FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
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DOI ISSUES ANNUAL ANTI-CORRUPTION REPORT IDENTIFYING CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND THE STRATEGIES TO REMEDY THEM AT 61 CITY AGENCIES AND ENTITIES

--This annual report is mandated by Executive Order 105--

Margaret Garnett, Commissioner of the New York City Department of Investigation (“DOI”), issued the City’s annual Anti-Corruption Report today, a progress report on City agencies' anti-corruption programs, which includes the vulnerabilities agencies have self-identified as problems and the strategies they are using to remedy them. The compilation of the report is mandated by Executive Order 105 (“EO 105”), which consolidated the Inspector General (“IG”) function within DOI during the 1980s and established the Commissioner of DOI as the City’s independent Inspector General. EO 105 also establishes that agency heads are principally responsible for maintaining corruption-free agencies and calls upon DOI to assist in the agencies’ anti-corruption efforts by preparing this annual report. The 2020 Anti-Corruption Report is the first one to be issued publicly. A copy of the Report is attached to this release and can be found on our reports page or by clicking here.

“This annual report catalogues City agencies’ and entities’ corruption vulnerabilities from their own perspectives, reflecting what they view as problems and the fixes they are employing. This year we have reimagined the report, making it relevant for governing in the 21st century and including agencies that historically have not been asked to participate, such as the Mayor’s Office and the NYPD. DOI is issuing it publicly for the first time to promote effective information-sharing on common integrity problems and the potential ways City government can fix those problems. We hope this public report will allow New Yorkers to better understand some of the integrity obstacles agencies’ face and how agencies are choosing to remedy them as well as instill greater insight and confidence in government operations.”

This annual report is different than most other DOI reports in that it is not the product of DOI’s investigative work, but instead provides a broad overview of the approach City agencies are taking to fight corruption from the perspective of the 61 City agencies and entities that responded. DOI’s Inspectors General worked with agency executives to assess corruption hazards, develop anti-corruption policies to reduce them, and identify areas warranting further DOI review.

The 2020 report marks several firsts, including garnering the voluntary participation of 12 additional non-mayoral agencies, such as the Board of Elections, City Council, City Comptroller, various City Libraries, all City Public Administrator’s offices, and the Office of the Public Advocate. Also a first, is focusing the agencies’ responses on a relevant corruption topic, with this year’s being the COVID-19 pandemic and the corruption hazards arising in the pandemic response, as well as other public health and safety corruption hazards. Some
of the broad themes addressed include challenges and policies involving procurement and securing pandemic-response equipment and services, and transition to remote work. Agencies were asked to address several questions relating to potential corruption hazards, specifically:

1. What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of Personal Protective Equipment ("PPE") and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

2. What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

3. What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

Agencies were also asked: (i) what were the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period; (ii) to reflect on the corruption hazards they identified in 2019, if applicable, and any ongoing mitigation efforts; and (iii) to expound on any additional corruption hazards faced by the agency in 2020.

Next year’s report is expected to focus on corruption hazards in the area of cybersecurity and data protection.

DOI is one of the oldest law-enforcement agencies in the country and New York City’s corruption watchdog. Investigations may involve any agency, officer, elected official or employee of the City, as well as those who do business with or receive benefits from the City. DOI’s strategy attacks corruption comprehensively through systemic investigations that lead to high-impact arrests, preventive internal controls and operational reforms that improve the way the City runs.

DOI’s press releases can also be found at twitter.com/NYC.DOI

Bribery and Corruption are a Trap. Don’t Get Caught Up. Report It at 212-3-NYC-DOI.
2020 Annual Anti-Corruption Report

Margaret Garnett
Commissioner
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Introduction

As head of the Department of Investigation (DOI), the Commissioner of Investigation serves as the City’s independent inspector general, supervising a staff of Inspectors General, investigators, attorneys, forensic auditors, computer forensic specialists, and administrative personnel. This reflects a consolidation of the Inspector General function from the various city agencies to DOI in 1986, pursuant to Mayoral Executive Order No. 105 (EO 105).¹

While EO 105 consolidated the Inspector General function within DOI, it also made clear agency heads “remain principally responsible for maintaining corruption-free agencies through this formal collaborative arrangement by developing procedures and systems to protect against corrupt and other criminal activity affecting their agency, by hiring employees of integrity and competence, by careful managerial oversight and high-quality supervision of agency employees, and by adequate review and monitoring of fiscal commitments and processes within their respective agency.” This mandate is further supported by New York City Charter § 389(a), which assigns to agency heads the responsibility for maintaining “an internal control environment and system intended to maximize the effectiveness and integrity of agency operations and to reduce the vulnerability of the agency to fraud, waste, abuse, error, conflict of interest, and corruption.”

EO 105 calls upon DOI to assist agencies in their anti-corruption efforts by preparing this annual anti-corruption report. The anti-corruption report reflects corruption hazards identified at City agencies and the strategies identified by agencies, in consultation with the various Inspectors General at DOI, to address those hazards.

To prepare the annual anti-corruption report, DOI works with agency executives to assess corruption hazards, develop anti-corruption policies to reduce them, and identify areas warranting further DOI review. Although this report has been prepared each year since EO 105, DOI has decided to issue this year’s report publicly for the first time to promote information-sharing and transparency around corruption

hazards and the measures that are being used by City agencies to combat corruption. In contrast to DOI’s typical reports, this annual report is not the product of DOI’s investigative work, but rather is intended to provide a broad overview of the approach City agencies are taking to fighting corruption. As the City’s Inspector General, DOI uses this report as one tool in its work with City agencies to assist them in their anti-corruption efforts.

The 2020 Anti-Corruption Report

EO 105’s mandate applies only to Mayoral agencies. However, the obligation to guard against corruption extends to all City agencies and entities. As such, DOI invited non-mayoral agencies to participate in this report, in order to broaden the scope of this joint effort to prevent and root out corruption in the City. There was unprecedented voluntary participation, with an additional 12 non-mayoral agencies, including the Board of Elections, City Council, Comptroller, Libraries, all Public Administrator’s offices, and the Public Advocate, electing to contribute.

Given the unique challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the focus of this year’s report is corruption hazards arising in the pandemic response, as well as other public health and safety corruption hazards.\(^2\) In collaboration with its assigned Inspector General, each agency was asked to evaluate specific identified pandemic response corruption hazards, summarize and identify other major public health and safety corruption hazards affecting the agency, and provide the agency’s risk mitigation plan for identified hazards. Agencies were also asked to review the corruption hazards they identified for the 2019 report, and discuss their risk mitigation efforts in addressing those hazards.

This report catalogs the corruption vulnerabilities reported to DOI by the agencies and entities it oversees, and reflects the collaboration between DOI and these agencies to establish an individualized and effective anti-corruption plan. The summaries that follow are based

\(^2\) In addition to publicizing the report for the first time, this year also marks the first time DOI has focused the annual anti-corruption report on a particular subject matter area, which we believe will make the report more useful as a learning tool for City agencies and the public. We expect that next year’s report will focus on corruption hazards in the area of cybersecurity and data protection.
solely on the information provided to DOI by the relevant agencies and do not address ongoing DOI investigations that may be related to the identified vulnerabilities.

COVID-19 State of Emergency

On March 12, 2020, Mayor de Blasio issued Emergency Executive Order 98 (EEO 98), declaring a state of emergency in the City of New York and directing agency heads to take all appropriate and necessary steps to preserve public safety and the health of their employees, and to render all required and available assistance to protect the security, wellbeing and health of the residents of the City. In the ensuing months, the City faced, and continues to face, extraordinary challenges and disruption as a result of the pandemic. While City agencies worked to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, concurrently they worked to ensure that corruption and fraud did not divert or waste resources.

Corruption in local government during COVID-19, or any time, prevents resources from reaching New Yorkers in greatest need, and can undermine public trust in government, which takes on increased importance during a public health crisis. As many agencies sought out materials and resources quickly, at times without the safeguards that the traditional procurement process provides, risks of corruption present in the public procurement process were exacerbated.

Looking across City agencies, there was no one-size-fits-all approach to mitigating fraud or corruption risks while preserving acceptable levels of service and expanding to provide new services to address the pandemic. This report provides an opportunity for reflection on the different approaches taken to strike that balance. The next section summarizes how agencies indicated they addressed corruption hazards in the City’s response to the pandemic, and in response to other public health and safety issues, and aims to provide an overview of the corruption-related challenges. The balance of the report details the specific responses provided by each agency to DOI’s inquiries. The information obtained in the compilation of this report allows DOI to assist agencies with their future anti-corruption efforts as other risks emerge due to the impact of COVID-19, and can be used to edify other agencies on best practices and lessons learned.
The City will be grappling with the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath for the foreseeable future. Recovery efforts will continue and the need to respond to new crises will as well. Agencies must remain mindful of corruption risks even in the midst of unprecedented challenges. While collaboration and cooperation between each agency and their Inspector General at DOI is essential to effectively combat and mitigate corruption hazards, the strength of the City’s anti-corruption program depends largely upon the system of controls and oversight that each agency builds and maintains. The DOI Commissioner commends the efforts undertaken by responding agencies in analyzing their vulnerabilities and developing remediation strategies as reflected in this report. DOI, as the City’s watchdog, hopes this annual anti-corruption report can be a tool to promote transparency, accountability, integrity, and enforcement across the City, and to instill confidence in the public that government is addressing these important issues.

Corruption Hazards in Pandemic Response

A. Procuring and Securing Pandemic-Response Equipment and Services

The City’s response to COVID-19 created an urgent need for additional equipment and services. For example, extensive procurement was needed to secure proper Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), expand sanitizing capacity, and support increased remote work across the City’s workforce. Other pandemic response equipment was used to set up COVID-19 testing sites. A variety of services were also contracted for the pandemic response, including, for example, distributing meals to the elderly; providing short-term lodging for self-isolation, quarantine, or housing healthcare workers; installing protective partitions in public areas and workplaces; adding additional disinfecting and sanitizing; enhancing websites to increase online services; and providing additional security for open and closed office buildings.

Emergency procurements and suspension of the normal safeguards provided by procurement rules created two distinct categories of risk for corruption and fraud. The first kind of vulnerability is in the contracting process itself, by, for example, creating opportunities for sweetheart deals for connected vendors, or waste created through time pressures on
agency contracting officers or the need to purchase certain materials for the first time. The second kind of vulnerability is fraud by third parties, where bad actors take advantage of an emergency to steal from the City by, for example, promising materials that they cannot deliver, delivering defective materials, or taking advantage of programs intended to assist vulnerable populations.

**Procurement Process**

Emergency Executive Order 101 (EEO 101) suspended the City’s procurement rules for COVID-19 related purchases and allowed agencies to fast-track goods and services to respond to the crisis. As of November 2020, 25 agencies utilized these emergency provisions for 853 procurement contracts, with 15 agencies making 359 contracts for emergency procurements of goods, and 20 agencies making 494 contracts for emergency procurements of services. The Mayor’s Office of Contract Services (MOCS) coordinates the procurement activity of Mayoral agencies for both goods and services. Under EEO 101, although the independent review of the Comptroller was suspended, multiple approvals were still required for emergency contracts, including by MOCS, the Office of Management & Budget (OMB) and the Law Department.

Numerous agencies reported employing other internal corruption prevention practices such as conducting thorough checks to vet the suitability and background of contractors. NYC Emergency Management (NYCEM) created a team of trained accountants and forensic auditors to review invoices, payments, and financial practices relative to major COVID-19 emergency contracts. In addition, many agencies took DOI up on its offer to conduct a Vendor Name Check, although that requirement had been suspended by EEO 101; DOI conducted these checks on an expedited basis for emergency contracts. Agencies also reported relying on requirements contracts or blanket orders with previously-established fixed prices to obtain necessary equipment whenever possible.

**Equipment Contracts**

MOCS, along with the NYC Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS) and the NYC Economic Development Corporation
(EDC), participated in a multi-agency PPE procurement process, including sourcing, contracting, and delivery/distribution to fulfill the Citywide need for PPE. As part of its effort to minimize corruption risks, MOCS noted that it established a process for the intake, evaluation, and prioritization of vendor offers. Before moving forward with a purchase, a number of factors were considered, including on-hand inventory, current usage rates, usage rate projections, product price, approval of product sample, delivery schedule, and vendor capacity and integrity. DCAS separately reported to DOI that its Office of Citywide Procurement requested price quotes, samples, delivery timelines, and packaging information from each vendor. DCAS also required input from other agencies leading pandemic response efforts (Health + Hospitals, Department and Health & Mental Hygiene and NYCEM) to validate item specifications, samples, and quantities offered by vendors before processing a procurement. These efforts minimized, but could not eliminate, risks associated with procurements.

For example, one DOI investigation that has already been announced resulted in the federal arrest of a New Jersey man allegedly attempting to deceive and price gouge the City into paying him and his co-conspirators approximately $45 million for PPE he was not authorized to sell and could not deliver. DOI partnered with the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York on that investigation. Notably, that case began with one of this City’s best defenses when it comes to ensuring integrity in contracts: astute and proactive procurement specialists who implicitly understand the complex, exacting details of contracting and related pricing, and question them. In this case, procurement specialists at DCAS questioned the astronomical price, and then City officials reached out to the manufacturer, leading to our criminal investigation.

Twelve agencies or entities reported their PPE needs were exclusively or primarily met by DCAS’ efforts as part of the multi-agency process, thus mitigating individual agency risk in procurement. Forty-three agencies or entities responded that they purchased PPE through existing City requirements contracts, existing certified supply vendors, registered/approved women and minority business enterprises, competitive bids, and/or via on-line retailers such as Amazon. Several of those agencies also stated that they vetted vendors through searches
using a variety of databases, such as LexisNexis, state and federal tax warrant databases, lien and debarment databases, internet searches, and PASSPort, the City’s on-line procurement portal. Finally, six agencies did not indicate their methods for procuring PPE, stated no outside vendors were used, or that PPE purchase was minimal or not necessary to regularly provide to staff, and, therefore, there was no significant corruption risk in this area.

With respect to how agencies minimized corruption risks regarding the storage of PPE, nearly all agencies reported securing PPE in locked storage rooms or other secure locations within the agency, where access was only given to designated or authorized staff. Several agencies also reported the use of surveillance cameras protecting storage locations. Four non-mayoral agencies did not discuss storage protocols in their response and two agencies did not store equipment because DCAS managed the procurement and distribution.

More than seventy-five percent of the responding agencies addressed inventory protocols, including tracking delivery of equipment and conducting frequent counts to monitor usage rates, and to detect fraud and abuse. One agency disclosed that the dramatic increase in usage rates in March and April 2020 rendered accurate tracking and inventory more challenging. As an example, the Office of the City Medical Examiner (OCME) went from supplying 5,000 Tyvek suits per year to providing 5,000 per day. To prevent theft and track supplies, they implemented several initiatives, such as centralizing inventory assessment under a materials logistics unit, which dispatched staff to each agency location to conduct inventory counts and organize the physical storage of all PPE. This permitted reliable monitoring of the usage rate, which, in the initial stages of the pandemic, was higher because the agency provided PPE to personnel in other City offices, such as hospitals, the NYC Police Department, and military personnel. OCME was able to monitor the allocation of such PPE and, despite the high usage rate, the agency reported no indication that PPE was being stolen. The agency also implemented a policy that, for items such as hand sanitizer and disinfecting wipes, locations were required to return the used empty container before refills or replacement units were distributed.
Services Contracts

The City relied on contract services for several elements of its pandemic response. For example, contract services were obtained to distribute food to the elderly, to supplement the City morgue’s capacity, and to provide hotel rooms for persons unable to quarantine at home. Agencies that were responsible for procuring or supervising such services reported following standard internal controls for minimizing fraud, including reviewing contract staffing needs and hours worked, and imposing additional reporting requirements unique to pandemic response contracts. Specifically, agencies reported that contract service providers were required to: (i) track and report on all COVID-19-related expenses beyond the scope of their current contract for which they were seeking reimbursement; (ii) maintain records of all COVID-19 expenditures; (iii) create separate cost centers or grant codes to track costs, and justify the reason for the additional expenses.

Many agencies relied on complaints from end users to identify where contract services were falling short. Agencies would monitor and investigate complaints and request that the service provider make changes if necessary to address identified shortcomings. Some agencies also took a more proactive approach to identifying fraud. For example, before adding hotel capacity, the Department of Homeless Services (DHS) conducted desk audits to ensure compliance with building codes and conducted walk-throughs prior to use to ensure each site was suitable for program needs. Additionally, to detect fraudulent use of City-provided hotel rooms for quarantine, NYCEM created a fraud detection unit to monitor social media, patterns in reservations, and questionable activity at the hotels. Suspicious activity was reported to DOI and additional layers of screening were implemented to verify or cancel certain reservations. Another City agency reported working with DOI to conduct field monitoring of a vendor to verify that services were provided on schedule and in compliance with the contract terms. Unsatisfactory performance was brought to the vendor for remediation. Other fraud prevention methods included the requirement that all work associated with the pandemic must have time-and-materials backup information, changing all service procurements from time-and-material to fixed fee, requiring contractors to certify their understanding of
NYC’s procurement rules and prohibitions, and instructing vendors on the zero-tolerance policy regarding gifts to City employees.

When the pandemic struck New York City in the first quarter of 2020, agencies responded quickly to be able to continue their operations. Employees who were able to work from home were supplied with remote equipment, while essential in-person work sites required the distribution of necessary PPE and, in some cases, the installation of protective barriers as well as increased cleaning. Although the City’s procurement rules were suspended to enable agencies to acquire goods and services through emergency contracts, many agencies nevertheless scrutinized vendors as they normally would, using a variety of sources, including requesting a DOI Vendor Name Check. A centralized group of agencies obtained most of the PPE for the City, creating a storehouse for City agencies. For other needs, some agencies amended existing contracts, thereby using known vendors, City requirements contracts, or certified lists, while others used open bidding. Once contracts were in effect, agencies kept detailed records of secured inventories from receipt to distribution and services were monitored by in-person inspections and video conferences. At each step, agencies reported being mindful of potential fraud and implementing procedures to prevent it.

B. Transition to Remote Work

Following the unprecedented measures taken by the Mayor and Governor to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, including putting in place stay-at-home orders, the majority of City agencies had to quickly transition eligible staff to remote work in mid-March 2020. This was a herculean task because very few City agencies had any routine remote work option at all prior to the pandemic. The shift to telework operating status permitted eligible employees to perform their duties during this period with minimal interruptions and, in most cases, without the suspension of services to the public. Significant efforts were made to ensure that agencies could protect the health and safety of workers, clients, and other stakeholders.

As City agencies transitioned to remote work, several measures were instituted to mitigate the risk of fraud or abuse and to safeguard confidential agency and client information. Such measures included: issuance of City-owned laptops, phones, and mobile devices with
restricted access to agency networks; Virtual Private Network (VPN) utilization by staff to remotely access databases equipped with password protection to mitigate the risk of network intrusions; restrictions on the usage of personal email accounts to send or receive work-related emails; and the implementation of daily conference calls and virtual meetings to ensure attendance and assignments were completed by staff.

Time and Attendance

When the transition to telework occurred, agencies continued to utilize CityTime, the City’s computerized time-and-leave management system, to record employees’ time and attendance while working remotely. However, the rapid transition to remote work presented challenges when not all employees had access to CityTime. For example, one agency coordinated and implemented alternative practices for managers to ensure accurate recording of staff time and attendance in CityTime. This included the increased use of video conferences and telephone check-ins to ensure adequate supervision and monitoring of time, which was then recorded on timesheets until remote access to CityTime was more widely available. Agencies also issued cellphones to staff to allow for continued access to CityTime and oversight by managers.

Additional telework time and leave policies included electronic submission of doctor’s notes for approved sick leave and advanced approval of overtime requests. Many agencies also reported the implementation of split shifts where staff was divided into teams that worked alternate weeks in the office and at home. In some cases, personnel was deployed to other agencies that exhibited a need for additional support. For example, the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) utilized school-based medical staff from the Department of Education (DOE) by reassigning them to hospitals to support the pandemic response when schools closed. Following these redeployments, the DOHMH/DOE Office of School Health worked with partner agencies to monitor employees’ time and attendance through spot checks and phone calls.

An issue that arose for a number of agencies while working remotely was the difficulty for supervisors to monitor staff and ensure they were available and engaged in work activities. In several cases, agency supervisors addressed this issue by assessing employees’ level of
productivity. Additionally, numerous agencies required employees to submit daily task logs to ensure that all assigned tasks were completed. For those employees working in the field, a number of agencies reported that staff were required to continue to use CityTime. Also, City vehicles have geographical location and E-ZPass tools, which allow for monitoring and observation of vehicle usage.

Recognizing the challenges faced with time and attendance tracking when they transitioned to remote operations, the Department of Information Technology and Telecommunications (DoITT) sent guidance via email to all managers and supervisors at the agency to address, among other things, ways to check in with their employees to maintain accountability on a daily basis. The communication also listed steps for managers to actively engage with their team.

The Department of Buildings (DOB) leveraged its use of the Field Force telephonic web application for inspectoral staff who continued to work in the field throughout the pandemic. This web application enabled continued supervisory oversight via location checks and data streams, and proactively identified connectivity issues and other potential route or assignment discrepancies. The agency also created a dedicated email box monitored by the Human Resources (HR) staff to handle COVID-19 related staff inquiries. Employees seeking COVID-19 related sick leave directed their requests to this email box where HR reviewed each matter and made determinations as to the employees’ eligibility for leave.

**Technology and Confidential Information**

In order to support the rapid surge of remote work, DoITT increased the capacity of the City’s remote access infrastructure, accommodating an approximate 900% increase in the number of remote workers. To assist with analysis of data from this system, DoITT’s Information Security Division deployed a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system for collection of log data and development of custom alerts on irregular behavior. The SIEM tool allows the Information Security Division to monitor for suspicious behavior and alert on signs of fraud or cyberattacks across a variety of technologies for CityNet, the Public Safety Answering Center, and all supported agencies.
As agencies shifted to maximum telework operating status during the pandemic to allow telework-eligible employees to perform their duties, all City agencies were required to focus on ensuring that agency systems were secure and that sensitive data remained protected. Given the amount and type of information that is collected and used by government agencies, breaches in government systems may expose individuals’ and clients’ personal information and compromise security. Use of telework can strain an agency’s ability to support operations efficiently and may create additional vulnerabilities. In order to address this, agencies followed procedures to prevent outside infiltration of databases, to identify risks, and to prevent improper use of agency information. The majority of agencies reported that computer access was password protected and, in many cases, different staff members had different levels of access, so permission to open, modify, delete or print information was user-specific. Additionally, in order to mitigate the risk of improper disclosures, agency case information was stored in secured locations and confidential data was maintained on encrypted drives with controlled access. The majority of agencies reported using the citywide VPN and the DoITT-provided Microsoft 365 secured cloud-based service to ensure the protection and security of agency information and confidential data.

For a majority of agencies dealing with confidential agency or client information, access to documents was limited to in-office access only. Those needing access to this type of information were required to physically report to the office, retrieve the information, and return documents to their original place. Employees were reminded not to save or print confidential information on or from home computers, and not to make confidential information accessible to outside parties. The Department of Records and Information Services (DORIS) required a staff member be on site each week to perform a walkthrough of its facilities in order to preserve its historical collections. At its Queens warehouse, a major leak was quickly discovered because of this practice, and staff were called in to remove wet boxes, while a vendor performed freeze-drying and mold remediation.

At least one agency reported that the move to telework placed stress on its network infrastructure and security defenses. With an increase in phishing attacks, the agency took proactive steps by advising its
employees to be more vigilant and cautious, especially when opening links, email, and documents. Similarly, the Office of the Comptroller reported working closely with NYC’s Cyber Command in the execution of phishing exercises, and the identification and remediation of potential malware, viruses, and other cyber threats.

Numerous agencies updated their data privacy measures, security policies, and, in some cases, devices, to prohibit confidential and sensitive data from leaving the organization. For those agencies not issuing agency cell phones, staff were reminded to safeguard their work product and their own personal information by blocking home phone or personal cell numbers when making outgoing calls.

In its effort to resume civil service exam-related activities and mitigate potential risks associated with employees transitioning to remote work, DCAS developed a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) to conduct virtual Test Validation Boards. The SOP was created as a means to safeguard exam materials, ensure security breaches remain low risk, and to track breaches back to the responsible parties if they occur. As another example, the Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) made significant operational changes to ensure continued housing subsidy assistance in response to the pandemic and stay-at-home orders. To mitigate the risk of fraudulent application submission, a digital application includes a unique ID and pre-populates the applicant’s name, allowing staff to verify applicant legitimacy.

At the height of the pandemic, OCME brought on approximately 300 external staff, primarily from government agencies (National Guard, U.S. military, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team). These on-loan staff members were all required to sign confidentiality agreements, which are maintained centrally in the agency’s Legal Department.

In sum, the pandemic forced agencies to shift their traditional office setups to a work-from-home environment. Many agencies were able to quickly implement measures to mitigate the risk of fraud associated with telework. The best mitigation efforts were often increased contact with supervisors, as human contact associated with reviewing CityTime entries and work logs helped agencies identify and rectify possible time and attendance abuse quickly. Additionally, agencies relied on their
Information Technology (IT) departments, as well as Citywide IT departments at DoITT and NYC Cyber Command, to implement new policies or practices aimed at safeguarding confidential agency and client information.

**Agency Anti-Corruption Self-Evaluations**

As part of the anti-corruption program required by EO 105, agencies were asked to address several questions relating to potential corruption hazards over the last year. The responses provided by each agency inform DOI’s understanding of changing corruption hazards within the City and of existing efforts to address those hazards. Responses to the self-evaluation questionnaire are included below, with minimal revision for style, tone, and consistency.

Agencies were specifically asked:

1. What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

2. What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

3. What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

Agencies were also asked: (i) what were the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period; (ii) to reflect on the corruption hazards they identified in 2019, if applicable, and any ongoing mitigation efforts; and (iii) to expound on any additional corruption hazards faced by the agency in 2020.
Office of Administrative Tax Appeals (OATA)

Francis Henn, President/Commissioner
Ann Petterson, Inspector General

OATA consists of the Tax Commission and the Tax Appeals Tribunal. The Tax Commission is responsible for reviewing applications for the correction of tentative New York City (NYC) Real Property Tax (RPT) assessments set by the Department of Finance (DOF), including property classification and full or partial exemptions. The Tax Appeals Tribunal reviews petitions filed by taxpayers protesting statutory notices issued by DOF asserting deficiencies, or denying refunds, of NYC-administered income and non-property excise taxes.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

PPE, including masks and gloves, was procured through the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS) via City Hall. Disinfecting wipes were ordered through a NYC contract. Supplies were available to staff as needed and placed in storage facilities within the agency.

TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

Hearing staff are working both in the office and from home reviewing applications and entering decisions electronically. Each hearing officer is assigned cases to hear on an ongoing basis. After a determination is made on a case-by-case basis, it is entered on secure laptops provided by NYC and transferred electronically to permanent records. Support staff are working both in OATA’s offices and remotely and reporting their time. Time and attendance can be measured by work output.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

All procurement for OATA is done through NYC or New York State (NYS) contracts.
PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

As none of OATA’s functions or activities affect public health and safety, OATA does not believe there are any issues to report.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

OATA’s automated system for selecting cases for review continues to insure that adjustments to assessments are not subject to potential corruption. The agency continues to rotate cases among hearing officers to avoid potential corruption hazards. Security in the Petition Tracking System computer system is more robust and assessment changes are more easily detected than in the former mainframe system.

ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

OATA has nothing additional to report at this time.
Office of Administrative Trials & Hearings (OATH)

Joni Kletter, Commissioner/ Chief Administrative Law Judge
Eleonora Rivkin & Andrew Sein, Inspectors General

OATH is an independent central court that consists of two divisions: the Trials Division and the Hearings Division. The Trials Division adjudicates or settles a wide range of issues referred by City agencies, including employee discipline, retention of seized vehicles, license and regulatory enforcement, real estate and loft law violations, contract disputes, and human rights violations. The Hearings Division adjudicates summonses or notices issued by 23 City agencies and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey regarding alleged violations of City laws.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

Staff who request and approve requisitions differ from the staff that process the purchase orders for the procurement of PPE and other pandemic response equipment, and these staff differ from the staff that process the vendor payments. All items that are not provided by City Hall, purchased from the DCAS Storehouse, or are on DCAS requirements contracts are bid out and awarded to the lowest bidder. The majority of PPE and all other pandemic response equipment is ordered centrally by OATH Operations.

At the start of the pandemic, disinfecting wipes and hand sanitizer were purchased for the OATH Hearing Centers and included in their inventory. Written requests are submitted to the inventory manager to draw down the PPE as needed, and the inventory tracking is updated upon distribution. OATH Operations receives quarterly inventory reports from each division and conducts spot checks to ensure accuracy of reported inventory levels.

Upon receipt, all PPE procured by OATH is inspected, counted, and stored in secure rooms. The staff who inspect and count the materials differ from staff who receive it and/or deliver it. OATH Operations maintains a master PPE inventory tracking sheet and draws down inventory when OATH departments make requests. The departments make requests by submitting tickets, which are tracked, to the Operations email box. Upon disbursement the inventory tracking sheet is updated. The departments are responsible for tracking their on-site PPE inventory and submitting their current inventory levels to Operations upon requesting replenishment.
When the departments receive the order, they lock the supplies in secure storage areas and keep their own internal inventory. Department supervisors make written requests to the department head for supplies. When the on-site inventory needs replenishment and the department head approves the need for more PPE, a request is made to OATH Operations by submitting a ticket.

An OATH Operations staff member is on-site to receive delivery of all pandemic response equipment and ensure that it is installed properly.

**TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK**

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

OATH employees were instructed to sign in and out each day in CityTime if they can access CityTime from their home computers. Employees who are unable to access CityTime from their home computers were instructed to email their work hours to their supervisor at the end of each day. Once the supervisor reviews and approves the employee’s hours, they forward the email with the hours to Timekeeping Services. Supervisors were also instructed to check in with their staff daily and to ensure that staff respond to emails in a timely manner and are completing their daily assigned tasks. If an employee fails to respond to their supervisor’s attempts to contact them, the period of time for which the employee is unavailable is documented and the employee may be docked time or be required to charge the time to annual leave depending on the outcome of the investigation. If an employee is unreachable due to a power failure or internet connectivity issues, for example, the employee will not be docked the time.

OATH HR ensures that the agency is current regarding the Guidance for City Agencies on Leave Policy Applicable During the Outbreak of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) issued periodically by DCAS and that the agency complies with the guidelines.

To safeguard the confidentiality of agency and client information during the transition to remote work, the department heads review and approve all requests for remote access to agency files and systems and submit these requests to the IT department for implementation. Any remote login activity is subjected to Multi-factor Authentication (MFA), which serves to validate the identity of a user by requiring approval in an additional device (such as a phone) in order to confirm the login. Most remote users are limited to a small number of applications, which are securely accessed through DoITT’s secure remote infrastructure. Access to full desktop PCs is limited to users approved at the Deputy Commissioner level; remote PCs are located within OATH’s offices and remain subject to all agency and citywide security controls. OATH was also transitioned from older versions of Microsoft Office, including hosted email, to the newest Microsoft 365, which is far more secure and enforces strong security at all endpoints as well. Additionally, any
agency-issued laptop computers have a full security software stack, consisting of Crowdstrike and McAfee Endpoint Security and are administered by DoITT security to ensure up-to-date signatures and software versions for all laptops. Through these methods, any activity that touches OATH systems is ensured to pass through DoITT’s centrally administered security infrastructure.

### VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

Since the implementation of the health screening process, all contractors are required to complete a visitor health screening assessment and email the health screen submission form to OATH Operations. OATH Operations schedules a staff member to be on-site when non-cleaning contractors engaged in the emergency pandemic response visit OATH’s locations. The health screen submission forms and the associated log are kept on file and document that contractor visited the OATH facility.

Cleaning contractors are required to fill out an additional log which allows OATH to track that the work was completed and verify the name of the individual conducting the cleaning.

### PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

### ADHERENCE TO HEALTH SCREENING ASSESSMENT PROTOCOLS

Staff who were exposed to COVID-19 or who traveled to a state identified by New York State as having widespread community transmission of COVID-19 reported to OATH locations. The staff members were immediately sent home upon identification of their status and counseled on the necessity to comply with agency protocols. Staff who were working on-site in the location were informed of the possible exposure and an agency bulletin was sent to all staff reiterating the importance of complying with the health screening assessment protocols and informing them that failure to do so may result in disciplinary action.

### ADHERENCE TO FACE COVERING REQUIREMENTS

Staff and clients were identified as not wearing face coverings or not wearing them properly. The staff were counseled by their supervisor regarding the face covering requirements while in the office and the Special Officers were counseled to ensure that the clients were wearing face coverings and to provide a face covering if the client disposed of the face covering they were provided upon entering the building. An agency bulletin was sent to all staff reiterating the importance of complying with
the face covering protocols while in the office and informing them that failure to do so may result in disciplinary action.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

OATH identified three major corruption hazards in last year's report: (1) revenue collection, (2) undue influence, and (3) theft of time and property. Risk mitigation efforts have been implemented and are continuing as follows.

REVENUE COLLECTION

As an agency that collects revenue, OATH must be alert to potential corruption and theft. OATH's major revenue source is the collection of fines by the Hearings Division for violations issued by various City agencies. OATH has implemented protocols to segregate the duties and responsibilities of employees who are involved in collection to minimize the opportunity for corruption. These protocols include a system of logging and reconciling payments on a daily basis, storage of payments in safes until deposited into established bank accounts, which must occur within one business day of their receipt, and daily reconciliation of OATH's bank deposits with its internal data.

OATH Trials Division occasionally receives small amounts of revenue in the form of checks, money orders, and/or cash. For these purposes, OATH has written protocols that comply with the safeguards outlined in Comptroller Directive Number One. All checks and money orders are scanned using an Electronic Check Deposit machine the same day they are received and small amounts of cash are secured in a safe until the total reaches $100, at which point the cash is deposited in the bank.

These protocols are in place and have continued to serve to mitigate revenue collection corruption hazards in the current year.

UNDUE INFLUENCE

As a tribunal, there is a risk of OATH's legal and support staff being unduly influenced or compromised in the performance of its adjudicatory function. OATH mitigates this risk by conducting hearings that are open to the public, audio recording those hearings, publishing their decisions or making them readily available, and logging all case activity electronically. As of Fiscal Year 2020, OATH has CCTV cameras in all of its courtrooms and in other public areas of OATH. Judging staff at OATH continue to be subject to various ethical rules, including the Rules of Conduct for City Administrative Law Judges and Hearing Officers of the City of New York. Attorney and non-attorney representatives who appear at OATH continue to be subject to various rules, including OATH rules of procedure governing conduct at OATH (see 48 RCNY §§ 6-23, 6-24, & 6-25). Based on established risk-mitigation protocols, OATH's Office of General continues to refer
instances of potential undue influence violations to DOI arising from complaints and incident reports. All OATH staff receive regularly scheduled mandatory training on conflicts of interest, corruption hazards, and procurement protocol.

Further, in the 2020 reporting period, OATH requested the placement of the Administrative Law Judge title on the Investigation before Appointment (IBA) list. Placement on the IBA list would allow OATH to inquire as to an ALJ applicant's record of criminal conviction prior to extending a conditional offer of employment. This would serve to further mitigate the risk of undue influence for those hired to serve as an OATH ALJ, a position susceptible to bribery and corruption. DCAS confirmed placement of the ALJ title on the IBA list after this reporting period closed.

THEFT OF TIME AND PROPERTY

Like other agencies, OATH is at risk of theft of time and work property by employees. OATH’s Office of General Counsel reviews all allegations of employee misconduct and, as appropriate, reports such allegations to DOI. Department supervisors are actively monitoring and reporting instances of suspected theft of time to the Office of General Counsel, which on behalf of the agency brings disciplinary charges and imposes sanctions, including suspension or termination, when warranted. OATH keeps detailed records of serial numbers for all electronic equipment in an inventory list and updates this list as it purchases new equipment. OATH continues to safeguard all Food Establishment Grade Cards given to OATH by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene in locked safes at each of the Hearings Division locations prior to distribution as warranted.

ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

OATH has additionally identified as a corruption hazard the submission of fraudulent documents by registered representatives to facilitate the dismissal of agency-issued summonses. To mitigate this risk, OATH has begun to implement a rule that mandates the presentation of valid government-issued photo identification by all registered representatives to file a notice of appearance for an in-person hearing, or to submit any motions in person. This serves to facilitate the investigation of fraudulent submissions to OATH by ensuring that photo identification illustrating the identity of any person submitting a document to the OATH Hearings Division in person is recorded.
Department for the Aging (DFTA)

Lorraine Cortés-Vázquez, Commissioner
Eleonora Rivkin & Andrew Sein, Inspectors General

The Department for the Aging’s (DFTA) mission is to eliminate ageism and ensure the dignity and quality of life of diverse older adults. DFTA also works to support caregivers through service, advocacy, and education. DFTA accomplishes these goals by partnering with hundreds of community-based organizations to provide services through senior centers, naturally occurring retirement communities, case-management and home-care agencies, home-delivered meal programs, mental health and friendly-visiting programs, and other programs throughout the five boroughs.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

DFTA obtained PPE and other pandemic response equipment for both its providers and staff. These supplies include cloth and disposable face masks, hand sanitizer, sterile gloves, disinfecting wipes, as well as one-use and no-touch thermometers. Some of these supplies were procured, and others were acquired through the Mayor’s Office.

For DFTA Staff

Each employee was required to sign for their PPE supplies, and employees were instructed to lock any unused or leftover supplies in their offices or cubicles. All staff were provided with lockable storage in their offices or cubicles to store their PPE supplies.

Pending distribution to staff, supplies were securely stored on-site in locked storage rooms and offices, requiring combination codes and/or keys for access, and accessible only to certain staff.

For DFTA Providers

Beginning in March 2020 and continuing through the summer of 2020, DFTA distributed pandemic response equipment and supplies to providers. Supplies included one-use thermometers, disposable masks, sterile gloves, hand sanitizer, and disinfecting wipes. To prevent theft and avoid corruption risks, supplies were stored by the delivery company and delivered directly to providers from the
company’s warehouse. Records of deliveries were created by the company and submitted to DFTA.

DFTA continues to review the steps taken throughout the COVID-19 public health emergency for areas of improvement. DFTA’s Office of Emergency Preparedness and Response (OEPR) has convened work groups to this end, and an example of an immediate step DFTA has taken is that all upcoming requests for program services will now include robust emergency planning and readiness elements.

**TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK**

*What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?*

**Telework**

DFTA swiftly planned for staff transition by ensuring that all staff had remote access to DFTA’s network, migrating DFTA’s entire network to Microsoft 365, integrating Microsoft Teams into workflows, setting up WebEx accounts for virtual meetings, and purchasing necessary assets such as laptops and mobile phones.

When employees transitioned to telework, DFTA distributed a *Teleworking Supervisory Protocol* (Protocol) in compliance with DCAS directives. The Protocol specifies how employees are to account for their time, indicates that employees must adhere to information security protocols when accessing electronic equipment or systems, and that employees must maintain any approved safeguards to protect DFTA records from unauthorized disclosure or damage, and must comply with privacy requirements set forth by the City, among other directives.

Units were and are encouraged to meet regularly with their staff, via Microsoft Teams or WebEx, to ensure regular presence and participation of employees. In addition, DFTA implemented agency-wide daily “Muster” meetings for all staff, to which supervisors were asked to ensure their staff’s attendance.

**Asset Tracking**

All DFTA mobile devices are enrolled in a mobile device management system (Airwatch) through which they are tracked.

**Security Protocols and Confidential Information**

In order to access internal DFTA systems and databases, users must log in twice: once into the Department of Information Technology and Telecommunications (DoITT) virtual private network, and once into DFTA’s system. End-point protection solutions required by NYC Cyber Command have been implemented and are kept updated. Accounts for employees who separate from DFTA are disabled.
DFTA is also currently working on fully implementing Multi-Factor Authentication across the agency, as recommended by DoITT, to enhance security.

When files containing any personal identifying information are transmitted by DFTA staff to third-parties (e.g. providers, contracts), proper levels of security are taken, including but not limited to encrypting and password protecting files.

In addition, DFTA entered into memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with various sister agencies in order to facilitate data sharing of confidential information to aid in parallel emergency efforts. These MOUs detailed specific protocols for the secure transmission of data between DFTA and sister agencies.

**VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE**

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

All contractors engaged to provide emergency services through DFTA were vetted by the Law Department prior to engagement, and some required additional approval by the Mayor’s Office of Contract Services. As is DFTA’s regular practice, the contracts are managed by a program officer such that contractors are closely monitored for quality control and contract compliance.

Throughout the pandemic, DFTA has continued operation of its Aging Connect resource center. Aging connect is DFTA’s information and referral contact center for older adults and their families; in addition to being referred for services and resources, callers can lodge complaints regarding DFTA-funded services with Aging Connect. Complaints are then routed to the appropriate units for follow-up, ensuring that complaints are adequately and appropriately addressed.

**PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

**MEAL DELIVERY**

Meal delivery was identified as a public health and safety corruption hazard issue early on in the COVID-19 public health emergency. It was critical that deliveries were made in a timely manner so that food was delivered to clients fresh and unspoiled. DFTA’s nutrition team worked closely with contractors to ensure that contractors had proper delivery supplies, such as cooling bags and temperature-controlled vehicles.

**MEAL NUTRITION**

A secondary public health challenge to the emergency meal program undertaken by DFT was meal nutrition and the menu review and approval process.
In the early days of the COVID-19 public health emergency, contractors faced difficulty with sourcing food, and DFTA was required to be quite nimble with approving contractor’s menus in order to ensure that clients were served. In addition, for DFTA’s kosher, Glatt kosher, and halal clients, contractors had great difficulty sourcing meals, and thus, substitutions often had to be approved quickly in order to meet demand.

**REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT**

Food related and personnel expenses continue to be areas with potential for corruption and fraud due to the high volume of transactions and variable nature of both areas. Program income, including voluntary contributions, also present an area of risk due to the liquid nature of cash. In 2018, DFTA successfully completed its rollout of the Team Mate audit management software following its adoption and implementation in 2017. The DFTA Financial Compliance Unit uses Team Mate for all financial compliance audits. The DFTA Compliance Audit Unit continues to focus on high-quality audits that yield significant findings.

**ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)**

Not applicable.
The Board of Elections in the City of New York is an administrative body of ten Commissioners, two from each borough, appointed by the City Council for a term of four years upon recommendation by both political parties. The Commissioners appoint a bipartisan staff to oversee the daily activities of its main and five borough offices.

The Board is responsible under New York State Election Law for: voter registration, outreach, and processing; maintaining and updating voter records; processing and verifying candidate petitions/documents; campaign finance disclosures of candidates and campaign committees; recruiting, training, and assigning various Election Day officers to conduct elections; operating poll site locations; maintaining, repairing, setting up, and deploying Election Day operation equipment; ensuring each voter’s right to vote at the polls or by absentee ballot; canvassing and certifying the vote; voter education, notification, and dissemination of election information; and preparing maps of various political subdivisions.

**RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

**PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC RESPONSE EQUIPMENT**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?*

The Board rigidly adhered to the PPB rules as may have been amended by NYS Governor’s Executive Order(s) with respect to all PPE purchases. The Board centralized receipt and distribution of PPE equipment and other items, and distributed them to its various locations on an as-needed basis. Such equipment and items necessary for early voting and election day locations were received and distributed using a similar process. This process was established to ensure an accurate inventory and distribution of supplies, and an ability to track consumption and replacement upon depletion.
### TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

*What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?*

Employees that worked remotely were provided with access to the Board’s Virtual Private Network (VPN). Employees were required to log in to the VPN and then web punch via CityTime to account for work hours. Board MIS staff worked closely with NYC Cyber Command and its cyber security vendor to monitor VPN traffic and guard against external intrusion. The Board limited remote access and precluded databases with certain sensitive data (i.e., voter information records) from being accessed remotely to ensure that such databases remained fully protected within the existing cyber security structure.

### VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

*What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?*

The Board rigidly adhered to the PPB rules as may have been amended by NYS Governor’s Executive Order(s) with respect to all PPE purchases.

### PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

*What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.*

### CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS

The ability to conduct Board operations while maintaining appropriate social distancing is an ongoing challenge.

### REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

Not applicable.

### ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

Not applicable.
DOB promotes the safety of all people who build, work, and live in the City by regulating the lawful use of over one million buildings and construction sites across the five boroughs. With a focus on safety, service, and integrity, DOB enforces the City’s Construction Codes, Zoning Resolution, and the New York State Multiple Dwelling Law. DOB enforces compliance with these regulations and promotes worker and public safety through its review and approval of building plans, permitting and licensing functions, and inspections. In addition to Code and Zoning compliance review, emergency response and professional analysis of accidents to prevent future incidents, the DOB has strengthened its education and outreach programs to provide the construction industry, property owners, and tenants with a heightened understanding of safety awareness.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

As the City transitioned to remote work, DOB remained open to the public and participated in the enforcement of the Governor’s and Mayor’s Executive Orders to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. As a result, the Department had to increase the volume of PPEs it had on-hand to meet its daily needs. Those supplies included hand sanitizer, face masks and cleaning supplies. The Department leveraged several procurement paths to secure PPE supplies which had become scarce in early March 2020. The Department procured supplies through the city office supply vendor WB Mason, micro-purchases and Purchase cards (P-Cards) (total value equals $20,000 or less). The Department also procured supplies through trusted vendors (registered in VENDEX) with which it had previous business relationships and with registered M/WBEs. In rare circumstances where the Department was unable to obtain necessary PPEs, it made purchases through online retailers. For non-PPE supplies such as mobile phones, laptops and other computer accessories, the Department purchased those items from DoITT using Interagency MODs. All other purchases, with the exception of some P-Card purchases by Asset Management and IT (non-PPEs supplies) were made by the Department’s Procurement Unit. All Assessment and IT P-Cards purchases were approved by the Procurement Unit and reconciled within 30 days. Since July, the Department has reduced its dependency on commercial suppliers for PPE related
supplies and has since received supplies directly from DCAS Storehouse and/or Deputy Mayor's Office (DMO) and will only purchase items that cannot be supplied by those entities and with approval from the DMO.

**Storage/Distribution**

The Department stores supplies both at its headquarters (280 Broadway) in Manhattan and in other DCAS buildings where the Department is a tenant. Access to all supplies is monitored and controlled by the Department's Asset Management Unit. Moreover, the unit closely tracks daily supply inventory and resupplies as needed. Employees who are not part of the Asset Management Unit do not have access to any area where supplies are stored. Only authorized members of the Asset Management Unit have access to the storage area. In addition, before any box is removed from the building, DCAS security checks the content of the box to ensure that the employee is authorized to remove the item.

As far as the distribution of supplies, the Unit regularly issues its field staff such as inspectors with individual kits that contain PPEs. The Unit also supplies employees who report to the office with cloth facemasks (2), hand sanitizer and disinfectant wipes as needed. If an employee is short on supplies, they may make a request through their supervisor and/or via a dedicated email box that is monitored by the Asset Management Unit. Upon receipt of the request, the Unit will authorize the request and then deliver the supplies to the director of the Borough Office for further distribution. Employees may also report to headquarters to pick up supplies. To track its inventory, the Unit maintains a database of all supplies received and distributed. The Unit shares the information with Senior Staff and the Commissioner on an ongoing basis.

**Non-PPE Supplies**

In addition to PPEs, the Department also made significant hardware purchases to allow it to transition to the teleworking environment. As discussed in other sections, to facilitate the transition, many employees had to be issued mobile phones and laptops. The IT Department was charged with purchasing and storing the hardware while the Asset Management team was responsible for receiving deliveries and delivering it to the IT Unit, keeping a clear separation of receipt and storage. Because of the value of the hardware, it was stored in DOB's High-Value storage facility at 280 Broadway. That facility is in an area that is separated by a cage door and access is limited to a few IT employees. To distribute equipment, the IT Unit developed a spreadsheet where it identified who already had equipment and who did not. IT then developed a distribution schedule where employees had to come to 280 Broadway to pick up their laptops and activate their mobile phones. Each item's unique serial number was recorded along with the name of the employee who received each item.
What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

As the Department transitioned to a remote work model, the Department focused on several key areas: technology access, employee accountability and communication. First, the Department quickly adapted to remote work by increasing the number of network servers that would allow for employees to access DOB’s network using VPN. In addition, the Department’s IT Department created a dedicated help desk team to assist with all remote access technical issues. The Department ensured that all full-time employees had access and in limited circumstances, hardware was delivered to employee’s homes.

Next, the Department distributed mobile phones and laptops to all full-time employees. Employees were instructed to call forward their office phones to their mobile devices. This allowed anyone calling an employee at their desk to have their call redirected to the employee’s mobile phone. The Department also purchased software licenses to host virtual/online meetings. The virtual or online meetings allowed employees to continue to meet with the public to conduct plan exams and other Department business. It also allowed employees to continue with internal meetings and to connect with their colleagues and staff.

The Department continued to leverage its use of the Field Force Manager (FFM) telephonic web application. This became relevant for inspectoral staff, which remained working in the field throughout COVID, because it enabled continued supervisory oversight, via location checks and data streams, to pro-actively identify connectivity issues and other potential route or assignment discrepancies. Monitoring and reporting of compliance also increased, and was regularly provided to management to improve visibility of operations to identify where adjustments in staff deployment, oversight, or monitoring are potentially required.

To ensure attendance compliance, the Department developed an Oracle attendance dashboard that supervisors could check to ensure that employees logged into the Department’s network on each workday. The Department also developed an application available on both desktops and mobile phones that allowed employees to register their attendance. Employees are expected to register their attendance daily before 9:30 am on each workday. Employees who fail to register their attendance are reminded to register by the HR Unit and supervisors are also required to follow-up with their staff. The attendance data is made available to supervisors by 10:00 am and available in an attendance dashboard. The application reinforces the need for the employee to be accountable and it also gives the Department a clearer real-time picture of the availability of staff members. This process was appropriately vetted internally and
with the unions to ensure cooperation and compliance with requisite rules, contracts, and procedures.

Finally, the Department developed teleworking policies that were distributed to supervisors and employees. The policies addressed obligations and requirements for teleworking. The policies reminded employees of key anti-corruption policies and contained a link to the Department’s Code of Conduct. All key communications were made available on the Department’s intranet. The Department also created a dedicated email box that was monitored by the Human Resource team to handle COVID19 specific staff inquiries. Employees seeking COVID19 related sick leave directed their requests to this email box where the HR team reviewed each matter and made determinations as to the employees’ eligibility for leave.

Moreover, to support the Department’s efforts, Internal Affairs and Discipline (IAD) designated its staff to periodically confer with each unit head to ensure teleworking employees were responsive and compliant with all Department rules and procedures. Wellness checks were conducted to physically ensure the well-being and rule out time-and-leave abuse by employees who were nonresponsive to any Department correspondence for a significant period of time.

**VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?*

To minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response, the Department contracted with VENDEX registered vendors, vendors with whom the Department either already had a contractual relationship with currently or in the past and leveraged the City’s list of registered M/WBEs. This ensured that the contractors had previously been vetted and would be less likely to take advantage of an emergency situation since their reputation and continued working relationship with the City or Department would be at stake.

If the Department was contacted by a vendor with which it did not have any prior relationship, it directed the vendor to a DCAS supplied link to complete a supply registration form. Finally, the Department utilized vendors from Vendor Source and OGS/GSA for emergency procurements. If there were concerns about a vendor, the Department would have referred them to DOI.

**PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

*What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.*

**EXPOSURE TO PUBLIC**

When the pandemic hit, the Department took certain precautions to limit its staff’s exposure to the public. Beginning mid-March, 2020, the Department began
significantly limiting the amount of walk-in customers to DOB offices. Effective Tuesday, March 24, 2020, the Department ceased all in-person plan examination appointments for standard plan review BIS job filings, and all plan sets and documents were required to be uploaded in eFiling. All enforcement units were closed for walk-in service, and alternative telephone or email addresses were provided. By early April, payments for fees, applications, renewals and other Department-related business were required to be paid remotely. While these measures drastically reduced the risk of staff’s as well as the public’s exposure to COVID-19, increasing remote transactions also improved transparency while reducing the risk of theft or corruption.

Executive staff convened daily to ensure that all necessary safety precautions were implemented internally for the sake of staff and on-site customers, and also to coordinate inspection department efforts to keep construction sites safe and, particularly for those shut-down, adequately secured. A COVID-19 team was created to oversee and relay all relevant concerns and to assist in implementing all necessary policies and procedures.

Inspector staff continued working in the field through the pandemic, ensuring construction did not continue in contradiction of New York State Executive Order 202.6, Empire State Development guidance, and New York City Emergency Executive Order 103, which suspended all work on non-essential construction and demolition sites for the duration of the state of emergency. Only essential construction was permitted to continue, pursuant to set criteria and only so long as requisite safety criteria was met. From the beginning of this pandemic, inspectors visited all construction sites to ensure that only essential construction work was being performed. The Department created a portal where applicants were able to obtain a determination of whether a job was essential so that certain work could continue, published a detailed FAQ to answer many of the questions from the construction industry and released maps on the Department’s website to provide the public with tools to determine if construction work was considered essential or non-essential.

As construction reopened, inspectors continued to ensure appropriate safety measures at construction sites, such as requisite distancing, the presence of COVID-19 site safety monitors, and use of PPE such as masks and hand sanitizing products. Dedicated guidelines have been issued by the State to oversee ongoing or reopening construction sites. Many of these guidelines, which detail the requisite safety precautions necessary for reopening, are posted on the Department’s website. As discussed above, posting these requirements serves to protect the health and safety of workers and occupants, as construction sites must adhere to these safety guidelines. Since this guidance was issued in June, Department inspectors have been visiting construction sites proactively to ensure that guidelines are being followed. The inspectors are ensuring that workers on construction sites are physically distanced where possible, wearing appropriate
face coverings, observing occupancy limits in confined spaces, and that hand hygiene stations are readily accessible to workers. Signage must also be posted throughout a site reminding workers to adhere to proper hand hygiene, physical distancing rules, appropriate use of personal protective equipment, and cleaning and disinfecting protocols. Additionally, a safety plan that addresses all aspects of these guidelines must be developed and posted in the building.

Throughout the pandemic, inspectors continue to respond to complaints and emergency situations, which required interaction with the public and exposure at various sites, premises, and structures. As such, the necessary PPE, as described in the above section, has been distributed and is regularly used in the field. Since the beginning of the pandemic, the Department has been sending frequent reminders about use of masks, and spot checks have been conducted by IAD to ensure compliance in the field and office. In addition, onsite staffing has been reduced and the implementation of daily attendance, as discussed above, also requires a health check survey to be completed by those employees reporting in the office or field.

WORK AGAINST EXECUTIVE ORDER PROHIBITING CONSTRUCTION DURING COVID-19

The emergency orders described above prohibited much construction activity for several months. This unanticipated halt caused significant financial distress to the industry, and prompted some construction activity to continue, despite the ban. As such, unauthorized construction activity was a safety hazard that the Department faced. The Department continued to respond to complaints alleging unauthorized construction by speaking with complainants and sending inspectors to the sites. In addition, the FAQs and maps described above empowered the public to better identify and understand whether construction was permissible. This gave the Department additional eyes and ears on the ground, as neighbors and tenants were equipped to report on-going non-essential construction.

Daily COVID-19 sweeps by the Department’s various inspectorial units ensured that such illicit activity was thwarted. Inspectors were assigned to sweeps of construction sites throughout the City, checking for compliance. Approximately 36,000 sites required inspection to safeguard against sites operating contrary to the construction ban. Violations and Stop Work Orders were issued accordingly. Where no work was occurring, inspectors ensured that sites were locked, secured, and properly fenced. The Department regularly issued bulletins to update the industry on permissible construction and all such related requirements, including electronic filings. Of note, the Essential Construction portal was created to enable construction sites to remotely apply for and receive updates on their requests to reopen as essential construction sites. Though construction has gradually reopened, the Department continues to educate the industry and the public on the
new safety requirements, via its continuing COVID-19 Response bulletins, which protects both workers and residents.

**REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT**

In 2019, the Department identified four areas in which the risk for corruption was most significant, as follows: Construction Site Safety Enforcement; External Public and Industry Relations, Accountability, and Oversight to Overcome an Department/Public Knowledge Gap; Tenant Protection During Construction; and Fiscal and Procurement Protocols/ Internal Corruption.

**CONSTRUCTION SITE SAFETY ENFORCEMENT**

While the pandemic has temporarily stunted the rate of growth in the construction industry, as the steep costs and investments continue to mount during these uncertain times, the industry remains vulnerable to corruption, which poses an added risk to public safety. Executive orders issued earlier this year halted nearly all construction for several months and have significantly decelerated the progress of those projects now resumed. Falling behind schedule, with debts owed and projects still outstanding, there are certainly those in the industry who will look to cut corners by engaging in illicit activities, such as using unlicensed/untrained workers, failing to abide by all code requirements, or even attempting to bribe Department employees to ensure their project deadlines are met.

Nevertheless, the Department continues to work throughout the pandemic to focus on its primary mission to ensure construction site safety. Its inspectorial staff consistently asserted its presence in the field, beginning with COVID-19 sweeps to ensure no construction was occurring in violation of the Executive Orders, through its supporting efforts monitoring compliance with the City’s Open Restaurants program, and resuming business as usual through its regular daily inspections as the industry resumes.

**EXTERNAL PUBLIC AND INDUSTRY RELATIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND OVERSIGHT TO OVERCOME A DEPARTMENT/PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE GAP**

Concurrently, the Department’s other units continued to work, both onsite and remotely, servicing customers with licensing, plan examinations, administrative support, and in other areas. The Department’s constant communication and responsiveness remind the public that, despite a Citywide shutdown, the Department remains open and committed to protecting public safety. In addition, throughout this past year, the Department continued training its employees, including code and integrity trainings, and IAD remained responsive to complaints and continued monitoring employee conduct in the field and remotely.
TENANT PROTECTION DURING CONSTRUCTION

The Office of the Tenant Advocate (OTA), which was implemented to be the primary link to tenants affected by construction work in occupied multiple dwellings, was a strong tool in ensuring tenant protection during COVID-19. This past year OTA focused its efforts to improve transparency and access to DOB by implementing proactive strategies. As a direct resource for community groups, partner agencies, and tenants living in buildings under construction, OTA educated the public about construction requirements, helped tenants and their advocates obtain up-to-date information on active construction projects and/or restoration of essential services, and actively identified dangerous or predatory construction practices for the Department’s enforcement activities through the Tenant Harassment Prevention Task Force. Moreover, through the Task Force on Construction in Occupied Multiple Dwellings, OTA continues to work with partner agencies to develop and enhance strategies for improved collaboration, coordination, and enforcement. OTA’s contact information and statistical reports are available on the Department’s public website.

FISCAL AND PROCUREMENT PROTOCOLS/ INTERNAL CORRUPTION

This past year, the Department continued to monitor fiscal infractions, namely any transactions that failed to adhere to citywide or agencywide protocols, and closely assessed those instances where such failures resulted in error. Fiscal Operations remain diligent in enforcing internal controls for cash receipts, and proactively continues to perform random on-site cash receipt reviews of about thirteen cash-collection units at the Department’s six citywide collection centers. While the pandemic halted most in-person transactions for several months and shifted most financial transactions online, Fiscal Operations continued to perform daily post-audit reviews of the units’ reconciliations. Fiscal Operations issued notices of non-compliance to inform the unit managers of errors found and ensure that managers counseled and retrained the affected staff. These notices of non-compliances also serve as a learning tool by identifying and highlighting for staff any major errors, and by updating relevant trainings and Standards Operating Procedures. IAD was notified of all such infractions, and subsequently audited and archived each instance to ensure that repeat mistakes are not occurring and to identify where improvements to the processes may be warranted.

Finally, the Department also improved transparency and mitigated the risk of internal corruption by transitioning more programs to remote processes. While the primary reason for this speedy transition was to ensure the health and safety of staff and the public, increasing the number of electronic filings, payments, and other submissions by customers, licensees, and members of the public serves several additional purposes. It enables the Department to track ongoing construction readily and accurately. It also increases transparency in the processes, minimizing the risk of corruption because all transactions are made
electronically and are easily accessible. Finally, electronic processing enables the Department to better monitor the productivity of its employees, which is particularly important in the current remote work environment, thereby mitigating the risk of waste.

**ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)**

Not applicable.
The Business Integrity Commission (BIC) regulates the private commercial waste (known as “trade waste”) hauling industry and the City’s public wholesale market businesses and wholesalers, and ensures the integrity of businesses in those industries. (BIC also has the authority to regulate the shipboard gambling industry, although that industry currently does not operate in New York City.) Businesses operating in these industries are required by law to apply to BIC for a license or registration. BIC’s core mission includes eliminating organized crime and other forms of corruption from the industries it regulates, and now also includes safety in the trade waste industry. BIC’s staff performs vigorous background investigations of applicant businesses and principals before approving or denying an application. BIC enforces the rules and regulations, regulates the conduct of licensed and registered companies, issues violations, and conducts long-term criminal investigations. By ensuring businesses in the regulated industries possess good character, honesty, and integrity, BIC helps maintain a fair marketplace for all businesses that have contact and work with BIC regulated companies.

**RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

**PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?*

BIC used preferred vendors and M/WBE vendors whenever possible to purchase PPE. When items were not available using these methods, BIC reached out to other agencies for recommendations and requested samples of items prior to ordering. BIC also communicated with New York City Emergency Management (NYCEM) and other agencies on possible options to locate needed items. BIC utilized the open marketplace as needed and compared unit cost as well as related time constraints. BIC followed all agency standard operating procedures for purchasing, including limiting purchasing authority to the Director of General Services with oversight and approval by the Assistant Commissioner of Finance and Administration.

BIC secures all PPE in the BIC storeroom. The Procurement Assistant provides an updated inventory of all PPE to the Assistant Commissioner of Finance and Administration weekly. By maintaining this inventory, that Assistant Commissioner can monitor the overall consumption of the PPE and can detect whether it appears that an unusually large amount of PPE is being removed from the storeroom.
TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

BIC issued a temporary telework policy to employees prior to remote working, which requires disclosure of each employee’s physical work location and requires prior approval of an alternative location. During remote work, supervisors check in on their employees regularly, monitor productivity, and have regular virtual unit staff meetings to discuss work. Staff were reminded to safeguard all work product and information, as well as safeguard their own personal information, such as blocking their personal home phone or cell numbers if they had not been issued an agency cell phone. In some instances, staff were issued agency cell phones to aid in performing tasks more efficiently and securely. Overtime must be approved in advance of an employee working more than scheduled work hours. BIC’s IT Unit issued agency laptops to most staff and assisted other staff with utilizing their own home computers; all computers utilize the DoITT mandated VPN solution to connect remotely to the employee’s agency desk workstation. BIC IT also implemented NYC Cyber Command’s mandated Multi-Factor Authentication for all staff.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

BIC used preferred vendors and M/WBE vendors whenever possible to purchase PPE. When items were not available using these methods, BIC reached out to other agencies for recommendations and requested samples of items prior to ordering. BIC also communicated with NYCEM and other agencies on possible options to locate needed items. BIC utilized the open marketplace as needed and compared unit cost as well as related time constraints. BIC followed all agency standard operating procedures for purchasing, including limiting purchasing authority to the Director of General Services with oversight and approval by the Assistant Commissioner of Finance and Administration. BIC has not paid vendors for such products until the items have been delivered and inventoried.

BIC researched multiple online vendors for signage, decals, and other items needed to prepare the office workspace for future reopening.

BIC utilized a building-recommended vendor for sanitizing the office space. Prior to BIC contracting for those services, the BIC procurement officer reached out to the Law Department for a referral, as they had used this vendor on multiple occasions during the pandemic. The vendor had the proper insurance and provided their services on short notice.
BIC has sanitized agency vehicles twice so far during the pandemic. BIC got the name of an approved vendor from DCAS, and BIC set up appointments for each agency car. The bills were sent directly to the DCAS ARI system.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

*What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.*

HEALTH AND SAFETY OF BIC ESSENTIAL WORKERS

This reporting period, BIC investigators and market agents faced a new unknown risk: exposure to COVID-19. These are BIC’s essential workers: they enforce the laws and rules of the trade waste hauling industry (including safety on the streets) and the public wholesale market businesses; they have face-to-face encounters with trade waste collection vehicle operators and helpers, and wholesalers, retailers, and their employees. Without continued enforcement, there is a greater potential for corruption and safety issues in these industries. To mitigate exposure to the virus, BIC’s strategies to safeguard essential workers included issuing masks and hand sanitizer to staff, scheduling staggered work hours to ensure social distancing when in the office, supervisors managing field work and giving direction on interaction with the public and BIC applicants, and the head of HR monitoring the health screening report. Additionally, BIC investigators and market agents distributed PPE, as provided to BIC by the City and the New York State Dept. of Transportation, to those trade waste and market companies in need during the pandemic. This PPE inventory was kept separate and secure from agency inventory. The Executive Director of Investigations closely tracked requests by industry companies, as well as the distribution of PPE. This was reported to the BIC Commissioner/Chair and members of BIC senior staff regularly.

HEALTH AND SAFETY OF BIC FRONT LINE STAFF

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic this reporting period, BIC Licensing Unit and Administration Units staff faced risk upon coming into the office. BIC strategies to safeguard agency front line staff included issuing them masks and hand sanitizer, made available sanitizing wipes, scheduling staggered work hours to ensure social distancing when in the office, coordinating safe transportation to and from the office, supervisors closely managing staff, and the head of HR monitoring the daily health screening report.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

As discussed in last year’s report, BIC’s senior staff continues to closely supervise employee behavior in matters of the approval or denial of licenses/registrations and sales transactions, the issuance of violations, and the settling or negotiation of fines. Agency management must not only concern itself with the context and
quality of employees’ decisions or actions, but must focus on their motivations as well. Managers periodically meet with staff to discuss specific proposals for actions before they are implemented, paying particular attention to a staff member’s explanation for conclusions and recommendations. Managers conduct regular in-depth case reviews with staff to obtain full briefings regarding staff’s contact and correspondence with applicants and licensees as well as conduct periodic internal audits of staff’s work, if necessary, to detect possible patterns suggestive of corruption. Additionally, managers remain acutely aware that they must report any concerns or suspicions immediately and directly to the IG for BIC, and cooperate fully with any investigation that ensues. The BIC complaint system and all requests for agency funds receive multiple levels of approval.

**ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)**

The circumstances of the pandemic during this reporting period add a potential increased risk of bribe offers or other forms of corruption by BIC licensees or registrants, or other members of the public. As mentioned in past anti-corruption reports, a variety of BIC employees are vulnerable to attempted corruption as a means to avoid or ease enforcement, ensure selective enforcement, obtain competitive advantages over rivals, or secure agency approval of transactions that might otherwise be denied. In the normal course of their job, BIC investigators and market agents have face-to-face encounters with licensees and registrants, their employees, and other members of the public. As the agency’s essential workers during this pandemic, BIC investigators and market agents are in a position of greater risk to attempted corrupt influence given the resulting atmosphere of financial stress on businesses everywhere and the likelihood that corrupt individuals will attempt to take advantage of this unpredictable time. BIC staff are under close supervision and communicate directly with their supervisors who monitor employee behavior in all tasks and audit productivity. Agency management must not only concern itself with the context and quality of employees’ decisions or actions, but must focus on their motivations as well. Managers meet with staff to discuss specific proposals for actions before they are implemented, paying particular attention to a staff member’s explanation for conclusions and recommendations. Managers conduct regular in-depth case reviews with staff to obtain full briefings regarding staff’s contact and correspondence with applicants and licensees. BIC senior staff coordinate closely and regularly with the Commissioner/Chair. Maintaining strong internal lines of communication and close supervision of tasks by supervisors are key to keeping BIC employees informed and safe.
Administration for Children’s Services (ACS)

David A. Hansell, Commissioner
Laura Millendorft, Inspector General

The Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) provides services to ensure the safety and well-being of New York City’s children and families.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

At the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, the ACS Division of Administration (Admin) built a 3-month model that estimated ACS’ weekly and monthly usage of PPE based on the total number of staff members, mission essential functions, average number of clients served ACS-wide, and the life span of the PPE. Distribution priorities for PPE, hand sanitizer, and cleaning supplies were afforded to our public facing units with staff that provide home visits and family assessments, or direct services to children in our care and youth in our custody. To prevent excessive ordering, hoarding, fraud waste and abuse, Admin centralized all PPE related supplies at the ACS Warehouse. Inventory is reported on a daily and weekly basis and stock levels are reviewed frequently using the inventory reports to ensure that unusual usage trends do not develop, and that fraud, waste, and abuse can be quickly identified.

Regarding PPE distribution, ACS established a protocol for acquiring PPE items. The Chiefs of Staff for each Division are required to submit the PPE needs for their respective Divisions via a form to the Commissioner’s Office, where the “orders” are recorded in a master spreadsheet. Admin then facilitates packaging, coordinating, delivering, and creating delivery receipts. The receipts note the content of the supplies being delivered and a signature is required from both the person delivering the PPE and the person receiving the PPE delivery. This established protocol allows ACS to control the distribution of PPE as well as to account for where the PPE is distributed.

ACS Custodians are required to submit an inventory of available supplies every two weeks. All cleaning supplies have an approximate burn rate based on the usage guidance provided to each Custodian. Multiple levels of ACS managers routinely review inventory supply levels for consistency with the usage guidance to ensure appropriate usage, depletion, and replenishment of supplies.
TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

The ACS Office of Information Technology (OIT) provided ACS-issued mobile devices (either laptops or tablets) to staff who use confidential ACS or client information in order for these staff to work from home. These mobile devices were issued using the DoITT-provided Mobile Device Management software system and meet or exceed citywide cybersecurity policy and are encrypted. In addition, OIT implemented Multi-Factor Authentication for all ACS and Contract Agency Remote Access users per citywide guidance. ACS also procured secure video platforms for videoconferencing in alignment with citywide guidance.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

The ACS Office of Procurement implemented several anti-corruption measures to meet ACS’ pandemic-related purchasing needs. For example, ACS amended current active contracts, which has allowed ACS to utilize known vendors. ACS also continued to conduct responsibility determinations, scrutiny of invoices and close monitoring of its vendors. For Human Services pandemic-related needs, ACS utilized budget modifications and amendments that permit ACS to modify scopes of work under mayoral emergency declarations. ACS solicited and approved those budget modifications through a citywide process designed and closely monitored by the Mayor’s Office of Contract Services and the Office of Management and Budget. ACS also utilized the Department of Citywide Administrative Services requirements contracts for micro purchases of PPE.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

CONTRABAND REDUCTION WORK IN SECURE DETENTION

Sometimes youth in ACS’ secure detention facilities, Horizon Juvenile Center and Crossroads Juvenile Center, attempt to gain access to contraband that can compromise facility security and pose a risk to themselves or others. As ACS’ population of youth has grown older since the implementation of Raise the Age, ACS has seen an increase in contraband found within these facilities. With the support and assistance of partners such as DOI, the New York State Office of Children and Family Services and the New York State Commission of Correction, ACS is implementing a multi-pronged contraband reduction plan. The
enhancement of the frequency and thoroughness of youth and unit searches is an important element of this plan.

ACS has enhanced its core Youth Development Specialist (YDS) pre-service training and instituted an on-going series of roll-call trainings for supervisors and line-staff in both detention facilities aimed at improving the quality and effectiveness of youth searches. The trainings focus on increasing the frequency of searches of youth and their rooms, as well as on effective techniques for performing youth searches to increase the likelihood that contraband secreted by youth is discovered. ACS is conducting random youth searches at a far greater frequency, and the thoroughness of these searches is more comprehensive than in the past.

Further, ACS is developing a protocol for targeting youth who have a history of contraband possession for unscheduled personal searches as frequently as twice daily and for searching their rooms at more frequent intervals than in the past. Additional staff also escort these youth as a means of more closely supervising their actions.

Managers have built into their supervision practices the regular review of video footage to identify both effective as well as ineffective or improper staff practices related to youth searches and supervision. Staff have received refresher training on maintaining healthy professional boundaries with youth and the exercise of these boundaries is a regular focus of supervisory efforts.

A significant new feature of the ACS search capacity is the conducting of canine searches throughout both facilities, which involves a collaborative partnership with DOI. Trained canines and handlers have proven extremely effective in locating contraband and, we believe, equally effective in deterring the introduction of contraband to the facility by staff or visitors.

In addition to the more aggressive youth search procedures, housing unit searches have increased significantly in terms of both frequency and thoroughness. Teams of trained staff are now performing housing unit searches each day, sometimes multiple times a day. These random searches involve a detailed sweep of each youth’s room and all personal items, as well as the bathrooms/showers and all common areas. The randomness of these searches is such that the same unit could be searched several days in a row, thereby reducing predictability and increasing effectiveness.

ACS security staff have also developed and digitized a tour inspection form that has improved the quality and consistency of thorough inspections in all parts of the buildings. The digital version of this form is not yet finalized but is being tested at both facilities and will be fully implemented once finalized. The digitized form is maintained on an electronic tablet allowing staff completing these forms to efficiently and thoroughly cover all critical areas in need of inspection and search, while maintaining a detailed record of completion. In addition, staff utilize these
forms to immediately identify areas of the facilities that have been damaged or fallen into disrepair and require prompt remediation.

**LANGUAGE ACCESS SERVICES**

New York City is the most linguistically diverse city in the country. About 23% of New Yorkers are limited-English proficient, meaning they need interpretation or translation services in order to communicate with ACS staff and ACS’ contracted provider agency staff. As such, ACS contracts with third party vendors to provide in-person, video-remote and telephonic interpretation and translation services, which are free of cost to families. Providing quality, efficient interpretation services is a fundamental part of ACS’ equity goals and is critical to ACS’ mission to keep children safe and to support families with the services they need to keep children safe.

In Fiscal Year 2019, ACS spent almost $800,000 on in-person interpretation services, which were provided through a third-party interpretation vendor and tracked using carbon copy voucher forms. However, in February 2020, ACS moved its language access contract management into the ACS Office of Immigrant Services and Language Affairs (ISLA), to have language access contract management and policy in one office. Because ISLA was new to contract management, they sought the support and guidance of the ACS Office of Agency Accountability (OAA) regarding how to incorporate best practices into their contract management work. Under the guidance of OAA, ISLA began tracking all the surplus, or unused, voucher numbers at every ACS location. ISLA also implemented safeguards to minimize the risk of fraud and abuse by storing the physical surplus vouchers under lock and key and working with the vendor and ACS divisions that used the paper vouchers to maintain consistent communication regarding the status of voucher service provision.

In March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic also impacted ACS’ language access services and contract management processes. Due to social distancing guidelines, in-person interpretation was no longer advisable. Instead, ACS language access contract management staff worked closely with the vendor to transition services to video-remote interpretation (where a live interpreter appears via video conference). Moreover, it proved impossible to distribute and collect physical language access services vouchers to and from ACS employees who were now largely working off-site. ACS language access contract management staff (with the advice and support of OAA) adapted by developing a new tracking system for Video Remote Interpretation (VRI) sessions, replacing physical vouchers. ACS staff are no longer required to obtain and submit a physical voucher, which had previously been an additional step when obtaining interpretation services for their clients. Further, ACS has cut down the invoice certification time by more than a week, so the vendor receives payments much faster.
In addition, ISLA now receives quick quality assurance feedback from the relevant ACS staff on each interpretation session, and the tracking system is able to account for every interpretation session each month, helping to protect the agency against fraud. This feedback is obtained via email: ISLA sends a follow-up email to every staff member who requests a video-remote interpretation session, confirming that the session was held and asking the staff member to complete a survey about the session quality.

Because of the success of this new VRI-tracking system, ISLA is working to expand the system to all in-person interpretation requests, completely phasing out physical voucher usage. While the number of in-person interpretation requests are still low due to social distancing guidelines, ACS anticipates an increase once social distancing guidelines are relaxed. ACS plans to test-run the system for in-person interpretation requests and fully implement the system for all language access in-person and VRI services by the beginning of 2021.

**REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT**

**CHILD CARE SUBSIDY FRAUD MITIGATION EFFORTS**

ACS conducted a database clean up to ensure that all voucher child care providers in the Automated Child Care Information System, ACS’ child care subsidy system of record, had correct and updated licensing status. ACS has sought recoupment from closed providers when necessary and continues to receive a monthly exception report to ensure accurate provider licensing status. The ACS OAA continues to work closely with the ACS Division of Child and Family Well-Being, the ACS Office of the General Counsel, and the ACS Division of Financial Services to carefully review various areas of the child care voucher program, conducting audits and reporting possible incidences of fraud to DOI and to the Human Resource Administration’s Bureau of Fraud Investigation. In 2020, ACS has seen a reduction in fraud referrals as a result of many child care programs and providers being closed due to the pandemic and fewer families seeking subsidized care. To date, ACS has identified over $55,000 in 2020 payments for recoupment.

**ENSURING STAFF SAFETY IN SECURE FACILITIES**

ACS continuously strives to achieve a safe work environment in both Horizon Juvenile Center and Crossroads Juvenile Center. To that end, ACS has taken multiple steps to reduce incidences of staff assaults and to ensure our staff feel safe in their work environment, which also contributes directly to improving youth and staff performance, as well as boosting staff morale. The ACS Division of Youth and Family Justice (DYFJ) enters all incidents and other information into the Group-Oriented Analysis of Leadership Strategies (GOALS) database and, on a monthly basis, a multidisciplinary team reviews a variety of safety metrics.
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Administration for Children's Services

contained in the GOALS database to identify patterns and trends in the data and inform practice and/or policy.

The DYFJ Leadership Team ensures that all staff are properly trained, and that supervisors consistently promote and enforce conduct expectations, professional relationships/boundaries, group dynamics, situational leadership and de-escalation techniques. DYFJ has expanded its contract with JKM Training, Inc., the developer of Safe Crisis Management (SCM), to include monthly on-site trainings for YDSs in order to provide more opportunities for these staff to refine, practice, and successfully apply crisis prevention and verbal de-escalation skills to safely manage conflict within the facilities. ACS expanded its SCM training capacity by training and certifying 15 additional ACS detention staff as SCM trainers. The trainers kicked off the first skill builder trainings for staff at Horizon in late January 2020 and completed approximately six sessions before COVID-19 forced a pause. These trainings resumed in August 2020 and as of September 2020, almost 60 staff have participated in these skill builders since then.

In addition, YDS supervisors at both facilities participated in a new Supervisory Core training curriculum, which emphasizes guidance on situational awareness and safe youth engagement strategies.

ACS’ Detention leadership relies on post-incident video reviews to assess a YDS’s skill, situational awareness and decision-making. More than 100 video cameras are located strategically throughout each of ACS’ secure detention facilities, capturing virtually all incidents as they occur. ACS managers systematically review video of any incident that involves a high-level restraint, mechanical restraint or child abuse allegation. Additionally, videos of youth-on-youth and youth-on-staff assault are reviewed. Supervisors review select videos with YDSs and offer instruction and guidance on strategies, methods and techniques of safely managing youth.

ACS has a contract with the National Partnership for Juvenile Services to strengthen the STRIVE behavior management system and formally implement Cognitive Behavioral Therapeutic practices, which are already in use at both facilities. All staff receive training in the STRIVE behavior management system, which focuses on maintaining a safe and secure environment and improving the behavior or residents in ACS’ secure detention facilities by offering a range of incentives for positive behavior and consequences for negative behavior.

ACS has also implemented Core Supervisory training to all mid-level managers and supervisors in ACS’ juvenile detention centers to provide supervisors with the skills they need to properly manage and coach staff, while also creating a stable and safe environment for everyone.

ACS has issued security belts to all YDS staff to help secure items such as radios, keys, and personal protective gear such as gloves and masks. This allows YDS
staff quick access to these items and the ability to use their hands while ensuring that their security equipment is safely secured.

Finally, ACS views enriched programming and daily recreation as critical methods of improving engagement and eliciting positive youth behavior. At both secure detention facilities, youth have daily access to multiple recreation spaces, including gymnasiums, grassy fields, basketball and handball courts, and courtyards (outdoor spaces are used weather permitting). Activities are consistent with ACS’ efforts to maintain social distancing among youth and staff while working to ensure that youth have at least one hour of large muscle exercise each day.

**TRANSITION OF THE PROCUREMENT CARD OVERSIGHT FUNCTION COMPLETED**

The ACS Procurement Card (P-Card) Unit provides technical assistance to cardholders and cardholder approvers regarding P-Card usage and serving as the single point of contact between ACS and the Department of Citywide Administrative Services’ citywide P-Card Unit. The ACS P-Card unit conducts initial and annual P-Card training for all cardholders, cardholder approvers, and stakeholders and has implemented a quarterly audit process whereby 25 percent of the cardholders’ transactions and processes from each ACS Division are reviewed and corrective actions implemented as needed. ACS is finalizing a comprehensive P-Card policy to clearly detail and define roles, responsibilities, business processes and transaction requirements.

**CS-900 UPDATED**

The rollout to all ACS divisions is complete. Paper/PDF versions of the CS-900 requisition forms are no longer accepted. ACS continues to modify and enhance the new electronic requisition form system to incorporate user experience and feedback. Some enhancements that are currently being developed with the IT office include adding a role for the buyer in Procurement and adding the functionality to include budget structure information for capital projects. Many additional minor updates are being made to the system to improve workflow and user experience. Once PASSPort is fully implemented, the CS-900 Requisition System will only be used for micro purchases and small purchase solicitations.

**ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)**

None identified.
Office of the Comptroller

Scott M. Stringer, Comptroller
Eleonora Rivkin & Andrew Sein, Inspectors General

Comptroller Scott M. Stringer is New York City’s Chief Financial Officer, an independently elected official. The Office of the Comptroller safeguards the City’s fiscal health, roots out waste, fraud, and abuse in local government, and ensures that municipal agencies serve the needs of all New Yorkers.

The Comptroller’s responsibilities include:

- Conducting audits of all City agencies in accordance with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards;
- Serving as a fiduciary to the City’s five public pension funds;
- Providing comprehensive oversight of the City's budget and fiscal condition;
- Reviewing City contracts for integrity, accountability, and fiscal compliance;
- Resolving claims both on behalf of and against the City;
- Ensuring transparency and accountability in setting prevailing wage and vigorously enforcing prevailing wage and living wage laws; and
- Promoting policies that enhance City government’s commitment to efficiency, integrity, and performance for all New Yorkers.

The Comptroller’s Office is composed of a staff of approximately 800 employees, including accountants, attorneys, economists, engineers, IT professionals, financial and investments analysts, claim specialists and researchers, and administrative support staff.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

The Office of the Comptroller adheres to Chapter 13 of the City Charter and the Procurement Policy Board Rules when procuring PPE and other pandemic response equipment. All PPE was purchased through the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS) in two ways:

- From existing Citywide Requirements Contracts led and managed by DCAS; and
Directly from DCAS, which maintains a supply of certain items in the City’s central storehouse. All items procured through DCAS have been certified by the Agency that the products meet the City’s specifications.

The Office of the Comptroller continues to use its procedures and precautions to safeguard all goods which pre-date the COVID-19 pandemic, which include the following:

- We continue to follow the prescribed separation of duties involving the receipt, inventory, and distribution of goods. Our requisition and inventory software application provide audit trails including employee name, date, and time of transactions;
- All deliveries are fully coordinated and scheduled in advance to ensure supply room staff are available to receive goods. All PPE and other pandemic response equipment are entered into the agency’s supply inventory database and tagged as “COVID” followed by a description of the item (i.e., COVID-19 Face Masks); and
- All COVID PPE and other related supplies are distributed using the agency’s internal supply requisition system, which requires Bureau-level approval. Employees are then notified to retrieve, review, and sign for their supplies.

All goods (including PPE and other pandemic response equipment) are located in a designated secure storage room. The supply room can be accessed only by three authorized employees with electronic ID swipe access. In addition, surveillance cameras are set up in the supply room, corridors, and public hall areas leading to the supply storage area. In the unlikely event of theft, DCAS police will be notified immediately.

**TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK**

*What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?*

The Comptroller’s Office was among the first agencies to move to full remote work on March 13, 2020. On the same day, all of the agency’s employees, received an email regarding Telework Guidelines which incorporated many of the requirements of DCAS’s Personnel Services Bulletin (PSB) 600-3, “Temporary Citywide Policy for City Employees during the COVID-19 Outbreak.” This included, but was not limited to, timekeeping; compliance with Terms and Conditions of Employment; following security protocols; and employee responsibilities to protect agency records from unauthorized disclosure or damage. In addition, the Office of the General Counsel distributed to the entire agency Citywide guidance from the Law
Department concerning document confidentiality protocols and COVID-19-related litigation holds.

Further internal controls instituted by the Comptroller’s Bureau of Information Systems and Technology (BIST) regarding the use of devices and access to the agency’s applications and systems strengthened compliance. Particularly, BIST has numerous hardware and software-based components in the technology infrastructure of the Comptroller’s Office to ensure the security of confidential information. Additionally with a remote work environment, the Comptroller’s Office has utilized multi-factor authentication as an added security step for all Comptroller remote users to gain access to the agency’s applications. BIST also applies software updates on a regular basis, inventories and tracks all office-issued phones and laptop PCs, and works closely with NYC’s Cyber Command in the execution of phishing exercises, and the identification and remediation of potential malware, viruses, and other cyber threats.

**VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?*

No contractors were engaged by the Office of the Comptroller to participate in the emergency pandemic response. All procurements performed during the pandemic were done so in a manner that was consistent with the Charter, Administrative Code, PPB Rules, and best practices for determining a vendor’s responsibility prior to awarding a contract.

Furthermore, the Comptroller’s Office has called for the Mayor’s Office to rescind Emergency Executive Order 101 so that the checks and balances in the City’s procurement process can be restored.

**PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

*What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.*

**RISKS IN THE PERFORMANCE OF AUDITS**

As noted, the Comptroller’s Office audits City agencies, including those whose functions affect public health and safety. GAO’s Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS), the standard under which most of the Comptroller’s Office audits are conducted, impose controls that minimize corruption hazards in the performance of these audits. Specifically, GAGAS mandates extensive ethics and independence measures (see, e.g., Chapter 3) and the establishment of a system of quality control to ensure compliance with professional standards and applicable legal and regulatory requirements (see, e.g., Chapter 5). To ensure strict compliance with these and other critical audit requirements, the Audit Bureau has established a Quality Assurance Unit (QA) that functions independently from
the audit teams and that reports directly to the Deputy Comptroller for Audit and Investigations. The function and authority of the QA Unit is detailed in the Comptroller’s Office Audit Manual. Adherence to the GAGAS requirements of ethical conduct and independence, as well as proper supervision, competence, and adherence to professional standards is further ensured through mandated external peer reviews that must be performed once every three years. In these peer reviews, selected audits are closely reviewed and staff at every level of the organization are interviewed as part of the peer reviewer’s evaluation of the Audit Board’s adherence to ethical and professional standards.

**REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT**

Not applicable.

**ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)**

Not applicable.
New York City Council
Corey Johnson, Speaker
Eleonora Rivkin & Andrew Sein, Inspectors General

As the legislative body of New York City, the City Council, which is made up of 51 members, introduces and votes on legislation that governs the City. The Council negotiates the City budget with the Mayor and approves its adoption. With its general powers of oversight, the Counsel ensures that City operations and services are effectively and efficiently carried out. The Council reviews land use proposals and helps determine the growth and development of the City.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

UNSCRUPULOUS VENDORS

In an effort to mitigate the risks of contracting with vendors engaging in corrupt business practices, the Council procured goods and services from vendors on preapproved City and State lists and/or conducted business with vendors with a preexisting relationship.

MISINFORMATION

In an effort to mitigate the spread of misinformation on COVID-19, the Council, through its oversight committees, such as the Committee on Health and the Committee on Hospitals, holds monthly hearings to ensure that City hospitals and agencies are responding to COVID-19 in accordance with CDC guidance and effectively providing vital information to the public.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

Not applicable.

ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

Not applicable.
Department of City Planning (DCP)

Marisa Lago, Chair/Director
Gregory Cho, Inspector General

DCP is the City’s primary land use agency and is instrumental in designing the City’s physical and socioeconomic framework. DCP supports the New York City Planning Commission in fulfilling its Charter mandated responsibilities for the conduct of planning relating to the orderly growth, improvement, and future development of the City, including adequate and appropriate resources for the housing, business, industry, transportation, distribution, recreation, culture, comfort, convenience, health, and welfare of its population. DCP additionally conducts studies related to land use matters, collects statistical and other data, and records all legally authorized changes to the City map. The Commission consists of thirteen individuals with seven members appointed by the Mayor, one each appointed by the borough presidents, and one appointed by the Public Advocate. The Director of DPC serves as Chair of the Planning Commission. Other than the Chair, the appointment of members of the Planning Commission is subject to the advice and consent of the City Council. All meetings of the Planning Commission are public.

The Commission certifies and votes on land use applications in accordance with the City’s Uniform Land Use Review Process. The applications involve requests for re-zonings, special permits and waivers, as well as City real property acquisitions and dispositions and site selections for capital projects.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

Until recently, DCP staff have all worked remotely since March, and accordingly DCP did not procure or provide PPE and pandemic response equipment for its staff. DCP provided limited PPE (hand sanitizer, wipes, etc.) in its offices before beginning to remotely work in March, and since reopening for very limited onsite work in October, has similarly provided limited PPE for employees coming to the office. Everything was procured either through DCAS or through DCP’s standard procurement process. DCP maintains a PPE inventory that is reviewed monthly, and all PPE is stored in a central, locked storage room until it is needed.
TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

As for confidential information, DCP maintains confidential data on encrypted drives with controlled access. When working remotely with such data, staff are required to work on their office PCs, accessing them by Remote Desktop. As for time and attendance, each employee is required to account for 35 hours each week, to list any leave taken each week, and to report whether he or she is fully deployed. Supervisors can monitor whether employees are working by assessing their productivity.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

DCP did not engage any contractors to participate in emergency pandemic response.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

As mentioned, DCP staff have been working remotely since March, and DCP’s offices were closed for work until October. In October, DCP’s main office reopened for limited on-site work on a voluntary basis. DCP has no employees who regularly work in the field, conduct inspections, provide services to the public, enter or oversee construction contracts, or work in secure facilities. Any equipment made available to DCP employees working remotely is tracked and PPE is inventoried. Based on this, we believe that public health and safety corruption opportunities as a result of the pandemic are extremely limited or de minimis.

Because all significant discretionary determinations regarding land-use planning are made by the Planning Commission, a public body which, as indicated above, consists of 13 members representing diverse constituencies, there is limited opportunity for corruption to influence Commission decision-making. Further, the determinations made by the Department’s Director apart from the Planning Commission are extremely limited in scope, and principally consist of non-discretionary certifications of conformance with zoning. Hence, the nature and extent of corruption hazards or risks that may affect public health or safety is extremely limited or de minimis.
REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

DCP continued to implement the items identified in last year’s report. Specifically:

All Planning Commission actions, as required by law, are taken in public.

- Planning Commission members are subject to the City’s Conflict of Interest Board (COIB) policies, and regularly consult with General Counsel and COIB on conflict issues. Where required, Planning Commission members are recused from voting on matters where a conflict exists.

- DCP requires that, other than testimony at public meetings, communication by the public with the Planning Commission be conducted in writing, and that all written communications are shared with all commissioners.

- With regard to Director determinations, in each instance there is an agency record created that includes staff analysis and recommendation supporting the requested determination. The General Counsel reviews each recommendation before the Director’s approval.

In addition, last year’s report noted that annually the General Counsel issues an operating protocol to Planning Commissioners, including rules on communication in writing with public, and reminds the Commissioners and Director about conflict of interest rules. The 2020 protocol and reminder will be issued before the end of 2020.

ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

Not applicable.
DCAS’ primary responsibility is to provide value-added and effective shared services to support the operations of New York City (NYC) government. Its commitment to equity, effectiveness, and sustainability guides its work with NYC agencies on:

- Recruiting, hiring, and training employees;
- Providing facilities management for 55 public buildings;
- Acquiring, selling, and leasing NYC-owned property;
- Purchasing more than $1 billion in supplies and equipment each year; and
- Implementing energy conservation and safety programs throughout NYC’s facilities and vehicle fleet.

**RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

**PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?*

Despite the uncertainty of the pandemic, DCAS swiftly instituted emergency protocols to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE. The procurement and dissemination of PPE to agency employees and its clients was paramount to minimizing the spread of COVID-19 and to ensuring a safer work environment for DCAS’ essential workers (e.g., custodial/maintenance/fire safety staff and DCAS Police Officers). To comply with public health and safety standards, DCAS kept a supply of PPE and made PPE readily available to DCAS staff and its clients. Each line of service followed DCAS’ existing procurement procedures when ordering PPE for staff assigned to report to agency work sites.

DCAS also developed and made enhancements to its in-house Warehouse Management System (WMS) to track all procurements from initial intake to inventory distribution. DCAS Office of Citywide Procurement (OCP) requested quotes, samples, delivery timelines, and packaging information from each vendor. Throughout this review process, DCAS required input from agencies leading NYC’s response efforts to validate item specifications, item samples, and quantities being offered by each vendor. These agencies, New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (H+H), the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene...
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(DOHMH), and New York City Emergency Management, needed to sign off on a package in order for DCAS to process a procurement. Information on DCAS’ intake pipeline and vendor delivery timelines was reported daily to ensure that all intake packages were reviewed for accuracy and completeness.

The following responses outline specific efforts undertaken on the agency’s behalf by OCP, Administration, and Facilities Management (FM):

**Office of Citywide Procurement (OCP)**

In order to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE, OCP vetted vendors and their principal officers, as much as practicable, through various background checks, including but not limited to, searches in LexisNexis, state and federal tax warrant/lien databases, and the federal debarment database. The vast majority of the vendors with which DCAS did business during the pandemic also went through DOI Vendor Name Check (VNC) process.

**Administration**

To comply with public health guidelines, the Administration line of service maintained a supply of masks for clients and employees entering NYC-owned buildings and all DCAS Police Officers. DCAS Police Officers were deemed essential during the pandemic and, as a result, were required to report to all NYC-owned locations daily. As the first point of contact for all building entrants, DCAS Police Officers supplied masks to anyone in need upon entering a NYC-owned location.

To ensure masks were readily available, Administration placed orders with OCP in accordance with the agency’s standard procurement procedures. Upon receipt, orders were signed for, recorded, and secured in a locked area by DCAS Police. Masks are replenished at DCAS locations with a DCAS Police presence on an as-needed basis.

**Facilities Management (FM)**

The FM line of service also made PPE readily available to its essential workers. During the pandemic, FM’s Building Services, Trade Shops, and Mechanical Maintenance and Operations (MMO) teams were required to perform their duties on-site at NYC-owned facilities.

- **Building Services**
  
  In order to minimize corruption hazards with regard to storage and distribution of PPE, Building Services established inventory thresholds that allowed for a minimum of a monthly supply of PPE to remain on hand. Setting thresholds allowed Building Services to make supplies readily available to its essential workforce, to track instances when thresholds needed to be adjusted, and to prevent the need to store a surplus of...
materials. Orders for PPE were placed in accordance with agency procurement procedures, and supplies were secured in locked storage rooms upon receipt. Access to storage rooms is limited to authorized personnel (e.g., building supervisors). Items removed from storage are recorded and subtracted from inventory. All inventory usage continues to be tracked in Archibus.

- **Trade Shops**

  The Trade Shops team is responsible for providing in-house repairs and maintenance. To ensure PPE is made readily available to the team, and that accurate inventory is maintained, the acting director is exclusively responsible for order placement, retrieval, and disbursement. The acting director routinely canvasses trade supervisors to determine their teams’ needs, obtains supplies from Building Services, and secures the PPE in a locked storage area prior to distribution. Upon distribution of the PPE to the trade supervisors, the acting director logs the recipients of the item(s), the date of distribution, the quantity, and the type of items distributed.

- **Mechanical Maintenance and Operations (MMO)**

  During the pandemic, orders for PPE have been placed by the senior engineer of MMO. Upon receipt of the requested supplies, the transaction is recorded by the chief/senior engineer and the items are secured in the engineering storeroom. PPE is issued to MMO staff on an as-needed basis, and upon issuance, the transaction is recorded to ensure an appropriate allocation of supplies based on safety and health concerns and operational needs.

**TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK**

*What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?*

Following the New York State (NYS) stay at home order, and the NYC-declared state of emergency, an emergency, temporary telework personnel services bulletin was issued. To prepare for DCAS’ transition to a remote working environment, steps were taken to ensure productivity, to promote the health and safety of agency employees, and to mitigate the risk of fraud.

The agency conducted a top-down review of its functions to determine essential services that must be performed on behalf of NYC. Once that list was developed, all employees providing services that must be performed at the worksite were deemed essential and excluded from remote work. DCAS’ list of essential titles was also shared with the Office of Labor Relations (OLR). Over 50 percent of DCAS’ workforce falls within the “essential” category.
For the remaining staff, a plan to support the transition to remote work was immediately implemented. This plan included the following:

- An assessment of technology needs, which involved a review of all previously issued laptops, iPads, and cellular phones, as well as pending orders for updated equipment.

- An evaluation of DCAS’ access to NYC’s virtual private network (VPN), along with a plan to request additional VPN access from the Department of Information Technology and Telecommunications (DoITT), given the number of remote workers.

- The provision of in-person and online training covering Microsoft 365, OneDrive, VPN access, and document protection protocols for remote workers.

- The creation of a DCAS telework site which provides agency employees with 24/7 access to instructions on the proper use of technology, how to properly access VPN, information on DCAS “return to office” protocols, and relevant agency updates.

- The development and issuance of the Guidance for Managing Remotely document. The document, created for agency managers and supervisors, outlined ways to monitor productivity and employee engagement in a remote environment.

- The use of end point protection to deter any cyber incidents and the implementation of multi-factor authentication (MFA) for every user to safeguard against user credential compromises.

DCAS staff working from home or remote site locations are required to utilize the CityTime Web Clock to sign in (log on) and sign out (log off) through a secure VPN connection on a daily basis, when feasible. All supervisors have also received instructions on how to monitor time remotely, as well as how and when to report time and attendance abuses.

Additional risk mitigation efforts are below:

**Administration**

The Administration line of service, which houses the agency’s Human Resources (HR) and Employee Relations departments, developed an internal guide for all remote workers. The guide outlined the responsibilities, protocols, and expectations for employees who were assigned to work remotely. Instructions on monitoring employee time, attendance, and productivity were provided, and all supervisors were instructed to report all instances of misuse and/or abuse of leave to Administration for appropriate action.
Employees assigned to the Administration line of service are also charged with the safeguarding of confidential employee information. Members of staff were reminded of this mandate and of the fact that, despite their transition to a remote working environment, their removal of confidential documents from the office worksite was strictly prohibited. In cases in which confidential information must be accessed, employees are allowed to report to the office on a rotating schedule pre-approved by their supervisor.

**Information Technology (IT)**

Within the IT line of service, directors and managers continue to leverage a combination of formal written reports, planned and impromptu online meetings utilizing Microsoft Teams with team members and peers to ensure critical milestones are met, and that staff remain productive while working remotely.

**Construction and Technical Services (CTS)**

To keep track and prevent the risk of fraud, CTS requires staff to report their current work location every morning. CTS also holds daily staff meetings, and each supervisor is required to submit a weekly progress report documenting each employee's productivity for the week.

**New York City Fleet (Fleet)**

Fleet utilizes a variety of daily and weekly performance measures to assist with monitoring each division's work and staff activities. In addition, Fleet has expanded the use of encryption for data relay and is currently in the process of a full security and data protection review of all fleet systems.

**Human Capital (HC)**

In an effort to resume exam-related activities and mitigate potential risks associated with employees transitioning to remote work, a comprehensive Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) was developed to conduct virtual Test Validation Boards (TVBs). This SOP was created as a means to safeguard exam materials, to ensure a low risk of security breach, and to track breaches back to the responsible parties.

To address the potential hazards of resuming operations using virtual TVBs:

- Participants are required to join the virtual TVB meeting with both video and audio features activated, to ensure the facilitator can monitor any use of prohibited devices;

- A security protocol was created that requires all TVB participants to acknowledge the use of any additional electronic devices (e.g., cell phones, laptops, tablets, smart watches, etc.), software (e.g. checking emails, browsing the internet, multitasking on other applications, etc.) or screen captures is strictly prohibited once the virtual TVB is in session;
Participants are required to type their names on various affirmation documents to confirm that they understand the protocols that each document addresses; and

A recorded verbal confirmation is required by each participant, in addition to the official affirmation documents, for further confirmation.

Additional measures taken to minimize risk in this area include the following:

- A requirement for all HC employees to provide email notifications to their supervisors at the start and end of each shift, including any breaks. Supervisors are also required to verify employee timestamps from emails to time punches submitted in CityTime.
  - Employees are required to notify their direct supervisor when they are punching in or out via email, including Start Time, End Time, Meal Time Start, and Meal Time End.
  - Time punches may also be documented in a summary format to be provided to direct supervisors.
  - Teleworking staff are required to check their emails and voicemails at least every 30 minutes.
  - Teleworking staff are not permitted to run personal errands or be away from their connected devices during the time they are teleworking, unless time has been approved through normal leave request procedures.
  - Any deviation from the above requirements will cause the forfeiture of that day from being counted as a telework day, and annual leave will be charged in lieu of regular time.

- Upon transitioning to remote work, HC collaborated with DCAS IT and the Financial Information Services Agency & Office of Payroll Administration (FISA-OPA) to ensure compliance with DoITT's cybersecurity protocols to safeguard confidential data. For example, transmission of New York City Automated Personnel System (NYCAPS) data files and reports are done using Secure File Transfer Protocols (SFTP).

- The number of staff performing essential duties and having access to sensitive and confidential data was also limited.
  - Where applicable, employees who accessed sensitive and essential data in NYCAPS had limited access to NYCAPS in order to perform essential duties.
  - Some staff were only provided access to scrambled data in test environments for training or troubleshooting purposes, thus further restricting access to data.
While teleworking, HC continues to utilize Microsoft 365 online applications such as OneDrive and Microsoft Teams. As work continues remotely, all staff are required to utilize OneDrive rather than transferring documents via email, thus adding an extra layer of security to ensure confidential data is not compromised.

Bureaus within HC have disseminated policy documents including a “[NYCAPS Central] NCC Teleworking Information and Procedures” document informing bureau employees of the processes and procedures as they telework from home. Bureaus regularly remind employees of the need to ensure security and safeguard data while maintaining adherence to standard business practices and policies.

Office of Citywide Procurement (OCP)

OCP ensured that all essential staff were issued laptops or tablets and were provided instructions on the secure storage of information on Microsoft 365 OneDrive. Based on guidance from IT, OCP also established shared folders with access control on Microsoft 365. OCP and IT have also developed a COVID-19 intake system via WMS to ensure that all vendor data is available through a single system. In addition, supervisors within OCP require staff to submit daily logs of their activities on days they work remotely, while OCP has also instituted daily leadership meetings with 20+ staff engaged in COVID-19 purchasing, logistics, and inventory reporting.

Office of the General Counsel (OGC)

OGC attorneys and administrative staff are required to sign in via email at the beginning of the workday, inform their leadership of their lunch period, and sign out each day via email. In addition, there are daily staff check-ins via phone and Microsoft Teams to discuss ongoing assignments and deadlines, as well as frequent client meetings that the attorneys are required to attend with their leadership. OGC holds bi-weekly meetings to go over the status of each attorney’s projects to ensure that progress has continued at the same pace as before working remotely and holds bi-weekly unit meetings to discuss important administrative and legal developments and common issues. With respect to safeguarding information, attorneys use either VPN access or OneDrive, which is managed by DoITT.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

Steps taken to minimize fraud by contractors engaged during the pandemic by CTS, FM, HC, and OCP include the following:
Construction and Technical Services (CTS)

CTS utilizes requirements contracts under the supervision of DCAS staff. The unit prices being used for work performed during the pandemic were previously established.

Facilities Management (FM)

The vast majority of materials purchased for COVID-19-related work are associated with the installment of Plexiglas and assembly clips, which are used to put together partitions for the office spaces. The Trade Shops team purchases this material using one of the following procurement methods as needed:

Requirements Contracts (RC) – NYC has RCs, established before COVID-19, for required materials, and the contracts include set pricing. The vendors, therefore, cannot change the agreed-upon price that they charge NYC.

Blanket Orders – FM has utilized blanket agreements to support Plexiglas partition construction. Similar to RCs, the blanket agreements have a pre-determined, agreed-upon price that the vendor cannot change based on market fluctuations and changes in demand.

P-Cards (Procurement Cards) – Use of the p-cards has been limited primarily to the purchase of assembly clips for the office partitions used to fasten the sections of plastic together. The clips are inexpensive and their prices can be researched online to ensure comparability.

Human Capital (HC)

Established protocols remain in effect and require the continued use of SFTPs for transmission of sensitive documents between HC and its exam consultants/vendors to ensure secure communication. It has also been communicated to staff physical resources (e.g., paper documents) are to remain in the office as part of normal protocol. Documents with sensitive information that require review are handled by HC employees through scheduled office visits, pre-approved by a supervisor, while ensuring social distancing and use of PPE.

Office of Citywide Procurement (OCP)

In order to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response, among other things, samples were obtained and approved prior to finalizing contracts, vendors underwent background checks, goods were inspected and tested upon receipt, and invoices were reviewed through normal processes prior to payments being issued.

Given the breadth of the NYC’s PPE needs and burn rates of items desperately needed by hospitals, health care facilities, and essential workers, DCAS established agreements with third party logistics (3PL) vendors to acquire additional storage space and warehouse staff to offer round-the-clock distribution and security of PPE. DCAS established scheduling and delivery protocols with
each 3PL and created a robust and diverse logistics network very quickly, which included multiple additional warehouses and transportation vendors, in addition to DCAS’ Central Storehouse. All data transmitted to NYC regarding delivery and inventory information was reviewed by a central team and inputted into WMS for consistency.

WMS was also used to track inventory once vendors made their deliveries. DCAS orchestrated inter-stock inventory transfers from warehouse to warehouse, as well as from 3PL warehouses back to the Central Storehouse in order to respond as quickly as possible to any supply emergencies or shortages. DCAS tracked all inventory transfers in its WMS system, which required each 3PL vendor to provide corroborating documentation, such as Bills of Lading, Receiving Reports, and Good Receipt Reports. Each 3PL provided DCAS with daily inventory reports that were reviewed centrally. DCAS also established a distribution operation to provide PPE to NYC agencies, non-profits, and public and private healthcare facilities utilizing its new network of warehouses and transportation providers. Each request for delivery was reviewed and vetted by OCP and communicated directly to warehouse staff. DCAS provided reports to the Deputy Mayor of Operations’ office on what PPE was distributed each week, as well as what PPE deliveries were being staged for the following week. This was all recorded in WMS.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

GENERAL WORKPLACE HAZARDS

Agency-wide

- Developed and implemented agency-wide communications (e.g., town hall meetings, newsletters) to inform all staff of the agency’s adherence to federal, state, and local health and safety guidelines, as well as the enhanced cleaning protocols that would be instituted.

- Created an agency-specific document to assist employees in navigating their workdays in accordance with public health standards. The document included information about mandatory health screening, restroom occupancy, new wayfinding protocols, the establishment of sanitizing stations in “high touch/heavily trafficked” areas, and health-related signage requirements.

Administration

- Pursuant to NYC’s COVID-19 leave regulations and DOHMH public health and safety guidelines, HR established a reporting protocol whereby all positive COVID-19 cases are required to be reported directly to HR to
ensure that it can provide for the proper processing of time and leave usage, and that employees can be sent home immediately.

- Established a notification protocol with FM to ensure that all workspaces occupied by staff that tested positive for COVID-19 are properly sanitized.

**Real Estate Services**

- Established maximum occupancy standards for common areas to comply with social distancing requirements (e.g., conference rooms, pantries, bathrooms, elevators).
- Established wayfinding protocols to minimize employee contact and to control the flow of employee/customer traffic throughout work locations.

**Facilities Management (FM)**

- Provided mandatory Infection Control and Safety training for all custodial staff.
- Installed Plexiglas in customer-facing locations (e.g., security desk, computer testing centers, fingerprinting office, customer service windows).
- Provided sanitization of workspaces promptly after positive COVID-19 cases were confirmed.
- Implemented an enhanced cleaning schedule for “high touch” areas.

**Information Technology (IT)**

- Developed an electronic health assessment tool for agency staff to comply with NYS regulations.

**CONSTRUCTION SITE HAZARDS**

**Construction and Technical Services (CTS)**

- Pursuant to the Department of Buildings (DOB) requirements, all construction areas are cleaned and sanitized daily as a precautionary measure to help prevent the spread of COVID-19.
- If any construction worker tested positive, the construction area was shut down for 24 hours and then cleaned and sanitized. This protocol remains in place.

All PPE provided to staff and stocked at the sanitizing stations, as well as Plexiglas, was procured in accordance with established procedures.
REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

Progress in risk mitigation efforts for 2020, as identified in last year’s report, include the following:

CONSTRUCTION AND TECHNICAL SERVICES (CTS)

CTS plans to perform routine and improved inspections, as mandated by DOB, in the following areas:

Elevator Inspections – DOB code requires a category (CAT) or CAT1 (annual) inspection and a CAT5 (every five years) inspection to be performed for building equipment (elevators, escalators, and lifts), to ensure the life and safety of its users. Inspections are costly to NYC, since testing and witnessing must be performed by two independent licensed companies. Therefore, DCAS provides an in-house elevator inspector with a QEI (Qualified Elevator Inspector) license to witness the testing, along with the companies, to protect contract validity and to deter any dishonest activities. This process also prevents collusion between the involved parties.

Façade Inspections – In order to ensure public safety, DOB requires building façade inspections every five years for buildings six stories or higher. If the façade inspection reveals any hazardous conditions, sidewalk sheds must be installed, creating a greater expense to NYC. To eliminate the use of sidewalk sheds, CTS utilizes a façade Requirements Contract, which is already in place, with construction details to handle façade repairs in all buildings owned and maintained by DCAS. The contract is used to comply with DOB’s requirement. This contract will enable DCAS to eliminate hazardous conditions and avoid sidewalk shed installations.

Construction Activities – To avoid unnecessary repairs or overbilling, CTS assigns a construction manager to oversee day-to-day construction activities. CTS created a multi-step review process for invoices, involving both a construction manager and a project manager, to review and scrutinize prices and quantities on invoices and to help identify any erroneous and/or falsified documentation. The multi-step review process is currently documented within CTS policy. In addition, only invoices with company seals and appropriate company signatures are accepted.

FACILITIES MANAGEMENT (FM) AND THE OFFICE OF CITYWIDE PROCUREMENT (OCP)

The MMO Unit has completed installation of inline fuel oil meters at 100 Centre Street in Manhattan. This will allow for recording the amount of fuel delivered by the vendor to each of the fuel oil tanks at the facility. The next location scheduled for meter installation is 851 Grand Concourse in the Bronx. The work commenced but was significantly interrupted by COVID-19. The project recently resumed and
is now in the permit phase. It should also be noted that DCAS is currently utilizing a citywide contract with Metro Environmental Services to maintain and upgrade DCAS fuel oil tanks and fuel oil level monitoring systems.

To address the issue of fuel delivery discrepancies on a citywide level, DCAS is working on a Requirements Contract for fuel level gauges, which will allow NYC agencies to purchase and install these devices. DCAS has surveyed agencies on their uses of fuel gauges and will use the information from the surveys, along with market research and agency specifications, to determine the most appropriate specifications for a citywide contract. Work on this contract had to be postponed due to the pandemic.

NEW YORK CITY FLEET (FLEET)

Establishment of the Dedicated Fleet Compliance Unit

In Fiscal Year 2020, Fleet reorganized its staffing to establish a dedicated Fleet Compliance Unit, including a deputy chief fleet officer, a director, and an analyst. This dedicated unit is assigned to follow up with agencies and DOI as needed on various and potential vehicle misuse or fraud issues that stem from the fleet tracking systems, including fuel tracking, telematics tracking through the Fleet Office of Real-Time Tracking (FORT), crash tracking, and 311 or other complaints. Fleet produces a regular fleet compliance report that tracks citywide adherence to fleet rules regarding sign-offs, lights and sirens, commuting authorizations, and safe driving requirements. Fleet has also been preparing reports for agencies on the actual usage trends for commuting vehicles.

A growing responsibility for over the last five years has been to monitor and address misuse or potential misuse of fleet and related assets. This responsibility greatly increased due to the vast amount of data received through FORT, which covers 50 separate agencies and offices and the entire school bus fleet. At this time, approximately 23,000 fleet units are tracked in FORT. Therefore, Fleet has formalized and institutionalized this responsibility and has established formal internal procedures for monitoring compliance through the dedicated Compliance Unit. The dedicated Compliance Unit was established as an extension to the FORT initiative, which in turn freed FORT staff to concentrate their efforts on safety, efficiency, and environmental roles.

Implementation of a Daily Morning Fleet Compliance Report

Through FORT, Fleet implemented a Daily Fleet Compliance Report for all agencies and citywide. This is an automated system report where fleet managers receive the following information each morning:

- A list of vehicles that went out of NYC or NYS on the previous day.
- Details for each vehicle that operated overnight between midnight and 4:00 a.m. for any reason.
A list of any potential crashes that occurred the previous day.
- Incidents of excessive speeding and hard braking.

DCAS supplies additional reports and alerts on seatbelt compliance, idling, and alerts for vehicles that go to locations of potential concern, such as airports. The daily report allows Fleet to supply agencies with timely and user-friendly lists of potential concern and misuse. A summarized example of the listing within this report is as follows:

**HUMAN CAPITAL (HC)**

In last year’s report, HC identified theft of test materials by agency-nominated Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), prior to the administration of exams, as the most significant corruption hazard. These agency-nominated SMEs, who were also involved with the development of two exams, compromised the security of the exams by sharing the test content with others prior to the administration of those exams.

This hazard was addressed with the creation, implementation, and continuous use of an official Security/Confidentiality protocol document, along with the following measures:

- The protocol document was presented at mandatory staff meetings, and all staff were required to sign the document to acknowledge their understanding and receipt of the information.
- The installation of access card readers to replace lock and key entries to track SME and staff entry into secure workspaces.
The development of a SOP for exam security which included:
  - A policy regarding the elimination of electronic devices in SME areas.
  - A clean desk policy for all staff.
  - Secure print features mandated on all printers and copiers.

Additionally, the procurement and installation of security cameras for all SME work areas and public areas is currently in progress.

**ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)**

Not applicable.
The Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) resolves complaints received from the public against uniformed members of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) alleging excessive use of force, abuse of authority, discourtesy, or offensive language. The Agency addresses these complaints through investigation, mediation, and prosecution, depending on the nature of each case. When cases are substantiated, CCRB makes disciplinary recommendations to NYPD.

### RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

#### PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

PPE and other pandemic related materials were almost exclusively acquired through the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS) and/or the DCAS Storehouse and stored in Operations’ secure rooms. Limited PPE was acquired through approved Minority/Women-Owned Business Enterprises (MWBE) vendors in the early stages of the pandemic in small quantities and at competitive pricing. Distribution of the items were handled by key Agency administrative staff. Inventory management and controls were adhered to closely by the limited staff working on-site and distributed to civilians and members of service as needed.

#### TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

The Agency has procedures in place to prevent outside infiltration of the Case Tracking System (CTS) and Electronic Document Management System (EDMS) databases, to identify risks, and to prevent the improper use of information; these apply equally inside and outside of the office. CCRB can search forensic history pertaining to specific cases using CTS and EDMS thanks to upgrades and implementation of third-party software; only through local access certain employees can be granted remote access as needed. All CCRB computer access is password-protected to prevent unauthorized access to the Agency data and
systems. The levels of access granted to staff members vary, so that permission to open, modify, delete, or print information is user-specific.

The Agency has refined access levels, especially concerning sensitive and restricted cases. Case Management Unit (CMU) staff can access sensitive cases, while the CMU director and supervisor can access restricted cases.

The Agency relied on prior tour scheduling, CityTime entries, and supervisory workflow to manage employees’ time. The bulk of Agency staff have worked in small units remotely, allowing closer management of time and work product. Agency workflow is also time sensitive, making delays noticeable. Pre-approval is mandatory for all overtime, with exceptions to be made only at the deputy executive director or executive director levels. Overtime requests must be assessed and approved in writing by the supervisor of the unit or squad in advance. Such approvals are made on CCRB’s new overtime approval forms. These forms must be submitted to the Human Resources (HR) Unit immediately upon sign-off. HR must reference the relevant overtime forms before approving the CityTime entry that would grant overtime pay to the employee. Overtime cannot not be processed in the absence of this form. Violation of the overtime policy would lead to a disciplinary action.

In order to mitigate the risk of improper disclosures, the Agency’s case information is stored in secure locations. All case information, including confidential personal information concerning civilians and police officers, is maintained in one or both of the CCRB’s two electronic databases. In addition, all physical case files are retained for several years before they are destroyed in conformance with the New York City Department of Records (DORIS) retention policy. CCRB monitors staff access to case information, including confidential personal information concerning civilians and police officers. Access to cases marked sensitive or restricted is limited according to CCRB policy, which states that only those involved in the case or have a specific need can be granted access to case information. CCRB’s training also emphasizes confidentiality of its records and information. Requests for case material are made in writing and tracked by CCRB. In addition, requests from “courts, attorneys, law enforcement agencies other than the NYPD, prosecutors, and private non-governmental persons” are handled by the Agency counsel. For at least some portion of the reported period, most such records were protected by Civil Rights Law 50-a and closely monitored.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

The Agency followed standard procurement procedures, obtaining multiple quotes on any items needed and working to minimize any contracting risks. PPE and other pandemic related materials were almost exclusively acquired through DCAS. IT needs were met by DoITT or approved vendors, under standard purchase
protocols. CCRB regularly vets potential vendors by checking references and, in certain cases, requiring them to sign non-disclosure agreements (NDAs). The Agency also strives to only work with vendors that are on State and City approved contracts and pre-certified lists such as the NYC MWBE approved vendor certification. CCRB routinely works with DoITT to identify preferred and known vendors, under their guidance. All contracts are further registered with the appropriate NYC agencies that provide additional controls.

**PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

*What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.*

**VENDOR PRICE GOUGING OR UNAUTHORIZED PRODUCT SUBSTITUTION**

CCRB experienced limited issues early on in the pandemic with availability of certain types of PPE. Vendors claiming to have the requested PPE delivered a substitute, non-conforming (but also much lower priced) product in place of N95 masks needed to conduct in-person interviews with members of the service who were on patrol or otherwise at risk. As is standard practice, CCRB rejected the shipment. The vendor refused to collect it but did agree to remove the charges. The Agency found that during this pandemic period an elevated level of vigilance proved useful, if not necessary, in protecting its capital.

**REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT**

In 2019, the Agency identified three primary risks and its mitigation assessment. These risks and our reflections are indicated below:

**WRONGFUL DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION AND/OR RECORDS –**

For the period of calendar year 2019 and most of fiscal year 2020, State Civil Rights Law 50-a prohibited most disclosure of records kept by the Agency, primarily its investigative documentation. This State law has subsequently been repealed and is presently subject of litigation. Although the Agency expects that disclosure will be permissible in more instances going forward, it remains committed to data security and confidentiality of case information as a general matter. CCRB constantly reviews its policies related to such records, physical and digital access are heavily restricted, increasingly so with the sensitivity of cases.

**INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY**

The agency has refined access levels, especially concerning sensitive and restricted cases. CMU staff can access sensitive cases, while only the CMU director and supervisor can access restricted cases. Similarly, investigative staff may not access a sensitive or restricted case unless assigned to it.
OVERTIME ABUSE

The bulk of Agency staff have worked in small units remotely, allowing closer management of work time and product. Agency workflow is also time sensitive, making delays noticeable. Pre-approval is mandatory for all overtime, with exceptions to be made only at the deputy executive director and executive director levels. Overtime cannot be processed in the absence of the requisite documentation. Violations of the overtime policy lead to disciplinary action.

ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

Not applicable.
Department of Consumer and Worker Protection (DCWP)

Lorelei Salas, Commissioner
Clinton Daggan, Inspector General

DCWP licenses and regulates more than 81,000 businesses in more than 50 industries by performing on-site inspections, enforcing license regulations and weights and measures regulations, and enforcing the New York City (NYC) Consumer Protection Law. DCWP also provides mediation and restitution for consumer complaints and enforces various workplace laws.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

PPE procurement was primarily centralized through City Hall and the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS), so it was unnecessary for DCWP to procure PPE. With respect to storage of PPE, it is kept in a locked area on the fifth floor of DCWP’s offices at 42 Broadway in Manhattan. With respect to distribution, DCWP designated one person per division to be responsible for managing PPE distribution. In addition, DCWP tracks all purchases, inventory, and distribution of agency PPE, as well as cleaning supplies.

TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

To mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work, DCWP took several steps.

DCWP implemented a Telework Policy, which was distributed via email and is regularly updated. In addition to forwarding this policy to all employees, it can be found on DCWP’s Intranet. The Telework Policy aims to further the agency’s goal of seamless operation while maintaining standards of safety. The directives include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Employees are expected and must agree to work from their homes or another designated work location where telework duties can be performed in a safe manner.
Employees are required to notify their supervisor immediately if unable to work at their designated location.

DCWP has provided equipment to employees including computers, phones, and internet access where feasible to enable eligible employees to work remotely.

Employees are instructed that whether using a DCWP-provided computer or a personal computer for remote work, they must strictly adhere to agency information security protocols put in place by NYC Cyber Command.

Employees are required to participate in conference calls and team meetings as necessary.

Supervisors monitor the work of staff regularly, as determined by respective division heads.

Web conference tools such as Webex and Microsoft Teams, as well as other remote desktop connection setups, are put in place to enable all employees work remotely and effectively in a secured remote environment.

With respect to DCWP preventing time and attendance abuse:

The Director of the Human Capital Division created and distributed a refresher training regarding DCWP’s Time and Leave Policy.

The Human Capital Division regularly sends reminders about the Time and Leave Policy to staff via email.

The Human Capital Division distributed updated policy regarding excessive lateness and absenteeism.

Leave time must be requested and processed in the same manner as in the workplace and overtime must be approved in advance.

With respect to DCWP safeguarding confidential agency information:

Employees are instructed not to use DCWP-issued equipment for personal use.

Employees are instructed not to use their personal email accounts to send or receive work-related emails.

Employees with DCWP-issued phones are instructed to make all work-related phone calls on their DCWP, not personal, phones. Similarly, employees are instructed not to send or receive work-related messages on personal phones.

Employees must follow safeguards established to protect agency records from unauthorized disclosure or damage and comply with privacy
requirements set forth by NYC and DCWP’s Information Technology (IT) Resource Policy.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

*What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?*

DCWP did not engage any vendors to participate in the pandemic response.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

*What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.*

LIABILITY PROVISIONS OF TOW TRUCK INSURANCE POLICIES

Under Administrative Code Section 20-500, a tow truck company must provide each tow truck “not less than two hundred thousand dollars for personal injury or death of any one person resulting from any one accident; not less than five hundred thousand dollars for personal injury or death of two or more persons resulting from any one accident; and not less than fifty thousand dollars for injury to or destruction of property of one or more persons resulting from any one accident.”

DCWP additionally requires that that every tow truck company applicant must provide “a copy of a Certificate of Insurance as proof that every tow truck to be used by the applicant under its license is insured under a liability insurance policy.”

This serves as a risk management tool to protect the general public, as this insurance requirement safeguards the personal and property loss that consumers or individuals may suffer under any tow truck related incident. In keeping with this, the Licensing Division (Licensing) conducts a thorough analysis of the Certificate of Insurance provided as proof of a tow truck company’s eligibility to the license.

Working with General Counsel, a detailed protocol was established for Licensing’s review of such insurance policies, and a specific training was provided to Licensing’s staff. In addition, Licensing supervisors closely monitor the staff’s review to ensure consistent adherence to the protocol. When necessary, General Counsel will conduct additional review related to insurance policies. Lastly, no tow truck is scheduled for a required inspection to obtain the tow truck company’s license if the insurance policy is about to expire.

ADDITIONAL

DCWP does not have any additional substantial public health and safety corruption hazards to report at this time; however, DCWP’s Settlement Unit completed a transition from in-person conferences to handling settlements via phone and email, which has minimized health and safety corruption hazards.
In addition, DCWP’s Consumer Services Division (Consumer Services), which is always vigilant about the potential for improper handling of money coming into or out of DCWP, has made revisions as a result of the pandemic. In last year’s report, with respect to “check safekeeping,” DCWP noted that checks from businesses that are made payable to consumers are copied and then mailed within 24 hours via certified or first class mail. Consumers were also able to pick up checks from Consumer Services. In response to the pandemic, the check handling procedure has been slightly revised. Checks from businesses that are made payable to consumers are copied and now mailed once a week via certified mail. Consumers can no longer pick up checks. Additionally, mediators strongly encourage businesses to mail refund checks directly to consumers and to send a copy of the check to Consumer Services. To date, there have been no issues with this revised procedure.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

ENFORCEMENT DIVISION

In last year’s report, the Enforcement Division (Enforcement) reported that supervisory staff regularly monitored inspectors by conducting follow-ups and spot checks. Department guidelines require supervisors to perform a follow-up inspection of each inspector at least once every quarter. During the follow-up, the supervisor visits each location on the inspector’s route, reviews paperwork, speaks to the employees of the inspected businesses, and prepares a report summarizing the follow-up. The division’s management team reviews these reports and contacts individual businesses as needed. Spot checks are additional random checks conducted by borough directors and supervisors to ensure that inspectors are at their assigned location on time. Spot checks also serve as opportunities for supervisors to observe inspectors in the field and provide additional training and coaching as needed. Last year’s report also provided disciplinary cases stemming from follow-ups and spot checks where inspectors recorded inaccurate information about their locations and/or the time of inspections.

In July 2020, Enforcement improved on these risk mitigation efforts by creating and implementing an Automated Inspection Management System (AIMS) to schedule, route, record, and monitor field inspections conducted using handheld devices. These devices record the start time, end time, and GPS coordinates for all inspections performed in the field. The inspection times auto-fill on all certificates and are not editable, so inspectors are unable to falsify inspection times on certificates. AIMS allows supervisors to obtain real-time information on routes and inspection results, allowing them to monitor the inspectors’ use of time, inspection efficiency, and adherence to route projections on a daily basis. AIMS facilitates more accurate follow-ups as supervisors can now review inspection forms and results prior to entering a business. In addition, AIMS renders the previous practice
of spot checks unnecessary, as supervisors can now view GPS coordinates and inspection results without making a physical appearance at the start of an inspection shift.

DIVISION OF TECHNOLOGY AND STRATEGIC SOLUTIONS (DOTSS)

DoTSS implemented a new mobile inspections framework, AIMS, to increase transparency for the inspectors, help administer efficiency, manage price-gouging, and reduce corruption.

OFFICE OF LABOR POLICY AND STANDARDS (OLPS)

Last year, the Disciplinary Advocate Officer (DAO) completed an investigation regarding an OLPS investigator in which it was determined that the investigator improperly displayed his badge. On June 25, 2019, while not on City time, the investigator had an argument with the manager of a dry-cleaning business about a stain on his shirt where he stated, “I know the rules,” and briefly showed his DCWP badge to the manager before quickly walking out. DCWP discovered this misuse of position after the investigator filed a consumer complaint and the manager, in the business response, stated the inspector flashed some kind of badge at her and she was alarmed. The investigator admitted his misconduct. DAO issued a warning memo and forwarded all documentation to DOI on August 30, 2019.

In order to prevent further instances of investigators misusing their position, a new policy for the agency has been created and implemented. This policy clarifies the appropriate use of badges and the consequences for misuse. It also provides that badges will only be issued to Enforcement inspectors who routinely conduct fieldwork. For other agency employees, the policy provides for division head approval of badge issuance for a time-limited and specific purpose.

SETTLEMENT UNIT

In last year’s report, the Settlement Unit reported that, in order to further enhance efficiency and the procedures in place to prevent bribery, corruption, or special preferential treatment, it was transitioning from an in-person, by appointment only model of handling settlements. Pursuant to this new model, the majority of settlements are handled by email or text. The unit has now completed this transition. This service allows business owners or representatives to obtain the same results they would receive in office, without losing time away from their business. This model also allows supervisors to monitor the email discourse of a settlement conference. In addition, any settlement that may require an in-person conference will now be conducted in advance and by referral only. This transition was timely with respect to the pandemic as it better ensures the health and safety of DCWP settlement officers, as well as business owners, since it limits in-person contact.
Additional Agency Identified Corruption Hazard(s)

Falsified Documents

After an investigation, DCWP brought charges against an inspector in Enforcement, alleging that he submitted fraudulent documents, including Daily Inspection Reports, summonses, and Certificates of Inspection, to DCWP and to DCWP-licensed businesses. The documents falsely stated the times the inspector started and completed inspections. The times recorded of photographs taken during the inspections were substantially different from the times recorded in the documents. The matter is pending, with a Step II Conference scheduled for December 8, 2020. DCWP believes that AIMS will prevent this type of misconduct moving forward because it will not allow for false inspection times on certificates.

Inappropriate Vendor Communications

An inspector was issued a Warning Memoranda on September 14, 2020, for phone conversations the inspector had with two DCWP inspectors during their respective inspections at a DCWP-licensed business. Specifically, the inspector in question willingly spoke to or called two inspectors, whom the inspector did not supervise, while the inspectors were conducting inspections. These calls occurred after the business asked the inspector in question to speak to the inspectors. The inspector in question had provided a personal cell phone number to the business owner and used a personal cell phone for the communications. DOI referred its investigative findings to DCWP for whatever action DCWP deemed appropriate. The Warning Memoranda was served and incorporated into the inspector's personnel file. In order to prevent further instances like this, DCWP updated its Enforcement Protocol: Vendor Communications to include policies on inspector telephone communications. The protocol prohibits the use of personal cell phones and providing personal cell phone numbers. It includes specific instances where an inspector should be communicating with businesses on DCWP-issued phones and what an inspector should do if a business insists on speaking to a DCWP supervisor during an inspection.
Mayor's Office of Contract Services (MOCS)

Daniel A. Symon, Director
Eleonora Rivkin & Andrew Sein, Inspectors General

MOCS is the City’s compliance and oversight agency for procurement. The office is run by the City Chief Procurement Officer (CCPO), the position delegated by the Mayor to coordinate and oversee the procurement activity of Mayoral agencies. The City’s procurement system spans an enormous range of subject areas, but the overarching goal of MOCS is to ensure the fairness, transparency, and cost effectiveness of the procurement process. Annually, City agencies procure billions in products and services from a diverse pool of vendors that represent various industries. In Fiscal Year 2020, New York City procured $22.5 billion worth of goods and services through almost 114,500 transactions. MOCS partners with industry groups to implement policies and tools that streamline and modernize procurement, resulting in the delivery of quality services to New Yorkers.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

MOCS is unique in that it is both a stand-alone agency and an oversight for Mayoral agencies. As a stand-alone agency, MOCS transitioned all of its staff to a remote structure in March, which minimized its need for pandemic response equipment. In the limited time prior to MOCS’ transition to remote work, MOCS distributed hand sanitizer, single-use masks, and gloves to all staff as requested.

As an oversight, MOCS played a role in helping to secure PPE at a citywide level. In the spring of 2020, New York City was the epicenter of the COVID-19 crisis. The crisis of PPE supplies for health care providers was met by a major strain on the global supply chain for these items, which saw massive price increases, a surge in nefarious actors, and competition between state and local governments to secure these items from overseas. The City managed to effectively navigate this “gray market” by sourcing an unprecedented volume of emergency PPE and standing up local production to supply the needs of the spring peak.

