the
10 existing NYPD policies related to policing events are adequate?

11 Chief Monahan: Yes.

12 Mr. Sanchez: Do NYPD policies differ in between types of events? For example,
13 parades versus protests?

14 Chief Monahan: Yeah, a -- a parade is an organized event where you know Point A
15 to Point B. Protests you have to be fluid.

16 Mr. Sanchez: Got it. And obviously your strategy to respond to those --

17 Chief Monahan: Are completely different.

18 Mr. Sanchez: -- depends on --

19 Chief Monahan: Right.

20 Mr. Sanchez: -- planned or not planned --

21 Chief Monahan: Right.

22 Mr. Sanchez: -- obviously. Riots, same thing.

23 Chief Monahan: Exactly.

24 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, can you unpack a little bit for us when it's appropriate for
25 NYPD to use OC spray?

1 Chief Monahan: The OC spray is only supposed to be utilized when you are making
2 an arrest. Unless it's utilized by the -- the SRG under the direction
3 of a captain or above, I believe it is.

4 Mr. Sanchez: Got it, only in arrest situations or --

5 Chief Monahan: Under --

6 Mr. Sanchez: -- the direction --

7 Chief Monahan:: -- orders and it's only by certain personnel within the -- the Strategic
8 Response Group that are allowed to --

9 Mr. Sanchez: Captain and above.

10 Chief Monahan: Right. There was one time during -- it was at the Barclay Center,
11 when I gave the approval to SRG to utilize it.

12 Mr. Sanchez: You -- can you tell us a little bit about that specific incident?

13 Chief Monahan: That was -- standing at the Barclays as I described earlier, when for
14 40 minutes they were getting stuff thrown at them, I had cops getting
15 injured, being dragged into the Barclay Center. The SRG asked if
16 they had approval to utilize it, try and break the crowd up, I gave
17 them the approval and they utilized it.

18 Mr. Sanchez: Thank you, Chief. At the same scene, though, in a similar fashion,
19 when is it appropriate for NYPD to use a baton or the (unclear)?

20 Chief Monahan: Baton is utilized to gain control of a person that's resisting.

21 Mr. Sanchez: So a tremendous amount of discretion an officer has to --

22 Chief Monahan: Absolutely.

23 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, does the NYPD use of force policy account for the use of an
24 NYPD vehicle as a means of force?

25 Chief Monahan: No.

1 Mr. Sanchez: Would the use of an NYPD vehicle, such as the incident on May
2 30th where there were two RMPs surrounded by individuals, be
3 covered by the use of force policy?

4 Chief Monahan: It wasn't a -- my -- again, this is my own opinion. It wasn't an ideal
5 use of force, it was a get out of dangerous situation where someone
6 thought they were under attack. So it wasn't to control a person, the
7 use of force is to control somebody. This was to escape what could
8 have been a deadly attack on a police officer. At -- at the scene
9 earlier, at Bedford, where the cars got surrounded and they -- an
10 inspector had to put over a transmission that came over the radio
11 saying "this may be my last (unclear)." So there was a fear factor
12 that goes into a lot of what happens. That was my opinion at that
13 point. It wasn't so much use of force, it was to escape what could
14 have been a deadly situation.

15 Mr. Sanchez: Thank you, Chief. At the time of the Floyd protests, was there any
16 NYPD policy in place that related to the presence of members of the
17 press?

18 Chief Monahan: Yes, they're supposed to have -- to cross the police lines without a
19 press pass.

20 Mr. Sanchez: Press truck.

21 Chief Monahan: Press pass.

22 Mr. Sanchez: Yeah. At the time of the Floyd protests, were there any NYPD
23 policies in place related to the presence of legal observers at events,
24 including protests?

25 Chief Monahan: A legal ob-- a legal observer had to obey the same laws that

1 everyone else did. They had no special privilege as a legal observer.

2 Mr. Sanchez: Thank you, Chief. After the curfew was implemented, was there

3 any departmental policy or directive issued regarding who

4 constituted an essential worker?

5 Chief Monahan: It was -- an essential worker was what we looked at the same as with

6 COVID. The same thing: who had to go to work, who was necessary

7 for the running of the City

8 Mr. Sanchez: There was, you said -- the same as the COVID --

9 Chief Monahan: Same as COVID, everybody except the (unclear) who had to be out.

10 Mr. Sanchez: Did the NYPD receive any direction from the Mayor's Office

11 related to the presence of members of the press, legal observers or

12 essential workers at these protests?

13 Chief Monahan: I didn't.

14 Mr. Sanchez: Okay. At the time of the Floyd protests, was there any internal

15 NYPD directive issued regarding the departmental -- departmental

16 personnel wearing masks.

17 Chief Monahan: We were supposed to wear masks at this point. Obviously in the

18 course of the demonstrations, a lot of times, they did not.

19 Mr. Sanchez: And now an interim order or operations order came out making it a

20 rule now, now it's --

21 Chief Monahan: Yes.

22 Mr. Sanchez: -- now it's the rule.

23 Chief Monahan: Yes.

24 Mr. Sanchez: But at the time it wasn't, right?

25 Chief Monahan: Yeah, it was just told that we should, based on City rules.

1 Mr. Sanchez: And who was relaying that information, the PC directly or --

2 Chief Monahan: Yes.

3 Mr. Sanchez: And how would he do that, through email, FINEST?

4 Chief Monahan: FINEST.

5 Mr. Sanchez: Same -- same line of questioning here. At the time of the Floyd

6 protests, were there any internal NYPD directive or Patrol Guide

7 issued regarding department personnel covering their name plates or

8 shields?

9 Chief Monahan: It's never been allowed to cover your nameplate or shield number.

10 Mr. Sanchez: Anything to address mourning bands?

11 Chief Monahan: Mourning bands are allowed to be worn if there was an order put out

12 for -- because of the 46 people we had lost to COVID, the

13 Commissioner put out an order to wear the mourning bands.

14 Mr. Sanchez: But nothing to address mourning bands --

15 Chief Monahan: Mourning bands are not allowed to cover your nameplate or your

16 shield number.

17 Mr. Sanchez: Thank you, Chief. To your knowledge, does the department plan to

18 make any changes to existing policies based on these protests that

19 ensued over the last few months?

20 Chief Monahan: There has been an After Action Report that is being done, the

21 Commissioner is still looking at it, so as of this point no policies

22 have been changed. That'd be up to the Police Commissioner.

23 Mr. Sanchez: Can you tell me a little bit about this After Action Report?

24 Chief Monahan: That was done through the Police Commissioner's office, (unclear).

25 Mr. Sanchez: Before we move away from policies and practices, does the team

1 have any questions?

2 Mr. Richardson: Yeah, so in regards to the incident with the vehicle hitting the
3 protestors, you said that that -- so generally with use of force policy
4 there is, you know, reasonable force that could be used, and then
5 there is unreasonable, in which it violates that policy. If knowingly
6 hitting a civilian with a vehicle is not covered in the use of force
7 policy, do you know what policy that would be covered in? Whether
8 reasonable or not.

9 Chief Monahan: This would be more common sense on whether or not a
10 determination is made if the person thought that their life was in
11 danger. So this would be, and this was investigated by our Internal
12 Affairs Division, whether or not based on the whole totality of the
13 circumstances, whether or not they thought there was any violation
14 of procedure. And at this point I believe we did not find any
15 violation because it was, after interviewing them, that they felt that
16 their lives were in danger at this point.

17 Mr. Richardson: Sure. And I guess, hypothetically, if an officer knowingly hit a
18 civilian, let's say in a different circumstance, and -- like, what
19 procedure could they potentially violate?

20 Chief Monahan: They could be violating criminal law.

21 Mr. Richardson: What about NYPD's Patrol Guide, is there any procedures
22 independent of criminal law that we could cite or point to that they
23 might be violating?

24 Chief Monahan: Not that I'm aware of. I may be missing, but not that I'm aware of.

25 Mr. Richardson: Thank you.

1 Mr. Sanchez: Alright, Chief, thank you. Chief, moving onto training. Chief, what
2 kind of training do officers receive specific to protests?

3 Chief Monahan: Again, I'm gonna -- I'm gonna say it's best to ask either the training
4 bureau or Mr. Tucker. Training falls under his purview of the
5 administrative functions of the agency. I don't want to try and go
6 into detail of everything that they do.

7 Mr. Sanchez: Understood. And just broadly, obviously I won't hold you to the
8 specifics or modules or anything like that, but just, you know, to
9 your knowledge what -- you know, somebody entering the
10 department, what -- what type of training do they get, or...?

11 Chief Monahan: How to disperse crowds, form a line, form a wedge, stuff of that
12 nature.

13 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, are you aware of the term "kettling"?

14 Chief Monahan: I've heard about it after -- after this incident.

15 Mr. Sanchez: What -- what -- what is your understanding of the term?

16 Chief Monahan: Based on an act from, I guess it's saying when you surround,
17 surround the group.

18 Mr. Sanchez: And is that a tactic the NYPD employs?

19 Chief Monahan: No, never used the word kettling. First time I heard "kettling" was
20 when I read it in the paper.

21 Mr. Sanchez: Alright. And in terms of the tactic itself, regardless of what it's
22 called in terms of containing a crowd, is that a tactic the department
23 uses?

24 Chief Monahan: There are times when we need to make an arrest, no matter if it's
25 one person or a hundred people, if you are making an arrest you have

1 to make sure they can't get away. So if -- even if three cops are
2 pulling up on a guy with a gun, one guy is going to get out here, one
3 guy is going to get out there, so they can't get away.

4 Mr. Sanchez: In terms of this particular tactic, when it's at this situation that --
5 when it's hundreds of individuals on the street, can you -- can you
6 help me understand a little bit more when that might be in play?

7 Chief Monahan: If a commander on the scene determines that everyone that is on the
8 scene needs to be arrested 'cause they violated some sort of law, at
9 that point you want to contain the people that you're gonna arrest so
10 that people can't flee.

11 Mr. Sanchez: We were recently informed that there were some recent changes
12 made to -- in service training related to policing protests. Are you
13 aware of these changes?

14 Chief Monahan: I'm not sure what term -- changes you're talking about.

15 Mr. Sanchez: I think disorder control training. There's been some proposed
16 changes, some changes to the training itself. But --

17 Chief Monahan: I'm not exactly sure --

18 Mr. Sanchez: -- you're not --

19 Chief Monahan: -- of the exact orders, I know there's been more training going on.

20 Mr. Sanchez: So you had zero involvement with those trainings?

21 Chief Monahan: Yes, I had zero involvement.

22 Mr. Sanchez: If you saw something on the -- at the scene, something that would
23 require a change in tactics, as the Chief of Department, would you
24 be able to let folks in training, their respective --

25 Chief Monahan: Yeah.

1 Mr. Sanchez: -- muni-- you could -- you could chime in and make --

2 Chief Monahan: Yes, I would discuss it as an incident with the Police Commissioner
3 and with Commissioner Tucker.

4 Mr. Sanchez: And Tucker would put it into place?

5 Chief Monahan: I guess if the Commissioner said so, yes.

6 Mr. Sanchez: To your knowledge, does the NYPD use any outside consultants for
7 training related to policing protests?

8 Chief Monahan: To my knowledge, never.

9 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, to your knowledge, you know, training on OC spray and
10 batons, is there annual in-service? What does that -- what does that
11 training look like from an outsider?

12 Chief Monahan: Again, I'm not -- I don't know the exact implication involved in
13 training, I know we all train in it. To give you details on it I think it
14 would be better asking the training bureau or Commissioner Tucker.

15 Mr. Sanchez: Understood. Before we move away from training, I wanted to see
16 if the team had any questions. Alright, I think we're good. And just
17 -- just, you know, for your knowledge, bringing questions to the
18 team in real time prevents, you know, lots of questions at the end.

19 Chief Monahan: I got it.

20 Mr. Sanchez: We're going to be moving onto Community Affairs. And you
21 alluded to them earlier in our -- in our conversation. Could you tell
22 me what the role of Community Affairs is in policing protests?

23 Chief Monahan: Many times you want to put them up front. They may know the
24 people involved in the protests. They may know the organizers.
25 They have relations with people in the City. They dress differently.

1 We have them in the light blue so that they look -- a softer look,
2 more approachable. So, for many protests we will have them there.
3 And we can keep the uniformed cops further to the background.

4 Mr. Sanchez: Thanks, Chief. And what did Community Affairs officers do during
5 the Floyd protests?

6 Chief Monahan: The first I saw them, was when we utilized them at the Barclays
7 Center. We put them on the line at the barriers in front of the
8 Barclays Center, and they were the ones who were trying to hold the
9 barriers, and they were the original ones that were getting pelted
10 with rocks and sprayed with all sorts of different liquids.

11 Mr. Sanchez: They were the ones that -- getting the brunt of it.

12 Chief Monahan: Yes.

13 Mr. Sanchez: Would you say that the Community Affairs officers were -- were
14 they part of the NYPD strategy to address?

15 Chief Monahan: Yep, yes, absolutely.

16 Mr. Sanchez: And would this be the Community Affairs officers that are assigned
17 to specific precincts?

18 Chief Monahan: Yes. 'Cause they would be the ones that would have the
19 relationships within those particular boroughs.

20 Mr. Sanchez: Because, you know, there is a Community Affairs Bureau --

21 Chief Monahan: Right.

22 Mr. Sanchez: -- which is at 1PP and none of those individuals were involved, is
23 that correct?

24 Chief Monahan: They may have been out there at some point, but the main ones were
25 the ones from the individual precincts 'cause you wanna have them,

1 Chief Monahan: Nilda Hoffman.

2 Mr. Sanchez: She's been on for a little while too.

3 Chief Monahan: Yeah. Know her.. Been around for a long time.

4 Mr. Sanchez: Lots of -- lots of returns.

5 Chief Monahan: Yes.

6 Mr. Sanchez: Chief O'Neill's is pretty soon. I (unclear) --

7 Chief Monahan: Yup. He's gone Friday too.

8 Mr. Sanchez: Is that Friday?

9 Chief Monahan: Yeah.

10 Mr. Sanchez: This Friday?

11 Chief Monahan: And Pichardo is -- is leaving Friday also.

12 Mr. Sanchez: This Friday?

13 Chief Monahan: Yup.

14 Mr. Sanchez: Man. Chief, can you tell me about the new NYPD Community
15 Partnership Initiative that's been taking place citywide?

16 Chief Monahan: That under Chauncey Parker. Again, to go into details would be
17 best discussed with him.

18 Mr. Sanchez: And who is Mr. Parker?

19 Chief Monahan: Chauncey Parker is the Deputy Commissioner of -- of Community
20 Partnerships. Commissioner Shea hired him back when he first came
21 -- I think it was earlier in the year, January or so.

22 Mr. Sanchez: Gotcha. And it's -- there's been a little bit of restructuring --

23 Chief Monahan: Restructuring put Collaborative Policing and Community Affairs
24 under Commissioner Parker.

25 Mr. Sanchez: Was that the PC's call, restructuring?

1 Chief Monahan: The PC's call.

2 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, would you say that, if you were to go back, if you could,
3 would you use more Community Affairs officers in any of those
4 days?

5 Chief Monahan: No, they were out there. The ones that I needed out there were out
6 there.

7 Mr. Sanchez: Yeah.

8 Chief Monahan: The cops, the Community Affairs cops, I stood side-by-side with
9 them. They were out there. These are the ones from the precincts
10 who I see all the time, get to interact all the time. Didn't make a
11 difference, they were being the same as any other cop at that point
12 because no one was speaking to them. Like no one spoke to
13 Jumaane Williams. No one spoke to the God Squad. No one spoke
14 to Senator Perkins. No one was speaking to our Community Affairs
15 cops.

16 Mr. Sanchez: Got it. There is only a couple per precinct, right?

17 Chief Monahan: Yes.

18 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, before we turn away from Community Affairs, I wanted to
19 see if the team had any follow-up questions.

20 Mr. Brunsdon: I have one -- it is not directly Community Affairs -- but, Chief, you
21 mentioned that Pichardo is retiring as well. I was just wondering,
22 in his role as Chief of Patrol did he have a -- sort of a first deputy or
23 someone else who -- who would have been sort of the number 2
24 from that -- you know, that -- it -- it -- that particular area during the
25 times of the protests?

1 Chief Monahan: Yeah, it was Kevin Williams and -- why am I drawing a blank?

2 Kevin Williams was the main guy and he had a second chief too.

3 Mr. Brunsdon: Okay.

4 Mr. Sanchez: Alright, Chief, we're gonna now turn to the Mott Haven incident --

5 Chief Monahan: Sure.

6 Mr. Sanchez: -- specifically. And I'm going to allow my colleague here to take
7 the lead over here.

8 Mr. Tellet: Do you folks want to take ten minutes, stretch your legs a little?

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
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
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
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Mr. Tellet: Sorry. Thank you. Hi Chief, just as a reminder, my name is Chris Tellet, I'm an Assistant General Counsel here. I have got some questions about Mott Haven specifically. Just as a preface, I want you to know that it's not my intent to duplicate the work of what CCRB or IAB would be doing. We are more interested in sort of the facts and the decision-making process about that day in particular, 'cause it seems like a pretty useful microcosm. So, let's jump in. So, there were a couple public statements the following day on June 5th, I think coming out of both the Mayor and the Commissioner, that indicated that the response to that particular protest, that being the FTP 4 march had been planned. Is that correct?

Chief Monahan: Yes. Yes we knew that to be a planned event that we were quite

1 concerned about.