Under Emergency Executive Order 101 (which amended Emergency Executive Order 100), Mayor de Blasio directed the suspension of the City’s procurement rules for COVID-19 related purchases, enabling agencies to fast-track purchases of goods or services necessary to combat the crisis. Each emergency contract was processed through the City’s Fiscal Management System (FMS), as is normally
the case, and multiple oversight approvals were required for all emergency contracts, including Agency Head, OMB, Law Department, and MOCS approval. Further, each contract was published in the public domain in sources such as Checkbook NYC. This rule change succeeded in streamlining the regulatory apparatus to secure the acquisition of life-saving equipment at the scale and urgency merited by the crisis.

Under this policy framework, the City quickly established a multi-agency operation to manage the procurement of PPE from sourcing to delivery and distribution. The Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS), Mayor’s Office of Contract Services (MOCS), and New York City Economic Development Corporation (EDC) all played a major role in the sourcing, contracting, and delivery stages of this process. Meanwhile, the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) set out standards to guide the procurement of these goods and distributed them upon arrival to the City’s hospitals.

The sourcing team set up a process for intaking, evaluating, and prioritizing supplier offers at a breakneck pace to ramp up acquisition under extremely pressing deadlines. This team evaluated nearly 5,000 supplier offers in a few weeks’ time, a massive effort that strove to surface the most credible offers with the capability to deliver a high volume of priority items in a short period of time. Over time, the City also engaged vendors with expertise in global sourcing, delivery and storage to sufficiently locate available PPE, transport it to New York City at scheduled intervals and securely store it for distribution.

Even considering this rapid mobilization, MOCS still operated in a situation of precious little information compared to normal Citywide procurement. The wave of offers from organizations who may not have previously done business with the City meant MOCS did not have historical performance to use in evaluating the quality of a vendor’s offer in those instances. Thus, MOCS considered a number of factors in determining whether to move forward with a purchase, including on hand inventory, current burn rates, burn rate projections, product price, approval of product sample, delivery schedule, vendor capacity, vendor integrity, the presence of multiple vendors per category to avoid single points of failure, and others. No matter where each offer came from, they were evaluated against the same key criteria: capacity to reliably deliver a high volume of priority items on a short timeline, at a reasonable price. To perform vendor background checks, agencies emulated the responsibility determination process on an expedited schedule to ensure that risk controls still remained in place.
TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

Upon the transition to remote work, MOCS followed citywide guidance issued by the Department of Citywide Administrative Services. MOCS instituted virtual daily check-ins with agency staff and periodic all staff meetings. Employees were required to account for the daily time spent working in CityTime and provide managers with a daily update of tasks performed throughout the day. Staff were further ensured access to Microsoft 365, remote log-in capability and instructed on confidentiality protocols for work materials.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

See above.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

LOCATING PPE FOR CITYWIDE USE

MOCS played a role in helping to secure PPE at a citywide level, making sure the City managed to effectively navigate the “gray market” by sourcing an unprecedented volume of emergency PPE and standing up local production to supply the needs of the spring COVID-19 peak.

The sourcing team set up a process for intaking, evaluating, and prioritizing supplier offers at a breakneck pace to ramp up acquisition under extremely pressing deadlines. This team evaluated nearly 5,000 supplier offers in a few weeks’ time, a massive effort that strove to surface the most credible offers with the capability to deliver a high volume of priority items in a short period of time. Over time, the City also engaged vendors with expertise in global sourcing, delivery, and storage to sufficiently locate available PPE, transport it to New York City at scheduled intervals, and securely store it for distribution.

EVALUATING PPE VENDORS

As stated, the sourcing team set up a process for intaking, evaluating, and prioritizing supplier offers at a rapid pace. Even considering this rapid mobilization, we still operated in a situation of precious little information compared to normal Citywide procurement. The wave of offers from organizations who may not have previously done business with the City meant we did not have historical
performance to use in evaluating the quality of a vendor’s offer in those instances. Thus, we considered a number of factors in determining whether to move forward with a purchase, including on hand inventory, current burn rates, burn rate projections, product price, approval of product sample, delivery schedule, vendor capacity, vendor integrity, the presence of multiple vendors per category to avoid single points of failure, and others. No matter where each offer came from, they were evaluated against the same key criteria: capacity to reliably deliver a high volume of priority items on a short timeline, at a reasonable price. To perform vendor background checks, agencies emulated the responsibility determination process on an expedited schedule to ensure that risk controls still remained in place.

**REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT**

In its 2019 Anti-Corruption Report, MOCS identified two principal corruption hazards that may arise in connection with the agency’s critical objectives. One is the potential that the processes MOCS oversees and administers would allow for corruption or favoritism in the manner that City contracts or other agreements are awarded; and the other is that the direct dealings it has with vendors and their representatives, or the exercise of discretion by MOCS staff, would inappropriately affect a vendor’s chances of obtaining a City contract.

Through the management structure and internal controls developed by MOCS, as outlined in its 2019 Anti-Corruption Report, the potential corruption hazards identified have continued to be addressed in 2020. Moreover, the allocation of functions and responsibilities both between and among the individual units at MOCS, and as between the City Chief Procurement Officer and Agency Chief Contracting Officers, has also acted as a check and balance for the procurement process. Further, MOCS maintains close communication with DOI whenever it appears that there may have been potential wrongdoing in any given procurement action, and in cases where a proposed contractor appears to have business integrity concerns.

MOCS remains committed to reducing the risk of fraud and corruption in the City’s procurement process. Since last year, MOCS has launched Release 3 of the Procurement and Sourcing Solutions Portal (PASSPort) to further streamline and protect City procurement. PASSPort allows for shared and simultaneous review by fiscal, legal, and procurement oversights, and facilitates an efficient and collaborative effort throughout the procurement process.

MOCS continues to work on further releases of the PASSPort system with the goal of not only improving the procurement process for the City but also improving the safeguards against corruption hazards in the City’s procurement process.
### ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

Not applicable.
The Department of Correction (DOC) has a stated mission of transforming lives and building safer communities. To that end, the Department is committed to creating a safe and supportive environment where we act with integrity and professionalism while providing those in our care with a path to successful community reintegration. To carry out its public safety responsibilities, the Department believes it is important to adhere to the following core values: recognizing the humanity in people; acting with integrity; investing in staff wellness and professional development; providing individuals in our care with programming and rehabilitative services; and achieving excellence in correctional practices.

More specifically, the Department cares for people accused of crimes and held in custody while they await trial and those who are convicted and sentenced to a period of incarceration of one year or less. DOC operates nine facilities for incarcerated individuals, including seven jails on Rikers Island; court pens in each of the five boroughs; and two hospital prison wards. By the end of November, the Department expects to close two facilities, Otis Bantum Correctional Center on Rikers Island and the Manhattan Detention Complex. In the previous fiscal year, DOC processed over 23,000 admissions, and managed an average daily population of approximately 5,800 individuals. In light of many factors, including New York State’s bail reform legislation and efforts by the City and others in response to COVID-19, the Department’s overall population has ranged more recently between historically low levels – from below 4,000 to the mid-4,000’s.

**RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

**PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT**

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

The Department has risk mitigation strategies that have been in place prior to the Governor’s declared emergency, including emergency preparedness procedures. Throughout its response to the COVID-19 pandemic, DOC has been guided by and responsive to Federal, State, and City health authority guidance, which evolved over time as the health authorities learned more information. Pursuant to and consistent with health authority guidance throughout the pandemic, DOC provided uniformed staff and individuals in custody with appropriate PPE to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 and protect the health and safety of individuals who live and work within Department facilities. The Department also communicated the importance of wearing PPE pursuant to DOC policy. The
Department issued and/or reinforced various teletypes since the start of the pandemic with guidance and requirements, and distributed weekly COVID-19 flyers to persons in custody.

Aligned with the primary objective of protecting health and safety, the Department also prioritized minimizing the risk of associated corruption hazards. Although COVID mitigation preparations began weeks earlier, on Sunday March 22, 2020, and in response to the impact of the pandemic both in DOC jails and in the community, the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at DOC was activated. The Department’s Storehouse had a supply of PPE on hand and continued to order adequate PPE during the pandemic. As such, the Central Warehouse Operations Division (CWOD) immediately began scheduling 24/7 tours of the CWOD I Warehouse, which receives, stocks and distributes all PPE. The Department has distributed over 600,000 items of PPE since the onset of the COVID-19 Pandemic.

Prior to the activation of the EOC, CWOD I began securing the Department’s supply of PPE in specific and secure storage locations within the warehouse. These areas were under closed circuit video surveillance (CCTV) coverage and only accessible to staff working with the PPE products at the time. To better track PPE items, special locations and item identifications were added in our warehouse management system (EAM). EAM tracks all inventory and transactions at the Division I central warehouse. It can efficiently expose operational issues to decrease concerns with inventory. In addition, cycle counting started to be conducted by staff more frequently to ensure counts were accurate and to also monitor stock levels.

All PPE items that were distributed had to have approval by the Chief of Department. Each command/facility submitted a request for supplies to the manager for approval. The command/facility manager signed the request acknowledging the need for the supplies at the command/facility. This request was forwarded to the Chief of Department for final approval before the Storehouse released PPE to the command. Upon approval, they were put together by warehouse staff and either hand delivered or picked up by a facility’s command. All stock delivered to a jail facility was expected to be handed to and only signed for by a tour commander or higher rank. Staff were required to sign for their masks (surgical and N-95’s) as a way to track the actual use of the PPE in the commands. Staff were also required to document which incarcerated individuals receive PPE.

As of October 2020, with the exception of operating the warehouse on a 24/7 schedule, cycle counting is still conducted to identify any issues; PPE is still located in the same secure location and under CCTV coverage; and approvals are still through the Chief of Department, with the same pick-up and/or delivery procedures. All of the aforementioned procedures continue to assist with minimizing any corruption hazard within our operation.
TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

At the start of the COVID-19 outbreak, DCAS, in conjunction with the NYC Law Department and the Office of Labor Relations, provided guidance to all City agencies regarding the circumstances under which employees would be permitted to work remotely, depending on the operational needs of each agency. Based on such guidance DOC established a Telework policy. While essential workers were generally not able to work remotely, City Agency’s were informed that they should allow their non-essential workers permission to perform their work in a remote location, if possible. DOC identified staff members who were able to complete the work responsibilities of their positions in a remote location without interfering with the operational needs of the Department. Identified staff members who met the criteria for remote working executed an agreement laying out the remote working expectations. The agreement included a provision that any violation of the telework agreement may result in its immediate revocation. Upon executing the telework agreement, the staff member was generally able to commence remote working shortly thereafter.

Staff were permitted to work remotely by logging into their DOC workstation computer via a secure remote connection. Staff were only allowed access to applications that they were authorized to use. In order to initiate the secure connection with the DOC computer, staff proceeded through a multi-factor authorization process each time they logged on. This included entering a username and password to logon to the secure software, then entering a one-time code received via text message to a cell phone, and finally entering a personal access code assigned to the individuals DOC computer. At that point, the employee would be connected to the DOC computer, which then still required the user to enter the DOC password as they would if they were at a DOC workstation.

Outlined in the Telework agreement were the steps supervisors and employees should take to ensure employees are completing their assignments from their remote location. The policy specified that employees must continue to adhere to the same protocols for attendance, recordkeeping, privacy, and other job responsibilities as they would while working in a DOC office. Staff were expected to work at the same level and productivity as if they had been working in an office. This included communication with their supervisor and team members via e-mail, phone conference, or other means necessary.

The alternate work site of the employee must have been an appropriate work environment, such that work can be completed safely and privately. Employees could complete work on their private computers only with strict adherence to security protocols ensuring that DOC records were kept private and secure. For
employees that require DOC equipment in order to telework, the employee was responsible for securing and protecting agency-issued equipment. Agency-issued equipment must be used for agency business only.

Supervisors were tasked with taking the steps necessary so that staff members were productive and performed their work in a satisfactory manner. They were required to monitor job performance, just as they would if staff were working in the office. In order to do so, supervisors were required to provide the supervision necessary so that assignments were performed satisfactorily, and that critical milestones and deadlines were met. Direct supervisors also needed to maintain awareness of their team’s work schedules.

**VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?*

From a procurement standpoint, DOC worked with various vendors throughout the early stages of the response; specifically, partnering with MWBE Vendors and leveraging existing requirements contracts with known responsible Requirement Contract vendors DOC has done business with in the past. DOC cautiously purchased items and avoided price gouging from vendors. Additionally, upon receipt of the purchased items, they were thoroughly inspected and counted prior to distribution and added into the Department’s inventory accordingly.

DOC solicited quotes pursuant to applicable procurement method rules to ensure the Department was receiving the best pricing offer available. Additionally, as part of the procurement process, DOC’s Central Office of Procurement (COP) conducts an integrity check via a variety of resources (i.e. DOI, Department of Finance, PASSPort, LexisNexis) prior to the recommendation for award. Such integrity checks confirm that a contractor is in compliance with NYC Procurement Policy Board rules and Chapter 13 of the NYC Charter. DOC’s end-users are responsible for monitoring vendor performance and are instructed to contact the Agency Chief Contracting Office (ACCO) if any issues/concerns arise so they may be addressed accordingly. To date, the ACCO has not received any notice of fraud or other rule violations by a contractor relating to its assistance with the pandemic response.

**PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

*What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.*

**PROTECTING THE PPE RESERVES OF THE DEPARTMENT FOR THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF STAFF AND PERSONS IN CUSTODY**

DOC maintains its strong commitment to identify and address corruption hazards, even during the challenges it faced throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. Minimizing corruption hazards regarding the procurement, storage, and
distribution of PPE has been a continued priority for the Department. Protecting DOC’s PPE reserves both reduces its vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse, as well as protecting the health and safety of staff and individuals in custody. In furtherance of protecting health and safety, the Department has distributed over 600,000 items of PPE since the onset of the pandemic. In order to mitigate the spread of COVID-19, the Department allocates adequate PPE for staff and incarcerated individuals and communicates the importance of wearing PPE pursuant to DOC policy. PPE safety and compliance rules have been communicated to staff via teletypes, memos, posters, and flyers and the Department has posted over 10,000 informational and instructional posters throughout DOC facilities since the beginning of the pandemic. The Department intends to continue posting instructional information to staff, with a focus on facility entrances, so that staff understand the Department’s policy requiring mask compliance.

Aligned with the primary objective of protecting health and safety, the Department also prioritized minimizing the risk of associated corruption hazards. The Department has risk mitigation strategies that have been in place prior to the Governor’s declared emergency, including emergency preparedness procedures. Although COVID-19 mitigation preparations began weeks earlier, on Sunday, March 22, 2020, and in response to the impact of the pandemic both in DOC jails and in the community, the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at DOC was activated. The Department’s Storehouse had a supply of PPE on hand and continued to order adequate PPE during the pandemic. As such, the Central Warehouse Operations Division (CWOD) immediately began scheduling 24/7 tours of the CWOD I warehouse, which receives, stocks, and distributes all PPE.

Prior to the activation of the EOC, CWOD I began securing the Department’s supply of PPE in specific and secure storage locations within the warehouse. These areas were under closed circuit video surveillance (CCTV) coverage and only accessible to staff working with the PPE products at the time. To better track PPE items, special locations and item identifications were added in our warehouse management system (EAM). EAM tracks all inventory and transactions at the Division I central warehouse. It can efficiently expose operational issues to decrease concerns with inventory. In addition, cycle counting started to be conducted by staff more frequently to ensure counts were accurate and to also monitor stock levels.

All PPE items that were distributed had to have approval by the Chief of Department. Each command/facility submitted a request for supplies to the manager for approval. The command/facility manager signed the request acknowledging the need for the supplies at the command/facility. This request was forwarded to the Chief of Department for final approval before the storehouse released PPE to the command. Upon approval, they were put together by warehouse staff and either hand delivered or picked up by a facility’s command.
All stock delivered to a jail facility was expected to be handed to and only signed for by a tour commander or higher rank. Staff were required to sign for their masks (surgical and N-095s) as a way to track the actual use of the PPE in the commands. Staff were also required to document which incarcerated individuals receive PPE.

As of October 2020, with the exception of operating the warehouse on a 24/7 schedule, cycle counting is still conducted to identify any issues; PPE is still located in the same secure location and under CCTV coverage; and approvals are still through the Chief of Department, with the same pick-up and/or delivery procedures. All of the aforementioned procedures continue to assist with minimizing any corruption hazard within our operation.

PROTECTING THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF STAFF AND PERSONS IN CUSTODY BY PREVENTING THE INTRODUCTION OF CONTRABAND, EXCESSIVE/UNNECESSARY USE OF FORCE, AND SEXUAL ABUSE

The DOC Investigation Division (ID) continues its efforts to mitigate the health and safety corruption hazards, including protecting against introduction of contraband to DOC facilities, excessive or unnecessary use of force (UOF), and sexual abuse of persons in custody. Such corruption and abuse hazards pose a danger to both staff and people in custody. Protecting the health and safety of all involved by reducing these corruption hazards remains amongst the highest priorities of the Department.

ID has continued to successfully work hand in hand with DOI to proactively address the introduction of contraband into Department facilities, including through the pursuit of staff discipline. ID and DOI work together to gather information by utilizing various tools and screening methods. ID K-9 staff also patrol front gates and visitor entrances of the various commands to serve as a deterrent as well as to offer assistance in the event that staff is discovered introducing contraband into facilities. COVID-19 has not caused a decrease in productivity, nor our ability to keep contraband out of DOC facilities.

DOC worked with the Nunez Federal Monitor to modify the ‘Full ID investigation’ requirements, and with that, the Department created the Intake Squad, which investigates every single Use of Force (UOF) within the Department. This restructure allows the Department to investigate and close UOF cases with appropriate conclusions and recommendations much faster than the previous structure. With the advent of the Intake Squad, ID immediately met compliance with the consent decree’s mandate of conducting thorough, timely, and impartial investigations within the agreed upon 25th business-day from the UOF incident. Since its inception, the Intake Squad has successfully met the requirement to reach a determination within 25 business days; cases that require a longer investigation (i.e., where additional interviews such as Mayoral Executive Order No. 16 interviews are necessary) are handled by a different group of investigators, who now have the time and lower caseload to manage such investigations. Of the
approximate 4,128 Intake Squad investigations conducted from February 3, 2020 through October 13, 2020, approximately 3,598 cases are already closed. The Intake Squad has been able to maintain this rate of closure despite the impact of the COVID-19 epidemic and having a remote workforce.

ID investigates all allegations of sexual abuse and sexual harassment against persons in Department custody, pursuant to the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA). The ID PREA team is currently working from a centralized, expanded workspace, which allows for an expedited response to any of the Department’s facilities around the city. As a result of increased staffing and supervision on the ID PREA team, the Department has seen better quality investigations. The Department notes that there has been an increase in substantiated PREA allegations. Our current substantiation rate for the last two reporting periods (encompassing July 2019 to July 2020) are 5.1% and 5.8%, respectively. Additionally, the Department has effectively eliminated the backlog of allegations and is now PREA compliant as it relates to the timeliness of investigations.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

In 2019, DOC reported on the following topics related to the Investigation Division (ID):

INTRODUCTION OF CONTRABAND:

ID continues to work hand in hand with DOI to proactively address the introduction of contraband into DOC facilities, including through the pursuit of staff discipline. ID and DOI work together to gather information by utilizing various tools and screening methods. ID K-9 staff also patrol front gates and visitor entrances of the various commands to serve as a deterrent as well as to offer assistance in the event that staff is found to be introducing contraband into DOC facilities.
COVID-19 has not affected agency productivity or ability to keep contraband out of DOC facilities.

EXCESSIVE/UNNECESSARY USE OF FORCE (UOF):

DOC worked with the Nunez Federal Monitor to modify the ‘Full ID investigation’ requirements, and with that, the Department created the Intake Squad, which investigates every single UOF within the Department. This restructure allows the Department to investigate and close UOF cases with appropriate conclusions and recommendations much faster than the previous structure. With the advent of the Intake Squad, ID immediately met compliance with the consent decree’s mandate of conducting thorough, timely and impartial investigations within 25 business days from the UOF incident. Since its inception, the Intake Squad has successfully met the requirement to reach a determination within 25 business days; cases that require a longer investigation (i.e., where additional interviews such as Mayoral
Executive Order No. 16 interviews are necessary) are handled by a different group of investigators, who now have the time and lower caseload to manage such investigations. Of the approximate 4,128 Intake Squad investigations initiated from February 3, 2020 through October 13, 2020, approximately 3,598 cases are already closed. The Intake Squad has been able to maintain this rate of closure despite the impact of the COVID-19 epidemic and having a remote workforce.

**UNDUE FAMILIARITY/PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT (PREA):**

ID receives allegations and referrals relating to Undue Familiarity claims from many sources: outside law enforcement agencies, 311, the Board of Correction (BOC), DOI, Constituent Services and sometimes from anonymous sources. Undue Familiarity is defined as any interaction between staff and a person in custody (socialization, romantic involvement, showing preferential treatment, favors, financial transactions etc.) that is not directly within the scope of the staff member’s official duties as prescribed by the Department. Every complaint is reviewed and investigated. Once a complaint is received by ID, identified staff are subject to monitoring and modified duties during the course of the investigation to ensure the safety of the facility, its population and staff. In addition, the identified person(s) in custody is/are monitored during the course of the investigation. Investigative steps as it pertains to an Undue Familiarity incident are followed. Ultimately, interviews of all involved parties are conducted, which may subsequently result in discipline and possible termination of the staff’s employment with the Department. To investigate these types of incidents, DOC works with DOI, the DOC Criminal Investigation Bureau (CIB) and Information Technology Division (IT) and sometimes even outside Law enforcement agencies; these digressions are treated very seriously.

ID investigates all allegations of sexual abuse and sexual harassment against persons in Department custody, pursuant to the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA). The ID PREA team is currently working from a centralized, expanded workspace, which allows for an expedited response to any of the Department’s facilities around the city. As a result of increased staffing and supervision on the ID PREA team, the Department has seen better quality investigations. The Department notes that there has been an increase in substantiated PREA allegations. Our current substantiation rate for the last two reporting periods (encompassing July 2019 to July 2020) are 5.1% and 5.8%, respectively. Additionally, the Department has effectively eliminated the backlog of allegations and is now PREA compliant as it relates to the timeliness of investigations.

**ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)**

Not applicable.
Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice (MOCJ)

Marcos Soler, Chief of Staff
Eleonora Rivkin & Andrew Sein, Inspectors General

The Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice (MOCJ) advises the Mayor on criminal justice policy and is the Mayor’s representative to the courts, district attorneys, defenders, and state criminal justice agencies, among others. MOCJ designs, deploys, and evaluates citywide strategies to increase safety, reduce unnecessary arrests and incarceration, improve fairness, and build the strong neighborhoods that ensure enduring public safety.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

MOCJ’s PPE and equipment procurement is managed by DCAS. MOCJ did not undertake separate procurements. The agency put measures in place such as securing hand sanitizer to walls and distributing PPE only.

TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

MOCJ shifted to teleworking in accordance with Personnel Service Bulletin 600-3. This included identifying staff who could work from home, staggering shifts for those who could not, and ensuring that all determinations about work location were made in an equitable manner.

MOCJ has mitigated against the risk of fraud while working remotely, such as time and attendance abuse, though managerial engagement. Teams have been doing one-on-one calls, regular staff meetings, and reporting deadlines. MOCJ leadership reviews weekly timesheets, ensuring that time and attendance records are received and reviewed promptly. After the transition to work from home, MOCJ began to send weekly reminders to all staff to turn in timesheets and report their labor allocations and increased one-on-one communication with all individuals to emphasize the need for timely and correct reporting. MOCJ continues to be vigilant about time and attendance whether individuals are working in the office or from home. For individuals whose main work is difficult to do from home, we have reassigned individuals to alternative or additional duties.
To safeguard information, everyone uses multi-factor authentication to access their email and files. MOCJ does not allow individuals to take confidential information or PII offsite. Individuals must remote in to their desktops to access their files or any client information, which uses a secured VPN connection. As a general practice, staff are also required to save secure documents in the team’s City-protected share folder and staff have been reminded to refrain from using any public platforms that might compromise the confidentiality of City information.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

MOCJ had some COVID-19-response contracts and purchases coordinated with partner human service vendors. In addition, MOCS spearheaded an initiative to provide existing human service vendors with COVID-19-response resources (PPE, remote capabilities) through contract amendments. All of the above have safeguards in place, pursuant to vendor-specific as well as citywide, state, and federal safeguard policies, connected to invoicing and compliance to ensure accuracy and prevent fraud, such as distinct invoicing for COVID-19 items, justifications for purpose to connect to COVID-19 response at budgeting phase, and providing backup to substantiate purchases. Some human service vendors also received funds deriving from a federal grant to fund criminal justice related COVID-19 expenses, which includes reporting and payment rules to ensure proper disbursement and tracking.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

PRIVACY

MOCJ’s systems hold City confidential information and PII. To ensure the relevant protections, the Mayor’s Office vets all individuals before providing them access to the agency’s systems. Access must be undertaken through a secured connection, either from an individual’s desktop or by using a secure VPN to access that desktop. In addition, MOCJ ensures data is sufficiently protected and the need for access is documented.

ENHANCED OVERSIGHT

In recent years, MOCJ has seen significant growth in contracting partners and related budgets. MOCJ has identified the need to increase internal capacity to properly monitor vendors and related payments through all phases of engagement, from contracting to auditing. MOCJ has made significant efforts over the last year to improve internal vendor compliance and payment monitoring. MOCJ has done
this through enhanced invoice submission procedures, compliance staff hiring, and expanded auditor capacity.

**REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT**

Not applicable.

**ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)**

Not applicable.
DCLA continues its mission to fund, administer technical support, and advocate for hundreds of non-profit organizations that offer cultural and arts-related activities within New York City (NYC). DCLA oversees NYC expense funding to more than 1,000 organizations annually, including 34 cultural institutions operating on NYC-owned property that comprise the Cultural Institutions Group (CIG), and capital funding to more than 200 organizations for construction, renovation, equipment purchases, and improving energy efficiency and sustainability. In addition, the agency manages NYC’s Percent for Art Program, which expands access to public art and art-making opportunities throughout NYC. The agency also manages Materials for the Arts (MFTA). MFTA is a premier arts re-use program that provides donated materials and supplies to non-profit organizations and NYC public schools.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

DCLA worked closely with City Hall, the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS), and NYC Emergency Management to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE by following procedures set out by these agencies and using the permitted procurement methods, systems, and requirement contracts. DCLA also followed its standard internal controls, including financial and operational, to minimize fraud by following procedures and policies and separating duties, such as having separate staff members handle procurement, receiving, invoicing, and payment approvals.

TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

DCLA quickly adapted to the ever-changing landscape of remote work due to COVID-19. The agency provided detailed written guidance to both employees and managers regarding remote work, including time and attendance, communication with supervisors and colleagues, and safeguarding confidential information, including abiding by information security protocols and privacy requirements set
for by NYC. DCLA also implemented two-factor authentication for remote access for increased cybersecurity. The agency emphasized the importance of regular communication within units and throughout the agency and implemented individual employee check-ins, unit check-ins, and all-staff meetings to share information and resources and provide updates.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

DCLA did not have vendors engaged directly in the emergency pandemic response. For standard vendors providing other goods and services, DCLA followed its standard internal controls for minimizing fraud through separation of duties by having separate staff members handle procurement, receiving, invoicing, and payment approvals. Staff were also in constant communication through phone calls and emails with one another and vendors to ensure continuity of service while staff and vendors were working remotely.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

EXPEDITED TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

DCLA had never implemented a telework program in its history, and creating and implementing a program under the unprecedented public health crisis in a matter of days was challenging. However, DCLA took very seriously the potential for public health and safety corruption hazards and put into place several safeguards, including written telework guidance, communication protocols, and cybersecurity and privacy protocols. The agency worked very closely with its NYC partners to coordinate on human resources (HR), legal, operational, and information technology (IT) issues as they came up and to coordinate a consistent and fair response throughout the agency and NYC.

As the pandemic continued in the fall of 2020, a small number of staff members asked to voluntarily return to the office on a very limited basis, once or twice per week or month, in order to access systems that were not as readily accessible remotely. This posed a potential public health and safety challenge and was handled carefully. DCLA worked with its NYC partners, including DCAS, the Law Department, the Office of Labor Relations (OLR), and other agencies, to create risk mitigation strategies and protocols that have permitted employees to voluntarily return on a limited basis. These protocols included a mandatory health screening, working with the building owners in both of DCLA’s office locations to ensure proper safety protocols and cleaning and maintenance of the buildings, and in-office protocols related to the scheduling of office time and social distancing.
DCLA continues to operate remotely, but is now in a better position to be flexible, given the ever-changing nature of this pandemic, while still safeguarding against public health and safety corruption hazards.

**ADMINISTRATION OF GOODS VIA MATERIALS FOR THE ARTS DURING COVID-19**

The MFTA program was created in 1978 as a collection service to provide free access to donated materials to NYC’s non-profit arts and cultural community. In Fiscal Year 2019, $9.4 million worth of goods and materials were donated to MFTA, resulting in 6,584 distributions of donated materials to arts and cultural organizations, public schools, and NYC agencies through MFTA’s warehouse and online services.

The collection and distribution of millions of dollars’ worth of goods and materials exposes shoppers and staff to opportunities that, if unchecked, would create the risk of theft or inappropriate use of goods that are intended to support and benefit public purposes. However, MFTA staff diligently observe careful inventory control practices. Upon intake into the warehouse, all goods are promptly entered into MFTA’s database, and then deducted accordingly as items are taken by recipient shoppers. Items of considerable value, such as furniture, computers, and other electronics, are tagged and labeled for identifiable tracking. Warehouse staff also constantly conduct visual inventory checks during operating hours. Even when the warehouse shut down due to COVID-19, MFTA adapted to provide very limited services to hospitals and health care facilities to assist with supporting first responders and health care workers. In addition to additional public health and safety protocols, this work was done utilizing the same safeguards listed above to protect against corruption and fraud.

**REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT**

DCLA continues to implement extensive safeguards in the four areas outlined in 2019 that present potential risks of corruption and violation of NYC laws and regulations. For each of the four areas (administration of CIG funding; administration of capital funding; administration of programs funding; and administration of goods via MFTA), the greatest corruption hazard exists with respect to misuse of funds or goods distributed for the purpose of mission-related cultural activity and capital improvements to the facilities of cultural organizations. As a result, DCLA continues to utilize the extensive safeguards outlined in its 2019 report to ensure that corruption risks are mitigated.

**ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)**

The agency-wide gift policy remains in effect to ensure that DCLA employees accept invitations to cultural events within the confines of the City Charter and Conflicts of Interest Board (COIB) Rules. DCLA employees routinely attend
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cultural events in connection with their duties to monitor and administer NYC funding to cultural institutions. There is no history of corruption, but this policy helps ensure that employees are accepting invitations within the confines of the law and ethical guidelines. In addition, COIB has been a reliable partner in offering training to DCLA staff and has been a helpful resource for the agency.
DDC’s mission is to deliver the City’s construction projects in an expeditious, cost-effective, and safe manner while maintaining the highest degree of architectural, engineering and construction quality. DDC provides communities with new or renovated structures such as firehouses, libraries, police precincts, courthouses, senior centers and more. To successfully manage the agency’s portfolio, DDC collaborates with other City agencies, as well as with emerging and world-renowned architects and consultants. DDC’s staff designs and improves the City’s vital infrastructure including roadway, sewer and water main construction projects. The agency provides quality infrastructure restoration such as sidewalks, street reconstruction, water mains, sewers, and pedestrian ramps that is essential for a healthy, resilient city.

**RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

**PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?*

Like most City agencies, the majority of DDC staff began working remotely during the week of March 18, 2020, in response to COVID-19. As always, DDC’s facilities staff continued to maintain and manage the storage of all inventory items, including PPE, for all Divisions and particularly for those employees continuing to report to the office or field locations for essential work. DDC facilities management has a system for tracking inventory and distributing materials, including PPE during the pandemic. DDC facilities staff is on site every day in order to maintain the storage room and distribute items as needed. DDC also advises City Hall on the agency’s ordering of PPE and provides an inventory count every 45 days. Finally, DDC’s Facilities provides PPE based on requests from supervisors and tracks the number of items provided (which generally is a standard amount per week).

**TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK**

*What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?*

Although DDC (like most City agencies) did not previously allow most employees to work from home, the systems in place for remote work quickly allowed the agency to transition in response to COVID-19. In addition, the agency provided
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managers with tools to ensure that all agency work was continuing. All DDC staff use CityTime, including field staff that have remote access to the system to enter time and leave. All City vehicles, including those used by DDC, have GeoTabs that allows for the monitoring of vehicle use. Further, DDC vehicles are equipped with EZ-Pass that provides another tool for tracking the location and use of City vehicles. DDC IT and HR ensured that most staff had agency issued devices where they could access CityTime. In the limited cases where an employee did not have an agency device, they were granted remote access through a personal computer. All employees were directed to maintain daily logs of their work and report their start and end time directly to HR as well as their supervisors. All managers interact with their direct reports on a daily basis and in many cases more than once a day – similar to how personnel is supervised in the office. Regular meetings continue to be held by regular conference and teleconference call. Available software allows for the sharing of information on-screen during videoconference calls. All employees were advised to use DDC devices for conducting DDC business and to avoid using their own personal devices unless specifically authorized. In instances where they had to use a personal device, they were instructed to log on to DDC’s system so all work would remain on the DDC servers/cloud applications. Management continues to track the status of all projects. DDC’s Office of Compliance and Ethics responds to any allegations, and reviews any potential issues with employee time/leave, vehicle use and general misconduct.

**VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?*

DDC continues to follow all applicable laws, rules, regulations and contractual guidelines for procurement and management of projects. This applies to all emergency pandemic projects that were handled in a manner consistent with previous large-scale emergencies. DDC’s ACCO, Law Division, and the individual divisions worked together on each procurement initiated under the emergency orders issued by the Governor and Mayor. Tracking of individual projects from request through procurement to contract administration and closeout was maintained throughout the emergency pandemic response. In addition, DDC worked closely with the NYC Law Department, OMB, City Hall, and other relevant agencies, including the Comptroller’s office, as needed. With regard to potential fraud by contractors, all projects directly supervised by DDC were managed in the same manner as all other projects. Qualified staff are on site to ensure that all work continues as directed. Payment requisitions and change orders are carefully reviewed by program staff, as well as appropriate agency oversight, including EAO. Any potential issues would be forwarded to DOI, as appropriate.
VENDOR COMPLIANCE

DDC’s procurement and construction management practices are set-up to detect any issues with bidders, contractors, and consultants that may impact their ability to complete essential public works projects. The agency’s site safety and prevailing wage units monitor and visit active work sites to ensure that all required safety measures are taken, and that workers are paid the appropriate wages and benefits. DDC’s Engineering Audit Office reviews all payment requisitions to ensure that vendors comply with all applicable contract requirements.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

It appears that all of DDC’s safeguards in terms of contract fraud and contractor performance, financial fraud, prevailing wage compliance and COIB rules have been working to prevent or detect issues on DDC projects. At this time, DDC is not aware of any investigations of any project or contractor in the past year, and have not reported any issues to the relevant oversight entities. DDC continues to refine and streamline these safeguards.

ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

Working closely with HR and IT, the appropriate program units continue to supervise and monitor employees whether they work from home, the office or field and on a full or part-time basis. DDC continues to monitor the work of consultants and contractors on active projects in terms work product, schedules, and payments. In addition, DoITT, DDC, and other relevant agencies remain vigilant about cybercrimes that remain a constant threat as we move to a digital workplace and a paper-free work-zone.
NYC Employees’ Retirement System (NYCERS)

Melanie Whinnery, Executive Director
Ann Petterson, Inspector General

NYCERS’ primary purpose is to administer the statutory pension benefits of its clients, retirees, and beneficiaries by providing quality service to its members, retirees, and beneficiaries. This is accomplished by delivering accurate and timely benefit information and payments and by maximizing investment returns on the funds of the system with an appropriate level of risk.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

NYCERS has a Code of Ethics Policy and Procurement training specifically for staff involved in an active procurement. Most PPE was obtained from the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS) Central Storehouse and secured at NYCERS. NYCERS facilities maintain a spreadsheet to track and log the distribution of all PPE related to COVID-19. NYCERS’ policies direct essential employees on-site to complete a facilities equipment request, which also serves as a tracking log. NYCERS’ Code of Conduct establishes a common standard of behavior expected of all employees of the agency. Any NYCERS-issued cleaning supplies and sanitizers are to remain in the workplace.

TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

All NYCERS employees were granted remote access, giving them the ability to work from home. Employees connect to a virtualized desktop, limiting user access to applications required to perform their work duties. In addition, every user must log in with their unique network credentials, combined with Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), to mitigate fraud and misuse of user credentials. Continued efforts to further harden and enhance remote access policies include the mitigation of data loss by disallowing print, screen scrapes, and copying data onto external storage devices. In addition, security awareness training was provided to all employees to make them aware of secure computing practices when working from home and to warn against phishing and malware threats. These efforts continue...
as part of our Information Security program with awareness letters, advisories, training modules, online posters, and threat intelligence shared with our user community.

The pandemic has not had an impact on the certification of time and attendance. NYCERS is following the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and New York City (NYC) guidelines for leave policies related to potential cases of COVID-19 exposure and infection. Managers and supervisors are responsible for ensuring they are familiar with all NYCERS policies and procedures. Policies and procedures were extensively updated around data privacy and security, access control, confidentiality, integrity, safeguarding and locking devices when not in use, data protection with secure data handling, and data classification to prohibit confidential and sensitive data from leaving the organization. Managers and supervisors are responsible for ensuring that employees are producing work outcomes that are expected. They are also responsible for addressing any staff non-compliance with NYCERS policies and procedures and are responsible for maintaining accurate records of staff schedules on- and off-site. Administration will certify an employee’s time in CityTime after input and verification from managers.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

NYCERS did not engage contractors to participate in the emergency pandemic response. Emergency pandemic response efforts were handled internally.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

COVID-19

At the start of the pandemic, Executive Director Melanie Whinnery created a Pandemic Planning Committee headed by the NYCERS Chief Compliance Officer. The committee initially focused on preparations for the workforce to pivot from on-site to remote work. It also worked on all aspects of maximizing the health and safety of the NYCERS workforce and clients upon returning to on-site work, including planning, new policies and protocols, acquisition of PPE, training, signage, effective practices for working and supervising remotely, and protecting the health, safety, and privacy of employees and clients. NYCERS collaborated with other agencies, including the Department of Health & Mental Hygiene (DOHMH), New York City Emergency Management, and DCAS. As a result, several guidelines and policies were implemented. To ensure all employees were familiar with policy changes, all employees were required to participate in a series of training modules to help them navigate changes at the work place, including
prohibited behavior. All policies were designed for the successful reintegration of employees back to on-site work at NYCERS in as safe a manner as possible.

NYCERS is a tenant in two commercial buildings, one in Brooklyn and one in Queens. Building Management at both locations have assured NYCERS that they are in compliance with New York State (NYS) recommendations for commercial buildings and adhere to additional requirements from the CDC for disinfecting the premises.

VENDOR FRAUD

At the height of the pandemic, many vendors were charging exorbitant prices for basic supplies such as hand sanitizer and disinfectant. NYCERS was able to secure an ample supply of PPE from the DCAS Central Storehouse at no cost. All additional vendors utilized were under NYS or Minority and Women-owned Business Enterprises (M/WBE) contracts.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

Since the establishment of the Enterprise Risk Committee (ERC) in 2019, much effort has been made to expand and mature NYCERS’ Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) Program. The ERC has developed a broad suite of governing documents including an Enterprise Risk Charter, Risk Appetite Statement, and Risk Escalation Criteria. Additionally, throughout 2019 and 2020, the ERC has embarked on several enterprise-wide projects to enhance risk governance, foster continuous dialogue among ERM stakeholders, and enrich the collective expertise of the organization.

During 2019, the ERC made considerable progress with respect to the conduct of a holistic, agency-wide fraud risk assessment. The goal of the fraud risk assessment is to closely examine NYCERS’ control environment with an eye towards identifying and rectifying potential deficiencies. NYCERS’ comprehensive fraud risk assessment spans functions and services including, but not limited to, Finance and Accounting, Purchasing and Contracting, Information Technology, Retirement and Pension Benefits, and Human Resources. In addition to the assessment, fraud risk awareness training has been incorporated and delivered as part of NYCERS’ overall risk management program.

In addition to the fraud risk assessment, the ERC has begun development of a robust Vendor Risk Management process. In July 2020, the ERC formed a subcommittee charged with furthering this effort. The ERC subcommittee consists of members from the Finance, Legal, Information Security, and Compliance Divisions. The purpose of the ERC Vendor Risk Management Subcommittee is to
work collectively to develop policies and procedures that address vendor onboarding, vendor risk rating, and continuous annual assessment.

**EXTERNAL AUDIT**

NYCERS undergoes a comprehensive audit conducted by NYC’s Independent Certified Public Accountant (CPA) on an annual basis. The audit is performed in accordance with auditing standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and generally accepted in the United States of America, and includes audits of the Combining Statement of Fiduciary Net Position of the Fund, the Schedule of Employer Allocations for the Fund, and a thorough technology assessment. Results of the audit are reported to the NYCERS Board of Trustees.

In addition to satisfying its annual NYC audit requirement, NYCERS is subject to audit by the New York State Department of Financial Services (NYS DFS), as per New York State Insurance Regulation No. 85. NYCERS is also responsible for timely adherence to, and completion of, NYC Comptroller’s Directive #1, a self-assessment and review of enterprise-wide internal controls, on an annual basis.

**ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)**

In closing, NYCERS’ commitment to a safe and secure environment is an ongoing effort. NYCERS continues to assess and revise its security strategy in an effort to protect its members, ensure the integrity of its operations, and efficiently and effectively deliver services.
NYC Economic Development Corporation (NYCEDC)

James Patchett, President & CEO
Ann Petterson, Inspector General

NYCEDC promotes economic vitality in each of the five boroughs of New York City (NYC) under two annual contracts with NYC: the Master Contract and the Maritime Contract. NYCEDC reports to the Deputy Mayor for Economic Development. Pursuant to its annual contracts with NYC, NYCEDC develops and administers projects within the five boroughs and acts as a resource for businesses large and small, emerging and established. NYCEDC also provides staff services to the New York City Industrial Development Agency (NYCIDA), Build NYC Resource Corporation, and New York City Neighborhood Credit Corporation.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

NYCEDC procured PPE and other pandemic response supplies for use by staff at its offices and at NYCEDC-managed facilities through the emergency procurement provisions of the Master Contract, which allow NYCEDC to make emergency procurements when there is a threat to public health.

These procurements were made through four channels: (i) purchases through contracts and ordering lines with two existing supply vendors; (ii) purchases of KN95 masks through an apparel supply vendor with whom NYCEDC had an existing relationship, following an internal review of cost reasonableness for the quoted price, as well as background information about the manufacturing facility and grade of the masks; (iii) purchases of hand sanitizer from local hardware and supply stores near NYCEDC’s facilities; and (iv) obtaining supplies from the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS) once NYC had available supplies.

NYCEDC maintains tracking information for all supplies, including PPE. Supplies are kept in a locked room and access is tracked and limited to NYCEDC facility maintenance staff. NYCEDC developed and implemented a protocol for use and distribution of PPE at its offices and NYCEDC-managed facilities to ensure supplies were utilized but not wasted or abused.
TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

NYCEDC has adopted and published on its internal website a series of internal policies addressing: (i) hours of work and timekeeping procedures for working remotely; (ii) updated leave and pay procedures applicable to employees during COVID-19; (iii) remote work during business disruption (including COVID-19); and (iv) NYCEDC reporting with respect to any employee who may have contracted COVID-19. NYCEDC has also published on its internal website guidelines for on-site work (and return to work protocols) and off-site remote work, as well as helpful tips on working remotely for its staff, such as facilitating effective meetings. Managers are required to review and approve subordinates’ timesheets in a timely manner.