2 Mr. Tellet: Why were you concerned?

3 Chief Monahan: A lot of different reasons. We had intelligence coming that they
4 wanted to cause damage into the neighborhood. Speaking with
5 Kenny Lehr, Kenny Lehr is a commanding officer of the Bronx,
6 Kenny Lear had a lot of concerns about it, numerous phone calls
7 from the elected officials in the Bronx, and from the Chamber of
8 Commerce, from The Hub saying that they had information that
9 looting was going to take place that evening in regards to this -- this
10 march. The Bronx had been hit very hard up on Fordham Road and
11 there was a lot of negative press about the response that day, so there
12 was a lot of concern. Kenny had also, the night before, had
13 information and they grabbed a car with people in it with cans of
14 gasoline, that they had information was going to attempt to burn the
15 40 Precinct. So going into this there was a lot of concern, and -- and
16 our past events with the FTP had been marked by a lot of criminal
17 mischief throughout the subway system the last time they had
18 planned an event. So, there was a lot of concern about this event.
19 And as the day progressed the concerns grew even more. Intel about
20 a person who was attending the march that was going to go and get
21 a gun. That person was arrested right by where the march began on
22 149th Street before the beginning of the march. There was also a car
23 that was stopped prior to the march where people were arrested in
24 possession of fireworks, hammers, helmets that said they intended
25 to utilize these things during the course of the march. So, the Bronx

1 was very, very concerned about this before it began.

2 Mr. Tellet: So, it's -- it's interesting to hear, and in my head, I think I had

3 assumed that a lot of this had come out of the Intel and we had seen

4 some of it, but it also sounds like information was coming out of the

5 local precinct and the Chamber of Commerce?

6 Chief Monahan: Absolutely. I drove around beforehand and all the businesses in the

7 neighborhood had the -- the gates were down and signs posted on

8 them, "This is a minority-owned business, please do not loot."

9 Mr. Tellet: And the -- the gun that was recovered, is that in reference to the [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED]

11 Chief Monahan: Yeah.

12 Mr. Tellet: Gotcha. So, what was the plan going into this march?

13 Chief Monahan: So Kenny Lehr had -- he was in control. It's his borough, He was

14 in charge. I had discussions with him, Kenny Lehr said that he

15 wanted to monitor this extremely closely. He was going to work

16 hand-in-hand with Legal, and if there were violations of law that

17 they were going to be warned and arrested. So, Kenny worked hand-

18 in-hand with the legal division on that scene.

19 Mr. Tellet: Was he in -- was he the commander for the scene?

20 Chief Monahan: Yes, he was.

21 Mr. Tellet: For the entire time?

22 Chief Monahan: Yes, he was.

23 Mr. Tellet: Gotcha. What was your role on the scene?

24 Chief Monahan: I was there to observe what was going on, but Kenny Lehr had the

25 command. He was making the decisions.

1 Mr. Tellet: When you folks are planning for this kind of thing, are you planning
2 out what streets you will permit them down and which ones you
3 won't?

4 Chief Monahan: No. We -- we have very little control because we don't where
5 they're gonna go. I know that they didn't want to allow them to take
6 the bridge into Manhattan, so there was -- there was going to be
7 prevents of letting them where all the cars are going on the bridges,
8 but we didn't even know if they were going to go that way. So that's
9 why it's the commander on the ground who's with them that's gotta
10 make the determinations what they're going to allow them to do and
11 not to allow them to do.

12 Mr. Tellet: Was the curfew talked about as part of this plan?

13 Chief Monahan: Yes. Yeah. It was something that they could utilize. So, again,
14 everything was going to be determined on what Kenny Lehr saw as
15 he was with the group.

16 Mr. Tellet: And why were they not permitted to go into Manhattan?

17 Chief Monahan: There were cars all over the bridge. The last thing that -- and this
18 was speaking to Kenny Lehr afterwards -- the last thing he wanted
19 was having a group marching through the cars that were on the
20 bridge at the time, so he made that call as they were heading towards
21 the bridge.

22 Mr. Tellet: So, Kenny Lehr was -- we -- I guess you could fairly characterize
23 him as -- as the author of this plan as the initial plan?

24 Chief Monahan: Yes.

25 Mr. Tellet: Did you take part in assembling this plan?

1 Chief Monahan: I told Kenny that we talked about all the information that we had
2 and that we had to monitor this group extremely closely. But I told
3 him it would be his determination when, and if, any arrests needed
4 to be made.

5 Mr. Tellet: When it came to deployment decisions, who -- whose decision was
6 that?

7 Chief Monahan: That was Kenny Lehr's. Once -- once we got him the resources up
8 there -- so, we had a lot of resources 'cause we were concerned
9 about this. But they were all under -- under Chief Lehr, and he made
10 the calls on what was going to happen.

11 Mr. Tellet: So what resources were on the scene?

12 Chief Monahan: He had SRG and he had the SRG uniform, he had the SRG bikes,
13 and he had Field Forces. I'm not sure exactly of how many Field
14 Forces, but there were -- there were sub-- substantial number of cops
15 that were working this.

16 Mr. Tellet: Were they predominately from the precinct or not?

17 Chief Monahan: Most of them were from the Bronx, whether it's narcotics, the
18 detective bureau -- I saw a lot of detective bureau, Bronx Detective
19 Bureau people that I knew.

20 Mr. Tellet: Were there any plainclothes officers?

21 Chief Monahan: No. Just the men who -- some from Intel. But not --

22 Mr. Tellet: Oh okay.

23 Chief Monahan: -- involved in the --

24 Mr. Tellet: So, I think -- we've covered that. Okay. So I'm going to do two
25 things at once and I'm going to try and use the -- the video feed.

1 Human Rights Watch has a video that is a fairly comprehensive, I
2 think, video of what happened that day and it's useful because they
3 do some 3D graphics, so let me try and get that up on the screen. As
4 we talk through this, I think this will just be a useful tool for us to
5 start and pause and figure out where certain things happened. Let
6 me make this a little bigger. All good, folks?

7 Mr. Sanchez: Yeah.

8 Mr. Tellet: Okay. So, here is -- I think this is The -- The Hub, right?

9 Chief Monahan: Right.

10 Mr. Tellet: Okay. I'm not -- not using the audio, so. This is, I think --

11 Chief Monahan: Let me go back -- let me go back to just the Patterson Houses 'cause
12 it's a --

13 Mr. Tellet: Oh yeah, sure.

14 Chief Monahan: Again, I wasn't right with the group, I followed in the area behind.
15 I actually drove past the Patterson after they left, and here was a
16 group of people who I know from the Patterson Houses who are
17 actually standing there, and one kid just looks out and goes, "If these
18 MFers come back, they're gonna get lit." So there were --

19 Mr. Tellet: (Unclear) --

20 Chief Monahan: -- there were some very unhappy people in the Patterson Houses
21 after they had gone through.

22 Mr. Tellet: This is a -- this is a kid who had talked to you?

23 Chief Monahan: Yeah, I was in the car with my window open so I, you know --

24 Mr. Tellet: Oh, okay.

25 Chief Monahan: I heard him and he just started -- I heard he was talking to himself

1 and I looked at him, he goes, "Aww man," and just shaking his head.
2 They -- they were not happy about them walking through their
3 neighborhood.

4 Mr. Tellet: Gotcha. John, I'm going to get to the point on -- I think it's, like, a
5 turnaround on Willis Avenue, here we go. So this -- this line of
6 officers, do you know why they were blocking this street?

7 Chief Monahan: Looking at that, most likely, I'm gonna -- Kenny Lehr made the
8 determinations. I was not there. I did not see it. I'm -- from
9 conversation with him it was to prevent them to get on the Willis
10 Avenue Bridge.

11 Mr. Tellet: Gotcha. Okay. Then, I think at -- at this point they get diverted
12 down East 136th --

13 Chief Monahan: They diverted themselves.

14 Mr. Tellet: Alright, so I think this is 136th and Brook. Where are you in this, if
15 you are here at all?

16 Chief Monahan: I'm not there at this point. I come after I get the radio transmission
17 that they're making arrests at 136 and Brook.

18 Mr. Tellet: So I -- I think here we're seeing -- are these SRG moving up on the
19 left?

20 Chief Monahan: Are they on bikes? They should be, yeah.

21 Mr. Tellet: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

22 Chief Monahan: Yes, they are.

23 Mr. Tellet: Do you know what decision is being made here?

24 Chief Monahan: Nope. Kenny Lehr is making all of these decisions at this point --

25 Mr. Tellet: Got it.

1 Chief Monahan: I'm here -- I'm by -- I think I'm still over by the Patterson Houses
2 talking to those guys at that point.

3 Mr. Tellet: Gotcha. Later, I think there is going to be a lot of questions that sort
4 of follow that pattern, but just bear with me.

5 Chief Monahan: Got it.

6 Mr. Tellet: So I think at this mo-- this point, the protestors are not able to move
7 forward onto Brook Avenue. Again, do you know why they were
8 not able to move forward on -- onto Brook?

9 Chief Monahan: From conversations afterwards with Kenny Lehr, he said that they
10 were going to be placed under arrest.