NYCEDC also works with NYC Cyber Command. By the time NYCEDC employees had transitioned to remote work due to the pandemic, NYCEDC had already completed critical implementation to mitigate risks from remote work as outlined in NYC Cyber Command’s directive regarding remote access cybersecurity controls. NYCEDC employees conduct remote work through either a secure virtual private network (VPN), which is only accessible from NYCEDC-issued laptops, or a remote access solution. Both methods encrypt data during transmission and provide a secure work environment. Employee logins are also protected with Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to confirm their identity. All NYCEDC-issued laptops have a feature enabled that protects data by encrypting the entire hard drive. This protects the data saved on the laptop in the event the device is lost or stolen.

Many of NYCEDC’s existing security solutions are cloud-based, which extends protection beyond an on-site Information Technology (IT) network. These cloud security solutions will continue to protect employee access and NYCEDC’s data regardless of the user accessing the information on-site or working remotely. Additionally, all NYCEDC employees are required to take cybersecurity awareness training annually. NYCEDC sends out regular email communications, such as remote work best practices and cybersecurity tips, to increase employees’ awareness of risks and to equip them with the knowledge to help safeguard NYCEDC information.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

On April 2, 2020, Deputy Mayor Vicki Been issued a Delegation, Directive, and Indemnity Order to NYCEDC (the Directive) that specifically directed NYCEDC to make emergency procurements under the Master Contract to aid in response to
COVID-19 during the pendency of the State of Emergency in NYC, established by Mayoral Executive Order No. 98, dated March 12, 2020.

NYCEDC’s procurement of PPE and pandemic response medical equipment and supplies for NYC was done as an emergency procurement under the Master Contract between EDCNYC and NYC and pursuant to approvals by the Executive Committee to NYCEDC’s Board of Directors (collectively, the Directive Procurements).

The Directive Procurements include breathing respirators, gowns, face shields, masks, COVID-19 test kits, and the creation and use of laboratories to analyze COVID-19 test material to obtain test results. NYCEDC is continuing to source medical supplies for NYC. NYCEDC formed a new entity, NYC COVID-19 Emergency Services, LLC (NYCCES), which purchased PPE for the City. NYCEDC’s Internal Audit Division assisted by reviewing selected activities and information provided by NYCEDC staff working on medical supply procurements and providing internal control insight and recommendations for process enhancement, including formalization of documentation retention practices and selected project management procedures.

Working in collaboration with DCAS, NYC Health & Hospitals Corporation (H+H) and the Mayor’s Office, NYCEDC evaluated price reasonableness to ensure fair market value of goods purchased on behalf of NYC. Price reasonableness was determined by means of comparing and evaluating the market value of available goods and equipment at the time of procurement. Supplies that were purchased from multiple vendors (such as medical gowns and face shields) were tracked against similar products to ensure consistent pricing. When possible, limited requests for proposals (RFPs) were issued for the procurement of services to ensure competitive pricing.

NYCEDC negotiated a reduction in cost of freight/shipping for the delivery and distribution of goods and equipment and was provided a discount of over 90 percent off market prices from existing shipping partners, such as FedEx.

Supplies and equipment were purchased through executed purchase orders, which ensured that vendors who engaged in sourcing COVID-19 supplies complied with professional standards relevant to the goods and equipment they were providing and that all purchases would be in compliance with Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) requirements.

NYCEDC and NYCCES engaged third-party quality control firms to inspect and accept goods and to manage the process to ensure that goods that did not pass quality control were fixed or replaced. Subject to capacity, purchased supplies were delivered directly to DCAS and/or H+H warehouses for storage, tracking, and utilization by the City.
PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

REQUESTS FOR RELIEF OR DEFERRAL OF RENT AS A RESULT OF COVID-19

Managing and processing requests to NYCEDC from tenants, subtenants, permittees, and other occupants of property owned, leased, or administered by NYCEDC as lease administrator on behalf of NYC, including several public markets and operating agreements, as well as entities chartering or leasing NYCEDC-owned vessels, seeking relief or deferral of rent or other lease obligations as a result of economic hardship asserted by these entities, related to COVID-19.

At duly called meetings, NYCEDC’s Board of Directors authorized NYCEDC to provide relief to: (i) tenants, subtenants, permittees, and other occupants of property owned or leased by NYCEDC; and (ii) entities that have a charter or lease of NYCEDC-owned vessels, who have been adversely impacted by the pandemic, subject to limitations on the scope and duration of such relief set forth in the Board’s resolutions.

To implement the Board of Directors’ resolutions, as a risk management strategy, NYCEDC’s Asset Management Division adopted policy and procedures for handling intake and due diligence in connection with evaluating and processing requests for relief and issuing discretionary approvals, including establishing a four-member Rent Relief Committee, comprised of senior NYCEDC staff, with established guidelines.

Information collected by the Asset Management Division from each requestor includes documents demonstrating: (i) the current status of the requestor’s compliance with its lease, permit, occupancy agreement, operating agreement, or charter; (ii) the nature of the intake request; and (iii) submissions describing the financial condition, including assistance from other loan or grant programs. Evaluation of the information addresses whether the requestor has met certain eligibility criteria, the necessity for a NYC agency review and approval, and other policy considerations. The Asset Management Division also tracks the final determinations responding to rent and other relief and deferral requests.
DEVELOPMENT OF NEW GRANT AND LOAN PROGRAMS

Developing new grant and loan programs in conjunction with other non-NYC partners for small businesses adversely affected by COVID-19 as an emergency response to the pandemic, including the NYC Small Business Continuity Fund; the NYC-LMI Small Business Restart Fund, which is poised to be rolled out; and the East Harlem Small Business Grant program. These programs were presented to and approved by the Executive Committee of NYCEDC.

The risk mitigation strategy adopted by NYCEDC for these new programs was to contract with reputable organizations with extensive track records of administering comparable programs and to collaborate with these organizations to ensure their duties would include rigorously conducting proper due diligence for the businesses receiving financial assistance, administering the programs, and adopting policies and procedures to protect against fraud. NYCEDC evaluated the respective contractors' ability to perform the responsibilities of administration, as well as their policies and procedures for protecting against fraud, including requiring that the contractors provide NYCEDC with regular, detailed reporting on grants and/or loans. In addition, these organizations cleared background investigations by NYCEDC.

For the NYC Small Business Continuity Fund, NYCEDC established a joint credit facility with Pursuit Lending/NYBDC, Goldman Sachs, and Tapestry Foundation to provide zero-interest loans of up to $75,000 to support small businesses with fewer than 100 employees. For the NYC-LMI Small Business Restart Fund, NYCEDC has contracted with NYBDC to provide loans to small businesses with up to 100 employees in low- to moderate-income areas of NYC with an emphasis on storefront businesses in these communities. NYBDC acts as the program administrator for both programs. NYBDC is a corporation with over 65 years of experience in providing funding to support businesses, created under the Banking Law of the State of New York for the purpose of providing financial assistance in the form of loans to small businesses. NYCEDC previously had a successful working relationship with NYBDC in providing disaster relief funding in 2012 to assist businesses affected by Superstorm Sandy.

For the East Harlem Small Business Grant Program, NYCEDC entered into a consultant contract with Union Settlement Association, Inc. (US), pursuant to which US acts as the administrator for the program and provides grant funding to businesses impacted by the pandemic in East Harlem. US, a nonprofit corporation in New York, has been an on-the-ground resource for East Harlem residents since 1895 and has actively assisted small businesses, including by the provision of services over the last several years to Small Business Services (SBS).
REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

NYCEDC continues to follow and monitor the policies and procedures described below, as identified in NYCEDC’s 2019 Anti-Corruption Report.

PROCUREMENT

The provisions of our Master and Maritime Contracts contain many safeguards against all risks of corruption. They are designed to ensure that all contracts are negotiated and entered into based on demonstrated competence and qualifications and at fair and reasonable prices. Included among the safeguards are the following:

- Open Competition: The vast majority of NYCEDC’s procurements involve open and public competition.
- Sole Source Review: The Deputy Mayor must approve the use of the sole source procurement method for individual contracts unless they fall within pre-approved parameters.
- Selection by Committee: With respect to RFPs for personal and professional services, a committee comprised of members from many different departments within NYCEDC reviews the potential selection.
- Background Checks: All vendors, except for those for small purchases, are subject to a background check. In the case of contracts using NYC funds, except for small contracts, the background check includes an additional inquiry by DOI.
- Controls over Waivers/Exceptions: The Master and Maritime Contracts require certain provisions to be included in construction and consultant contracts. These provisions may only be waived by the NYC Law Department or Deputy Mayor, providing independent oversight of variations from the requirements of the Master and Maritime Contracts.
- Independent Board Review and Oversight: NYCEDC’s consultant and construction contracts and funding agreements, except for small purchases, must be approved by NYCEDC’s Executive Committee of the Board of Directors or the Board itself. Certain agreements are also reviewed by the Board’s Legal Affairs Committee or the Board’s Audit Committee.
- Multi-Department Review: Prior to entering into any consultant or construction contract or funding agreement, approvals from several different departments (e.g., budget, legal, contracts, and the department doing the contracting) are required.
LAND AND ASSET SALES AND GROUND LEASES

When NYCEDC engages in the sale or long-term ground leases of NYC or NYCEDC-owned property, there are extensive safeguards and internal control processes used to avoid corruption risks. These include:

- **Mission-Driven Rationale:** All sales and leases are conducted solely for the purpose of economic development, including retention and expansion of business and employment in NYC.

- **Competition through Open and Public RFPs:** Land and asset sales and leases are primarily done pursuant to open and public RFPs, which are widely advertised.

- **Review and Approval by the Deputy Mayor:** NYCEDC's designation of a potential purchaser or long-term ground lessee is sent to the Deputy Mayor for approval.

- **External Stakeholder Review and Approval:** Each sale is subject to the following review process:
  - A background check is conducted of all purchasers, ground lessors, and their principals. There may be independent reviews of the sale or ground lease in any related Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP) and NYC Environmental Quality Review actions, which include other NYC agencies and elected officials.
  - When property is disposed of in accordance with section 384(b)(4) of the City Charter, the sale or ground lease of NYC property is sent to the applicable Community Board for review and must thereafter be reviewed and approved by the Borough Board and the Deputy Mayor, acting on behalf of the Mayor.
  - When property under the jurisdiction of the Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) is disposed of, a public hearing is held.
  - The Real Estate and Finance Committee of NYCEDC's Board of Directors, comprised entirely of outside directors, reviews each land sale and ground lease.
  - The sale or ground lease is then submitted to the full NYCEDC Board of Directors for final approval.
  - All deeds for the sale or leases for the ground lease of NYC-owned land to the New York City Land Development Company (NYCLDC) for conveyance to NYCEDC or a third party must be approved by the NYC Law Department.
EMPLOYEE MALFEASANCE

Other safeguards against corruption relate to oversight of employees at the time of hiring and throughout their period of employment at NYCEDC:

- NYCEDC uses a third-party independent vendor to begin background checks at the time an offer of employment is made, which precedes the more substantial background check conducted by DOI.
- Employees who could potentially be subject to corruption risks are required to undergo a DOI background check upon employment.
- NYCEDC employees who would have to file annual DOI and Conflicts of Interest Board (COIB) financial disclosures if they were employed by NYC must file such forms annually.
- Employees, upon employment, are required to agree to be subject to the restrictions in Chapter 68 of the City Charter.
- The number of employees authorized to sign contracts on behalf of NYCEDC is very limited. This limits the opportunity for corruption. Each of the authorized signatories is subject to the above described background checks and annual filings.
- NYCEDC’s internal website prominently provides provisions relating to Standards of Conduct and Ethics and Conflicts of Interest.

ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

Competition with other city, state, and government entities seeking to purchase PPE and raw materials, leading to market price and supply chain instability, as well as raw material shortages and unavailability.

- The risk mitigation strategy adopted by NYCEDC was negotiating the best price and delivery and supply terms possible under the circumstances, given timing and delivery requirements established by H+H and/or DCAS.
New York City Emergency Management (NYCEM)

Deanne Criswell, Commissioner
Andrew Brunsden, Acting Inspector General

NYCEM coordinates and supports multiagency responses to the City’s emergencies and other significant incidents, including severe weather, natural hazards and disasters, power outages, transportation incidents, labor disruptions, aviation disasters, and acts of terrorism. NYCEM’s critical objectives include:

- To plan, prepare for and mitigate emergencies;
- To coordinate and support responses to emergencies;
- To collect and disseminate critical information;
- To educate the public on preparedness; and
- To obtain funding and other aid in support of the City’s overall preparedness.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

Upon the activation of its Emergency Operations Center and the Logistics Center, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the agency took a number of immediate steps to fortify existing accountability practices:

- An online inventory system was purchased to track all equipment that was received at the NYCEM warehouse and distributed from the NYCEM warehouse.
- A Bill of Lading (BOL) system was established whereby goods delivered to or distributed from the NYCEM warehouse would have a signed receipt reflecting the receipt or distribution of the good(s).
- NYCEM installed additional cameras at the warehouse and hired a security firm to control access to the warehouse location.

With reference to purchasing goods or services, NYCEM followed procurement processes as established under existing Procurement Policy Board Rules and in compliance with the Mayor’s March 17, 2020 Emergency Executive Order 101. Vendors registered with the City and relevant payment and tax information was entered into the New York City Financial Management System and the New York...
City Payee Information Portal. Prior to ordering product(s), NYCEM’s Logistics Team performed market research to become more familiar with customary and industry practices and standards which they used as a basis to flag odd pricing and to confirm equipment specifications. NYCEM had ongoing discussions with the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS), Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH), and various medical associations to compare pricing to determine if price gouging was present. NYCEM required vendors to send quotes with full product specifications, together with timelines for order processing and delivery. For high demand items, NYCEM required photographs of the actual product, otherwise an item with stock images was rejected. Payment was issued after the product was received and quality/quantity validated. Prior to the distribution of any medical supplies, the request(s) were vetted through the parent medical organization, DOHMH, or through NYCEM’s Health & Medical Unit. NYCEM would also validate the authorization or authority of the requester to ask for supplies.

TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

The agency complied with the requirements set forth in DCAS Personnel Services Bulletin (PSB) 600-3 of March 13, 2020. As the agency transitioned to remote work, supervisors were frequently reminded to manage their staff work schedules and monitor work production/product. This message was amplified at executive and senior staff meetings. Supervisors were encouraged to maintain consistent, frequent communication with their staff, both to encourage compliance with work deliverables and timelines, but also to encourage work socialization and good mental health.

NYCEM provided equipment to employees working remotely to enable those devices to be maintained securely and eliminated the risk of using non-managed devices. Each device is protected with Endpoint protection software. This includes antivirus, threat detection, threat investigation and response, device management, and data leak protection (DLP). Many of NYCEM’s remote tools have logs, if needed, for auditing purposes. The transition to remote work escalated the agency’s migration to Microsoft 365 cloud. NYCEMS implemented Domain Message Authentication Reporting and Conformance (DMARC), an enhanced email security, and enhanced the agency’s identity and access management by requiring Multi Factor Authentication (MFA) and Privileged Access Management (PAM) across NYCEM’s environment.

The NYCEM Legal Unit advocated and provided oversight and guidance to employees and consultants with regard to the need to protect confidential information and personal identifying information. The legal unit kept close watch
on information collected, particularly with regard to HIPAA and Personally Identifiable Information (PII) issues, and provided continual guidance on what factors constituted PII. NYCEM invited the Office of the FDNY chief healthcare compliance officer to provide NYCEM personnel and consultants with HIPAA training for informational purposes only. The NYCEM Legal Unit sought the advice of the City’s privacy officer, as needed.

**VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?*

To the extent possible, NYCEM sought bids from multiple vendors for all emergency procurements. The agency also compared pricing to the Office of General Services (OGS), General Services Administration (GSA) contracts, exiting City contracts and market rates to ensure prices paid were fair and reasonable.

NYCEMS conducted vendor responsibility determinations by utilizing New York State Department of Labor (DOL), Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Thomson Reuters CLEAR, and Google, to identify any adverse information, liens, warrants, or cautions. NYCEM checked the vendor’s past performance history and any prior related emergency experience to see if there were any known performance or default issues.

NYCEM created a team of trained accountants and forensic auditors, retained through the agency’s staffing contractor, to review invoices, payments, and financial practices and procedures, related to NYCEM’s major COVID-19 emergency contracts.

**COVID-19 Hotel Program**

As part of NYCEM’s COVID-19 response, the City established programs to offer services to the public at no cost. This included the City’s COVID-19 Hotel Program offering free hotel rooms to COVID-19 positive or symptomatic populations who needed a safe place to isolate or quarantine. Rooms were also available for healthcare workers to reduce virus transmission between work and home.

Measures taken to reduce fraud and misuse included:

- Creating a fraud detection unit in the program to monitor social media, patterns in reservations, and questionable activity related to intakes and reservations
- Documenting and reporting all suspicious activity to DOI
- Immediately notifying hotel booking vendors of suspicious activity and requiring additional layers of screening to verify or cancel reservations
PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

*What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.*

CYBER CONCERNS AND TELEWORK

Expansive telecommuting activity has increased the potential for sensitive projects and personal identifying information, HIPAA information, or confidential government information to be exposed to unauthorized individuals. The move to remote work placed stress upon our network infrastructure and placed pressure on security defenses. Due to an increase in phishing attacks, NYCEM has taken proactive steps in advising employees to be more vigilant and cautious when opening links, email messages, and documents. NYCEM is vigilant in its detection of security concerns, and forwards continuous alerts and email notifications to the agency’s employees and consultants, providing guidance and advice regarding privacy and virtual meetings. Staff have been advised to report unusual or suspicious activity on any device utilized for remote work, including but not limited to, any computer, mobile device or home network, to the NYCEM IT or MIS cyber team.

SHORTAGES OF NEEDED GOODS

The shortage of PPE and other response related medical supplies created an opportunity for corruption. Early in the City’s response, NYCEM and other City agencies received a proliferation of unsolicited offers for PPE and related medical supplies from vendors. Some of these unsolicited offers were from seemingly reliable persons and businesses, but there was uncertainty. The avalanche of email solicitations overwhelmed NYCEM and other City partner agencies. As the supplies were needed, agencies sought to follow up on potential leads. An email address was established and a process developed whereby the unsolicited offers and leads would be sent to the established email address, and thereafter DCAS and the Mayor’s Office of Contract Services (MOCS), would vet the offers.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

THEFT OF PROPERTY AND SERVICES

NYCEM utilizes several methods to ensure proper usage of agency fleet vehicles. Every vehicle in the fleet, including passenger vehicles, and medium and heavy duty trucks, has a DCAS-installed Geotab GPS tracking device. All trips taken by NYCEM vehicles are visible to the agency transportation coordinator (ATC), executive director of support services and deputy chief operating officer (DCOO). In addition, trip data is actively monitored by the DCAS Fleet Office of Real Time Tracking (FORT) and is available to DOI. All DCAS notifications for violations
Annual Anti-Corruption Report
New York City Emergency Management

(speeding, forbidden zone or out of state travel) are investigated by the ATC and communicated to DCAS. The ATC reports repeat offenders to their supervisors and the DCOO. Second, all fueling is done using the DCAS WEX (formerly known as Wright Express) system, with the exception of a few heavy duty diesel vehicles. As such, WEX system controls report discrepancies in fuel usage. WEX users are issued a card that requires manual input of current mileage when fueling assigned (or pool) vehicles. Any discrepancies auto-generate a notification that is then investigated by our ATC. Finally, all pool vehicles are tracked using an automated key box and reservation system. Any agency employee who has reserved a pool vehicle is required to swipe their agency identification card to access the keys stored within the key box. As such, all pool vehicle trips are tracked within that system. The key box and reservation system also has controls to prevent a user from accessing vehicles that they are not authorized to drive (e.g. a vehicle with lights and sirens or requiring a commercial driver’s license).

ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

Not applicable.
DEP protects the environment and City residents by supplying clean drinking water, collecting and treating wastewater, and reducing air, noise, and hazardous materials pollution. DEP distributes more than one billion gallons of water per day, treats 1.3 billion gallons of wastewater per day, and regulates air quality, hazardous waste, and critical quality of life issues, such as noise.

**RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

**PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT**

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

At the onset of the pandemic, the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) centralized the procurement of PPE in the Office of Procurement Management (OPM) and in the office of the Agency Chief Contracting Officer (ACCO). DEP also suspended most agency purchasing cards (P-Cards) through the end of FY 2020. All procurements of PPE including masks, wipes, gloves, and cleaning services were reviewed and approved by OPM prior to purchase. Beginning in FY 2021, and after DEP operationalized a process, all P-Cards have been restored and the bureaus are able to once again do micro/P-Card purchasing for PPE however prior approval by OPM is still required. Each bureau is now responsible for storing PPE and distributing it to operational sites. PPE storage and distribution at DEP’s Lefrak headquarters is managed centrally through the office of the Chief Financial Officer. Also, an agency-wide PPE inventory, with burn rates, is maintained by the Department’s Office of Management Analysis, Planning and Auditing.

In addition, at the outset of the pandemic, DEP was responsible for making hand sanitizer for distribution citywide at two locations, one downstate and one upstate. All the materials for production were procured centrally through OPM and delivered directly to the sites. DEP completed hand sanitizer production at the end of August.

**TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK**

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

The Bureau of Information Technology (BIT) established systems to provide safe and secure access to City information and systems for DEP employees working
Employees generally used CityTime to clock in and out. On those occasions when CityTime was unavailable, employees notified their supervisors directly.

Supervisors monitored staff activity through regular communication by email, telephone, virtual meetings, and activity reports. By doing so, supervisors were able to confirm that employees were conducting City business while working remotely.

**VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?*

DEP procured cleaning services for the downstate operational sites when a case of COVID-19 was confirmed at a facility. In that case, OPM did the procurements and is managing the contracts. Whenever a case of COVID-19 is confirmed at a DEP facility, the relevant bureau contacts OPM to coordinate the response with an appropriate vendor. In a few cases, OPM determined that the vendors were underperforming and they are no longer utilized by the agency.

**PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

**COMPLIANCE WITH LICENSES, PERMITS, AND REPORTING OBLIGATIONS**

During the pandemic, many regulatory agencies provided some forms of relief related to licenses, permits, and regulatory reporting obligations. The terms of these relief efforts were described in various enforcement discretions and Executive Orders, and included items such as extension of expiration and due dates, allowing the use of alternative (flexible) protocols, and providing presumptive approvals or decisions. There is an inherent opportunity for such discretionary efforts to be used improperly, or when unnecessary, potentially leading to an abuse of these alternatives with regard to regulatory compliance.

In order to ensure that these discretions were properly utilized and exercised only when necessary to maintain public health, documentation of how and why each was implemented were required, and many required approval of a senior staff member or concurrence by agency or legal staff. As pandemic-related restrictions ease and these relief efforts expire, we will take extra steps to communicate those changes and verify full compliance via internal audits.

**INTEGRITY OF LICENSES AND PERMITS**

DEP managed capital construction contracts require the use of construction trades that need to be licensed or supervised by licensed individuals. With the closure of
in-person service windows at other agencies like FDNY, NYCDOB, and NYC SBS, and the ability of renewal applicants to automatically extend their registrations, there is a risk that a trade certification could lapse (Plumbing, Electrical, Fire Safety, etc.). This condition could also apply to competency certifications associated with cranes, welding, special inspectors, scaffolding, etc.). DEP’s mitigation strategy was to have the project CM representatives to routinely (weekly) check the individual contractor’s certifications.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION

With a $20.5 billion Capital Improvement Plan as of the Approved FY21 Executive (April) CIP (FY 20-29), the Department of Environmental Protection’s (DEP) capital construction program presents significant corruption hazards.

Hazards

DEP’s capital construction program is potentially susceptible to illegal activities such as bribery, theft of equipment and materials, fraud, and collusive bidding/bid rigging.

Steps taken to address hazards

- Contract WFF-BT-2 for the Rondout-West Branch Bypass Tunnel Construction and Wawarsing Repairs Delaware Aqueduct project: DEP entered into a partnership with DOI on or about November 18, 2015, for the auditing and monitoring by 10 full-time DOI employees of the work to be performed on this $707 million dollar contract. Funding is being provided by DEP for payment of salaries for this purpose through the end of 2025. In particular, these individuals, reporting to DOI, will ensure compliance with all applicable laws, rules, and regulations in connection with execution of the contract.

- The internal Quality Assurance/Quality Control section of the Bureau of Engineering Design and Construction (BEDC) provides vendor reviews and technical approvals, shop witness test support, material testing and evaluations as well as worldwide technical inspection services. All information is kept in a database that can only be accessed by BEDC staff. They use this database to ensure that faulty work is documented and to prevent approvals of unqualified vendors. Project-specific shop witness tests are performed by BEDC personnel for all critical equipment. These tests help to ensure that equipment performs as specified in the contract.

- To more closely monitor and track contractor and consultant payments, BEDC established a centralized Payment Processing Unit (BPPU). This unit has developed a number of standardized checklists to ensure...
compliance with the PPB rules and specific contract terms. Payments must be certified by the BEDC Accountable Manager, the resident engineer (for construction payments), and checked by the BPPU prior to submitting the payments to the Office of Engineering Audits (OEA). This unit’s procedures add scrutiny and oversight to the payment process.

- DEP has also established procedures for consultant selection by Evaluation Committees (ECs) pursuant to Requests for Proposals (RFPs). This centralized process, administered by the ACCO, requires an even distribution of operations and capital construction staff on selection committees. The diverse make-up of the ECs protects against favoritism in the consultant selection process.

- All Contract Change Orders are internally approved by BEDC Management in accordance with the Deputy Commissioner designated approval thresholds. Approval thresholds are set at:
  - up to $1,000,000 by Portfolio Managers/Directors;
  - up to $5,000,000 by Assistant Commissioners/Executive Directors;
  - and over $5,000,000 by the Deputy Commissioner.

  Once approved by BEDC Management, Contract change orders are then forwarded to ACCO and OEA for review and final approval.

- DEP works to ensure that contractors are only reimbursed for valid expenses. These efforts include the work of DEP’s OEA and ACCO, the on-site monitoring by BEDC’s project engineers and, where appropriate, DEP’s construction management consultants. These efforts include monitoring worksite activities, scrutinizing payment requests, and ensuring prevailing wage compliance through enforcing requirements for proper daily sign-in sheets and submission of certified payrolls. BEDC and OIT use an Enterprise Project Management Information System (EPMIS) for the management of construction projects. EPMIS contains all project data and is accessible by DEP personnel, design and construction management consultants, and contractors. To mitigate the possibilities of abuse, project roles (City employee, consultant, and contractor) are used to control what types of data a user has access. In addition, each document/process contains the history of which users approve, view or download thereby ensuring transparency to the process.

- BEDC completed the development of training for users of the system to specifically address document security. This will ensure that users know the safety features of the system and which documents are to be secured under these protections. BEDC plans to roll out this training by the end of the year.
A core function of the Bureau of Customer Services (BCS) is the collection of over $3.8 billion in customer payments for water/sewer charges. DEP provides several options for customers to make electronic payments, and approximately 50% of payments received is by electronic means. The remaining payments are made by check or money order, mailed to a lockbox, or hand-delivered to a borough office.

**Hazards**

Past investigations by the Inspector General have shown that the database systems used can be corruptly manipulated to the benefit of customers. Specific risks include staff awarding of unauthorized credits or adjustments to bills (e.g., removal of late payment charges) in exchange for personal gain; misappropriation of funds; misappropriation of payments for water/sewer charges; and inappropriate use of personal customer information (e.g., identity theft).

**Steps taken to address hazards:**

- BCS has established a Quality Assurance (QA)/Internal Audit unit staffed by senior, experienced account personnel and auditors to regularly review account transactions for compliance with DEP and Water Board policies. The QA unit conducts regular analyses of account transactions to identify situations that require training or other actions. The role of this unit has been expanded to include the audit and review of operational units within BCS. A quarterly report detailing errors made by staff is distributed to senior managers in the Bureau.

- Using the Customer Information System, database reports are generated to display all credit and debit transactions completed on a daily basis. Select accounts are reviewed daily from these reports. Random sampling is done for all BCS units. QA staff reviews sample transactions resulting in a credit (refund) to ensure compliance with the Water Board rules and regulations. As part of the QA process, while reviewing accounts, staff verifies that the employee who adjusted the account does not have a personal interest in the account. Borough office site visits are performed to observe the interaction of employees with customers. A program has been implemented for random monitoring of call center activity by supervisors and/or the manager, for quality assurance purposes, to ensure that appropriate information is provided to customers and that appropriate transactions are made in accounts.

- BCS has established policies and practices to reduce the likelihood of misappropriation of funds. A strict policy prohibits any employee from processing a transaction from any account in which they may have an interest. BCS requires third parties who are representing account holders to provide letters of authorization attesting that they are allowed to act on
behalf of the customer. Personal identifying information is redacted to prevent dissemination within the Bureau or DEP.

- BCS has established a robust refund process to prevent fraudulent disbursement of monies to the wrong parties. Property owners are required to provide proof of payment for the payments that resulted in the account credit. Multiple DEP personnel must independently review the account history to confirm that the refund is authorized. Any refund greater than $75,000 must be personally reviewed by a BCS Chief.

- BCS has revised its billing adjustment/credit authorization procedures to require an increasing level of managerial authorization commensurate with the value of the credit/adjustment. Approval by various BCS directors is required for any billing adjustment greater than $100,000. ‘Remote check depositing’ has been established to end the practice of manually transmitting checks to the processor. Checks are remotely scanned electronically, causing an immediate transaction to occur and ensuring deposit of monies in that day’s receipts. Scanned checks are voided and shredded after the deposit/payment is recorded, and the image is retained in the secure Citibank files, which are protected with electronic keys.

- BCS has created a standardized settlement document to be used when outstanding arrears are settled for less than the full amount. The BCS Ombudsman maintains a database of all the settlements that have been reached. The BCS Chief of Revenue Protection regularly meets with the Ombuds staff to confirm that accounts have been adjusted in accordance with the terms of the settlement documents.

**PROCUREMENT AND INVENTORY**

DEP procures large volumes of goods and both professional and construction services through its OTPS expense budget.

**Hazards**

- Contracting initiatives present some risk of potential illegal activities such as bribery, fraud and collusion.

- Materials and equipment purchased for use by employees are stored at facilities throughout the City and in the Upstate Watershed. There is a risk that these materials and equipment could be misused or stolen by DEP employees or others.

- An individual or small group of employees might arrange for the procurement of unnecessary items and then steal or otherwise convert the items for personal use.
Steps taken to address hazards

ACCO

- Reviews all RFP’s before release; reviews select CSB scopes and specifications concurrent with their review by DEP Bureau of Legal Affairs.
- ACCO selects vendors and awards consistent with all PPB rules and other local or state law requirements.
- For each professional services/consulting contract being awarded via a (RFP), an Evaluation Committee (EC) reviews the proposals and selects the winning proposer. The prospective contract manager is not part of the EC.
  - All EC members receive a package of documents addressing the process, ethics and conflicts of interest issues and are required to return signed conflict of interest and ethics certifications to the ACCO or they cannot serve on the committee.
  - Regular EC meetings are held for each RFP:
    - At each kick-off meeting, the EC members are advised that for purposes of evaluating the RFP: they report to the ACCO and not to their regular supervisors. They are advised that they cannot discuss the process or its results with peers, outside consultants or supervisors, and that they should not have individual discussions among themselves on the proposals or the proposers. They are also told they will be off the EC (and future ECs) should they not comply with these directives.
    - EC meeting prior to the submission of scores: all EC members meet again as a group with the ACCO’s office to discuss the proposals. Having this venue for questions discourages individual discussions.
    - The EC meets again to review the results of the evaluation process. The results are not disclosed until this meeting. This helps prevent information from being disclosed prematurely or only to one person.
    - The ACCO has a protocol for EC membership under which Bureau heads submit names of staff and their areas of expertise (e.g.: mechanical engineering, tunneling) and the ACCO selects the EC members based on availability, prior EC participation and role of the person in the agency. The goal is to have a well-balanced EC with all members bringing something different and valuable to the table.
    - Once a vendor is selected, the ACCO runs negotiation sessions with the bureaus participating in a technical assistance role. The
ACCO’s Office works with the bureaus to draft and finalize the contract, which is then reviewed and approved by DEP’s Bureau of Legal Affairs and the NYC Law Department.

- The ACCO’s office holds bid review meetings across all bureaus for competitive sealed bid procurements of a large dollar value or high level of complexity.
- The ACCO works to assure Labor Law, M/WBE and Sub Approval compliance. Samples of payrolls are submitted and inspected with each payment request. DEP resident engineers are trained in prevailing wage enforcement in Citywide courses offered through the ACCO’s Office.
- The ACCO conducts all small purchase solicitations centrally, for dollar values between $20K and $100K.
- Bureaus are required to provide copies of all micro-purchase documentation and P-Card holders’ monthly transaction documentation to the ACCO’s office for post-audit review.
- Procurement liaison meetings are held on an as-needed basis to disseminate any updated information or changes in policies/procedures regarding micro or small purchases.

BEDC

- Prepares and submits a projected spending plan before each fiscal year to ensure appropriate and efficient purchases.
- Each division within the Bureau is required to submit requests for procurement with justifications as to why the purchases are critical to operation to bureau senior staff.
- Authority to place orders is limited to a few key staff in the Bureau and all purchase requests are reviewed by a designated member of senior staff prior to submission to the ACCO.
- Procurements of goods and non-construction services are logged and tracked in a database to monitor both budget and adherence to agency policy. Upon delivery, the goods and services are reconciled with the purchase order prior to the preparation of receiving reports and submission for payment. A database is utilized to monitor and report on all expenditures to assure the Bureau remains compliant with the spending plan.
- BEDC maintains two secure storerooms for all equipment and supplies delivered to the Lefrak office. Each item is logged into an inventory and maintained by the Bureau’s procurement liaison. Each storeroom has staff assigned to oversee issuance of supplies and to accept and stock deliveries. Throughout the year, distribution of supplies is documented by
the designated employee into a supply/equipment logbook which is updated regularly into a database. The book records a description of the item(s) removed, the date of removal, and the name of the individual requesting the item. All supplies requests are submitted on a standard form and signature is required when the supplies are delivered and accepted. At the end of each fiscal year, the Bureau performs a complete inventory check and records all information.

Bureau of Water Supply (BWS)

- Developed and utilizes an integrated budget/procurement computer database that ensures that only authorized employees can initiate purchases while facilitating oversight and authorization functions for the Bureau’s central administrative staff. All receiving reports are entered and tracked with the budget/procurement database.

- In addition to the monitoring performed by the ACCO, BWS is recording all P-Card purchases centrally and reviewing all P-Card procurements on a monthly basis.

- Develops comprehensive spending plans before the fiscal year to ensure all expenditures are required.

- During the fiscal year, the authority to place orders is limited to a few key staff in the divisions and regions.

- Additionally, BWS has assigned additional administrative staff to some of the procurement sections in order to have more oversight.

- The Bureau has reorganized procurement to incorporate receiving reports as part of the responsibility of each regional procurement team to increase accuracy and accountability.

- Procurement staff reviews the purchases to ensure receiving reports are completed by staff, and the BWS budget/procurement database is updated to track payments to vendors. In addition, the procurement manager performs random audits of purchases. Also, files are available for review by managers, procurement staff, and all levels of supervisors. Requests that are not included on the spending plan require advance approval through the chain of command prior to the requisition being submitted. The Bureau strives to have all goods and services delivered and completed by June 30th in order to avoid any rollovers. These measures are instituted to various degrees throughout the Bureau with some latitude based on staffing, locations and technology available.

- BWS has updated its physical inventory database to be comprehensive at all of its facilities and locations. It has implemented security procedures for the supply stockrooms within the divisions to include video monitoring at
some locations. Inventories are maintained through the Bureau’s computerized maintenance management system within the Directorates. The Bureau is currently implementing additional measures, which have included better security, a pilot bar-coding inventory control program, and security locks.

- The Bureau performs a 100% inventory of all supplies within each of its divisions at the conclusion of each fiscal year. Copies of these inventories are sent to the Bureau’s Office of Expense Budget Purchases and are posted on a server for review by staff. Staff has been assigned to oversee issuance of supplies and to take deliveries. If a staff member is not available, his/her supervisor assumes the responsibility. Where supplies are stored at a location without a storeroom, access is controlled through a locked area. Throughout the year, distribution of supplies is documented by the storeroom attendant in a log book. The book records a description of the item removed, date of removal, the name of the individual who removed the item and a determination as to whether the item is expendable or not. Once the item is returned it is noted on log book with date and name of staff returning. In addition, the storerooms are secured in a segregated area and individually locked during off-hours. The Bureau has also implemented a new policy at some locations that are spread out geographically, under which all paper goods supplied by the Central Storehouse are currently locked in one central area. Storehouse goods items will be distributed as needed. Additionally, these measures are instituted to various degrees throughout the Bureau with some latitude based on staffing, locations and technology available.

Bureau of Police and Security (BPS)

- Stringent protocols have been established. Budget allocations, training requests and related expenditures are reviewed and approved at higher levels of the Bureau’s command to assure oversight and control of expenditures.

Bureau of Environmental Planning and Analysis (BEPA)

- For the procurement of planting material and soil for restoration work, the project/contract manager will visit the nursery before the plants are delivered to a site to ensure they are the correct size and variety per the contract. Soils that will be delivered to a site are tested to make sure they meet the specifications. Depending on the size of the restoration project, the soil is tested every 200 cubic yards for smaller projects and every 2,000 cubic yards for the larger projects.

- Approval of payments/invoices is performed by the project/contract manager and/or Bureau management. Invoices are reviewed against a contract task to ensure they comport with contract terms and/or deliverable
requirements. Adjustments are made to invoices when discrepancies/billing errors are identified. Formal sign-off of the invoices is required by each of the aforementioned entities before the invoices are sent to the OEA for review and sign-off.

- E-Z Pass accounts, P-Card purchases, office supply procurements, expense claims, telephone bills, etc. are monitored externally by ACCO and internally by Bureau management. All purchases and expense claims are approved by the Administrative Director and/or the Deputy Commissioner. Supplies, once delivered, are inventoried against invoices independent of the purchaser. Supplies are secured in locked drawers or cabinets. Supplies are periodically inventoried.

Office of Green Infrastructure (OGI)

- OGI follows DEP practices in its participation in ECs with other DEP bureaus to review proposals submitted in response to RFPs.
- Consultant invoices are reviewed by the OGI Project Manager, followed by a second/oversight review. Two signatures are required before an invoice is sent to OEA.

Bureau of Water and Sewer Operations (BWSO)

- BWSO currently keeps an inventory of its material on the IPS computer system. This system keeps track of material entering and leaving the Central Storehouse and the Queens Pipe Yard.
- BWSO also utilizes a sub-inventory system at the various maintenance and repair yards Citywide. These sub-inventories list materials received from the main inventories at the storehouse and the pipe yard, and their subsequent usage as indicated by the yard's IPS work orders. This system allows tracking of material from receipt by BWSO to its use in the various types of work performed by the maintenance and repair yards.
- BWSO has implemented an Enterprise Asset Management (EAM) System covering shaft maintenance, groundwater, pumping, and Bluebelt operations. Included in the EAM system is an inventory management module.

Bureau of Wastewater Treatment (BWT)

- BWT develops comprehensive spending plans prior to the beginning of each fiscal year to ensure all expenditures are handled properly.
- The Computerized Maintenance Management System (CMMS) at all 14 DEP wastewater treatment plants serves as a management tool that keeps a real-time inventory system that tracks parts, materials and equipment. The server for this system is installed in DEP’s headquarters at Lefrak
under the control of the Office of Information Technology (OIT), in a physically secured room with limited card access. The server is linked to users throughout the City via DEP’s internal network at each location; there is no outside access to the network by non-DEP personnel. Each CMMS user is given a unique user code and password, and the software will track all transactions to the database with a time, date and user name. OIT also oversees database usage to monitor for unauthorized activities.

- BWT is continuing to develop and train Supervisor of Stock Workers on best management practices for its storeroom operations. Obsolete items continue to be salvaged through DCAS. All inventory counts are being maintained in the CMMS database. The Bureau’s Inventory Management Section checks that physical stock matches quantities and descriptions in the inventory control system. In addition, barcoding of stock items is being done to improve the efficiency in inventory control.

FIELD INSPECTIONS

BWT, the Bureau of Environmental Compliance (BEC), BCS, BWSO, BPS, OGI and BWS all have employees who visit commercial premises and private homes in the course of enforcing regulatory programs and responding to complaints. These bureaus also have employees who interact with members of the public in a “service” capacity.

In addition, employees of BEDC and the OEA inspect equipment, materials and completed work to ensure compliance with contract specifications.

Hazards

Hazards associated with field inspection work include bribery from those seeking to influence an inspector’s discretion or to expedite the issuance of paperwork. It is also possible that inspectors might solicit such bribes.

Steps taken to address hazards:

Agency-wide

- DEP closely monitors the various field inspection and service units for corruption hazards. This monitoring generally takes the form of a double-check program, but it is also supplemented by integrity training. This training, such as corruption prevention lectures by DOI, covers various issues including the requirement that all employees comply with the terms of Executive Orders 16 and 105 by promptly reporting to DOI all information, suspicions and complaints about potentially corrupt DEP employees.

- DEP supervisors are vigilant in monitoring subordinates for indications of corrupt activities, such as favoritism towards certain contractors, expediters or citizens or other signs of illegal or unethical behavior.
DEP also emphasizes the need for all inspectors to present proper identification and publicizes the need for the public to grant access only to those inspectors who do present official DEP identification. Notices to that effect appear on the reverse side of every water bill.

BCS

The most significant corruption hazards in BCS’s inspection services concern improperly conducted inspections that ignore violations of metering standards. To address the inspection risk, BCS has implemented a policy of periodically rotating its Borough Chief Inspectors and is evaluating a similar program for the subordinate field staff.

- Over the past few years, there have been a number of personnel changes including the appointment of five new chief inspectors, and the creation of a Director of Field Operations (to whom the Chiefs now report) and a number of rotations among inspectors and supervisors due to promotions and shifting workloads. Based on the number and nature of personnel changes that have occurred recently, we do not believe there is an immediate need to rotate staff specifically to address this risk.

- Inspectors also use tablets in the field and work is assigned electronically. Staff that start their day in the field are monitored by office supervisors throughout the day. Work assignments can be tracked electronically from start to completion. Once submitted online, DEP systems are updated electronically with inspection results.

- BCS utilizes forms and sign-off procedures to track the movement of meter inventory from one location to another, has staff who are independent of inspection activities review mileage and EZ Pass usage logs, provides online permitting options, and is pursuing the issuance of electronic Notices of Violations.

- Meter replacements requiring specialized equipment are contracted out by BCS. These contracts had been managed through the universal metering program. Several years ago, BCS inspectors were arrested for accepting bribes from meter installation contractors and for soliciting bribes from customers. While BCS continues to contract for this work, stronger internal controls have been implemented. Inspections of work by contractors is fully documented and reviewed by supervisors. BCS no longer allows the same unit to issue, inspect and approve contractors’ work orders, and the contractors no longer have a single point of contact for inspection approvals and payment requests.

- Contractor meter replacements are reviewed by the contracts payment unit to verify field activities for each job performed by the contractors.
Payments must be certified by the BCS Project Manager and Bureau Oversight prior to submitting the payments to the Office of Engineering Audits (OEA). This unit’s procedures add scrutiny and oversight to the payment process.

Universal Metering has an Administrative Manager ensuring prevailing wage compliance through enforcing requirements for proper daily sign-in sheets and submission of certified payrolls.

Similarly, contractor payment documents are reviewed by BCS’s central administration office staff. Central administration has authority to examine the prevailing wage compliance documents submitted by the contractors subsequent to the contract manager’s review.

BCS has also made changes in its billing system that allow billing analysts in the central office to more easily detect accounts that may have a history of under-billing due to non-working meters. These analysts, rather than the individual borough offices, identify these accounts and make appointments with the customers for meter replacements.

BWSO

BWSO has centralized water and sewer inspection scheduling for all five boroughs. Requests for inspections are now made to the Central Connection Inspection Section contact number. This conforms to the Mayor’s initiative for streamlining permit issuance and inspections, eliminates the potential for duplication of water/sewer inspections and allows for more efficient use of each inspector’s time.

BWSO’s expanded double-check program now covers water (tapping) as well as sewer inspectors. The program provides for the rotation of inspectors, the submission of daily inspector route sheets when requested by the Inspector General’s office, and random unannounced visits by supervisors to inspection sites.

Construction laborers who work in the water and sewer repair and maintenance yards responding to leaks or sewer backups are regularly reminded that it is improper for them to recommend any private plumbers to a private party. All the yards have received corruption prevention presentations from the Inspector General.

BWSO employees who conduct private water and sewer inspections and those who are in the Job Order Contracts (JOC) section are regularly reminded that it is improper to favor one contractor over another. The sections also received computer based anti-corruption training and are closely monitored by their managers.
BWSO employees who are in the hydrant-flow test unit deal with developers in the scheduling and conducting of hydrant-flow tests. They are closely supervised by their managers. They are reminded to treat all developers fairly and equitably. Members of that section have received computer based anti-corruption training.

BWT

- The Industrial Pretreatment section of BWT operates a double-check program consisting of random spot checks of inspections to determine if they have been carried out properly. BWT submits a quarterly report to the Inspector General's office summarizing double-check findings. In addition, BWT pretreatment engineers are rotated on a yearly basis to ensure that cases/industrial facilities are inspected by a different engineer during each year of the inspection cycle.

BEC

- The Bureau has a double-check program in place. Supervisors contact complainants by phone or in person to confirm the inspection results and ask for feedback on the inspector's performance. Enforcement supervisors audit a small percentage of projects to verify the initial inspector's findings. Inspections for noise-code violations are normally a team effort for operational reasons, a situation which also provides a security element. After daylight hours, inspectors work on a “buddy system” (partnered). Some assignments involve multi-agency actions and include NYPD.

- Notices of violation are not issued in the field, but are mailed to the respondent. This measure provides some protection against bribery. Inspectors are rotated through all five boroughs, and assignments are changed approximately every six months. Follow-up inspections on projects are performed by a different inspector.

- The Bureau is utilizing more technology to enhance enforcement as well as increase accountability of the inspectors. Such technology includes smartphones and tablets. Inspectors are able to enter inspection details directly into the devices that will log time, date and location.

BPS

- Anti-corruption initiatives and practices are regularly reviewed, streamlined and adapted to assure compliance with all policies and directives and to support a forward thinking anti-corruption program.

- DOI and the DEP Police share a collaborative relationship to assure corruption risks are mitigated. Reports of improprieties or misconduct are immediately referred to DOI for review and resolution. Once assessed, complaints are either returned to BPS management for resolution or
investigated by DOI. In either instance, a hand-in-hand relationship has been developed which works to expedite the handling of potential reports of corruption and assure resources are best utilized to address these issues.

- Continued education, provision of information and direction to police supervisors encourage members of the DEP Police and civilian staff to promptly report any matter related to potential corruption either within or outside of BPS to appropriate authorities.

- Internal safeguards and protective methods rely heavily on the DEP Police supervisor.

- The Quality Assurance Deputy Inspector in BPS detects and investigates acts of serious misconduct or criminal activity.

- During routine Bureau meetings and training sessions, supervisors are provided information and education related to anti-corruption monitoring.

- Unannounced inspections are carried out at all levels by the police command staff to assure compliance with directives as well as to protect against corruption within DEP.

- The Division of Emergency Response and Technical Assessment (DERTA) of BPS investigates chemical safety in facilities that store, use and handle hazardous substances. The Right-to-Know program investigators enforce the City’s Local Law No. 26 in relation to the storage of chemicals and other hazardous substances in New York City. Investigators may issue notices of violation for non-compliant conditions. DERTA has implemented practices that promote transparency. These practices, as described below, are in place to enable quick detection of misconduct.

  o Audit inspections - To confirm that the investigator has visited the assigned facility and to verify the results on the inspection report. These audits are scheduled randomly and are conducted by a supervisor.

  o Quality control inspections - Duplicate inspections conducted by different investigators to confirm the findings of the first investigator.

  o Training - The training of new investigators covers behaviors that are illegal for civil servants under City and State Penal Law such as bribery, gratuity, official misconduct and conflict of interest.

OGI

- OGI managers speak to staff regarding gratuities and bribes, as well as proper conduct when interacting with consultants or contractors. OGI staff
also participate in training classes to reinforce proper conduct and procedures.

BWS

- BWS field staff coverage areas are structured to eliminate any possible corruption with respect to dealings with local contractors, homeowners, local municipal officials and business owners.
- The Bureau relocates and reallocates project review and inspection staff to prevent staff from working with family-member contractors and design professionals with whom they have a past working relationship.
- BWS continues to reinforce the policy that no fewer than two staff members shall enter private residences at any time.
- All field staff are regularly apprised of the agency’s anti-corruption initiatives and policies.

BEDC

- BEDC staff conduct inspections of manufacturing plants to ensure the quality of equipment purchased by DEP for capital construction projects.
- BEDC staff perform inspections of constructed works and installed equipment to ensure conformance with contract requirements. These inspections are performed by a qualified individual, overseen by a NYS Licensed Professional Engineer and subject to internal audit. The inspections also serve as verification of contract compliance at time of payment.
- All inspection staff are regularly apprised of the agency’s anti-corruption initiatives and policies.

OEA

- Constructed work is subject to random independent inspection and audit without notice by the Office of Engineering Audits.

**ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)**

Not applicable.
DOF collects approximately $40 billion in revenue for New York City (NYC) and values more than one million properties worth a total market value of more than $1.3 trillion. DOF records and maintains public property records related to ownership, deeds, and mortgages; administers exemption and abatement programs that provide $3.6 billion in tax relief to property owners and renters; adjudicates and collects parking tickets, as well as provides time-saving programs to eligible drivers and businesses; manages the NYC treasury with operating cash balances of more than $12.5 billion; through the Office of the Sheriff, acts as NYC’s chief civil law enforcer; and advises the Administration on NYC’s $200 billion pension system and $20 billion Deferred Compensation Plan.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

Procurement

DOF’s Procurement Office followed NYC purchasing guidelines provided by the Mayor’s Office of Contract Services (MOCS), COVID-19 Executive Orders, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS), and New York State (NYS) Preferred Source Program. All pandemic response equipment purchased required internal approvals before procurement processing.

To reduce the risk of procurement corruption, DOF works to ensure that the procurement procedures and system that DOF follows is based on fundamental principles of transparency, competition, and fairness.

Storage and Distribution

The Warehouse and Customer Delivery Services (WCDS) Unit requests, receives and stores all PPE and other pandemic response equipment in a double-locked storage room within the DOF warehouse. It is only accessible by a limited number of authorized WCDS staff. All access is recorded by the security system. A weekly physical inventory of supplies is performed and it is reconciled with a system-generated report. A supervisor is on-site to monitor staff, and work orders are generated to ensure prompt delivery of items to requestors. The system tracks inventory levels, disclosing the number of weeks the existing inventory will last.
Only a limited number of authorized users can make changes to the system and any changes made are recorded.

Managers and supervisors were instructed how to request PPE and other pandemic response items directly from the WCDS on a weekly basis. The quantity ordered is generally based on the amount of staff working in the office. Items received are safeguarded, are accessible only to authorized individuals, and are distributed to staff on an as-needed basis.

**TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK**

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

**Time and Attendance**

- Agency-wide telework guidance has been issued to all staff.
- On a daily/weekly basis, managers and supervisors communicate with staff working remotely by phone and email and regularly hold virtual meetings to distribute assignments and ensure that staff are engaged and completing them. For example, in Conciliations, secure technology has been implemented to remotely hold conciliation conferences. The director is notified of each conference and able to attend virtually to monitor the cases.
- Managers and supervisors monitor CityTime activity on a daily basis.
- Timekeepers perform internal reviews on a bi-weekly basis to ensure actions comply with NYC Time and Leave Policies and Procedures and the NYC Comptroller’s Directives.

**Safeguarding of Confidential Agency or Client Information**

- DOF implemented a secure collaborative platform that provided more robust protection of agency data and broadened efficiency.
- DOF rolled out customized health surveys to employees to help track and guide safe employee office visits.
- DOF ensured role-based access to all DOF systems is implemented and on a need to know basis only, enabling employees who work remotely to do so more securely and efficiently.

Staff have been instructed to inspect every email received to ensure its legitimacy. Regular virtual trainings are being held for staff on best practices for dealing with suspected phishing emails.
VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

DOF released updated guidelines to all existing contractors on agency purchasing practices, as well as reporting guidelines for apparent fraudulent activities. The Procurement Office maintained competition as much as practicable and conducted market research on emergency purchases including, but not limited to, form, function, utility, price, etc., as required for regular purchases.

Throughout the pandemic, site managers from DOF’s Facilities Unit have monitored contractors working on-site to ensure that services have been completed in a satisfactory manner and that the surrounding area has been returned to a safe condition. In addition, Finance Information Technology (FIT) staff worked with vendors directly on projects to minimize the opportunity for fraud.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

BUSINESSES POTENTIALLY BRIBING LAW ENFORCEMENT STAFF

Deputy sheriffs and investigators were tasked with assisting NYC in containing the spread of COVID-19, including by conducting checkpoints, distributing educational materials, and enforcing crowd gathering limits and social distancing. There is a now a potential for business owners to lose their liquor licenses for violating executive orders. With such risk, owners could potentially attempt to bribe staff from the Office of the Sheriff. This risk is paralleled with any enforcement work conducted currently by deputies and investigators. Pre-existing protocols to guard against bribes are still in place to ensure that no one works alone in the field, all teams are required to prepare NYS incident investigative reports detailing operations, and supervisors are present at all significant operations.

COVID-19 TRAVELER VEHICLE CHECKPOINT OPERATIONS

The Office of the Sheriff has been tasked with conducting checkpoints at entryways into NYC at major bridge and tunnel crossings for compliance with the NYS COVID-19 Traveler Form. There is a concern that motorists and bus operators could bribe deputy sheriffs during vehicle stops to be exempt from quarantine restrictions and requirements. All operations are overseen by extensive supervision and detailed documentation of every vehicle stop is collected and maintained in a database and reviewed by audit staff.
REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

Last year, DOF reported the corruption risk that assessors could accept or solicit bribes in return for adjusting real property assessments. To reduce this risk, there is limited personal contact between the assessor and property owners. Property owners and their representatives send property assessment-related information to the Assessment Review Unit through electronic mailboxes and the 311 system. In addition, the use of pictometry (aerial photography) and Cyclomedia (street level imagery with enhanced features, high-quality images, and accurate measuring tools) by assessors reduces the need for contact with property owners and their representatives.

Beginning in March 2020, assessors were not allowed to make in-person field visits. In addition, borough office email boxes have been reinstated so that the public can coordinate virtual inspections with selected property staff. Virtual inspections, generally using Microsoft Teams, were initiated in July 2020 and are being used when a desktop review is not sufficient. Recently, some in-person visits were allowed, but the number has been minimal. Two assessors usually participate in the field inspection and they take photographs that are loaded in the Computer Assisted Mass Appraisal (CAMA) system.

ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

Below are additional fraud risks not otherwise addressed by the mitigation strategies in the sections above:

- Accepting or soliciting bribes in return for adjusting taxpayer accounts, which could include possible actions such as issuing fraudulent tax refunds and adjusting real property exemptions/credits.
- Misappropriating cash; checks; other payments, such as credit or debit cards or electronic fund transfers; and portable NYC assets.
- Using NYC resources for personal business.
- Submitting fraudulent reimbursement claims.
FISA is responsible for the Financial Management System (FMS), New York City’s (NYC) central budgeting and accounting system; the Payroll Management System (PMS); the Debt Management System (DMS); the New York City Automated Personnel System (NYCAPS), its automated personnel system; and CityTime, its timekeeping system. OPA is responsible for ensuring the timely and accurate distribution of employee and retiree payrolls and providing related payee services; maintaining, enforcing, and disseminating uniform payroll policies and procedures, including coordinating payroll-related matters among central agencies such as the Comptroller’s Office, the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS), the Office of Labor Relations (OLR), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Department of Finance (DOF), the Law Department, line agencies, and between NYC and external organizations; ensuring compliance with the requirements of federal, state, and NYC taxing authorities; guiding the continued development, enhancement, security, integrity, and effectiveness of PMS, CityTime, and related systems; using technology to the greatest possible advantage in support of the payroll; and maintaining, funding, and reconciling NYC’s payroll accounts.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

The procurement of PPE is consistent with all agency purchasing procedures currently in place and pursuant to the Procurement Policy Board (PPB) Rules. All procurements are initiated and tracked via FISA-OPA’s Purchase Requisition System (PRS). All Purchase Requisitions require at least two levels of approval before any purchase can be made. After the initial stock purchase of PPE supplies from various vendors, FISA-OPA has been exclusively utilizing PPE from the DCAS Central Storehouse either through the DCAS requisition process or via requests to City Hall.

In order to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE supplies, the ordering, receiving, and distribution of PPE supplies have been segregated from the normal storage and distribution functions.
in FISA-OPA’s warehouse. A separate inventory listing of all PPE supplies is retained and the stock is securely stored in the warehouse. The distribution of PPE supplies is controlled and no supplies are issued unless accompanied by an Office Supply Request approved by the Director or Deputy Director of Facility Operations. Upon delivery of the requested items, a signature of the requestor or person receiving the delivery is required. In the event that PPE is needed urgently, a small inventory of masks, gloves, and sanitizer is kept in the Facility Directors’ office for issuance and is only issued by the Director or Deputy Director of Facility Operations.

**TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK**

*What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?*

In order to transition to remote work, the agency took the following steps to mitigate the potential for fraud:

- FISA-OPA drafted and issued guidelines related to remote work for staff to follow (e.g., Important Security Reminder & Guidelines While Telecommuting and DCD/Web Clock/Time Entry Guidelines). These guidelines reminded staff of the need to safeguard agency-issued equipment and sensitive/confidential information while working remotely. They also outlined the proper process for reporting time in CityTime.

- In order to mitigate the potential for time and attendance abuse, the agency implemented a process that required all employees taking leave for any reason (e.g., annual, sick, comp, excused, etc.) to send an email notification on the day of absence to their supervisor and Human Resources. This process was established in addition to any existing procedures (where applicable) to ensure accurate attendance information.

**VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?*

FISA-OPA did not engage with contractors to participate in the emergency pandemic response.
PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period. [List two or more. Each hazard identified should have its own sub-header as below, and include a discussion of the hazard as well as any risk mitigation strategies.

FISA-OPA is not an agency that interacts in person with the general public. It only interacts with authorized agency representatives for the distribution of payroll. As indicated in the agency’s primary areas of responsibilities, FISA-OPA performs back office-related functions that support payroll and tax processing, as well as governance over several IT systems. To the best of its knowledge, FISA-OPA has not experienced any substantial health and safety corruption hazards or conditions during the reporting period.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

In its 2019 Anti-Corruption Report, FISA-OPA discussed corruption hazards related to check printing and the steps it was taking to minimize the inherent financial risks associated with checks. While FISA-OPA has led NYC to record high levels of Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) enrollment to date, it continues to work to increase adoption efforts from paper checks to direct deposit.

ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

FISA-OPA has nothing additional to report at this time.
FDNY responds to fires, public safety and medical emergencies, natural disasters, and terrorist acts to protect the lives and property of City residents and visitors. FDNY advances fire safety through its fire prevention, investigation and education programs, and contributes to the City’s homeland security efforts. FDNY responds to more than 280,000 fires and non-fire related emergencies and over 1.3 million medical emergencies each year and maintains 252 firehouses and ambulance stations. FDNY’s key services include:

- Protect lives and property from fire hazards and other emergency conditions;
- Respond to medical emergencies; and
- Reduce the risk associated with fire incidents.

### RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

#### PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

**Procurement**

In response to the COVID-19 emergency, Mayor Bill de Blasio issued Emergency Executive Order 101 (amending EEO 100). This EEO suspended certain laws and rules related to procurement to the extent necessary for the City agencies to obtain goods, services, and construction needed to fight the spread of COVID19. Pursuant to the Mayor’s Executive Order, the FDNY Commissioner designated certain contracts as necessary to respond to the COVID-19 emergency. These contracts included, but were not limited to, the procurement of such items as: PPE (consisting of N-95 face masks, surgical masks, surgical gowns, gloves, hand sanitizer, and wipes), medical grade sanitizing and disinfecting services, and thermal imaging machines.

Vendors of these COVID-19 related goods and services were selected by the FDNY based on fair and reasonable pricing, along with the vendor’s ability to deliver materials expeditiously. To eliminate fraudulent vendors and ensure only legitimate ones were engaged, FDNY’s Bureau Fiscal Services, Incident Management Team (IMT), and the Bureau of Technical Services/Medical Supply
Unit, researched potential vendors and accepted pre-vetted referrals from other City agencies.

Once potential vendors were identified, Fiscal Services performed background searches on each potential vendor utilizing the following databases: PASSPort, NYS Department of State Tax Warrant Notice System, NYS Department of State Division of Corporation, Google, Federal System for Award Management, and Lexis Nexis. Background searches performed on all vendors revealed no adverse information. Once PPE was received, the chief medical officer reviewed product samples to ensure the quality of the PPE was in accordance with FDNY’s standards. In one instance, it was determined that a vendor supplied gloves that were too thin. The gloves were returned, and a refund was requested and received. It is important to note that the FDNY, having previously prepared for potential pandemics such as the Swine Flu, and Ebola, began to procure PPE through the normal procurement process in early January to ensure that it had an adequate supply on hand for the first wave of the pandemic.

Storage
The FDNY’s Bureau of Technical Services (BTS)/Medical Supply Unit (MSU) utilizes a computerized inventory management and supply distribution program called the Enterprise Asset Management System (EAMS). Under normal circumstances, inventory is maintained at FDNY’s primary supply warehouse. The warehouse has limited points of entry, is secured with card access and key controls, and is monitored 24/7/365 by internal and external security cameras. Non-warehouse personnel access is limited to ten borough logistics coordinators whose responsibilities include the pick-up and re-distribution of supplies to their representative divisions. In early March, the FDNY activated its IMT. In addition to assisting senior leadership with the coordination of FDNY’s overall response to the pandemic, IMT was assigned the additional tasks of managing the surge in inventory supply and distribution needs to meet the increasing PPE demands from the field. The Medical Supply Unit’s inventory of gloves, gowns, hand sanitizer, N-95 and surgical face masks were transferred to the IMT’s secure storage site. The IMT’s PPE warehouse site was secured 24/7 until the warehouse functions were transferred back to BTS - M S U. The IMT implemented controls that included taking morning and evening inventories, as well as taking on-site inventories of every EMS Station and Fire CFR-D location to re-establish par levels and validate field requests.

Distribution
Under normal circumstances, the pre-established PPE par levels for every EMS station and Fire CFR-D unit, allows the FDNY to ensure medical supply requests submitted by the field are in alignment with prior requests. Field requests are typically submitted electronically, with pick-up receipts provided to the borough logistic coordinators, which are then turned over to station and house commanding
officers. However, when the field requests for PPE increased during the first wave of the pandemic, and the inventory and supply chain management functions were transferred to the IMT, FDNY Management Analysis and Planning (MAP) and the IMT aligned field requests for PPE with the increase in suspected COVID-19 call types (fever, cough, and cardiac) volume by creating a near-real time PPE inventory tracking system. Inventory requests for PPE were automated and made accessible to the field units, and in real time, the Department was tracking requests with Tableau visualizations. In addition, the Department tracked N95 and Surgical mask usage to the incident and unit-level for EMS units by leveraging ePCR data. These two efforts (automating requests and tracking usage by incident type) enabled the Department to rapidly track and react to PPE requests, to efficiently plan distribution, and to provide department-wide transparency into daily PPE usage and compliance issues through data visualization.

Initially, field requests were higher than normal, but PPE usage guidance in the form of notifications to uniform staff (i.e., buckslips) was issued to help the Department conserve PPE. The IMT’s bi-weekly on-site inventory inspections and the daily inventories also ensured field requests for PPE were not excessive.

**TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK**

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

The FDNY was proactive in its approach to mitigating risks of privacy and information security breaches, as well as mitigating potential time and attendance fraud, or abuse when employees transitioned to remote work.

**Privacy and Confidentiality**

To help ensure the privacy and confidentiality of Department information and data being handled remotely, the FDNY’s Bureau of Technology and Development Systems (BTDS) and Privacy Office developed an educational email shared with employees entitled “Tips for Maintaining FDNY’s Privacy and Security”. The FDNY’s agency privacy officer also served as a resource to staff who needed guidance on handling Department data. The City’s chief privacy officer’s “Guidance on Privacy Considerations Related to the City’s Efforts to Combat COVID-19” was distributed to senior executive staff and posted in the Department’s Intranet Privacy Page for easy reference.

**Information Security**

Several additional technical controls were implemented to protect Department data and systems. Most network-based applications and systems already require some form of authentication. BTDS expanded the use of the Virtual Desktop Infrastructure interface, as well as security tokens for enhanced two-factor authentication. Additional laptops and cell phones were procured and distributed
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to function-critical employees to ensure that data was being accessed on Department issued devices. Department issued laptops were outfitted with the latest security and anti-virus tools, while cell phones were securely “wrapped” with the Department’s mobile device management application, which permits security updates to be pushed out to the devices and restricts access to unnecessary functions.

Time and Attendance

In mid-March, the Department issued guidance entitled “Timekeeping and General Guidelines for Revised Schedule Options Due to COVID-19 Emergency”. These guidelines informed staff who were offered the option of teleworking, of their ongoing responsibility to capture their daily Time In/Time Out punches by using Web Clock, and not by the Time Punch request feature. Other staff who previously had the ability to self-populate Time In/Time out maintained that ability but were also offered the option of using Web Clock to capture punches if they chose to. All staff were advised that to the extent the CityTime option was not available, then they were required to follow their assigned work schedule and report any variances (i.e. overtime or leave) to their CityTime approver and their timekeeper.

The guidance also advised teleworking staff that all terms and conditions of City employment would continue to apply, including time and leave rules, and workplace rules prohibiting private activities during work hours notwithstanding the fact that staff are working from home.

Manager and supervisors implemented and continue to use a variety of methods to monitor their staff’s time and leave including having regular check-in conference phone or video call meetings, or daily phone calls or email check-ins with their staff.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

Pursuant to the Mayor’s Executive Order suspending procurement protocols, the FDNY quickly engaged several vendors to assist in the emergency pandemic response. The FDNY was able to augment its cohort of telehealth service providers for low acuity calls through OptumHealth Care Solutions LLC. Unlike other providers, this vendor provided telehealth services 24/7 which was especially helpful on overnights and weekends. Senior leadership oversaw the implementation of services provided by this vendor. Additionally, one cleaning service contractor participated in the emergency pandemic response. The FDNY engaged the services of a vetted Minority/Women Business Enterprise (M/WBE) vendor to provide medical grade sanitizing and disinfecting services at EMS station and fire houses. The work of this vendor was closely monitored by the Bureau of Support Services.
PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

The FDNY is responsible for enforcing the fire safety provisions of the New York City Administrative Code. In support of this function, approximately 325 Fire Safety Inspectors (field inspectors) are assigned to conduct inspections and witness fire protection systems testing throughout the city. Failure to comply with fire safety provisions results in a violation order or an FDNY Summons (formerly called the “Notice of Violation” or “N.O.V.”) being issued. Violations that are not cured can result in the most serious enforcement action—the serving of a New York State Criminal Court Summons. The FDNY closely monitors this process. The Bureau of Fire Prevention (BFP) has just over 370,000 active inspection accounts. Information on almost all fire inspection accounts (greater than 99% of accounts) is maintained on the Fire Prevention Information Management System (FPIMS).

FIRE SAFETY INSPECTORS ARE VULNERABLE TO BEING OFFERED GRATUITIES AND BRIBES IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.

The management and oversight of the BFP inspection force is multifaceted. Inspectors are required to rigidly adhere to their prescribed routes and schedules, and to call in their work locations twice each day. They are subject to at least one telephone call per tour to verify their status. Inspectors must immediately report any problems or variances to their route. This close supervision allows all oversight entities (BFP supervisors, Internal Audit, and the Inspector General) to monitor the process effectively and to identify any areas of concern.

The following integrity controls have been implemented to mitigate these risks:

- The BFP supervisors are held responsible for staffing assignments and are mandated to rotate inspection accounts among inspectors to the maximum extent possible. There is approximately one examiner for every five inspectors, and one supervisor for every six inspectors. The examiner reviews the paperwork submitted by the inspector. Any discrepancies are reported to the inspector and his/her supervisor. Supervisors conduct supervisory inspections (a check of the original inspection) on a random basis or in response to an identified concern. All BFP field personnel have been trained and issued written instructions on the proper documentation of their activities, as well as the guidelines and standards they are expected to follow while performing these activities.

- As a safeguard, billing and collection for Fire Prevention related inspections and permits are the responsibility of the bureau of Revenue Management. The revenue collection process for fire inspections is subject to a separate audit.
The BFP has just over 370,000 active inspection accounts. Information on almost all fire inspection accounts (greater than 99% of accounts) is maintained on the FPIMS. FPIMS uses the inspector’s badge number as the control identifier, allowing the Department to centrally identify the individuals who have performed the work associated with any of the accounts.

The following steps have been taken to mitigate these risks:

- Maintaining the security, confidentiality, integrity, and accessibility of the data within FPIMS continues to be a high priority. Access to the system is limited to authorized personnel, individual passwords have been issued to each user, and only supervisory personnel have the capability to modify certain data fields.

- The BFP continues to strengthen fire inspection account activities through various operational enhancements. One such example is the contractual partnership with various consultants for the development of the Fire Inspection Revenue Enforcement System (FIRES). FIRES will replace the legacy FPIMS. The FIRES project contains four release phases planned for completion over a four-year period. The first phase was released in October 2019; and is exclusive to the Emergency Planning and Preparedness Group (EPPG). The FIRES Project Release 1, Deployment 2 (R1D2) which began in 2020, will continue into the following year. It will include a phase out of FPIMS in conjunction with the incorporation of the FDNY Bureau of Revenue Management’s business processes. Other units to be included in R1D2 are the Rangehood and Rooftop Inspection Units, as well as the business processes for Auxiliary Radio Communication Systems (ARCS) inspections.

COUNTERFEIT INSPECTION DECALS AND PORTABLE FIRE EXtinguisher TAGS.

Improved regulation of commercial exhaust systems and portable fire extinguishers has been enacted (3 RCNY §§115-01 & 115-02). This Rule includes a mandate for monitoring the cleaning of commercial exhaust systems, the servicing of fire extinguishers and the standardization of decals and tags for this equipment. To help ensure the integrity of the inspection process BFP created official decals and tags to validate the integrity of the inspection. There is a risk that some entities could create and use counterfeit decals and tags.

The following steps have been taken to mitigate these risks:

- A designated FDNY official approves orders for decals and tags from as many as 350 companies to a third-party vendor. Standardized printing and production through an authorized chain of custody has been instituted. In addition, the decals and tags have security codes – including holograms.
and UV metallic layers – to prevent unauthorized duplication. Companies whose FDNY approvals or insurance policies have exceeded their official expiration dates will be appropriately restricted, and/or removed from operating in the City of New York. Individual Certificate of Fitness holders will have their own stamps. The new process will provide consistency, impart legitimacy and create the fully authoritative use of these decals and tags. This process will lead to fewer duct fires which will protect property and, more importantly, save the lives of NYC residents, visitors, and our first responders.

- The BFP ensures that only licensed portable fire extinguisher and commercial cooking exhaust cleaning companies operate (performing maintenance and inspections) in NYC. During the current reporting period the BFP issued the following to approved companies:
  - 1,482,000 indoor portable fire extinguisher tags
  - 170,000 outdoor portable fire extinguisher tags
  - 136,000 commercial cooking equipment decals
  - 11,050 Non-compliant commercial cooking equipment decals
  - 257 Certificate of Fitness stamps
- Through outreach, the FDNY continues to inform the public on how to recognize legitimate decals and tags. The FDNY continues to distribute leaflets, post information on the FDNY website, and speak to affected organizations about this new program. FDNY has also worked closely with the portable fire extinguisher (PFE) and Rangehood industries on the requirements of the new regulation, decals and tags.

**REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT**

**CONTRACTOR ADHERENCE TO PAYMENT OF PREVAILING WAGE RATES**

FDNY contracts with various vendors who provide services to the Department that are subject to the requirements of the Labor Law §§ 220 and 230 Prevailing Wages rates, as well as the New York City Administrative Code § 6-109 “Living Wages.”

The following steps have been taken to mitigate these risks:

- FDNY Fiscal Services reviews applicable contracts, corresponding invoices, and certified payroll sheets to ensure that vendors comply with the contract requirements and that the vendor employees are paid the appropriate prevailing wage rates. Vendors are required to submit certified payroll reports to substantiate the job titles, and level of wages and benefits paid to the employee or to the union local. Reports that fail to reflect the
requirements of the rules result in the withholding of payments until such time as vendors provide adequate proof of employee payment and compliance. Violations that are not timely cured by the vendors are referred to the City Comptroller for further review.

- FDNY project managers routinely inspect FDNY facility sites to ensure contractor compliance with the Prevailing Wage Schedule Notification posting requirement.

- As needed, IA conducts spot audits of the contract projects to verify compliance with contract requirements. FDNY Fiscal Services notified IA that payroll reports submitted by vendors who provide services to the FDNY were substantially correct and few errors were found. Fiscal Services also advised that if any issues were noted, IA would be immediately notified. Therefore, it was determined that there was no need for IA to conduct a prevailing wage audit.

**PPR: CITYWIDE FLEET POLICIES TO PROMOTE AGENCY AND DRIVER ACCOUNTABILITY**

Following a 2017 report on the “Systemic Misuse of City-Owned Vehicles by Senior Members at New York City Department of Correction”, DOI audited ten agencies and issued 15 Policy and Procedure Recommendations (PPRs) to establish uniform policies and procedures to promote agency and driver accountability. Below is an update to one PPR:

**Vehicle Use and Telematics** – All on-road City vehicles, take-home vehicles, car share, and long-term rentals, regardless of the agency/driver, should have telematics with real-time Automatic Vehicle Location (AVL), unless specific approval is granted by the Mayor’s Office. Due to security precautions, law enforcement agencies that conduct criminal investigations will continue to monitor their respective fleets.

FDNY Fleet Services is currently piloting a telematics system that meets the AVL requirements. Upon the successful completion of the pilot’s evaluation process, the system will be implemented in phases. The first phase will include all emergency response vehicles such as EMS ambulances. Although the pilot is still ongoing, there has been a delay in getting enough ambulances with the tracking devices in the field. The factory building the ambulances is in Florida and has been adversely affected by the pandemic, thus causing a delay in deployment.

**ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)**

**AMBULANCE FEE FOR SERVICE BILLING**

FDNY EMS provided emergency ambulance transportation to approximately 568,000 patients during the reporting period. Claims for reimbursement for the
emergency medical care or transportation provided are submitted for reimbursement from patients, private insurance companies, Medicare, Medicaid and associated HMOs. The United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), and the New York State Office of the Medicaid Inspector General (OMIG), have provided compliance guidance to ambulance suppliers and identified high risk practices associated with ambulance claims such as:

- Medically unnecessary trips;
- Trips claimed but not rendered;
- Misrepresentation of the transport destination to make it appear as if the transport was covered (certain destinations are not covered by ambulance transports – e.g. doctor’s offices);
- False documentation;
- Multiple Ambulances Called to Respond to Emergency Call; and
- Up-coding from basic life support to advanced life support service.

The FDNY has an established Medical Billing Compliance (MBC) Program, administered by the Office of Health Care Compliance (OHCC) that monitors these high-risk areas. This compliance program, mandated by New York Social Service Law 363(d) / 18 NYCRR § 521, proactively enhances the integrity of FDNY’s organizational culture by promoting the prevention, detection, and mitigation of fraud, waste, and abuse; identifying opportunities to improve the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of operations; and encouraging best practices that ensure FDNY’s compliance with New York City, New York State, and federal laws, rules, and regulations, as well as its own business and ethical standards of conduct.

FDNY Risk Mitigation Actions

- The MBC Program conducted a risk analysis to identify and evaluate internal and external risks that could impact FDNY EMS operations. The assessment identified systems and management issues that were associated with adhering to federal health care program billing requirements. To address these identified risks, the MBC Program enhanced the Quality Assurance/Quality Improvement process to monitor the FDNY’s claims submission process that includes:
  - Pre-billing Claim Review;
  - External bi-monthly review of medical necessity documentation to support billing Medicare conducted by an Independent Review Organization;
o External Annual Review of Paid Medicare Claims conducted by an Independent Review Organization;
o Claims Denial Monitoring;
o Claims Development/System Review; and
o Annual review of ambulance billing procedures

- FDNY IA conducts daily (pre-claim submission) and annual (post-claim submission) medical billing compliance reviews of completed electronic pre-hospital care reports (e-PCRs). Using automated internal controls, the FDNY’s focus is specific to diagnostic coding, medical necessity, and other critical ambulance billing requirements. IA continues to assist the EMS Medical Compliance Committee to further strengthen its MBC Program and coding used for ambulance billing.

- EMS Operations continues to improve training and feedback to field personnel on proper documentation of patient care and transport; and will continue to reinforce these efforts.

- All complaints about ambulance treatment, transport, or billing are documented in the FDNY’s Confidential Complaint Unit database and/or the Commissioner’s Correspondence Unit database. These complaints are referred to the appropriate manager for investigation and action, and a response is provided to the complainant. In addition, these complaints may be periodically reviewed by IA and the OHCC.

- Write-off procedures for all FDNY account receivables conform to the City of New York Office of the Comptroller’s Directive 21. This allows the Department to write-off those accounts with little or no probability of collection.

- FDNY’s current billing vendor, Intermedix, was recently acquired by Sarnova and merged with Digitech Computer Inc. The current contractual relationship and business rules remain in effect. “FDNY and Intermedix Business Rules” are clear in Intermedix’s role in accounts receivable and account management (page 17), which includes write-offs (page 23). Write-off reviews conducted by IA over the past decade yield very low risk. Given the backlog, and other external oversight activities, the Department agrees that Intermedix will continue to oversee their accounts receivable and accounts management responsibilities, and that Revenue Management should consider writing-off respective accounts in a timely manner. It makes less sense to hold accounts open for years, when previous reviews reveal very low risk. IA will conduct post audits of this activity, should Revenue Management’s quality assurance reviews reveal an uptick in risk.
FDNY Risk Mitigation Example(s):

- As part of the Pre-billing Claim Review process, IA conducts probe sample reviews of e-PCR documentation. The documentation errors are shared with EMS Operations via Field Review Reports. EMS corrective actions included reviews with the identified EMS crews and additional crew education.

- To reduce ambulance crew medical documentation errors, the EMS Bureau of Operations continues to provide training and support to EMS field personnel and officers on proper medical documentation within the e-PCR system.
DOHMH protects and promotes the health and well-being of New York City (NYC) and all New Yorkers by engaging with communities to develop and implement robust public health programming and policy recommendations, enforcing health regulations, responding to public health emergencies such as COVID-19 pandemic, and providing limited direct health services.

DOHMH seeks to reduce death and disability from chronic diseases, such as heart disease and cancer, by reducing smoking and the consumption of unhealthy foods, improving the control of blood pressure, and promoting physical activity. It contracts with community-based organizations to deliver mental health, developmental disability, and alcohol and substance use disorder treatment services. It works with health care providers to improve health care delivery and to increase the use of preventive services, such as immunizations, and collaborates with community-based organizations to prevent, detect, and treat HIV and other communicable infections. Direct services are provided at its tuberculosis clinics, sexual health clinics, immunization clinic and at more than 1,200 public schools. DOHMH issues birth and death certificates, inspects restaurants and child-care centers, and protects public safety through immediate response to emergent public health threats. The agency’s Early Intervention Program serves infants and toddlers with developmental delays. DOHMH’s surveillance systems provide the basis for cutting-edge research grounded in public health principles.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

On January 30, 2020, DOHMH activated its Incident Command System (ICS), which integrates with the citywide response structure led by New York City Emergency Management (NYCEM) as part of NYC’s COVID-19 pandemic response. DOHMH’s ICS structure follows an incident emergency management model established by the NYC Citywide Incident Management System (CIMS). The model establishes roles, responsibilities, and designates authority for NYC agencies performing and supporting emergency responses.

DOHMH has been distributing and using PPE from the federal Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) and the New York State (NYS) Medical Emergency Response
Cache; PPE was also procured by the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS).

Under CIMS, NYCEM implemented a formal process for healthcare and non-healthcare facilities to request PPE and related supplies and to report PPE usage rates. DOHMH staff with inventory management expertise and training were activated to work in the ICS Medical Material Branch (MMB). MMB was tasked with overseeing inventory management operations, including updating records in the Warehouse Management System (WMS) of the Stockpile warehouse when items are issued, received, returned, or transferred.

DOHMH played an integral part in the distribution of PPE supplies throughout the city. Early in the response, hospitals and nursing homes received weekly pushes of PPE supplies; these pushes expanded to other healthcare providers as supply became more available. All of these recipients, including dialysis centers and other healthcare providers, were able to request emergency PPE by submitting an online COVID-19 NYC Request Form. The COVID-19 Request Form is submitted to the NYCEM Logistics Center and it is entered into their tracking system, DLAN. Upon approval, DOHMH’s ICS MMB fulfills the requests.

Most of the pandemic response equipment procured by DOHMH was for buildout and setup of the Quickie Labs and the Public Health Laboratory’s COVID-19 testing. DOHMH leveraged the existing sole source contracts, the Department of Information Technology & Telecommunications (DoITT) master contract and, when needed, created new emergency contracts. For new emergency contracts, the Agency Chief Contracting Office (ACCO) conducted due diligence reviews through preliminary vendor integrity checks of the prospective vendors by performing Google searches and PASSPort system queries, followed by additional checks by the ACCO prior to contract registration.

DOHMH divisional or Emergency Response Groups (ERG) requests for pandemic response-related goods or services must be submitted through the agency’s Emergency Resource Request System (ERRS) and be approved by ACCO (if a procurement is needed), Finance, and relevant ICS sections.

Procurement of Information Technology (IT)-related pandemic response equipment and services has to clear DoITT’s preapproval process. DOHMH’s ACCO does not proceed without this step. The acquired laptops, tablets, and iPhones are inventoried and are tracked using the agency’s Distributed Management System (DMS) by Tecsys. DOHMH laptops and tablets are managed by the Desktop Management team and iPhones by the Wintel team. This equipment is securely stored at the Gotham Center, with access restricted to the team managers. Once a laptop, tablet, or iPhone is provided to a user, it is assigned to the user in Tecsys and this information is automatically synchronized to the DOHMH Employee Database (EDB) employee’s profile. Each team conducts weekly inventory reconciliations between Tecsys and EDB to ensure accuracy.
The procurement of cloud solutions needed to accommodate the increased demands of remote work were expedited and implemented in compliance with NYC Cyber Command security requirements for single sign-on/multi-factor authentication (SSO/MFA), encryption, and audit logging.

DOHMH uses two warehouses for PPE and pandemic-related response equipment and supplies: the federal SNS for NYC and the DOHMH warehouse. Both play an integral part in the COVID-19 pandemic response strategy.

- DOHMH uses the federal SNS warehouse, with PPE and other pandemic response-related supplies, as a direct distribution center for the agency and other healthcare facilities throughout NYC. For security reasons, the location of this contracted warehouse is undisclosed; security measures in place include steel doors, restricted access to essential staff through security access cards, and extra surveillance cameras. To further protect PPE at this location, DOHMH enhanced the physical security at the warehouse to include a 24-hour on-site presence by a contracted security vendor and coordinated regular “directed patrols” by local law enforcement. Robust processes were established with the warehouse vendor that include staff accountability and supervisory review. Every function, including Receiving, Inventory Control, Medical/surgical supply, and Transportation, is independently staffed and supervised. ICS MMB was deployed to the warehouse to oversee inventory management operations there, including updating records in the WMS when items are issued, received, returned, or transferred. MMB works alongside warehouse vendor staff. To effectively manage a high volume of incoming requests and deliveries, a designated warehouse employee and MMB staff perform physical counts of inventory throughout the day. Daily inventory reports are sent to the DOHMH ICS Integrated Data Team (IDT) and to external agency partners like DCAS and City Hall.

- ICS MMB provides COVID-19 supply chain oversight and manages fulfillment of facilities’ requests. Healthcare and non-healthcare facilities must submit PPE and pandemic-related supply requests via a COVID-19 NYC Request Form for NYCEM approval. Approved requests are fulfilled at the warehouse and DOHMH’s distribution vendor delivers directly to the facilities. Note that during the height of the pandemic, the distribution vendor contract was amended to meet the increased demand for supplies.

- The DOHMH warehouse is located within NYC. DOHMH Bureau of Facilities Planning & Administrative Services is responsible for management and tracking the warehouse inventory; they are using a spreadsheet system for inventory control. The agency’s PPE supplies for distribution to divisions are stored there. To obtain PPE and other COVID-19 response supplies (e.g., hand sanitizers, disinfectant wipers, exam gloves for clinics, etc.), for agency staff, divisions submit a COVID-19 supply request form to the
warehouse. The warehouse staff review requests for appropriateness and, upon approval, fulfill these requests.

Each division is responsible for safekeeping and managing the inventory received and for distribution to employees. The management approach is customized depending on the environment. For example, Sexual Health Clinics and TB Clinics store PPE they receive in locked rooms or cabinets at each clinic, with access restricted to a designated employee at each site. These individuals are responsible for issuing PPE to staff as needed and managing and restocking PPE inventory for their assigned locations. PPE for clinical staff who see patients are kept in the exam room or lab. At the Public Health Laboratory (PHL), all PPE is securely locked and maintained by its Health and Safety Office. PHL’s supply inventory management system is also used for managing COVID-19 PPE. PPE and supplies for school-based personnel, including face shields, gloves, masks, and hand sanitizer, which were needed to reopen schools, were inventoried and mailed directly from Gotham Center to the school sites.

TRANSPORT TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

To mitigate the risk of time and attendance abuse and to safeguard confidential information when staff transitioned to remote work, DOHMH staff was required to follow the agency’s Human Resources (HR), Finance, and IT policies and procedures for teleworking, time and attendance, confidentiality, password protection, and acceptable use of DOHMH assets.

DOHMH HR issued Teleworking Policy and Procedures to Program Supervisors and Their Staff in Responding to Coronavirus (COVID-19). This policy and procedures document was distributed to all agency supervisors and posted on DOHMH’s Sharepoint. The policy is consistent with the citywide Updated Guidance for City Agencies on Leave Policy Applicable During the Outbreak of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). DOHMH’s policy and procedures provide guidelines on communication with staff, recording time in CityTime, call out procedures if staff is unable to work, and safeguarding and use of equipment and office supplies issued to staff.

Employees whose job duties allow for remote work were given virtual private network (VPN) access and are required to log into the agency’s network to continue to do their job. All employees working remotely utilize DoITT’s remote access to perform their daily duties on their DOHMH workstations and are authenticated using multi-factor authentication (MFA) for increased authentication account security. To facilitate remote work, the agency not only provided laptops to employees as needed, but expanded the cloud solutions offerings to ease collaboration and allow
real-time communication. Desktop Management encrypts all DOHMH laptops before releasing them to users.

DOHMH continues to enforce citywide guidance regarding time and attendance and access to CityTime. The use of CityTime Web Clock was expanded to include employees who routinely used the hand clock device to punch in and out. As before, any manual time entries (when Web Clock was not used) require justification and supervisory approval. The agency continues to follow NYC guidelines regarding timesheet submission and approval and to rely on supervisors’ review and approval of timesheets. Supervisors were encouraged to check in with their staff on a regular basis and monitor staff progress against their work plan.

For school-based staff, once schools closed, their job assignment changed and most were reassigned either to hospitals or to support the pandemic response. Ensuring that staff such as school health nurses reported to their new job sites as directed was important. The Office of School Health worked with partner agencies to monitor this through spot checks and phone calls. To enable staff’s continued access to CityTime regardless of their job site and to allow for oversight, they were issued agency phones.