11 Mr. Tellet: So -- so at this point the decision has already been made that these
12 folks --

13 Chief Monahan: He --

14 Mr. Tellet: -- all these folks are under arrest?

15 Chief Monahan: That's -- that's my understanding. Again, best to discuss that with
16 -- with Chief Lehr --

17 Mr. Tellet: Sure.

18 Chief Monahan: -- who's actually making the decisions at that time.

19 Mr. Tellet: Sure. And they are being placed under arrest for what?

20 Chief Monahan: For violating the curfew, for marching in the streets obstructing
21 traffic. The charges had all been discussed with Legal, who was
22 standing with Chief Lehr. So, again this conversation, exactly what
23 Chief Lehr observed and made his decision with -- with Legal,
24 would be best discussed with him.

25 Mr. Tellet: So -- so where is Chief Lehr in this?

1 Chief Monahan: I -- at this point I don't know where Chief Lehr is, I'm not there.

2 Mr. Tellet: Sure.

3 Chief Monahan: When I get there, I do talk to Chief Lehr.

4 Mr. Tellet: Okay. So I'm going to move it from here. So we have -- I think we

5 have SRG moving the line a little, and here I think you -- you may,

6 I don't know what resolution you have, but it looks to me like there's

7 a police van and a line of helmeted officers behind the protestors?

8 Chief Monahan: Yeah --

9 Mr. Tellet: Is that --

10 Chief Monahan: -- that makes sense if they were being placed under arrest.

11 Mr. Tellet: Right. So -- so at this point, though, the protestors -- have the

12 protestors been informed that they've been under arrest at this point?

13 Chief Monahan: Again, you're going to have to ask Chief Lehr, I was not there --

14 Mr. Tellet: Sure.

15 Chief Monahan: -- at that point in time.

16 Mr. Tellet: Do you -- did you have any conversations with Chief Lehr about

17 warning the protestors prior to the curfew?

18 Chief Monahan: Yes, he said when I spoke to him that they had been warning them

19 throughout the entire march about blocking traffic and the curfew.

20 Mr. Tellet: Did Chief Lehr go into detail about how they were conveying those

21 warnings?

22 Chief Monahan: Through the LRAD.

23 Mr. Tellet: And did the protestors receive any warnings besides, you know,

24 "there is a curfew, you will be arrested"?

25 Chief Monahan: Again, I believe it was for blocking traffic, but I'm going to say

1 Chief Monahan: I don't recall.

2 Mr. Tellet: Gotcha. So who ordered the arrest of [REDACTED]

3 Chief Monahan: I did.

4 Mr. Tellet: And you ordered it for what?

5 Chief Monahan: Utilizing the amplified sound and basically inflaming the crowd that
6 was across the street.

7 Mr. Tellet: Was [REDACTED] going to be arrested for curfew violations prior to
8 you ordering her arrest?

9 Chief Monahan: I wasn't going to have her arrested for that.

10 Mr. Tellet: Do you know if the Chief was?

11 Chief Monahan: I don't know what he had seen her do prior to that, no.

12 Mr. Tellet: Gotcha. Okay. Who did you order to affect the arrest?

13 Chief Monahan: Whatever cop was standing there, I just said place her under arrest,
14 and they moved in and arrested her.

15 Mr. Tellet: It looks like an -- an SRG officer is conveying to the uniform here.
16 Yeah.

17 Chief Monahan: Yeah, who it was, I don't know.

18 Mr. Tellet: Sure. Okay. Do you know where [REDACTED] was processed?

19 Chief Monahan: No.

20 Mr. Tellet: So -- okay, let me back up a little. So this is the arrest of [REDACTED]
21 I don't want to skip ahead and make you lose continuity, so let's just
22 roll it. Okay. Can you tell if this is the front or the rear of the
23 march? It looks like the rear to me. Is that accurate?

24 Chief Monahan: Right now, where [REDACTED] was or --

25 Mr. Tellet: Well, right now. It looks like the street slopes and if -- if I recall the

1 rear of the march is on the higher end of that slope?

2 Chief Monahan: Yeah, that's what it looks like.

3 Mr. Tellet: Yeah. So at this point arrests are -- they look like they're starting?

4 Were you in communication with Chief Lehr about when these

5 arrests would begin?

6 Chief Monahan: No.

7 Mr. Tellet: Did you have any warning about when any arrests would start?

8 Chief Monahan: No.

9 Mr. Tellet: Alright... Let's see where we are... Think --

10 Chief Monahan: That was Chief Lehr. I think so.

11 Mr. Tellet: Alright, so I've got a few questions about the legal observers,

12 specifically. As I understand it, they were detained, but not arrested.

13 Is that correct?

14 Chief Monahan: Yes.

15 Mr. Tellet: Why were they detained?

16 Chief Monahan: They were going to be arrested, I made the determination based on

17 past experience that utilizing discretion with the legal observers

18 would be appropriate, so I ordered that they all be released.

19 Mr. Tellet: Who gave the order to have the legal observers detained?

20 Chief Monahan: Legal.

21 Mr. Tellet: Did Legal specify how that detainment was to be affected?

22 Chief Monahan: They were being arrested with everyone else -- same regard.

23 Mr. Tellet: So we -- gotcha.

24 Chief Monahan: That they had no -- that they had no separate standing or authority

25 as a legal observer.

1 Mr. Tellet: And this is under the curfew order?

2 Chief Monahan: Yes, curfew or the -- the blocking traffic. I'm not sure exactly which
3 one, so you would have to discuss that with (Unclear) Lehr.

4 Mr. Tellet: Oh like a little -- like a discon charge?

5 Chief Monahan: Yeah.

6 Mr. Tellet: Okay. So we had received reports that when the -- they were
7 detained, the legal observers were turned away from the protests.
8 Do you know anything about that?

9 Chief Monahan: No.

10 Mr. Tellet: Did you observe that?

11 Chief Monahan: What do you mean by "turned away from the protests"? I don't
12 understand that.

13 Mr. Tellet: So it's -- from the reports that we've received, it sounds like they
14 were sat on the ground, facing away from the protests so that they
15 could not see what was happening behind them, which was the
16 majority of the other arrests.

17 Chief Monahan: I don't know. Because I know how to walk through the entire crowd
18 looking for the green hats to pull them out.

19 Mr. Tellet: Do you know when you did that?

20 Chief Monahan: That was some time, don't know an exact time, a lot of them had
21 already been arrested, so probably maybe a half hour or so after it
22 happened. As a matter of fact, talking to one of them, he told me
23 that there were legal observers in there that he didn't have enough
24 hats for that were still in the group, so I let him walk through the
25 group and pick them out and take them out also.

1 Mr. Tellet: And who -- who was telling you this?

2 Chief Monahan: It was someone from the legal observers group. I don't know who
3 he was. I know our -- Legal or someone got their names at some
4 point in time.

5 Mr. Tellet: Sure. Were -- were they from a group like the National Lawyers
6 Guild or anything like that?

7 Chief Monahan: Yeah. That's what the green hats were.

8 Mr. Tellet: Gotcha. Okay. We also received reports that notebooks and/or
9 pages from notebooks had been ripped out of the hands of legal
10 observers. Do you know anything about that?

11 Chief Monahan: No, I don't.

12 Mr. Tellet: Alright. Did this happen to be the individual you were speaking to?

13 Chief Monahan: I don't recall who it was. Honestly I don't.

14 Mr. Tellet: Gotcha. Do you know if this woman was arrested or just detained?

15 Chief Monahan: If she wore the green hat, she should have been -- should have been
16 released.

17 Mr. Tellet: When you walked through the crowd, was it light outside or dark?

18 Chief Monahan: So it was like --

19 Mr. Tellet: As -- as when you walked through and picked them out?

20 Chief Monahan: I didn't actually walk through, I had the -- him walk through with
21 one of the inspectors or captains. I already told him --

22 Mr. Tellet: Did you --

23 Chief Monahan: -- I told the -- I gave the order to let all the Green Hats out. So the
24 Green Hats were being released. They were brought off to the side.
25 And then, the one person that -- whether it was him or whoever it

1 was -- I had them walk with one of the captains so he could point
2 out the ones that didn't have hats 'cause they didn't have enough.

3 Mr. Tellet: And do you recall, when you gave this order was it light outside or
4 dark?

5 Chief Monahan: I believe it was still light out.

6 Mr. Tellet: Let's see... I need to back up, I'm sorry. It's like walking and
7 chewing gum at the same time. So, I have a few questions about
8 medics, specifically. I understand that there were four medics in the
9 crowd? Were they all wearing these -- these outfits with the scrubs
10 and the cross?

11 Chief Monahan: I don't know.

12 Mr. Tellet: Yeah. Did -- did you encounter or notice any medics in the crowd
13 that day?

14 Chief Monahan: No, I did not.

15 Mr. Tellet: So, we had received that the four medics -- at least four medics there
16 that day -- were arrested rather than detained. Do you know why?