In accordance with the DOHMH’s PS Policies During an Emergency Rev 3-18-2020, Finance issued Labor Allocation Codes at the beginning of COVID-19 pandemic response to be used to track all personnel activities related to the response. Based on the responsibilities, some of the staff activated as part of ICS was mandated to work outside their normal work schedule and extended hours to meet operational needs.

The safeguarding of confidential client information is paramount to the mission of the agency. All employees and staff were required to take the Acceptable Use Policy training and those with access to protected health information were not given access until they completed the Confidentiality training. Staff was consistently reminded of the agency’s commitment to protect and safeguard clients’ confidential information. This was further reinforced through ongoing, virtual trainings on Incident Reporting and Confidentiality during the COVID-19 pandemic.

When users are logged remotely into DOHMH workstations, VPN configuration allows printing only to printers located within the agency. To enhance security controls on mobile devices and prevent users from performing unauthorized actions, any agency mobile devices assigned to users are added to the citywide Mobile Device Management (MDM) solution and all laptops are encrypted. In addition, security agents are installed on end user devices for malware protection, internet (URL) filtering, Data Loss Prevention (DLP) and vulnerability patching. Documents such as birth and death certificates are further restricted to printing only from select on-site work printers. In addition, employees were reminded not
to save or print any confidential documents on or from home computers or make confidential information accessible to any external parties including family members or friends.

**VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?*

DOHMH’s programs reached out to their human service contractors to determine if they would be able to complete their contract deliverables. For those who were participating in the pandemic response, the programs assessed if a contract amendment was needed and followed the guidance of the ACCO. Some human service contracts were amended to modify the scope or add COVID-19-related funding, as requested by the vendors and approved by the NYC Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

To minimize fraud by contractors, DOHMH’s programs are routinely required to verify and certify the receipt of goods or services and subsequently authorize Fiscal Management to process payment. Fiscal Management reviews vendors’ invoices and ensures that they are aligned with the contract and the associated budget. Beginning in March 2020, all human service contractors, whether they received additional funding or not, were required to invoice separately for COVID-19-related expenses.


**PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

*What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period?*

**IDENTITY THEFT – OFFICE OF VITAL RECORDS**

As identified in last year’s report, the agency is potentially susceptible to the identity theft in the Office of Vital Records. The control strategies remain the same as in the prior year with one key improvement in the risk associated with forged or altered certificates being filed with Vital Records. Now, 100 percent of births and nearly 100 percent of deaths are reported electronically, which reduces the risk of fraudulent, counterfeit, and altered paper documents. All activity related to security paper has remained entirely on-site. The eVital registration platform uses a Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) so employees only access data and systems relevant to their duties and functions; this was maintained during the COVID-19
Unauthorized Access to Protected Health Information (PHI)

The risk of unauthorized access to Protected Health Information (PHI) was a top risk for DOHMH in last year’s report. Due to staff working remotely and utilizing various tools, ranging from Microsoft 365 to virtual meetings, to complete their work, the risk of unauthorized access, especially to PHI, has increased significantly. The agency is vigilant in patching identified vulnerabilities and encrypting communications. In addition, security tools such as Security Information and Event Management (SIEM), firewall, IPS, proxies, and endpoint agents are configured to monitor access 24/7.

Third Party Vendor Risk Management

While third party vendor risk management was a top risk in last year’s report, there is an increased risk this year of human services providers and vendors claiming for services not performed or expenses not allowed by federal, state, and NYC regulations. Due to the New York on PAUSE Order (PAUSE) and social distancing because of COVID-19, human services providers had difficulties providing in-person client services, resulting in missed targets and failure to achieve goals. However, these providers still needed to meet their fixed cost, a financial pressure that could create an incentive for billing for services not provided or inflating claims. For example, Nurse Family Partnership vendors received fewer referrals of new parents to their program. For Early Intervention, oversight of service delivery was particularly challenging, as some services were telehealth. To address the risk of vendor fraud, the agency is stressing the importance of the review and approval of invoices, especially during current conditions.

Theft of PPE

Theft of PPE has been a concern since the beginning of the pandemic. To mitigate this risk, programs have been keeping all response-related supplies and PPE in designated locked storage rooms with access limited to the authorized personnel, unless it is needed by clinical staff. In addition, DOHMH increased security at the federal SNS warehouse.

Time Theft

The agency managed the increased risk of time theft due to the shifting of staff to remote work by redesigning methods of staff oversight and employing new strategies for managing staff remotely. Approaches varied by area and included frequent check-ins with staff for some and using new tools like Microsoft Teams, deployed in recent months, to enable employees to collaborate on tasks and projects remotely. Overtime exceeded normal levels to accommodate a rapid shift in operations and the expansion of COVID-19-related activities due to pandemic
response. Employees’ activities were monitored by supervisors in the area of assignment and evaluated on the quality and timeliness of output.

### REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

Inspection services are consistently identified as the most vulnerable to corruption. However, due to COVID-19, this risk has been significantly reduced, as many agency inspection programs transitioned to either all or partial virtual inspections and DOHMH has suspended the issuance of fines for most violations during the COVID-19 pandemic. Until the PAUSE in March 2020, programs continued to develop reports and analyses to assess and mitigate risk within their inspection programs. The programs will be looking to restart those efforts once the emergency subsides and will do so by factoring in any permanent changes implemented as a result of the pandemic that may further reduce corruption risk.

Hundreds of DOHMH inspectors were diverted from their normal inspection duties to support the effort to curb COVID-19 surges in designated areas of NYC by conducting inspections of businesses to ensure they were operating in accordance with rules and regulations. Inspectors assigned to conduct business inspections in “COVID zones” are overseen by team leads, experienced inspectors with supervisory experience who track their staff’s daily attendance and time. The team leads report to their Bureau’s operational leads, who then report to the Environmental Operations section chief. Inspection data and incidents of verbal harassment and/or threats are entered into a web-based form and are made available to the Mayor’s Office of Special Enforcement (OSE) for real-time review. DOHMH Legal Counsel reviews summonses to verify that they were correctly issued prior to submitting them to the Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH). DOHMH Health Police provide support in areas where inspectors report being threatened and/or verbally harassed during business inspections and OSE requests NYPD presence in these areas.

As described above, the risk associated with forged or altered certificates being filed with Vital Records has been reduced as 100 percent of births and nearly 100 percent of deaths are now reported electronically. This reduces the risk of fraudulent, counterfeit, and altered paper documents.

Since the 2019 report, DOHMH implemented the HHS Accelerator System for human service contracts. The HHS Accelerator System is a citywide application that allows stakeholders to streamline and enhance the procurement and financial processes for competitive health and human services contracts. The system assists in effectively planning and executing procurements and managing contract budgets and providers’ invoices.
The mission of DHS is to prevent homelessness when possible, provide short-term, emergency shelter for individuals and families who have no other housing options available, and assist clients to return to independent housing in the community. DHS also provides street outreach services available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, with options for placement into safe havens and stabilization beds.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

PPE and other pandemic response equipment were procured for the Department of Social Services (DSS, which includes DHS and the Human Resources Administration (HRA)) using the agency’s standard procurement process. Items were only procured from the City’s registered and vetted Woman- or Minority-Owned (WMBE) vendors. Once received, items were checked by HRA’s General Supply Services (GSS) and DHS’s Warehouse for quality and accurate quantity upon delivery and at each stage of the distribution process. Items that did not meet the agency’s quality standards were sent back to the vendor and reimbursement sought. Vendors were contacted to remediate any inaccuracies in the quantities of supplies delivered. Pandemic response supplies were stored in secure facilities equipped with cameras to prevent theft or loss. PPE was distributed across both agencies based on staff headcount, as well as the number of clients and prospective clients. DSS/HRA/DHS monitored usage rates of these products along with supply requests to determine whether increases or decreases in stocks were needed. Based on these established usage and request trends, PPE was distributed to each agency program and shelter location, as well as contracted vendors who were in need.
TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

To mitigate risk related to the implementation of the agency’s work-from-home (WFH) policy, DSS’s Office of Human Capital Management (HCM) issued a Telework Policy in March 2020. That policy reiterated the fact that all human resources related policies, procedures, and practices remained in force for those employees in the WFH program. The Telework Policy also included a listing of these policies and procedures along with a link to make accessing them easier for staff. Managers and supervisors are required to review and approve staff time in CityTime just as they were prior to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Regarding the protection of confidential information and data security, DSS’s Office of Data Security Management (ODSM) established policies and provided guidelines on confidentiality for employees accessing agency resources while working remotely. ODSM ensured appropriate security software was installed on all agency laptops and resources. It also provided guidance on and established standards for the safe roll-out of online collaboration tools. ODSM engaged in continuous monitoring of employee access to agency networks and resources in partnership with New York City Cyber Command and accelerated the implementation of multi-factor authentication for all remote users.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

DSS’s Office of Finance and OMB put in place a rigorous review of expenses connected to COVID-19 pandemic (i.e. cleaning supplies, remote working supplies). Contractors/providers are required to track and report on all COVID-19-related expenses that are beyond the scope of their current contract and for which they were seeking reimbursement. Providers must maintain records of all COVID-19 expenditures and create separate cost centers or grant codes within their organization’s financial management systems to track costs related to COVID-19. All City contracts, including emergency contracts and those contracts containing amendments or change orders for COVID-19 response, remain subject to audit.

As part of its pandemic response, DHS sought additional housing capacity through the Hotel Association of New York City (HANYC). Before onboarding any HANYC site, DHS conducted desk audits to ensure compliance with building codes. DHS/vendors also conducted walk-throughs prior to use to ensure each site was suitable for program needs. The day-to-day operations of the hotel sites are managed by DHS-contracted vendors. During May and June 2020, DHS conducted virtual inspections of the contracted hotels sites. As it has become clear
that the use of hotels will continue for the longer term, additional inspections will be added.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period. [List two or more. Each hazard identified should have its own sub-header as below, and include a discussion of the hazard as well as any risk mitigation strategies.

MODIFICATION OF INSPECTION PROTOCOLS

Given COVID restrictions, DHS modified inspection protocols during the public health emergency. While inspections done by DHS’s Capacity and Planning areas for new sites continued in-person, other physical inspections, such as walkthroughs for apartment placements, were performed virtually. Additionally, Routine Site Review Inspections (RSRIs) were suspended temporarily but are set to resume soon.

MODIFICATIONS TO PROGRAM REVIEWS AND AUDITS

DHS conducted program reviews for quality assurance on a modified and/or limited basis in light of COVID-19 restrictions. Additionally, per guidance from the Mayor’s Office of Contracting Services (MOCS), new audit engagements were delayed and deadlines for existing audits were extended. Audits have since resumed.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

UNCONTRACTED SHELTERS TO CONTRACT

- As of September 2020, DHS has brought 12 billing sites to contract, with 14 additional sites pending contract registration. In addition, DHS closed a total of 16 billing sites in fiscal years 2017 (eight sites), 2018 (four sites) and 2019 (four sites). The agency has also identified 14 additional sites to be closed down, and an additional five sites are under review to determine their suitability to be contracted, converted for another use or closed.

- The agency continues to prioritize ending the 20-year cluster shelter program, which included approximately 3,600 units in January 2016 when the 90-day review of homeless services began. Between January 2016 and October 2020, the agency has removed 2,720 cluster units from the DHS shelter portfolio. As the City moves to end the use of all cluster units, it will continue to prioritize exits from units with the most serious problems. The cluster portfolio will be eliminated, converted to permanent housing, or contracted as State-approved Tier II shelters by the end of calendar year 2021.
VENDOR MANAGEMENT

- The newly formed Contract Monitoring Office (CMO) has made significant progress in improving vendor and contract management and monitoring across the agency.
- The CMO continues to meet with various HRA and DHS programs to provide them guidance on vendor oversight.
- Last year, the CMO dedicated a full-time staff member to work with DHS on contract monitoring. With dedicated staff focused on each agency, the CMO has been instrumental in developing corrective action plans (CAPs) for vendors of both agencies that are considered at-risk and has helped DHS to develop tools to monitor existing CAPs.
- The CMO meets regularly with the DHS Office of Policy Development and Implementation (OPDI) to assist with the development of policies and procedures related to vendor compliance.
- The CMO has developed and delivered training to HRA staff on best practices for contract management including instructions for improved case file review, updates to provider and agency recordkeeping practices, the creation of internal CAPs, and performance evaluations with standardized metrics to be applied uniformly across all program divisions. The CMO is working to extend this training to DHS program staff in the near future.

INTEGRITY OF RENTAL ASSISTANCE

- CityFHEPS’ dedicated integrity unit – Rental Assistance Integrity (RAI) – which proactively identifies patterns that indicate errors, non-compliance, fraud and/or abuse, continues to perform data analytics to ensure participant and landlord compliance, conduct quality assurance reviews of client packets, and to perform secondary walkthroughs to ensure compliance with program rules. Additionally, the unit continues to work on ad hoc inquiries and investigative matters for the program.
- The Agency continues its efforts to build a Landlord Management System (LMS) that will serve as a comprehensive payment tracking system, make electronic payments to landlords, track payments and improve the Agency’s ability to collect and manage landlord data. The expected implementation date for LMS is May 2021.
- The Agency has also developed an Inspection Web application, which enables staff to schedule appointments, and to complete walkthroughs and approvals depending on their roles.
Not applicable.
NYC Housing Authority (NYCHA)

Gregory Russ, Chair & CEO
Ralph Iannuzzi, Inspector General

NYCHA provides affordable housing to approximately 365,800 low- and moderate-income New Yorkers residing in 169,820 apartments within 302 housing developments across the five boroughs. Through federal rent subsidies (Section 8 Leased Housing Program), NYCHA also assists approximately 88,000 families in locating and renting units in public and private housing, including 7,793 units formerly managed by NYCHA and transitioned through the Permanent Affordability Commitment Together (PACT)/Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program. In addition, NYCHA facilitates access to social services through a variety of programs.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

NYCHA’s Procurement Department centralized the procurement of COVID-19 materials and immediately stopped individual requisition requests by various NYCHA departments. Procurement estimated monthly usage of COVID-19 related materials and placed bulk orders which allowed NYCHA to get better pricing by buying in bulk and shipping to one centralized location. Although most PPE items were purchased via emergency procurements, Procurement performed a “mini” solicitation to compare vendor quotes for the bulk purchases. Procurement requested prices from several vendors then chose the best overall vendor.

PPE items were shipped directly to NYCHA’s Long Island City warehouse and distributed accordingly. PPE items include but are not limited to the following: 3ply surgical masks (adult & child), cloth masks, respirators (N95 & KN95), gloves, hand sanitizer, hand soap and general disinfectant. A daily inventory summary of all PPE items was forwarded to NYCHA’s General Manager’s Office.

NYCHA’s Material Management Department (MMD) was responsible for the distribution and inventory controls for PPE items. MMD delivered a weekly and eventually a monthly supply of PPE items to NYCHA’s maintenance storerooms, NYCHA’s support services units, and central office locations. The following inventory controls were implemented:
**Development staff:** PPE items were delivered to the development maintenance storerooms where NYCHA staff were required to sign off on items received and some items were tracked in Maximo;

**Support services units and Central Office (CO) staff:** PPE items distributed directly to the support services units and CO locations and were signed for in bulk (on paper) and distributed to the staff from the department supervisors.

As directed by the General Manager’s office PPE items were to be distributed as follows:

- Caretakers - 2 masks per day/4 pair of gloves
- Maintenance Workers - 2 masks per day/5 pair of gloves
- Maintenance supervisors - 2 masks per day/5 pair of gloves
- Borough based skilled trades - 2 masks per day/4 pair of gloves
- Development management office staff & Borough office staff - 1 mask per day/2 pair of gloves
- Support services trades - 2 masks per day/4 pair of gloves
- Support services office staff & CO staff - 1 mask per day/2 pair of gloves
- All staff received reusable cloth masks - 3 per field employee/2 per office staff
- All staff received 1-16 oz bottle of hand sanitizer to be refilled either at any development or at their respective departments
- All staff were provided a face shield

Additionally, NYCHA’s Compliance Department monitored its complaint forum on a daily basis for any COVID-19 related complaints pertaining to COVID-19 supplies. This monitoring identified a complaint regarding a product that a vendor was using as a supplemental treatment as part of the disinfection efforts of NYCHA buildings. The supplemental product was advertised to provide longer lasting benefits on high-touch point surfaces. Based on the complaint, NYCHA Compliance immediately consulted with EPA on the product’s effectiveness for COVID-19, and, following this consultation, NYCHA promptly directed the vendor to no longer use the supplemental product at NYCHA buildings.
TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, NYCHA’s Human Resources Department established an Emergency Telework Policy to set a uniform policy for employees approved to work remotely. The Emergency Telework Policy, which was jointly issued by NYCHA’s Chair and GM, established, among other things:

- Supervisory responsibilities;
- IT requirements;
- Staff check-ins;
- Timekeeping requirements;
- Leave requirements;
- Prohibitions on personal activities during work hours;
- Obligations to ensure information security while teleworking; and
- Requirements for advance approval of overtime.

With respect to timekeeping responsibilities, NYCHA HR established a protocol for staff that do not enter their time via the Kronos timekeeping system. The policy requires that all NYCHA employees performing telework from home who are not authorized for entering their work time directly into the Kronos timekeeping system must use a Special Biweekly Alternate Timesheet to record their work time. NYCHA HR requires a standard protocol to transmit the Alternative Timesheets to supervisors for review at the completion of each pay period.

With respect to preserving information security during the pandemic, NYCHA IT took or is taking the following actions:

- NYCHA IT sent out multiple communications to staff on protecting PII and about using cloud products like One-Drive/O365 securely.
- NYCHA IT is in the process of implementing Multi Factor Authentication as quickly as possible.
- For the first few months of remote work, NYCHA IT sent out weekly reports on who was accessing the NYCHA network via the greatly expanded Virtual Private Network (VPN) solution to ensure that only authorized staff were accessing it. NYCHA IT continues to monitor this via detailed logs that contain login and logoff data at the user level.
NYCHA IT implemented the Data Loss Protection (DLP) tool within Microsoft 365 and on every desktop, ensuring NYCHA data is safe and encrypted.

NYCHA IT is in the process of revisiting all PII data sent within NYCHA to encrypt and block, as appropriate, certain data sets.

NYCHA maintains user access logs for all applications to ensure we know who is accessing which systems.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

NYCHA’s most significant procurement during the pandemic was for high-touch point disinfection services across its over 2,000 residential buildings, management offices, and maintenance areas. NYCHA retained two vendors to perform these services. One vendor – United Eastco – was retained to disinfect high touch points in senior buildings 5 days per week. A second vendor – Alliance – was retained to disinfect high touch points in family buildings 3 days per week. Both vendors were procured in March 2020 as emergency procurements. Vendors’ schedules have recently been increased to 7 days per week, starting November 2, 2020. This enhanced schedule has already started at certain developments.

In March 2020, the Chair and General Manager tasked NYCHA Quality Assurance (QA), Environmental Health & Safety (EHS), and Compliance Departments to develop a joint oversight strategy for both vendors. This oversight was in addition to contract management oversight performed by the Department of Management and Planning (DMP). The QA, EHS, and Compliance oversight strategy focused on the several areas, including the Vendors’ adherence to:

- The stipulated schedule;
- Staffing levels;
- Proper disinfectant procedures (i.e., use of approved disinfectant, use of labeled bottles, adherence to instructions on labels);
- The required scope of work;
- Adequate supervision levels;
- Requirements for badges, PPE, and uniforms;
- Proper conduct when interacting with staff and residents; and
- Prevention of fraud, waste, and abuse.

QA, in conjunction with EHS and Compliance, oversees the field monitoring component of the oversight strategy. At various times, QA used over 20 field
personnel, including staff from DOI, to perform field monitoring of both vendors. QA conducted monitoring at every NYCHA development and captured its results in a digital application customized for this project. When onsite, the inspection teams shadowed the vendor staff to ensure that they met the requirements described above. From March 25, 2020 to September 11, 2020, the field monitoring team made more than 81,000 observations of the two vendors: 79,635 were satisfactory and 1,947 were unsatisfactory. Common unsatisfactory observations were failure to follow the required scope of work, failure to follow the label requirements, especially in terms of allowing for proper contact time, and failure to adhere to the stipulated schedule.

To bolster the onsite field monitoring during the height of the pandemic, Compliance also developed a desktop monitoring program to ensure that the vendor arrived on schedule at each development and that NYCHA supervisory staff had no issues with the vendor. From March 30, 2020 to July 1, 2020, Compliance performed remote monitoring of vendor performance at 95% of developments on a weekly basis. Compliance made daily calls to developments receiving disinfection services and successfully made contact 95% of the time. Twenty members of the Compliance Department made an average of 100 daily phone calls to confirm the vendor arrived at the development on the scheduled day. Areas of investigation included but were not limited to: adherence to the published schedule, correct application of EPA approved disinfecting solutions, adherence to disinfecting protocols, following social distancing requirements and complying with general NYCHA vendor procedures.

Starting March 31, 2020 through July 1, 2020, Compliance published daily reports with findings from both the field monitoring and the remote monitoring to hold vendors accountable for performance and scheduling issues. Any findings from either monitoring were sent to the vendors for remediation. Additionally, Compliance requested follow up visits by QA or DMP for further investigation into vendor performance and liaised between developments and DMP for COVID-19 related inventory needs. The below chart provides a summary of the remote monitoring activities and the findings from the daily reports.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. Times Compliance Contacted Development</th>
<th>No. Times Compliance Confirmed Vendor was On-Site</th>
<th>No. of Vendor Issues (raised by QA inspections or development staff)</th>
<th>No. Vendor Issues Resolved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5,095</td>
<td>4,763 (93%)</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>179 (100%)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Finally, as a third layer of monitoring, Compliance monitored its complaint forum and complaints received via email or telephone to investigate the vendors’ compliance. Mainly, complaints from residents and resident leaders consisted of reports of the vendor not performing work on the scheduled days or the vendor not
adhering to social distancing. Compliance and QA, including the CCO and the QA Director, often conducted personal follow-up visits following these complaints and, if complaints were substantiated, requested modifications to vendor staffing or supervision. In addition to these complaints, Compliance and QA also investigated a complaint about a vendor staff member adding water to the disinfectant, which is not in accordance with its label. Following the investigation, the vendor staff member was terminated. Additionally, as noted above, Compliance investigated a complaint about the effectiveness of a supplemental product used by the vendor United Eastco. The vendor claimed that the supplemental product provided longer lasting protection on high-touch point surfaces. Following the complaint, Compliance consulted with EPA and determined that the purported benefits of the supplemental product were not substantiated. NYCHA directed the vendor to cease using the supplemental product after approximately one month of use and continue only with the EPA approved disinfectant.

**PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

*What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.*

**LEAD-BASED PAINT COMPLIANCE**

NYCHA’s ongoing effort to improve compliance with federal and local lead-based paint regulations constitutes a continued public health and safety corruption risk. Despite the demonstrable mitigation strategies discussed below, the breadth, scope, and complexity of lead-based paint compliance requires ongoing, daily supervision and oversight, as well as implementation of new initiatives intended to remedy ongoing compliance shortfalls. These efforts have been made more challenging by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has impeded the schedule of critical projects such as the NYCHA XRF Initiative and apartment and common area remediation. COVID-19 also temporarily affected NYCHA’s burgeoning field monitoring program. Despite these challenges, NYCHA as an agency must remain focused on consistently improving and devoting adequate resources to its compliance obligations with regard to lead-based paint. During the reporting period, NYCHA performed the following risk mitigation strategies to improve lead compliance:

- Publication of NYCHA standard procedure manual on the Lead Safe Housing Rule;
- Submittal of two compliance assessment reports to the federal government on the state of compliance with lead abatement and lead safe work practice rules;
- Publication of eight Lead Exceptions Reports by Compliance and EHS, which document field and documentary monitoring of key lead obligations and requirements;
Submittal of a draft Action Plan to the federal monitor and federal government to outline key actions NYCHA plans to take to improve its overall lead compliance;

Enhancements of the Maximo work order system on several key lead requirements, including clearance and common area remediation; and

Commencement or continuation of critical lead work streams including the XRF Initiative, biennial risk assessments, visual assessment and interim controls, enhanced identification of children under 6, common area remediation, and other.

NYCHA – top to bottom – will need to continue these efforts in earnest over the year to come in order to more fully mitigate the hazards posed by lead non-compliance.

MOLD INSPECTION AND REMEDIATION COMPLIANCE

Mold, leaks and excessive moisture present health hazards and are a serious source of frustration for NYCHA residents. NYCHA is subject to mold inspection and remediation requirements under the Baez federal consent decree, the HUD Agreement, and the Mold Action Plan. A common internal control essential to meeting all of these requirements is consistent compliance with the Mold Standard Procedure, which sets out the specific actions that NYCHA staff must take to investigate and remediate mold. During the reporting period, Compliance, EH&S, the federal monitor, and the entities appointed under the Baez Consent Decree have documented multiple deviations from the Mold SP, which have ranged from failing to properly conduct initial inspections to failing to adhere to remediation and repair timeframes. NYCHA has invested significantly in Moldbusters training for staff, and NYCHA must ensure that staff are following the requirements of both the training and the Mold SP. Under the Mold Action Plan, Compliance and EHS are tasked with documenting these deficiencies, and ensuring that proper staff corrective actions are taken by Property Management. These recommended corrective actions could include retraining, instructional or counseling memos, or formal discipline. Compliance is also obligated to escalate these recommendations to the GM if the recommended corrective actions are not implemented by Property Management. While lasting mold prevention and remediation efforts will take significant capital investments in NYCHA buildings, NYCHA must still ensure that frontline staff make good faith efforts to consistently comply with this important standard procedure to ensure that residents are not left to struggle with ongoing mold, leaks and excessive moisture in their apartments.
REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

Below is an update of mitigation efforts identified in last year’s report.

PROCUREMENT (CONTRACTOR FRAUD AND MISCONDUCT)

During the review period, NYCHA’s Department of Equal Opportunity, which conducts prevailing wage enforcement, received 144 phone calls pertaining to prevailing wage matters, withheld more than $407,000 from 7 contractors under investigation, and collected $12,077 for one worker who was underpaid the prevailing wage.

PROCUREMENT (MICRO-PURCHASES)

NYCHA Procurement continued to institute improved controls over its micro-purchase process. In the reporting period, an additional control was put in place. The control mandates that there can be no more than three micro purchases to one vendor per development or department within 30 days.

PUBLIC HOUSING RESIDENT AND SECTION 8 TENANT FRAUD

For the period October 2019 – September 2020, the Leased Housing Fraud Unit collected monies owed to NYCHA totaling $409,626.

The number of apartments and public space area inspections scheduled from October 1, 2019 to September 30, 2020 was 59,991. This total includes 681 Quality Control Inspections. Please note that in-person inspections were suspended in March 2020 due to COVID-19. The inspection unit has 30 inspectors performing inspections.

NYCHA’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) also conducts investigations of tenant fraud, and when appropriate, refers the results of its investigations for criminal prosecution. For the period October 2019 – September 2020, three individuals were arrested for stealing over $155,000 in housing benefits, while 12 individuals were convicted and ordered to pay about $745,225 in restitution to NYCHA. Also, NYCHA collected $347,194 ($221,230 for Section 8 and $125,964 for Public Housing residents) in restitution stemming from tenant fraud investigations.

NYCHA/HUD AGREEMENT-ADDITIONAL COMPLIANCE MATTERS

During the review period, the Federal Monitor approved the following Action Plans under the terms of the HUD Agreement: (i) GDA Action Plan; (ii) PHAS Inspections Action Plan; (iii) Heat Action Plan; (iv) Elevators Action Plan; and (v) Mold Action Plan. NYCHA continues to work with the federal monitor on the Pest and Waste Action Plan, the Lead Action Plan, and the Annual Inspections Action Plan. Specific updates from the federal monitor on NYCHA’s compliance with the HUD
SAFETY FOR RESIDENTS AND STAFF

During the review period, NYCHA has the following safety and security updates.

- NYCHA has 17,432 security cameras in operation, across 1,498 buildings in 218 developments;

- For 2020, NYCHA received 5,117 NYPD requests for security footage. There were 5,231 NYPD Original DVDs burned and 5,357 NYPD copies burned for a total of 10,588 videos.

- For 2020, there were 1,147 requests through subpoena. There were 881 originals DVDs burned and 1,013 copies burned for a total of 1,894 videos;

- NYCHA added 246 cameras across 78 buildings in 19 developments;

- NYCHA added layered security access at across 21 buildings in 4 developments

- **Additional Security Update**: To streamline the impact the Resident Watch program has on quality of life issues within NYCHA developments, the Office of Safety and Security (OSS) Resident Watch Program introduced the Quality of Life form and an Anonymous 24-hour Tip Line. Both initiatives assist in bridging existing communication gaps between program volunteers and management, widening the scope of the program currently has, and offering additional communication outlets to NYCHA residents. The goal is to equip NYCHA residents to become more effective in contributing to and improving their overall quality of life within their developments. This year, after revamping the Tip Line concept, OSS began to roll out the program to the full portfolio. Unfortunately, the Pandemic has halted these efforts slightly but OSS has been diligent in sharing the information with Resident Leaders, NYPD staff and our community partners, as a means to help get the word out. In the past seven months, since the onset of COVID (March 2020-September 2020) OSS has averaged 290 quality of life forms a month and 125 Tip Line calls a month.

ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

Not applicable.
HDC’s primary mission is the financing of affordable housing in the City. HDC partners with many private entities, including for-profit and non-profit developers, financial institutions, and other organizations which provide credit enhancement and loans for its projects. HDC seeks to increase the supply of multi-family housing, stimulate economic growth and revitalize neighborhoods by financing the creation and preservation of affordable housing for low, moderate and middle-income New Yorkers.

**RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

**PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?*

HDC utilized its controls already in place throughout the existing procurement process to ensure the validity of PPE purchase requests. All requests for PPE purchases are coordinated through the Department of Office Services and must have a prior approval from the employee’s Department Head.

HDC stores its PPE equipment according to the manufacturer’s instructions and the quantity is periodically inspected. PPE equipment is stored in a room that is always kept locked and access to the room is controlled and monitored.

Prior to the distribution of the PPE equipment, HDC thoroughly assesses the level of risk so that the appropriate type of PPE is determined.

HDC staff who work in high risk areas (e.g., engineers performing site and unit inspections and mailroom staff) are equipped with the N95 masks, surgical disposable masks, protective eyewear and puncture resistant gloves.

HDC has all other pandemic response equipment and supplies (e.g., disinfecting wipes, hand sanitizing equipment and cleaning supplies) available for staff and the distribution and refilling is coordinated through the Department of Office Service.
TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

HDC has taken a number of steps to monitor and oversee employee timekeeping and well-being, including:

- All HDC staff working remotely enter time and leave information into HDC's secure cloud-based workforce management system Ceridian Dayforce accessible via smart phones, laptops, and iPADS.
- Senior staff, managers and supervisors hold regular meetings with their team members via HDC's TEAMS secure platform to ensure staff’s well-being and to track performance.
- Senior staff, managers and supervisors instructed to contact the HR office should staff require work schedule accommodations or a leave of any type.
- HR Virtual Hours are held once a week for each HDC team whereby staff can "drop in" virtually with any issues/questions they may have and/or to connect with colleagues to say hello.

As discussed in prior reports, HDC implemented a suite of Microsoft 365 tools for email, office productivity and security. In the current reporting period HDC has expanded use of Microsoft 365 to better enable a secure mobile workforce, including:

- Use of Microsoft Teams as the Corporation’s meeting platform
- Use of Microsoft Forms for Employee Health Screening
- Updated the Corporation’s Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) policy to reflect the adoption of Microsoft Intune for mobile device management. Employees who have enrolled in BYOD have access to the full suite of Microsoft products including Outlook, OneDrive, Teams, SharePoint, OneNote, Word and Excel from their mobile devices.
- Use of multi-factor authentication (MFA) for access to all Microsoft 365 resources and other externally accessible web applications, which greatly improves security and overall monitoring of user log-in locations.

In order to facilitate transitioning to remote work, HDC has taken a number of steps to provide staff with secure ways to work remotely and secure confidential information, including:

- Increased the capacity of the secure VPN
- Significantly increased the number of staff with corporate issued laptops
Adopted use of Microsoft Windows Virtual Desktop, which allows staff to either connect to a full virtual desktop with access to Corporation applications, or connect to their desktop computer in the HDC office. In both scenarios no corporation information is stored on local devices, even if the employee is using a personal device.

HDC has taken additional steps to educate staff on safe remote work practices, including:

- Conducting additional online cybersecurity trainings
- Regularly reminding staff to be on the alert for fraud, including fraud schemes related to COVID-19 and fraud targeting remote workers.
- Formed a PII working group to define and identify PII within the Corporation, and work on developing best practices for working with PII.
- Implemented a new helpdesk portal that allows staff to quickly and conveniently report issues and security concerns to the IT helpdesk.

In order to maintain proper procedures and controls for contracts, purchasing, wire transfers and movement of funds, HDC adopted secure electronic signatures before leaving the office in March.

- All forms are now signed electronically, which has greatly improved efficiency and the ability to review a document audit trail, as compared to the previous paper processes.
- The adoption of electronic signatures has ensured that the Corporation’s financial controls, policies and procedures have been followed, with no changes working remotely as compared to working in the office.

**VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?*

HDC has not engaged any contractors to participate in the emergency pandemic response.

**PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

*What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.*

**PII WORKING GROUP**

In early 2020 (just prior to COVID), HDC assembled a working group to identify and develop protocols around securing personally identifiable information (PII). The PII working group has been meeting monthly since the beginning of 2020 with the goals of identifying PII throughout HDC, securing PII, and developing protocols
and employee training with respect to safeguarding PII. Members of the PII working group include employees from the Internal Audit, Asset Management, IT, Human Resources, and Legal departments. This working group has also been coordinating with the City’s Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) to develop best practices around PII. Thus far, the PII working group has identified all areas of the Corporation which house PII, and is currently in the process of developing protocols for securing PII and training employees on how to identify and secure PII.

**BUSINESS CONTINUITY PLAN**

As HDC has transitioned to remote work, the Internal Audit team has reviewed and updated the Corporation’s Business Continuity Plan (BCP). The BCP is a comprehensive plan that outlines team roles and responsibilities with respect to carrying out the BCP, identifies key operating systems, and articulates protocols to be followed with respect to succession.

**WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION POLICY**

HDC recently formalized and posted a Whistleblower Protection Policy to the HDC Employee Handbook. In the past, HDC followed the City’s whistleblower protection policy and posted information about the City’s fraud hotline in the corporate office space. With the move to a remote work environment, and to articulate our formal policy, HDC finalized a detailed whistleblower protection policy that outlines specific steps with respect to reporting responsibilities and procedures.

**ANNUAL CODE OF ETHICS REVIEW AND CERTIFICATION**

In addition to the initial employee onboarding process requiring that employees certify receipt of the HDC Code of Ethics, HDC employees are required to certify each year that they have read and understand the HDC Code of Ethics. The HDC Code of Ethics includes guidelines for employee conduct, as well as the most recent version of Chapter 68 of the New York City Charter, which addresses conflicts of interest. Additionally, HDC’s Human Resources’ Department will schedule annual online training with DOI and COIB so that the HDC employees remain up to date with respect to the City’s anti-corruption laws and rules. If safety protocols allow, HDC will conduct in person training in addition to the online training. If in person is not possible, HDC will conduct the lectures remotely.

**REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT**

HDC completed an extensive process for procuring cyber liability insurance. The insurance provides coverage against a wide range of cyber security risks and threats, including a special COVID-19 provision that covering employees working remotely.
HDC has continued to engage a consultant as a part-time Chief Information Security Officer. The CISO has completed a detailed security assessment of the HDC’s security controls and processes, as compared to nationally recognized standards. HDC will use the assessment report as a roadmap to strengthen its ongoing security program, and will update the assessment annually to track progress.

HDC has strengthened procedures to prevent check fraud, most notably by implementing Positive Pay with our bank. Positive Pay is a fraud prevention tool that compares the check number, payee, and dollar amount of checks presented for payment against a list transmitted to the bank by HDC. By verifying each check against the automated Positive Pay system, any modified, forged or counterfeit checks are successfully identified and not paid.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
HPD is the largest municipal housing preservation and development agency in the nation. HPD promotes the quality and affordability of the City's housing and the strength and diversity of its many neighborhoods. HPD strives to achieve this mission by preserving affordable housing and protecting tenants, developing new affordable housing, enforcing the Housing Maintenance Code to ensure quality and safety, and engaging neighborhoods in planning. HPD is responsible for carrying out Housing New York, the Mayor's initiative to build or preserve 300,000 affordable homes by 2026. HPD is leading the Mayor's charge, in partnership with over thirteen sister agencies, advocates, developers, tenants, community organizations, elected officials, and financial institutions.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

HPD has taken multiple steps to minimize corruption hazards. For all procurement, including PPE and other pandemic response equipment, HPD follows all requirements of the Procurement Policy Board (PPB) Rules. Most of the agency's PPE was received from the City Storehouse. All goods were received and stored in accordance with all requirements.

HPD restricts access to all PPE and pandemic response equipment. The equipment is kept under lock and key in various storage rooms managed by appropriate personnel. Access to PPE and other equipment is limited to certain employees who are responsible for maintaining inventory.

HPD receives goods and confirms that all received materials are as specified and that quantities match the purchase requirements. HPD keeps track of all goods and equipment from its receipt to distribution. Upon distribution, staff collect signatures of the designated receivers.

HPD reconciles inventory upon receipt and distribution. Staff count the amount received from the City Storehouse/vendor to be sure those numbers match manifests. Additionally, staff regularly count the amount in storage and reflect
changes to records. Staff subsequently count equipment that is distributed and reflect changes to records. No discrepancies have been identified.

### TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

**What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?**

HPD instituted multiple measures to provide guidance to staff working from home, while consistently addressing concerns of potential fraud or abuse. The agency implemented several tactics to address potential fraud and abuse in terms of protecting agency and client data, as well as limiting time and leave abuses.

**Safeguarding Agency and Client Data**

Prior to sanctioning remote work, HPD issued a guide on working from home, which included HPD’s telework policy, steps to safely access and save materials from HPD servers, and guidance to ensure data privacy.

Data privacy guidelines required that staff protect personally identifiable information of clients and other administrative data. Staff were directed in best practices to access, store, and distribute these data. To ensure that staff read the data privacy guidance, the agency required acknowledgement from staff that the data privacy guidance was read and would be followed. The Data Privacy Acknowledgement required staff to perform specific actions to safeguard personally identifiable information (e.g. password-protecting documents).

To further prevent issues with network and data corruption, HPD provided guidance on secure access and equipment use. Guidance required staff to use secure WiFi connections and password-protected computers. Additionally, staff were instructed to use Microsoft 365 products to ensure that work materials were stored in secure clouds and not on personal devices. Additionally, staff were instructed to use remote access to perform work functions that require downloading or storing confidential information.

**Limiting Data Breaches**

There are several tools and processes that help prevent data breaches from external parties and limit staff access to data that does not pertain to their job functions.

To prevent external threats, the agency employs firewalls and intrusion detection devices on the network. Additionally, HPD deployed multi-factor authentication to access HPD’s networks through remote access.

To restrict access to personally identifiable information when using agency databases, the agency identifies which staff should have access; individual databases and software only grant access to those staff whose roles allow for
access. HPD validates users against access lists using custom security to prevent unauthorized access.

**Mitigating Time and Leave Abuses**

To best protect against time and leave abuses, HPD issued guidance for supervisors which shared suggestions on how to remotely manage teams and record work times. Updates to this guidance continue to be provided. In addition to guidance, HPD works with supervisors to ensure timesheet accuracy when staff are on leave, granted excused absences, or assigned to volunteer roles. HPD Human Resources works to further confirm COVID-related absences and follows up to obtain any necessary documentation.

**Division of Tenant Resources (DTR)**

Consistent with remote work measures implemented agency-wide, in response to the COVID pandemic and stay at home orders, DTR has made significant operational changes in order to ensure continued housing subsidy assistance. DTR understands that this shift to a remote work environment presents unique challenges and creates new risks of fraud. As DTR adjusts business processes to enable remote work, a careful assessment of risk is always considered, to be balanced with the need to ensure stable housing for program participants. For example, applicants can now submit digital applications using the PDF format, which increases the risk of fraudulent application submission. In order to mitigate that risk, the digital application includes a unique ID and pre-populates the applicant’s name, allowing staff to verify that the applicant is a legitimate applicant for HPD’s program. While this is a short term solution which will ultimately be replaced by an applicant portal, it does allow continued operations, while at the same time providing protections against fraudulent activity. As DTR further adjusts to a remote work environment, the risk of fraud and opportunities to mitigate that risk will continue to be explored.

**VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?*

HPD follows the requirements of the PPB with respect to its procurement processes, including performing vendor responsibility determinations where required. When these determinations are not required, HPD performs a series of checks to confirm legitimacy. These checks include, but are not limited to: checking the entity’s existence on LexisNexis, PASSPort, Google News, the New York State Department of State Corporation and Business Entity Database, and Sam.gov.
PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period?

IMPROPER DISMISSAL OF VIOLATION-CODE ENFORCEMENT DIVISION

HPD continues to take the following steps to (a) reduce the ability of Housing Inspectors and other field/office staff to engage in misconduct which may result in violations being inappropriately dismissed and (b) improve employee accountability:

- The Field Audit and Review Unit (FARU) within the HPD’s Office of Enforcement and Neighborhood Services (OENS) continues to work toward reinforcing existing OENS internal controls by assessing the effectiveness of OENS field operations staff and procedures through trainings, audits, and field evaluations. FARU continues to review reports to identify patterns or discrepancies in inspection results; performs evaluations of staff and processes within OENS using field and desk audits to ensure compliance with policies and procedures; coordinates DOI and COIB trainings for staff; conducts monthly inspections of all public interviewer areas to ensure compliance with HPD and/or COIB rules; ensures signage is posted in all public facing areas in OENS offices regarding COIB rules and/or criminal statues against public servants promoting or providing information to private companies and the possible penalties for employees if found to be in violation of these rules; provides training to new and existing Housing Inspectors and Construction Project Managers and facilitates training and cross-training to new and existing clerical staff on in-office procedures; and advises and makes recommendations to senior management when new policies and procedures or reinforcement of policies and procedures are necessary.

- HPD continues to limit the number of users who can take the multiple actions required to dismiss violations in the HPDInfo database (for example, adding a result and approving that same result), and review the assignment of functions which determine which actions an individual user can take every six to nine months.

- In order to improve staff accountability, starting October 2020, all field staff are required to complete the Certificate of Inspection Visits (IV-1) card during their building visits. The card requires field staff to complete several pieces of information at the start and end of their building visit (inspection). Upon entering a multiple dwelling, field staff must locate the IV-1 card, which can be found in a frame approximately 6 inches by 9 inches at or near the mailboxes or other conspicuous and readily accessible place, and legibly enter the date of inspection visit; inspection start time; division;
purpose of the inspection; and the staff signature at the conclusion of the inspection. OENS is also planning, in 2021, to institute the use of global positioning technology for field staff.

HOUSING SUBSIDIES

Consistent with remote work measures implemented agency-wide, in response to the COVID pandemic and stay at home orders, the Division of Tenant Resources (DTR) has made significant operational changes in order to ensure continued housing subsidy assistance. DTR understands that this shift to a remote work environment presents unique challenges and creates new risks of fraud. As DTR adjusts business processes to enable remote work, a careful assessment of risk is always considered, to be balanced with the need to ensure stable housing for program participants. For example, applicants can now submit digital applications using the PDF format, which increases the risk of fraudulent application submission. In order to mitigate that risk, HPD has taken steps which allow staff to verify that the applicant is a legitimate applicant for HPD’s program. While HPD anticipates the launch of an applicant portal, these interim steps allow continued operations, while at the same time providing protections against fraudulent activity. As DTR further adjusts to a remote work environment, the risk of fraud and opportunities to mitigate that risk will continue to be explored.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

IMPROPER DISMISSAL OF VIOLATION-CODE ENFORCEMENT DIVISION

See discussion of this topic in the Public Health and Safety Corruption Hazards section of this report above.