17 Chief Monahan: Yeah, the medics would have absolutely no -- no authority not to be
18 arrested. Neither would the legal observers, but I thought it was
19 prudent to allow the legal observers to come out.

20 Mr. Tellet: Did anyone discuss with you about the medics?

21 Chief Monahan: No.

22 Mr. Tellet: So, we had received reports that some of the arrested medics had
23 sought to provide some medical support to some of the injuries that
24 they had observed on the scene. Did -- did you know about that?

25 Chief Monahan: No.

1 Mr. Tellet: Did you observe or hear of any injuries that had occurred at the
2 scene?

3 Chief Monahan: No.

4 Mr. Tellet: Did you see anyone bleeding?

5 Chief Monahan: I did not, could have been, but I did not.

6 Mr. Tellet: I'm not going to go through this whole video, just about two more
7 minutes. So the -- some of the protestors had alleged that -- and I
8 think the video may support -- that they had been, I guess, boxed in,
9 kettled and circled -- whichever term you'd like to use -- prior to
10 the -- to the curfew. Is that -- why was that decision made?

11 Chief Monahan: I spoke to Kenny Lehr, he said it was after 8 o'clock when they --
12 when they stopped them.

13 Mr. Tellet: So it looks like here that they are starting to affect arrests. Just to
14 ask you again, did you have any information as to when the arrests
15 were going to start?

16 Chief Monahan: No.

17 Mr. Tellet: Did you have any information about how the arrests were to be
18 affected?

19 Chief Monahan: No.

20 Mr. Tellet: So when we -- we've heard some reports that made a lot of this -- of
21 this particular scene about officers climbing on cars and using their
22 batons to strike individuals. Did you observe any of this?

23 Chief Monahan: I observed a lot of struggles going on. I observed, as when I walked
24 into the crowd, as they were attempting to make an arrest, numerous
25 arrests, people were struggling, I saw a lot of the de-arresting tactics

1 that we had seen elsewhere start again. As a matter of fact, at a point
2 over here, people had directed me to a pregnant woman who was
3 having issues, and moved in to walk her out. As I did that, one of
4 the protestors started pushing a cop right by me. Turned into a brawl
5 and we had trouble getting her out of there as that happened.

6 Mr. Tellet: And --

7 Chief Monahan: So, I did see a lot of pushing and shoving on both sides.

8 Mr. Tellet: And prior to this, had the protestors been informed that they were
9 under arrest?

10 Chief Monahan: Again, I don't know.

11 Mr. Tellet: Gotcha. I think it ends at around here. So, this scene, I think it stood
12 out for a lot of folks. Is this a normal kind of procedure or was there
13 -- or was there something different about this particular event?

14 Chief Monahan: This was not a normal procedure, this was something different about
15 this preve-- this event. Everything I discussed earlier, the fears the
16 neighborhood had, the fears the local electeds had, the signs that
17 were on every business over there, a determination was that a law
18 had been passed not to allow them out after the curfew. They were
19 warned -- from when I spoke to Kenny Lehr -- again, you are going
20 to need to speak to Chief Lehr to get exactly when and where every
21 warning was played. What I observed was people who were -- knew
22 they were being placed under arrest, fighting every time a cop tried
23 to place 'em under arrest, which turned the struggle which created
24 the type of video that you're seeing.

25 Mr. Tellet: Let's stop that for now. Just a couple follow-ups. Was -- Do you

1 know if there was a permit for this march?

2 Chief Monahan: No permit.

3 Mr. Tellet: Alright. Do you know if there was a permit application for this
4 march?

5 Chief Monahan: No, I have no permits for anything.

6 Mr. Tellet: Were any weapons recovered from the protests?

7 Chief Monahan: I don't know what was recovered from that scene. There was the
8 gun that was recovered on the way to -- at 149th Street where it
9 began, and there was the van that had the weapons inside the van,
10 the hammers, the helmets, and the fireworks that was going to --
11 going to the march.

12 Mr. Tellet: So, I think there had been sort of a mix of intelligence leading up to
13 this march. For example, we have seen for sure some social media
14 posts with the RMP on fire. Did Intel suspect or -- I guess I should
15 say -- what sort of violence did Intel think could happen here?

16 Chief Monahan: Intel had concerns with this group that there was going to be the
17 potential for violence, attacks on police officers and/or looting.
18 More of the intel came from the local community to Chief Lehr, that
19 he had, based on the arrests that they made, based on the phone calls
20 that he received. So it was a combination of intel. Like I said before,
21 as we talk there's intel we receive, but more importantly is what we
22 see on the ground and what we get from the people in the
23 neighborhood. And that's what Chief Lehr had that directed his
24 decision making.

25 Mr. Tellet: Is it your belief, based on what you know now, that that protest

1 prior to the event, particularly like the social media postings and
2 whatnot?

3 Chief Monahan: Yeah, I seen the social media postings.

4 Mr. Tellet: Had you discussed them --

5 Chief Monahan: And we had prior -- we had prior interactions with the FTP group,
6 knowing that their intentions have always been to engage in criminal
7 ma-- misconduct.

8 Mr. Tellet: Did you have any communications with the Mayor's Office about
9 this particular march, either before or after?

10 Chief Monahan: Mayor had people on scene.

11 Mr. Tellet: Did you have any communications with the Mayor's Office outside
12 --

13 Chief Monahan: Yes. Yes.

14 Mr. Tellet: -- of those individuals?

15 Chief Monahan: Outside? Yeah I spoke to the Mayor's Office on scene, I think I
16 spoke to the Mayor, I spoke to the Mayor on scene. And I spoke to
17 his person on the scene. I told his person I was going to release all
18 the legal observers.

19 Mr. Tellet: You spoke to him by phone?

20 Chief Monahan: I spoke to the Mayor by phone and I spoke to his person who was
21 on scene.

22 Mr. Tellet: Would this be a (unclear) or Community Affairs unit (unclear)?

23 Mr. Sanchez: Chris, your -- your sound is distorted.

24 Mr. Tellet: Oh great, hold one second.

25 Chief Monahan: I'm not exactly sure who he was. I think it's immaterial. Because I

1 hadn't -- hadn't ever seen him before. But, I was directed to him
2 and I had conversations with him.

3 Mr. Tellet: Alright. Are we clear?

4 Mr. Sanchez: No (unclear).

5 Mr. Tillet: Let me --

6 Mr. Brunsten: Chris, while you are working on that, I'm just going to jump in and
7 ask one question just on the topic. So, Chief, can you just describe
8 what your conversations were, first with the person from the
9 Mayor's Office on scene and secondly your conversation on the
10 phone with the Mayor.

11 Chief Monahan: That they -- basically they were all being placed under arrest. That
12 arrests were being made. That I saw the -- the legal observers in
13 there and I made a determination to -- to release them. We spoke
14 about there was a -- from the Mott Haven Houses, I think it is --
15 there was a tent guy over there who was fired up. I went, I spoke to
16 him, explained to him what was going on, the fear for the
17 neighborhood, he thanked me and got all the neighborhood people
18 from Mott Haven to leave the scene, so I talked about how we de-
19 escalated that area. Spoke about, again, the legal observers being
20 released and that the arrests were being made.

21 Mr. Brunsten: Thank you. I think -- I think you talked a little bit about the planning
22 before. I know that Kenny Lehr was -- was, you know, involved in
23 -- in some of the decision making around this as the commander on
24 scene, but was there -- was there some determination before the
25 protests started that arrests were going to be made? Were the

1 circumstances that would precipitate arrest being made?

2 Chief Monahan: Kenny Lehr was going to have that. His -- we weren't a hundred
3 percent sure if they were even going to march 'cause he had gotten
4 some information that they weren't going to march, that they were
5 just going to have a rally. So Kenny Lehr was given the call. If he
6 needed to make arrests, he had authority to make arrests based on
7 whatever he thought, working hand-in-hand with Legal. So, again,
8 the authority was given to the borough commander.

9 Mr. Brunsdon: Got it. Thank you.

10 Mr. Tellet: I think I am back. Sound good?

11 Chief Monahan: You're back. You're good.

12 Mr. Tellet: Okay. It's exciting. To your recollection, did you ever see the --
13 the code of conduct for the march? They had one online.

14 Chief Monahan: I -- I might have. Do I recall? No.

15 Mr. Tellet: It included a post-denouncing, quote: "goofy, irresponsible
16 adventurism." Did you ever see that?

17 Chief Monahan: Not that I recall. I might have, I just don't recall it.

18 Mr. Tellet: Sure, yeah. Did you ever see a flyer put out by FTP 4 instructing
19 members to not bring weapons to the march?

20 Chief Monahan: No.

21 Mr. Tellet: How long did it take to clear that scene?

22 Chief Monahan: I was gone before the scene was cleared, so I don't know how long
23 it took.

24 Mr. Tellet: To your knowledge, was there a mass-arrest processing center in the
25 Bronx?

1 Chief Monahan: No. Mass -- the only arrest processing center we had set up was in
2 Manhattan. But then during the course of these events we allow
3 commanders to utilize precincts or anything else to -- to set it up.

4 Mr. Tellet: When was that call made?

5 Chief Monahan: That's made all through. The mass-arrest processing center down
6 in Manhattan, I think it was only capable of 200-some-odd bodies at
7 any -- any individual time, so we didn't want to have people waiting
8 outside, So the units involved would make determinations as to
9 where they were going to take the arrests.

10 Mr. Tellet: Were you part of any conversations about where to process or how
11 to process the individuals that had been arrested at this scene?

12 Chief Monahan: No.

13 Mr. Tellet: Do you have any idea about how the individuals were removed from
14 the scene -- like, were there any buses, anything like that?

15 Chief Monahan: I believe there was a bus. I'm not a hundred percent sure how they
16 were removed.

17 Mr. Tellet: Alright. And, I think that's it for me. I would like to open it up to
18 the team.

19 Mr. Garcia: Hey Chief, just a few follow-up questions.

20 Chief Monahan: Sure.

21 Mr. Garcia: Prior to the arrests being made, did you personally observe any
22 violent actions on the part of the protestors?

23 Chief Monahan: I wasn't with the protestors.

24 Mr. Garcia: Prior to the arrests?

25 Chief Monahan: Or with the march. I was not with the march.

1 Mr. Garcia: Did --

2 Chief Monahan: I was in the areas around -- around the area but I was not observing
3 the march at all.

4 Mr. Garcia: In your conversations with either Chief Lehr or anyone who was
5 present, did they express to you that they observed any violent
6 activities on the part of the protestors prior to the arrests?

7 Chief Monahan: I didn't have that conversation, no.

8 Mr. Garcia: Did anyone express to you that there was any looting occurring prior
9 to the arrests?

10 Chief Monahan: No.

11 Mr. Garcia: Okay. And you had indicated that there were community members
12 or community leaders and members of the Chamber of Commerce
13 who expressed concerns. Did you personally have any
14 conversations with anyone from that community?

15 Chief Monahan: No. The only thing I observed were the signs on all the stores.

16 Mr. Garcia: Okay. Do you know if anyone from the Patrol Borough Bronx,
17 Chief Lehr or anyone there, attempted to speak with the organizers
18 of the event prior to the event's start?

19 Chief Monahan: I don't know if he did.

20 Mr. Garcia: Okay. That's it for me, thank you.

21 Mr. Brunsden: One more question, Chief. Did you hear at any point before the
22 protests, or learn at a later time of communications had with the
23 Mayor's office, that legal observers and/or medics were exempt
24 from the curfew?

25 Chief Monahan: Never had that conversation, ever.

1 Mr. Brunsten: Okay. Thank you.

2 Mr. Sanchez: Alright, Chief, I --

3 Mr. Richardson: Under normal circumstances when there is not a curfew, are legal
4 observers exempt?

5 Chief Monahan: No.

6 Mr. Richardson: Thank you.

7 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, we are mindful of your time, we wanna certainly wrap this
8 up. Just a couple more questions, please, if you can oblige us. You
9 know, this is certainly an unusual interview for us. You know, it's
10 not every day the Mayor issues an executive order asking us to
11 investigate something specifically and I think we can both agree the
12 reason that we have been asked to do so is because there has been a
13 tremendous amount of concern about the protests themselves and
14 how they unfolded. What concerns have you heard about how --
15 about the NYPD's response to the protests?

16 Chief Monahan: Obviously you're hearing concerns saying that we were too brutal.
17 You're not hearing enough of the concerns about how we were
18 brutalized. Thoroughly. I'll speak specifically to myself. I was hit
19 with numerous items throughout the course of the protests. I was
20 assaulted. [REDACTED]
21 [REDACTED]
22 [REDACTED] I was assaulted right out here on
23 the Brooklyn Bridge. This was happening to, not just me, this was
24 happening to my cops, every single day of that protests from the
25 beginning, for that first week and then it changed. And then we

1 were able to get thousands upon thousands of peaceful protestors
2 marching through the streets without incidents. But there were
3 provocateurs during the early days whose sole purpose was to attack
4 cops and to engage cops. Utilize tactics of jumping in front of police
5 as they're trying to make arrests, so you can get that viral video that
6 we've all seen. You need to look at the totality of every scene that
7 was occurring in unprecedented times that was happening
8 throughout the City, Manhattan, Brooklyn, the Bronx, protests in
9 Staten Island. It was an unusual time, something that I hope never
10 to see again in the City where people who just wanted to cause
11 anarchy succeeded. And hopefully -- and it appears, 'cause as we
12 look at protests now -- the numbers have dwindled back down to the
13 numbers that we saw on that first Thursday, in the thousands and
14 thousands that are no longer joining them.

15 Mr. Sanchez: Thank you, Chief. And Chief, just for the record, our investigation
16 wants exactly that, is to get as best a glimpse as possible of what
17 unfolded and report on those facts. That's exactly what this
18 objective is for us -- for us.

19 Chief Monahan: That's (unclear).

20 Mr. Sanchez: And Chief, you know, we fit -- part of the documents we reviewed
21 were the injury reports that were filed. There were a ton. We're
22 well aware that, you know, obviously that said, what took place.
23 You know, what you don't see a lot is -- you see an overwhelming
24 amount of footage that shows officers using force; with rare
25 exception we have got a couple of instances of where we have

1 footage of officers being assaulted. But those are certainly in the
2 minority. That the vast majority, especially in social media is --

3 Chief Monahan: Right.

4 Mr. Sanchez: -- is the complete opposite. So it's important, you know, to get a
5 good perspective of what was happening. We appreciate it. Not that
6 you got injured, anyway --

7 Chief Monahan: Yeah.

8 Mr. Sanchez: -- but we appreciate your candor and you taking the time to explain
9 it to us. Do you think the concerns that we have been discussing
10 here are fair?

11 Chief Monahan: Yeah. Obviously this was something that happened in the City that
12 we pray never happens again, and what can we do differently? This
13 was unprecedented. But just because it was unprecedented, it
14 happens again, it won't be unprecedented. How do we respond to
15 it? How do we balance the idea of keeping the City safe, not
16 allowing it to burn like other cities have done? How to get through
17 an incident, which we did, without loss of life. Without -- you know,
18 besides the two days of major looting, luckily no buildings went up
19 in flames. There was one incident on -- on Broadway over at, I think
20 it's 5th Street, where they lit a scaffolding on fire. If we hadn't
21 cleared the crowds out and were able to get the Fire Department in
22 there, the scaffolding had started to burn on an occupied building,
23 that could have been a tremendous tragedy. How do we prevent that
24 from happening again? A lot of mix messaging, I guess. Talking
25 about what happened. We can't -- we have to acknowledge it, to

1 make sure we never have this happen again in our city.

2 Mr. Sanchez: What you just said, that the -- I want to be perfectly aware, I want to
3 make sure that, you know, of the concerns that I am discussing here.
4 You know, both from the members of the community legislators,
5 City legislators --

6 Chief Monahan: Right.

7 Mr. Sanchez: -- and from the Police Department, you know, if you could help me
8 understand, you know, obviously I think you've been, you know,
9 quite articulate about, you know, what officers are facing every
10 single day. Now, do you feel that the concerns from the community
11 and the concerns from City Hall and other places are -- are -- are
12 fair?

13 Chief Monahan: I think if you look deeply at it, we have to get rid of the concerns of
14 those people who are looking to cause problems. There were people
15 out here whose sole purpose and their mantra, the anarchist mantra,
16 was of no concern, in my opinion, to Black Lives Matter, it was
17 whatever issues they could get to cause anarchy and hijack what is
18 a legitimate movement. And that's what they were doing, and that's
19 -- a lot of what you saw were people reacting to events that
20 happened, and it fell right into the hands of -- of people who -- who
21 had this objective. It fit into every bit of training that they ever had.
22 It is something we have to be careful that we listen to the majority
23 of the City of New York, not the minority that has the loudest voice
24 and not to overreact. Which I saw, a lot of electeds, I thought, were
25 overreacting in the moments after it without dissecting and getting

1 the full story, which it gives me comfort -- actually, I'm glad. This
2 is the first time I was able to talk to anyone about what I saw
3 personally out on the streets. So it's important, I think, what you're
4 doing, having spoken to the AG, and I know they put out an entire
5 report on what happened. I think it is important that you get the
6 perspective for the people who are on the ground every day and see
7 the same people that we were fighting on the Brooklyn Bridge are
8 still out there fighting with us last night in Brooklyn. Those were
9 the same people last night that ripped stores up in Brooklyn that
10 we've seen from day 1, except they no longer have the thousands
11 with them anymore.

12 Mr. Sanchez:

13 You know, some of the concerns, I think, you know, I don't want
14 to speak for anyone, but, you know, the -- you know there was
15 information we received where, you know, people said, "Listen, we
16 can distinguish between the individuals that were certainly wanting
17 to create problems, and then the vast majority of individuals that,
18 you know, they wanted to just, you know, be heard, following
19 directives. But at times were unable to either move or who were,
20 you know, faced with arrest." You know, clearly distinguishing
21 between themselves, "Those were the people, that, you know, really
22 were causing some problems. We're just kind of standing here
23 following directions. Like, we were being told to disperse, we're
24 disbursing, but we can't go in this direction. We reach over here,
25 and now we're getting arrested because we were told to come in this
direction." So it's like these are the folks -- these are the concerns

1 that, I think, are --

2 Chief Monahan: And -- and to answer that and I'll go back to what I saw at the
3 Barclay Center. If there was room for people to disperse, but they
4 joined arms to prevent us from going back to the people that were
5 behind them, and that's their story now, it was "Oh, I wasn't -- I
6 wasn't throwing anything." And I saw a lot of that. I saw a lot of
7 that personally. The only time I actually saw in the course of those
8 first two days anyone besides the electeds who tried to and failed to
9 de-escalate was in Washington Square Park on Sunday. That was
10 the incident where we had 5,000 coming out of the park. I'm sure
11 you have seen it all on TV a million times, where groups started
12 coming at my cops, bottles got thrown at us and the organizers of
13 the march actually took a microphone and tried to push the people
14 back, saying this is not what it's about, it's not about going against
15 the police. And that's when I joined the -- they asked me I to join
16 in with them. I spoke, it's been on TV a million times, and I knelt
17 with them.

18 Mr. Sanchez: Which (unclear).

19 Chief Monahan: And that was the idea of -- this was someone who was willing to de-
20 escalate. And that crowd, they left, and there were the people in it
21 that they understood they were trying to get them to attack the
22 police. And at that point, because some leadership within that group
23 showed up and de-escalated, there wasn't an incident. But in the
24 numerous other times throughout there was not that leadership
25 within the marches willing to stand up and de-escalate.

1 Mr. Sanchez: (Unclear), Chief. Chief, you mentioned this After Action Report that
2 the Commissioner is putting together, it's not out yet, it's still, I
3 think, being composed, is that correct?

4 Chief Monahan: Yes.

5 Mr. Sanchez: Aside from that, is there any other -- any after-action reports that
6 had been composed previous to the one that's being composed now
7 that were reviewed at any point by the Department?

8 Chief Monahan: No, nothing that I have been involved in.

9 Mr. Sanchez: Can you describe any kind of debriefing or post-action
10 conversations that you have been specifically involved with police
11 leadership about these protests, and what came out of these
12 conversations?

13 Chief Monahan: There was one -- one that was hosted by Police PC where they
14 discussed part of their plans that they were putting together. It was
15 just speaking of incidents that happened, number of cops that we
16 had, how we deployed them, how we got them, but that was the only
17 time. You know, everything else was in phone conversations.

18 Mr. Sanchez: And were there any reports or anything that would memorialize
19 these conversations of any kind?

20 Chief Monahan: No.

21 Mr. Sanchez: Some of this -- some of this we've already covered. Please bear
22 with me.

23 Chief Monahan: Sure.

24 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, I wanted to ask you, you mentioned obviously the -- the
25 bottles, the rocks, bricks, things that were being hurled at officers.

1 Again, we have requested the footage available. You know, we
2 asked, you know, the TARU to please put a hold on anything that
3 they might delete. We have requested everything, I think, relevant
4 to -- are you -- did you record anything --

5 Chief Monahan: No.

6 Mr. Sanchez: -- yourself?

7 Chief Monahan: No.

8 Mr. Sanchez: Are you --

9 Chief Monahan: I think I did record -- I did record a fire. The fire I spoke about, I
10 did take a quick recording of that.

11 Mr. Sanchez: If we can -- do you -- have you seen footage of officers that were in
12 these predicaments that would give a good view of the stuff that was
13 being hurled at them? Because that --

14 Chief Monahan: The Barclay Center one. There are these tower video of the Barclay
15 Center which shows the stuff being thrown at the cops.

16 Mr. Sanchez: Okay.

17 Chief Monahan: Throws m-- actually shows me get hit. It actually shows my
18 lieutenant knocking a bottle away not to get hit that bad.

19 Mr. Sanchez: Well, Chief, we may need your help to pinpoint that footage.

20 Chief Monahan: Sure.

21 Mr. Sanchez: And again, we've received (unclear) --

22 Chief Monahan: You may -- you may already have it. That was one of the first ones
23 TARU put out.

24 Mr. Sanchez: Okay. We may need to follow up with that.

25 Chief Monahan: Sure.

1 Mr. Sanchez: If you can help us get that. Are there any specific lessons you took
2 from your own experience and prior protests that helped influence
3 how you responded to (unclear)?

4 Chief Monahan: I been to so many different protests, this was unique. I've never
5 seen this before. I've never seen arrests being made and people not
6 leave. People continued to confront, confront, confront. I've never
7 seen that before and I've been through Washington Heights, you
8 know, I was right in the middle of the Washington Heights, I was
9 right in the middle of all the protests during Black Lives Matter in
10 2014. I was the Executive Officer Chief of Department back then,
11 so I was out on every one of them. That had never occurred. I had
12 never seen the level of violence that happened here. So, everything
13 I have learned from the past, looking at what happened here, no.
14 The only thing we did was put together the Field Forces, realizing,
15 'cause we had utilized them in the past, that the idea of putting
16 together a field force makes a quicker response.

17 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, I know -- Listen, there is a lot of ground that I still have yet
18 to cover, but, you know, there's officer fatigue, you know, officers,
19 they are under tremendous stress as it is. And then, you know, with
20 extended tours obviously that must have been a really tough
21 predicament for them too, in addition to everything else that was
22 going on. I know you were (unclear) pulling very long tours as well.
23 Do you think the department was sufficiently prepared?

24 Chief Monahan: Yes. We -- Well, how do you get sufficiently prepared for
25 something you've never faced before? This was, you know, we --

1 we've trained on a lot of different things, we mobilize, but we have
2 never had to mobilize an entire police department. This is the first
3 time we have ever -- ever gotten every police officer out of every
4 nook and cranny out to work. So, we have never had anything at
5 this extent in the past. We learned from it. We learned how to do it.
6 We adjust how we mobilize, how we account for where our
7 personnel, if we need to get that many, so there are always lessons
8 that you can learn from something like this.

9 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, what did you think the department did well?

10 Chief Monahan: I think we did a lot well. I think -- there was no loss of life during
11 the course of this. No buildings went up in flames. No businesses
12 were burned out. The looters, I think we responded, we -- we made
13 sure we were able to contain it to the best of our ability. For a city
14 of 8.6 million people, I thought we did a good job in light of
15 unprecedented type circumstances.

16 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, same question. What did you think the department did
17 poorly?

18 Chief Monahan: Listen, I'm just gonna go right back to the same thing. I think we
19 did the best we could under circumstances. I guess I compare us to
20 other cities around the country, watching things burned out, station
21 houses burned. I think we did a good enough job keeping this City
22 safe, keeping the people of the City safe.

23 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, was there ever a time during these protests that you disagreed
24 with the strategy or what was happening?

25 Chief Monahan: No, I was making decisions on the street. No one was interfering

1 with decisions that I had to make. No one was interfering with local
2 commanders' decisions. We allow our commanders to make
3 decisions. You know, it can't be driven from City Hall, it can't be
4 driven from 1 Police Plaza. It has to be driven by the people who
5 are seeing what's going on out there, and I -- I think the decisions
6 were made by great leaders who were out on the street that had to
7 make decisions that, you know, in -- in seconds you gotta make a
8 determination: do I have enough personnel, what can I do, how can
9 I handle this situation? It was trying times for everyone. But, I am
10 proud of the work that a lot of the men and women did.

11 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, did you observe any misconduct -- any police misconduct?

12 Chief Monahan: I did not personally observe any misconduct, no.

13 Mr. Sanchez: Did you observe any conduct, while not arising to the level of
14 misconduct, you didn't like?

15 Chief Monahan: No, not on us, on the people that were attacking us. Little things
16 that I look back on. Barrier setups could have been better. You
17 know, the Barclay Centers, the barriers weren't locked as tight as
18 they should have been, which caused them to kind of break up,
19 which is why we had to try and zip-tie them together so we can
20 keep the line, stuff like that. But no real misconduct or anything
21 along those lines.

22 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, you know, obviously, you know, your opinion here is very
23 important, and, you know, God forbid this ever happens again at the
24 scale of what you did. Knowing what you know now, everything
25 you've learned over the last few months, if you were to go back to

1 the very beginning, what would be different? If you were at the
2 helm, if you were in command?

3 Chief Monahan: Again, knowing that it happened -- it's gonna happen, it would be
4 different. We don't know what's gonna happen and everything, you
5 know, unfolded as it went, so, I think we responded the best any
6 agency can as things happened. I think we were able to get personnel
7 out there quickly. Could we have known where more of our
8 personnel were to get them out quicker? It would have been nice
9 if it happened on a Tuesday when all the cops are working instead
10 of a weekend when administrative people weren't available to be
11 called, that would have been a lot nicer. But I think we came together
12 under the most trying circumstances, working long hours -- again,
13 I'm gonna say I'm proud of what we did, and it's important for
14 people to understand just how much our cops were under attack out
15 there and making decisions, you know, in a second.

16 Mr. Sanchez: And -- and, you know, again, if -- nobody wants this to happen
17 again, of course, but if it were to happen spontaneously next week,
18 unbeknownst to the department, what would the re-- the
19 department's response be?

20 Chief Monahan: We now --

21 Mr. Sanchez: And how would it be different?

22 Chief Monahan: -- we now know where our personnel are better. We have a better
23 grasp of how we can mobilize them. We've practiced our
24 mobilizations. We've practiced how we could get people quickly to
25 a scene. We have actually trained our cops to get -- retrained them

1 in disorder control. How -- what to expect when they are there.
2 Trained our executives on what their responsibility is leading a Field
3 Force. So, I think right now, based on our experience of what
4 happened and most of our cops, 'cause all of our cops were on the
5 scene for this, we're better prepared if something should happen
6 again.

7 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, that's all I got.

8 Chief Monahan: Thank you.

9 Mr. Sanchez: Turning to the team to see if they have any follow-up questions. No.

10 Chief Monahan: Good.

11 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, I really appreciate the time that you devoted to us. Thank you
12 so much. We went beyond what we had initially allotted and, listen,
13 there is a lot to talk about, and thank you for this time, we are
14 grateful. And I know Commissioner Garnett wanted to say goodbye
15 to you on the way out.

16 Chief Monahan: Sure,

17 Mr. Sanchez: If I could just go grab --

18 Chief Monahan: Absolutely.

19 Mr. Sanchez: If I can --

20 Mr. Brunsden: Can I just ask, real quick --

21 Chief Monahan: Well, he said it was over.

22 Mr. Brunsden: Sorry. That's fine.

23 Chief Monahan: I'm joking.

24 Mr. Brunsden: (Unclear) much more on this, but Arturo, I didn't know if you had
25 any additional questions related just to accounting for -- yes, I think

1 we did a little bit of this -- but accounting for sort of officer wellness
2 versus -- and -- and then also sort of, like, community sentiment.

3 Mr. Sanchez: Yes. Yes, there were. Chief, if -- if --

4 Chief Monahan: I do have meetings I got to get to already.

5 Mr. Brunsten: Yeah, I think -- I think there were just a couple on these. I think this
6 is, like, five minutes.

7 Chief Monahan: Got it.

8 Mr. Brunsten: Or, I mean -- I -- I think -- I see the last ones here. I mean, I can sort
9 of take some of -- I mean, I think that these are just some quick
10 questions on, you know, how -- how does the -- the department kind
11 of account for, you know the -- this sort of, you know, stress or
12 challenge of having officers respond to protestor situations that in
13 part are expressing some anti-police sentiment?

14 Chief Monahan: Listen, we have been dealing with this for years. This isn't the first
15 time we have dealt with protests with anti-police sentiment.
16 Washington Heights, 2014. What we have done is put together a
17 whole health and wellness section of our agency of how our officers
18 deal with stress, not only stress from the job, but stress in their own
19 personal lives. We hired a psychologist, Adrianna Adams, whose
20 sole purpose is to work with the cops. Now, when we hired her she
21 told us that her client was the police officer, not the department,
22 which is what we wanted. We have her separate and distinct from
23 fitness for duty. She is someone that they can come to when they
24 are in the -- feeling the stress. We created peer counselors that we
25 have trained. We have over 300 peer counselors. These are police

1 officers that work within the commands that we have given
2 specialized training on how to deal with stress, how to talk to people
3 and they're out in the streets, working with the cops, there is
4 someone they can come to anonymously, talk to, ask for help. You
5 know, we have created a thing with Columbia Presbyterian where
6 an officer feeling stress can call up and make an appointment
7 anonymously to talk to somebody. You know, we saw this last year
8 with the amount of suicides we had in this agency that we needed to
9 get better, we needed our cops to feel comfortable to talk to
10 somebody, feel that every time the talk about stress they're not going
11 to have to worry about losing their guns, so we've given them outlets
12 that they can go to get the help, and I personally speak to every one
13 of the peer counselors' groups that go out there, just to let them
14 know how important their mission is. I've lost --

15 Mr. Brunsten: And Chief --

16 Chief Monahan: Go ahead.

17 Mr. Brunsten: I'm sorry. To your knowledge, are those resources that officers have
18 -- have utilized or been encouraged to utilize during the course of
19 protests when some of those issues can really kind of come to the
20 floor or be particularly acute?

21 Chief Monahan: They were -- they were informed they could utilize them at all times.
22 Obviously they are out there. Health and Wellness was going out.
23 Our Employee Assistance Unit during the course of -- the course of
24 the protests. Our peer counselors were out there with the cops. So
25 the resources were available for them to speak to if they wanted to.

1 Mr. Brunsten: Thank you. And then just a few questions more so about, then on
2 the flip side, the sort of community sentiment. You know, I -- we've
3 talked a lot today about sort of intelligence about, you know, threats
4 or potential threats during the protests. To what -- to what extent
5 does -- does the NYPD take into account or collect intelligence even
6 related to, you know, community sentiment around, you know, the
7 -- the complaints or claims that animate these protests? You know,
8 whether it's concerns about policing tactics, or concerns about racial
9 disparities or other types of factors like that.

10 Chief Monahan: We listen to everyone and we're willing to sit down with anyone
11 that wants to talk to us. Currently the police commissioner is going
12 out on a listening tour throughout the City to hear these types of
13 complaints, to hear what, you know, during the protests we did right,
14 what we did wrong, what we do on a daily basis. What people think
15 we need to change, what reforms are necessary in the agency.
16 Listen, this is something we have been focused on since 2014, after
17 the Gardner and Ferguson incidents, was reforming this entire
18 agency. A lot of the reforms that you hear about that other
19 departments are saying they need to do, well, we started them back
20 in 2014 with neighborhood policing, the idea of getting our cops
21 close to the communities that they serve, recruitment, trying to get a
22 department that reflects the communities that we serve. These are
23 things that we had already gotten into place prior to this and it's
24 something that we are still moving forward. We were just starting
25 our whole youth program that Commissioner Shea was making the

1 centerpiece of his administration, which really got sidetracked a lot
2 by what's gone on, but this is something that we are dedicated to. I
3 mean, a police department is only as good as the community that it
4 serves if the community accepts the way that we are policing them.

5 Mr. Brunsten: Thank you. Do you know whether there was collection of that type
6 of -- similar to the listening tour now, that is happening after -- if
7 there was collection of that type of information either before or
8 during the protests, in terms of the types of complaints that come
9 from the community, you know, that relate to police reform?

10 Chief Monahan: I don't believe there was any collection data that I know of.

11 Mr. Brunsten: Okay. And I think just one last question. We -- I think we asked
12 this question more specifically to Mott Haven, but to -- to what
13 extent did the NYPD coordinate or communicate with protest
14 organizers or protest organizations during the protests this summer?

15 Chief Monahan: They did not want to talk to us. There was no organizer that wanted
16 to come out and say "I'm going to have this protest." It happened
17 later on after these first initial days, when you'd have a Jumaane
18 Williams, who wants to walk across the bridge with thousands.
19 Those ones we coordinated with -- with no problems. The one I
20 spoke about earlier that ended up in Washington Square, that was a
21 group that talked to us originally and that was a group that, when
22 there was an incident, stood up and stood side by side with us. But,
23 the vast majority of these were leaderless and for a purpose
24 leaderless. You know, a part of the anarchist model is that there is
25 no leadership, that it's the people just going on their own, and that's

1 what we saw on the vast majority of the protests that occurred.

2 Mr. Brunsdon: That sounds good. Thank you for indulging those additional

3 questions.

4 Chief Monahan: Absolutely.

5 Mr. Brunsdon: That's all I have.

6 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, I think we're good.

7 Chief Monahan: Very good.

8 Mr. Sanchez: Let me go grab --

9 Chief Monahan: Sure.

10 Mr. Sanchez: -- Commissioner Garnett.

11 Mr. Tellet: Arturo, you wanna make me host so I can stop this thing?

12 Mr. Sanchez: Yeah. Thanks, Chris.

13 Mr. Brunsdon: Thank you, Chief.

14 Chief Monahan: Sure. Thank you.

15 Mr. Tellet: Yes. Thank you, Chief.

16 Mr. Richardson. Thank you.

17 Ms. Charles: Thank you.

18 Mr. Garcia: Thank you.

19 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, give me just one moment.

20 Chief Monahan: Sure.

21 **END OF AUDIO FILE**