PREVAILING WAGE

HPD’s Labor Monitoring Unit (LMU) monitors contractors’ compliance with prevailing wage requirements. LMU continues to review weekly certified payroll records, conduct unannounced site inspections, and investigate worker complaints. Upon receiving prevailing wage complaints from workers, HPD, at the direction of LMU, the State Attorney General, and/or the U.S. Department of Labor, will withhold payments from a project to ensure that sufficient funds exist to pay potential claims.

HPD continues to utilize a web-based payroll submission system, allowing streamlined submission and review of payroll records. HPD anticipates that this increased transparency, coupled with enhanced monitoring, will reduce prevailing wage violations.

In addition, HPD continues to promptly notify DOI of any prevailing wage violations which may have possible criminal law implications.
HOUSING SUBSIDIES

HPD continues to maintain procedures for the processing of payments in order to ensure payments are reviewed by personnel outside of the Division of Tenant Resources (DTR). Payment adjustments created because of changes on certifications are submitted to HPD’s Fiscal Division via an electronic tracking system and reviewed to ensure the adjustment is properly documented. HPD has also developed clear guidelines for staff on what documentation is required for an adjustment to be processed.

The Program Integrity and Compliance (PIC) team continues to research allegations of tenant and landlord fraud, utilizing online tools such as LexisNexis and the NYS Motor Vehicle database to evaluate allegations of unreported income and household members. This team also continues to conduct field visits and assists with special projects such as unreported assets. The PIC unit also continues to make and receive referrals to and from DOI.

DTR is investing in technology in order to increase operational efficiency, integrity, and consistency utilizing a variety of tools. DTR is currently working on several projects to move from a paper-based file system to a fully digital electronic case file system. Also, DTR, in coordination with HPD Tech, is in the process of procuring an Electronic Case Management (ECM) system that will allow DTR to create and establish digital workflows, which will provide additional consistency to business processes and will provide additional conformity with HUD rules and regulations, as well as with HPD’s administrative plan. Digital workflows will also offer enhanced auditing and tracking capabilities, as each step of the digital workflow can include important information on who utilized the system, as well as digital time stamps. This will be a multi-year project to re-engineer current business processes to the new system.

MITCHELL-LAMA MISCONDUCT

HPD conducted a request for proposals and selected a vendor to digitize the waiting lists for Mitchell-Lama developments. HPD is in the process of having the contract registered and anticipates that the vendor will begin the work to digitize the waiting lists by the end of the year or the beginning of the new year.

HPD currently tracks vacancies on a quarterly basis with reports that are provided by management. HPD plans to internally develop a system that will help keep these vacancies tracked in one place.

Also, HPD now explicitly requires Mitchell-Lama managing agents to cooperate with any investigation, audit or inquiry conducted by an appropriate authority. HPD requires that managing agents of Mitchell Lama developments report suspected malfeasance by anyone associated with the development to HPD Housing Supervision or DOI. An amendment to the Mitchell-Lama rules requires the managing agent to report any violation or attempted violation of the rules to HPD.
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<th>ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)</th>
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HRA provides economic support and social services to families and individuals through the administration of cash assistance, Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits, Medicaid, HIV/AIDS services (HASA), and child support services, as well as other programs.

**RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

**PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT**

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

PPE and other pandemic response equipment were procured for the Department of Social Services (DSS, which includes HRA and the Department of Homeless Services (DHS)) using the agency’s standard procurement process. Items were only procured from the City’s registered and vetted Woman- or Minority-Owned (WMBE) vendors. Items were checked by HRA’s General Supply Services (GSS) and DHS’s Warehouse for quality and accurate quantity upon delivery and at each stage of the distribution process. Items that did not meet the agency’s quality standards were sent back to the vendor and reimbursement sought. Vendors were contacted to remediate any inaccuracies in the quantities of supplies delivered. Pandemic response supplies were stored in secure facilities equipped with cameras to prevent theft or loss. PPE was distributed across both agencies based on staff headcount, as well as the number of clients and prospective clients. DSS/HRA/DHS monitored usage rates of these products along with supply requests to determine whether increases or decreases in stocks were needed. Based on these established usage and request trends, PPE was distributed to each agency program and shelter location, as well as contracted vendors who were in need.
TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

To mitigate risk related to the implementation of the agency’s work-from-home (WFH) policy, DSS’ Office of Human Capital Management (HCM) issued a Telework Policy in March 2020. That policy reiterated the fact that all human resources related policies, procedures, and practices remained in force for those employees in the WFH program. The Telework Policy also included a listing of these policies and procedures along with a link to make accessing them easier for staff. Managers and supervisors are required to review and approve staff time in CityTime just as they were prior to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Regarding the protection of confidential information and data security, the agency’s Office of Data Security Management (ODSM) established policies and provided guidelines on confidentiality for employees accessing agency resources while working remotely. OSDM ensured that appropriate security software was installed on all agency laptops and resources. It also provided guidance on and established standards for the safe roll-out of online collaboration tools. OSDM engaged in continuous monitoring of employee access to agency networks and resources in partnership with New York City Cyber Command and accelerated the implementation of multi-factor authentication for all remote users.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

OMB and DSS’s Office of Finance put in place a rigorous review of expenses connected to the COVID-19 pandemic (i.e. cleaning supplies, remote working supplies). Contractors/providers are required to track and report on all COVID-19-related expenses that are beyond the scope of their current contract and for which they were seeking reimbursement. Providers must maintain records of all COVID-19 expenditures and to create separate cost centers or grant codes within their organization’s financial management systems to track costs related to COVID-19. All City contracts, including emergency contracts and those contracts containing amendments or change orders for COVID-19 response, remain subject to audit.
PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period. [List two or more. Each hazard identified should have its own sub-header as below, and include a discussion of the hazard as well as any risk mitigation strategies.]

MODIFICATION OF INSPECTION PROTOCOLS

Given COVID-19 restrictions, several programs modified inspection protocols by either reducing the frequency of inspections or moving the inspections to a virtual format. These inspections are typically performed by vendors who inspect client rooms in domestic violence shelters, supportive housing, and rental assistance apartments. As an example, HIV/AIDS Services (HASA) housing inspections became virtual, with in-person reserved for emergency situations.

MODIFICATIONS TO PROGRAM REVIEWS & AUDITS

Program reviews for quality assurance were modified and/or conducted on a limited basis in light of COVID-19 restrictions. Per guidance issued by the Mayor’s Office of Contracting Services (MOCS), new audit engagements were delayed and deadlines for existing audits were extended. Audits have since resumed.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

INTEGRITY OF RENTAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

- CityFHEPS’ dedicated integrity unit – Rental Assistance Integrity (RAI) – which proactively identifies patterns that indicate errors, non-compliance, fraud and/or abuse, continues to perform data analytics to ensure participant and landlord compliance, conduct quality assurance reviews of client packets and perform secondary walkthroughs to ensure compliance with program rules. Additionally, the unit continues to work on ad hoc inquiries and investigative matters for the program.

- The Agency continues its efforts to build a Landlord Management System (LMS) that will serve as a comprehensive payment tracking system, will make electronic payments to landlords, track payments and improve the Agency’s ability to collect and manage landlord data. The expected implementation date for LMS is May 2021.

- The Agency has also developed an Inspection Web application which enables staff to schedule appointments, complete walkthroughs and approvals depending on their roles.
VENDOR MANAGEMENT

- The Contract Monitoring Office (CMO) has made significant progress in improving vendor and contract management across the agency.
- The CMO continues to meet with various HRA and DHS programs and provide them guidance on vendor oversight.
- With dedicated staff focused on both HRA and DHS, the CMO has been instrumental in developing corrective action plans (CAPs) for vendors of both agencies that are considered at risk and has helped HRA to develop tools to monitor existing CAPs.
- The CMO has developed and delivered training to HRA staff on best practices for contract management including: instructions for improved case file review, updates to provider and agency recordkeeping practices, the creation of internal CAPs, and performance evaluations with standardized metrics to be applied uniformly across all program divisions.

THEFT OF BENEFITS

The Office of Program Accountability’s Data, Analytics, Reporting and Triage (DART) and the Compliance Office continue to employ data analytics to identify patterns of error, fraud and abuse among HRA clients and employees. These units continue their work to identify unauthorized access to client information and track trends in inappropriate benefit issuances.

DATA SECURITY

The Agency’s Office of Data Security Management (ODSM) continues to adopt controls, applications, and techniques to protect network files, databases and accounts. Its key security efforts also include:

- Completing a risk assessment and gap analysis of the Agency Security Model and developing a Security Health Indicator Dashboard and an overall risk register.
- Performing frequent vulnerability scans on workstations, servers and network devices to identify potential security issues.
- Initiating a secure software development lifecycle to address security issues throughout application development. Continuing to perform periodic application scans on legacy and new applications to deal with complex and ever-evolving cyber threats.
- Continuously monitoring agency networks for malicious activity to protect end points as part of the agency’s end-point-protection program.
• Completing implementation of multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all DSS remote users. HRA is slated to be complete by December 31, 2020.

• Continuing to run, in collaboration with New York City Cyber Command (Cyber), periodic agency-wide "phish tests" as part of the agency's security awareness and training program.

• In partnership with Cyber, initiating an agency-wide incident response program.

**ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)**

Not applicable.
Commission on Human Rights (CCHR)

Carmelyn P. Malalis, Commissioner
Eleonora Rivkin & Andrew Sein, Inspectors General

The New York City Commission on Human Rights (CCHR) enforces the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), educates the public about their rights and responsibilities under the NYCHRL and encourages positive community relations. The NYCHRL prohibits discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations and is one of the most comprehensive antidiscrimination laws in the country. CCHR meets this mission through its law enforcement, community outreach, media and policy efforts. CCHR’s Law Enforcement Bureau (LEB) impartially investigates alleged violations of the law; negotiates and resolves matters; provides early intervention in cases of on-going discrimination, retaliation, or the need for accommodations; and, where appropriate, tries cases before an independent administrative judge. Mediation services are offered through the independent Office of Mediation and Conflict Resolution (OMCR). CCHR’s Community Relations Bureau (CRB) educates the public on their rights by building deep community relationships through roundtable discussions, workshops, trainings and other gatherings. The CRB also engages with the small business community, including chambers of commerce, merchant associations and business improvement districts to facilitate compliance with the NYCHRL. CCHR’s Office of the Chair is the agency’s policy, legislative, and adjudicatory hub. It convenes public hearings, publishes reports on key issues of the day, implements new legal protections, publishes legal guidance, issues final decisions and orders and oversees media campaigns.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

The Commission ensured the security of pandemic related items through tracking shipments from vendors and other providers, coordinating delivery times to ensure deliveries were received when staff were present (recognizing that buildings were not always open), tracking the inventory and use of such goods, and securing such goods in locked locations only accessible by authorized staff. The Commission has an established practice of distributing supplies on written and previously approved requests consistent with existing procurement rules and procedures and the City’s Financial Management System (FMS), which the Executive Director of Operations reviews for accuracy and need, and which is likewise periodically reviewed by the
Agency Chief Contracting Officer and supervising Deputy Commissioner. Purchases and inventory of PPE are also maintained, tracked, and reviewed.

Fraud or waste of PPE is mitigated by a number of safeguards. As an initial matter, access to the Commission offices is controlled, limiting opportunity for corruption, waste, or fraud: during the pandemic, staff are only permitted to visit Commission offices after, among other safeguards, advance notice and prior unit head approval is obtained. Second, such notice must identify what PPE supplies are needed, which the Operations team controls and distributes to ensure needed supplies are available, which limits access to prevent unauthorized retrieval or misappropriation. While a limited number of common areas, such as photocopier areas, pantry, or lobby areas, are supplied with hand sanitizer at all times, supplies at these stations are monitored by Operations staff for use and restocking purposes, and anomalies, including misuse or theft, would be promptly identified as part of that oversight. Similarly, requests for PPE, such as face masks or shields, is controlled and distributed by Operations staff thereby reducing risk of misappropriation.

**TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK**

*What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?*

**Security of Technology Used to Facilitate Remote Work**

Consistent with City policy and the need to protect staff and the public during the pandemic, the Commission rapidly transitioned to remote work and did so without suspending provision of services to the public. This entailed amending certain processes to address the novelties of remote working, such as the rapid increased use of videoconferencing software for uses that had previously been conducted face to face.

When deploying such software, the Commission’s IT Department, the General Counsel’s Office, and a supervising Deputy Commissioner coordinated with DoITT on the various videoconferencing platforms to be used and ensured that staff were instructed how to use the software, ensuring the protection and security of identifying information and confidential or sensitive data, and what best practices should be used for each platform depending on intended use. The Commission also directed managers and supervisors to monitor and approve the use of such platforms as a secondary check.

**Managing Staff Remotely and Ensuring Accurate Time Keeping**

While employees normally access CityTime from their desktops in the office, the rapid transition to remote work presented challenges when not all employees had access to hand-scanners or CityTime. The Human Resources Department, the General Counsel’s Office, and unit heads coordinated and implemented alternative
practices for managers to ensure the appropriate and accurate recording of staff time in CityTime using, among other strategies, increased videoconferences or telephone check-ins between supervisees and supervisors to ensure adequate supervision and monitoring of time and recorded such time with the use of timesheets in substantially the same format at the CityTime until such time as access to CityTime was more widely available.

Over the course of remote working, the Commission’s IT Department along with its supervising Deputy Commissioner ensured staff were provided with the necessary City-issued mobile equipment and/or access to DoITT approved City computer platforms to perform remote work securely.

**VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?*

The Commission procured PPE (such as additional hand sanitizer, gloves, and masks) through the New York City Department of Citywide Administrative Services’ storehouse, providing built-in efficiency, security, and compliance with applicable laws, executive orders, and mayoral directives. Because the Commission has a relatively smaller staff, it has obtained sufficient quantities of PPE for current anticipated use, though the fluid nature of the pandemic may result in shortages or other factors that would require the Commission to seek other sources. In such circumstances, the Commission minimizes the risk of fraud by continuing to adhere to the New York City Procurement Policy Board Rules regarding procurement of goods and services and the Office of Comptroller’s Directives regarding expenditures to avoid the misuse of City funds and possibility of corruption, including but not limited to the absence of using petty cash and the use of approved purchasing processes, including FMS.

**PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

*What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.*

**PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS DURING COVID-19**

Especially during this health crisis, which disproportionately impacted Black, Latinx and immigrant New Yorkers, and laid bare previously existing disparities in access to basic needs like healthcare, housing and jobs, the NYCHRL’s protections became even more essential. This was underscored as the crisis prompted violence, hate speech, and harassment, encouraged by racist and xenophobic rhetoric from the White House, upon Asian New Yorkers. This was also accompanied by protests against the devastating impacts of structural racism on Black people and called attention to the police violence in Black communities and other communities of color.
While remote work was necessary to protect public and staff health and safety, the Commission implemented operational plans to ensure that its work addressing equity and issues of particular importance to communities that have experienced interpersonal, institutional, and structural forms of oppression remained uninterrupted, and that in so doing its operations maintained existing safeguards against corruption, waste, and fraud.

This was achieved by adapting to the crisis to ensure its work could be assessed and reviewed: thus, at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Commission launched a COVID-19 Response Team in response to reports of an increase in bias-based harassment and discrimination, particularly involving anti-Asian discrimination. The work of this unit is tracked to ensure accountability: Since its creation in March 2020, through the end of July 30, 2020, for example, the Response Team responded to 376 inquiries. These responses include commencing investigations, conducting early or emergency interventions, informing New Yorkers about their rights under the NYCHRL and providing information, resources and referrals for inquirers who raise issues not within the Commission’s jurisdiction.

Similarly, to ensure uninterrupted enforcement and investigation work, LEB staff rolled out alternatives for reaching the Commission, including but not limited to guidance and information on a COVID-19 dedicated web page discussing the effect of State executive orders on Commission filing deadlines and how to reach enforcement staff remotely. The Commission rolled out new technology to ensure the ability of enforcement staff to continue to respond to public inquiries and to carry out investigations and enforcement work, with the guidance and coordination of the Commission’s IT Department to ensure the secure use of remote technology.

Finally, the Commission’s CRB rapidly developed alternatives to in-person outreach to ensure its ongoing ability to conduct workshops virtually and to hold events remotely. Likewise, these efforts were developed to ensure secure and confidential treatment of identifying information and confidential or sensitive information while preserving the Commission’s ability to continue its work.

**COMMISSION STAFF MAY ENGAGE IN WORK ACTIVITIES BEYOND REGULAR WORK HOURS, WHICH MUST BE COMPENSATED**

Where applicable and to ensure responsible use of limited City resources, the Commission limits overtime work to five hours a week earned as compensatory time. All overtime requests are subject to multiple levels of review and checks and balances. Among other things, requests must be approved in advance by the employee’s unit head and are ultimately approved by a Deputy Commissioner. Supervisors are responsible for ensuring that the employee performs the overtime. These multiple levels of review and increased managerial check-ins maintain a culture that will reduce the possibility of corruption or waste. In addition, the
Commission conducts CityTime trainings for staff to, among other things, emphasize policies on proper timekeeping.

**REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT**

**BIASED OR INCONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION’S ENFORCEMENT POWERS.**

The Commission continues to train and supervise staff through multiple levels of supervision and review from investigation, through trial, and post-trial appeals to ensure against biased or inconsistent implementation of the Commission’s enforcement powers. This safeguard is built in LEB’s structure: Supervising Attorneys are intimately involved in all cases and review staff attorney decision-making regarding cases from intake through resolution. The threshold decision at the end of an investigation—whether to issue probable cause or not—is a statutory requirement and is reviewed by a supervisor and, as needed, by an Assistant Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner. Similarly, conciliation positions are subject to multiple levels of review to ensure that each complaint is evaluated objectively, thereby mitigating corruption risk.

In addition, this administration continues to use specialized units to swiftly resolve claims of discrimination before a complaint is filed. Each of these units—the Source of Income Unit, the Early Intervention Unit, and the Gender-Based Harassment Unit—are supervised by more senior staff to help ensure that staff attorneys are applying and enforcing the NYCHRL consistently.

All Commission decisions may be appealed directly to the Commission’s Office of the Chairperson. A party can appeal decisions and orders issued by the Office of the Chairperson to the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Consequently, checks and balances are in place regarding both LEB decisions and decisions by the Office of the Chairperson. Through this appeal process, parties may voice allegations of biased or inconsistent application of the Commission’s enforcement powers. Therefore, to the extent that Commission staff are alleged to have engaged in activities that pose a risk of bias, this appeal process keeps the Commission informed of such allegations and allows for the evaluation of the effectiveness of the safeguards.

In addition, the Commission continues to train its enforcement attorneys by providing them with access to continuing legal education training and other mandatory trainings.

Finally, the Commission continues to adapt new technologies and processes to mitigate bias by: (i) ensuring the availability of language access services for parties; (ii) providing remote access during the pandemic to mitigate against the impact of otherwise indefinitely suspending a needed public service; and (iii)
deploying new units and outreach to address crises specific to the pandemic to mitigate against the bias of underreporting.

**INSUFFICIENT OVERSIGHT OF THE PROCUREMENT PROCESS**

On an ongoing basis, the Commission reviews its policies and procedures to ensure that they adhere to the City’s Procurement Policy Board Rules regarding procurement of goods and services and the Office of Comptroller’s Directives regarding expenditures to avoid the misuse of City funds and possibility of corruption. To that end, key staff engaged in procurement continue to be trained on relevant regulations and guidelines, including migration to and trainings on PASSPort, the City’s digital Procurement and Sourcing Solutions Portal. Further, the Director of Operations and the ACCO provided guidance to staff on solicitation and encumbrance procedures and have trained staff on these procedures; they continue to update these resources as appropriate.

**INSUFFICIENT OVERSIGHT OF REIMBURSEMENTS FOR PERSONAL AND TRAVEL-RELATED EXPENSES.**

When reimbursement of personal and travel-related expenses arises, the Commission requires multiple levels of review, including managerial pre-approval as well as independent review by the Operations Department. The Commission uses a reimbursement process that is tracked, monitored, and as a safeguard against corruption.

Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, requests for reimbursement of personal expenses arose most often from staff for local travel to a work-related event. The Commission maintains a MetroCard policy for all employees, which tracks usage, requires supervisory pre-approval, and is periodically reviewed by independent staff to mitigate the possibility of improper or unusual activity. For long-distance travel, the Commission follows the travel policy issued by the Mayor’s Office in 2014 and amended by the Travel Directive of September 26, 2018. The risk of corruption relating to travel expenses has been further mitigated to the extent that the City’s Executive Order 55 prohibited City employees from official non-essential foreign travel at the outset of the pandemic.

Finally, in further compliance with DOIs recommendations relating to fleet usage and oversight, the Commission’s Fleet and Facilities Coordinator continues to vehicle use and alerts, if any, through DCAS telematics software. The Commission’s Coordinator also maintains up-to-date lists of fleet-related information, including but not limited to agency vehicle assignments, authorized drivers, parking placard assignees, and completion of defensive driving courses. Authorized fleet users are trained on the City’s fleet policies. Five authorized drivers have received defensive driver training since July 1, 2020.
Where applicable and to ensure responsible use of limited City resources, the Commission limits overtime work to five hours a week earned as compensatory time. All overtime requests are subject to multiple levels of review and checks and balances. Among other things, requests must be approved in advance by the employee’s unit head and are ultimately approved by a Deputy Commissioner. Supervisors are responsible for ensuring that the employee performs the overtime. These multiple levels of review and increased managerial check-ins maintain a culture that we expect will reduce the possibility of corruption or waste. In addition, the Commission conducts CityTime trainings for staff to, among other things, emphasize policies on proper timekeeping.

The Commission believes it is doing everything in its power to prevent corruption in every aspect of its operation, and will continue to do so over the coming year. The Commission looks forward to hearing any comments or suggestions from DOI.
Department of Information Technology & Telecommunications (DoITT)

Jessica Tisch, Commissioner
Eleonora Rivkin & Andrew Sein, Inspectors General

The Department of Information Technology and Telecommunications (DoITT) provides much of the technology that enables City services for all who live, work, do business in, and visit the City of New York. Whether through DoITT’s management and development of the City’s 911 voice and text systems, the NextGen 911 transformation program, the City’s wired and radio networks, data centers, NYC.gov, the Open Data portal, the citywide rollout of 5G wireless communications, administration of the City’s mobile telecommunication franchises, or oversight of major interagency technology initiatives and procurements, DoITT connects NYC.

DoITT also manages the 311 Customer Service Center, which delivers fast and easy access to government services and information to all New Yorkers, such as health and social service referrals, service requests, collection schedules for sanitation, status on parking regulations, and City agency programs. Since March 2020, COVID-19 related inquiries to 311 have included requesting meals, information on medical care, small business loans, tenant-assistance, and citywide resources and support.

NYC 311’s services are available in more than 180 languages, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

Strict protocols were put in place in order to safeguard, distribute, and monitor all PPE. In both DoITT and 311, all requests for PPE were required to be made by division heads to the Deputy Commissioner of Management & Budget (DCMB) and DoITT Health & Safety, with a copy to the Deputy Director of Facilities & Property Management (DDFPM). Each request was required to have an accompanying justification, including the number of employees the PPE would supply and the expected burn rate. Upon review and recommendation by the DDFPM, the DCMB would grant approval for distribution.
Each division’s Deputy Commissioner designated a liaison to manage acquisition and distribution of PPE, and report burn rates. All supplies were stored in secure areas and amounts were tracked and updated. No supplies could be distributed without coordination through the DDFPM after authorization by the DCMB. Burn rates were closely monitored and all PPE stock received was safeguarded. The division liaisons were also required to secure PPE at their office locations and manage distribution to their operational staff during working hours.

**TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK**

*What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?*

Following the transition to remote work of a majority of DoITT operations, guidance was sent by email to all managers and supervisors to address, among other things, ways to check in with their employees to maintain accountability on a daily basis. Additionally, the timekeeping staff has continued to follow up with employees and supervisors about the submission and accuracy of their timesheets on a biweekly basis. Monthly reporting on overtime and compensatory time is also generated and reviewed to ensure that there are not unaccounted-for variations in usage. Please see Exhibit A for the communication to all DoITT People Managers on 03/24/2020.

For 311, the majority of staff performed duties onsite at the 311 Call Center. For 311 support staff who transitioned to remote work, managers and supervisors were provided guidance by DoITT to address, among other things, ways to check in with their employees to maintain accountability on a daily basis. Additionally, DoITT shared instructions and guidance for timekeeping with onsite and remote work staff.

Individual managers and supervisors engaged with and monitored employees and contractors via email, phone, enterprise instant-messaging applications, and video conference and team meetings throughout working hours. Managers and supervisors tracked and evaluated staff deliverables and updates to monitor employee activity and productivity, including but not limited to: content posted to call center and public websites; reviewing email exchanges with Agency liaisons; logging and evaluation of call recordings; collaboration on training guides; updates and entries to shared folders and documents; posting 311 social media updates and responses; updates to project plans; and general daily communication with staff throughout working hours. In addition, regular meetings were held with staff to validate attendance and contributions, and field questions.

DoITT utilized multiple technology approaches to monitor and secure employee work product. In order to support the rapid surge of remote work, DoITT’s Information Security Division increased the capacity of the City’s remote access infrastructure. This new infrastructure accommodated an approximate 900%
increase in the number of concurrent remote workers. To assist with the analysis of log data from this system, DoITT’s Information Security Division deployed a security information and event management (SIEM) system for collection of log data and development of custom alerts on anomalous behavior. The SIEM tool allows the Information Security Division to monitor for suspicious behavior and receive alerts on signs of fraud or potential cyber incidents across a variety of DoITT-provided technologies for CityNet, Public Safety Answering Center, and all DoITT-supported agencies. Specifically, DoITT took the following steps to enhance information security:

- Extended the application of Multifactor Authentication (MFA) across DoITT and agencies supported by DoITT;
- Augmented the governance, risk and compliance resources to improve transparency, reporting and oversight;
- Upgraded firewalls from unsupported legacy platforms to modern NextGen platforms with new technologies to increase security capabilities;
- Replaced end-of-life domain name services (DNS) hardware with a modern and enhanced system to provide both internal and public DNS management; and
- Expanded the City’s Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) protection service to combat DDoS attacks that increased dramatically in 2020. DDoS attacks flood a network with illegitimate/fraudulent traffic, preventing legitimate communications from taking place. DDoS attacks become even more disruptive to an agency when employees and contractors are working remotely, as the attack can target the infrastructure that enables remote work.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

Each vendor underwent an integrity review that included: Dun & Bradstreet; LexisNexis; Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs – Debarred Companies Database; NYS Department of Labor – Debarred List; NYS Department of State – Division of Corporations; NYS Office of General Services (OGS) Non-Responsible Entities List; PASSPort Contract Performance Evaluations; PASSPort Search; Internet Search.

Contract terms were negotiated for each scope of work and reviewed by the Law Department. Pricing was reviewed and approved by the business teams. Where applicable, existing contracts were utilized to incorporate previously negotiated terms or validate pricing. Additionally, as it became clearer how the pandemic would affect citywide processes, DoITT was able to further negotiate volume
discounts for hardware purchases, such as network equipment, on behalf of the City.

Technology contractors were onboarded and handled with the same policies and procedures as usual, and all access was logged and audited per standard processes. For the contact tracing application specifically, an insider threat detection model was developed due to the rapid increase in contracted staff necessary for that program.

311 leveraged DoITT processes and resources for contractor call-taker needs and utilization. Where applicable, existing contracts were utilized to incorporate previously negotiated terms or validate pricing. Contractors providing 311 call-taking services were onboarded and handled with the same policies and procedures as usual. In the case of on-site contractors, 311 staff were deployed at physical contractor locations in New York City to train, monitor, and evaluate contractor performance. For off-site contractors, 311 staff evaluated call recordings, initiated test call protocols, and monitored key performance indicators including real-time staffing levels and call metrics.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

SAFEGUARDING PERSONAL INFORMATION IN THE CONTACT TRACING APPLICATION

When DoITT built the COVID-19 contact tracing application for the NYC Test & Trace Corps, DoITT prioritized protecting the personal health information and personal identifying information that the system collects. This drove the technology architecture, policy, and operational choices associated with this important program.

The selected platform met the Agency’s high standards for privacy and information security. Key features to note include:

- Using only the Government Cloud offering;
- Encryption of all information both in transit and at rest, in accordance with NYC standards;
- Network protection techniques, including:
  - Network segmentation and use of firewalls to protect against intrusion into any segment;
  - Network address translation technology, to hide the internal network layout from external attackers;
o Network intrusion detection sensors to identify and report unusual network traffic;
o Physical protection of Salesforce’s facilities, equipment and resources;

- Security testing and validation, including:
o Penetration testing that simulates a third-party cyber-attack;
o Third party certification of Salesforce’s practices, using multiple methodologies, and NYC validation of those certifications; and

- Identity management controls, including access to information only based on the role assigned, multi-factor authentication, logging of all activity, and encoded storage of all passwords.

ENSURING INTEGRITY IN VENDOR INTERACTIONS AND ENGAGEMENT AND PREVENTING UNDUE INFLUENCE

DoITT negotiates and manages a number of enterprise contracts for products and services on behalf of the City. To combat corruption vulnerabilities in the procurement process, DoITT has developed the following policies and procedures to govern vendor interactions.

First, DoITT has developed a new business procedure, entitled “Procedure for Engagement with Vendors on New Business.” This procedure sets out requirements for DoITT staff to secure approval to engage in initial discussions with vendors to research and obtain information about new products and services that DoITT may wish to procure. The purpose of the procedure is to control the flow of information about DoITT’s business needs; to comply with applicable rules and avoid vendor disqualifications; to avoid the appearance of impropriety; to ensure integrity in the procurement process; and to ensure compliance with the DoITT Code of Conduct, NYC Charter Chapter 68 and Conflict of Interest Board Rules, and local laws. Among other things, this procedure requires that letters are exchanged between DoITT employees and the vendor agreeing to the limited nature of the discussions that are permissible at the early stages of the procurement process.

Second, DoITT has developed a memorandum of “Restrictions on Vendor Interactions.” This memorandum clearly outlines appropriate and inappropriate behavior by employees when engaging in interactions with vendors.

Third, DoITT is in the process of drafting a second business procedure, which will govern interactions with vendors and the sharing of confidential information in the negotiation process. That procedure is forthcoming and expected to be distributed to the agency by early November.

Fourth, an executive committee has been convened that will supervise a team of experienced investigators, including former prosecutors, in any internal
investigations that may arise with respect to any violations of the policies and procedures. Should the committee determine that there have been any violations of these policies and procedures, there will be discipline or termination of employees, if warranted. It is of the utmost importance that DoITT prevent and completely root out any corruption, inappropriate behavior, misconduct, and even the appearance of impropriety.

Fifth, DoITT is in the process of evaluating training options and focusing on courses that will best address these issues and prevent violations. The trainings being considered are:

- Computer-based training (CBT), which is a general COIB training that fulfills the mandatory biannual requirement;
- Webinars that will permit us to ask COIB to tailor content to focus on any specific aspects of the Conflicts of Interest law that address any potential misconduct or impropriety.

DoITT processes contracts, including emergency contracts, for several offices that fall under the DoITT umbrella, but historically, DoITT has had no oversight of or insight into how these offices conduct their interactions with vendors. To standardize the vendor engagement process among these several offices, DoITT recently required them to adopt and implement DoITT’s vendor engagement policies and procedures by early November.

**REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT**

In DoITT’s 2019 letter, DoITT identified an anticorruption monitoring program that would focus on the effectiveness of procedures for addressing theft and loss of property. As DoITT handles considerable volumes of high-cost equipment, the effort focused on establishing an Inventory Count process that included individual counts and validation by location. The inventory was conducted from 05/28/2019 – 06/10/2019. This included 1,437 assets counted at 86 slot locations. The count process was double-blind – two different people conducted the count at each location. Segregation of duties was observed (i.e., Inventory Management staff did not participate in the count). Counters were selected from various groups across DoITT, assigning individuals to areas other than their own as much as possible.

After reconciliation, the variance was 0%. All custodial groups received updated information after the inventory and variance validation were completed.

As a result of the inventory, DoITT identified and implemented two process improvements in control documentation upon request for pickup and signoff upon removal. This improved traceability, and in 2020, DoITT further enhanced the process by initiating quarterly outreaches to all divisions, which required them to provide a deployment/status plan for all inventory related to their division.
DoITT received a surprise visit from DOI in December 2019. DOI requested a step-by-step walk through from item receipt to deployment from inventory, including cross-referencing items from requisitions. To date, DOI has not reported any issues to the agency.

Note: In 2020, DoITT was not able to do a physical count due to COVID-19. DoITT mitigated this by doing smaller data validations, which entailed staff verifying inventory records and equipment slot locations, and internal cycle counts of areas to validate the accuracy of information. DoITT found no major issue with its process and plans to resume the annual inventory count in 2021.

**ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)**

Not applicable.
The DOI promotes and maintains integrity and efficiency in City government by investigating City employees and contractors who may be engaged in corrupt activities or unethical conduct, and by examining gross mismanagement and abuse in City agencies and entities. It has oversight of more than 45 Mayoral agencies and over 300,000 employees, as well as dozens of City boards and commissions.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

After transitioning to remote work in March 2020, DOI created a plan to safely re-open their office space beginning in July 2020. To ensure the safety and security of employees, DOI procured various PPE. As PPE was in demand and difficult to obtain, DOI established protocols to distribute and store all PPE received, including having the Executive Director of Facilities personally pick up PPE orders from the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS). Due to the limited number of face masks available in the early stages of the pandemic, and in consideration of the unexpected budget costs, masks were secured and a limited number were distributed to each on-site employee. As employees returned to the office, cloth face masks were hand delivered to staff on their first day back in the office. This policy enabled DOI to provide staff the PPE necessary to safely reopen the office. These tight protocols, before PPE procurement returned to pre-pandemic levels, allowed DOI to have stock of PPE available as additional employees began to return to work in the ensuing months. These efforts ensured the safety of our employees as they returned to the office.

TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

While transitioning to remote work, DOI’s Information Technology Department took numerous steps to enhance teleworking capabilities and safeguard data, confidential information, and personally identifiable information. First, DOI
provided equipment (e.g. laptops and cell phones) to DOI staff so they could effectively work remotely, and to keep an accurate inventory of all DOI issued equipment, employees signed for the equipment they received. DOI then had to increase bandwidth to allow all DOI employees to perform their work remotely, and configure the Virtual Private Network to provide protected and secured connectivity to DOI resources. IT also installed and configured antivirus software, endpoint protection, and mobile security to all equipment distributed to staff. Furthermore, they deployed a secured remote support solution to provide fast responses to technical support issues, and they instituted multi-factor authentication on all DOI accounts to protect against stolen credentials. All of these measures mitigated risks of fraud and ensured that confidential information was safeguarded.

**VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?*

The City recognized the need to procure goods and services expeditiously at the start of the pandemic and emergency procurement rules were established. To mitigate potential procurement related corruption hazards, DCAS established a task force of procurement personnel culled from across the city to assist with citywide procurement efforts, and DOI was happy to loan our Deputy ACCO to assist the task force. In addition, DOI offered to conduct expedited Vendor Name Checks for agencies obtaining emergency contracts and, we conducted over 120 checks in 2020.

To minimize fraud by vendors DOI contracted with during the pandemic, DOI continued to conduct a background screening before working with a vendor, consulted with compliance professionals, and conducted our internal procurement process, which exceeds the emergency guidelines for procurement.

**PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

*What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.*

**PEACE OFFICER PROGRAM**

DOI has tailored its Peace Officer Program to mitigate risks to employee and public health and safety that could arise from Peace Officer operations. DOI Peace Officers must pass rigorous psychological and proficiency exams to become a Peace Officer, and successfully pass annual refresher courses thereafter. Peace Officers are continually evaluated for suitability by their direct supervisors, the training division, and the Chief of Investigations. Peace Officer operations are evaluated and pre-approved, and Peace Officers rarely operate alone. While the COVID-19 pandemic has temporarily shifted some policies to maintain social distancing, Peace Officers work in teams which reduces corruption risks that can
develop in solo interactions with the public. By developing ongoing evaluations, and building in layers of review and supervision, DOI has mitigated hazards surrounding our Peace Officer Program.

**REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT**

DOI has implemented several strategies to mitigate potential corruption hazards in the expenditure of funds shared with DOI by State or Federal prosecutors to further DOI’s law enforcement efforts (referred to as “forfeiture” funds). State and Federal law govern the proper use of such funds.

To ensure effective management of DOI’s Asset Forfeiture Program, promote public confidence in the integrity of the program, and protect the program against potential corruption hazards, DOI follows several protocols to track fund usage and mitigate risks associated with administering these funds. DOI has a double authentication process to pay invoices using asset forfeiture funds. The person who enters the expenditure into the system cannot also approve the payment of the invoice with asset forfeiture funds.

**ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)**

None identified.
Office of Labor Relations (OLR)

Renee Campion, Commissioner
Clinton Daggan, Inspector General

OLR is primarily charged with representing the Mayor of the City of New York in collective bargaining with certified representatives of bargaining unit employees under the Taylor Law and the New York City Collective Bargaining Law (NYCCBL), as authorized by Executive Order No. 38 (February 7, 1967), amended by Executive Order 13 (July 24, 1990). OLR’s duties include representing the Mayor before the Office of Collective Bargaining (OCB) in all matters over which the OCB possesses jurisdiction. In addition, OLR is responsible for administering the Health Benefits Program, Management Benefits Fund, Employee Assistance Program, Medicare Part B Reimbursement and Pre-Tax Benefits, and Citywide Programs, including the Deferred Compensation Plan (DCP or the Plan) and New York City Employee IRA (NYCE IRA).

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

OLR has not faced significant corruption hazards in PPE procurement, storage, and distribution. Since March 23, 2020, employees at all divisions of the agency have been working remotely, and client service centers for the Employee Benefits Program (EBP) have been closed to the public. Agency staff are now permitted to report to the office on a voluntary basis, subject to a daily health screening, but most employees continue to work from home. For that reason, OLR’s need for PPE and pandemic response equipment has been limited over the past seven months.

In preparation for the eventual return of employees to the office, and to address the needs of staff reporting voluntarily, OLR has obtained face masks and hand sanitizer through the Mayor’s Office, which coordinates delivery from the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS) Central Storehouse. Upon receipt, all supplies are stored in a locked supply closet on agency premises.

In sum, the agency’s currently limited needs and the ability to obtain these items directly from the Mayor’s Office have obviated any potential corruption hazards at this time. However, OLR will remain mindful of these concerns as developments continue.
TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

Since OLR began preparing for employees to work from home, the agency has followed guidance from relevant oversight agencies on time and leave, payroll, information security, and other considerations to make this transition. Additionally, line supervisors in the agency’s units have regular check-ins and other measures to remain in contact with their staff and to ensure that they are carrying out their duties.

The safeguarding of confidential information has been a special consideration for OLR’s EBP, as the in-person benefit centers have been closed since March 2020. To allow EBP to continue providing services during the pandemic, Employee Benefits implemented a method for employees and retirees to submit forms and documents via a secure file transfer system. Additionally, OLR’s Information Technology (IT) unit has worked with NYC Cyber Command on various initiatives to address cybersecurity concerns.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

OLR has not engaged any new vendors during the pandemic response. To the extent that the agency’s transition to remote work has required new technology, the agency has coordinated with the Department of Information Technology & Telecommunications (DoITT). Additionally, OLR has obtained PPE and other protective equipment through the Mayor’s Office and DCAS.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

Based on the examples provided in the DOI guidance, of conditions that undermine the integrity of health or safety inspections, vendor fraud in providing human services, or conditions that allow for the introduction of contraband, OLR was not able to identify any public health and safety corruption hazards. Having the overwhelming majority of the staff working from home, along with the nature of the agency’s activities, has not given rise to these concerns.

Moreover, OLR notes with interest that DOI’s focus for next year’s report will be cybersecurity. Even before the pandemic, OLR had been working with NYC Cyber Command and DoITT to address cybersecurity threats. Relatedly, when OLR
moved offices in summer 2019, it transferred the majority of its paper files to a secure, cloud-based system.

Like all agencies, OLR has been mindful that the transition to a remote work environment heightens concerns about cybersecurity threats. As noted above, OLR has continued to work with oversight agencies to implement safeguards and to disseminate educational material on cybersecurity risks. OLR expects those efforts to continue over the coming year.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

Across NYC, the COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted operations in myriad ways, but OLR has sought to keep previously initiated risk mitigation efforts on track. As reported last year, OLR and the Municipal Labor Committee (MLC) agreed to initiate audits of NYC’s predominant health insurers, Empire Blue Cross and EmblemHealth, ultimately engaging KPMG to conduct the review. As of this writing, the process is nearing its conclusion. While no audit findings reflect malfeasance by the vendors, the review has identified approximately $7 million in claims overpayments resulting from clerical errors or use of incorrect billing codes. The review did not uncover corruption of any sort, but the process has been a helpful exercise to improve the performance of OLR’s health insurance providers and to reduce errors going forward.

With regard to DCP, in addition to its annual financial audit, a Cybersecurity Assessment and IT Security Controls Review is performed by an independent auditor. The assessment is an evaluation of the information security practices, including a review of the processes, controls, and configurations related to the Plan’s cybersecurity program. A report of the procedures performed, findings, and recommendations is presented to the Deferred Compensation Board at its June meeting. Specifically, the Plan consulted with NYC Cyber Command with regard to the auditor’s recommendation to create a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO).

ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

At this time, OLR has not identified any additional corruption hazards facing the agency, but the existing controls remain in force. With respect to collective bargaining, for instance, the agency works closely with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to negotiate fiscally responsible labor agreements consonant with NYC’s financial plan, a collaboration that has only intensified during these recent, challenging months. Each resulting Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) is published on the OLR website after ratification, and other unions closely monitor the MOAs for adherence to the “pattern” for that round of bargaining. Thereafter, a multi-step set of controls (as detailed in prior reports) applies in the processing of pay increases. Similarly, multiple controls continue to apply to welfare and
annuity fund payments, beginning with the drafting of fund agreements. From there, each payment passes through a multi-step approval process, and post-payment review is conducted by the Comptroller’s Welfare Fund Unit. Similarly, DCP has maintained existing controls and, during the reporting period, it completed a transition of recordkeeping services to Voya Financial. Longstanding controls also continue to apply in other functions of this agency, as detailed in prior reports. Taken together, OLR believes it has reasonable controls in place against corruption hazards that may emerge, but the agency will continue to remain vigilant as OLR navigates this unprecedented crisis.
Landmarks Preservation Commission (LPC)

Sarah Carroll, Chair
Gregory Cho, Inspector General

LPC is a charter-mandated New York City Commission, and the largest municipal preservation agency in the nation. It is responsible for protecting the City’s architecturally, historically, and culturally significant buildings and sites by granting them landmark or historic district status, and regulating them after designation. LPC is responsible for designating and regulating these buildings, structures, and districts. In addition to the eleven-member Commission, all appointed by the Mayor, with the advice and consent of the Council, for staggered three-year terms, the agency contains the following departments: Preservation, Enforcement, Research, Administrative and Environmental Review, and Archaeology.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

LPC requires multiple levels of approval for all purchases, including PPE and other pandemic response equipment. PPE and other supplies are kept in a locked storage room under the strict control of a limited number of designated employees. Accurate records are maintained for all supplies purchased, and the responsibilities for purchasing supplies and supervising inventory are segregated.

TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of employee fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and leave abuse)?

LPC developed and implemented a Telework Plan which was circulated to employees and included a reminder that:

- All terms and conditions of City employment will continue to apply while working remotely.
- Use of CityTime to document work hours would continue to be required.
- Workplace rules prohibiting private activities during work hours must be followed notwithstanding the fact that employees are working from home.
- Overtime must be approved in advance, and all leave policies remain unchanged.
Employees must maintain any approved safeguards to protect agency records from unauthorized disclosure or damage and comply with the privacy requirements set forth by the City of New York.

It is incumbent on all staff working at home to regularly and often check emails to ensure timely response to emails from supervisors, Administrative and Executive staff, and the public.

Furthermore, supervisors have regular check-ins during the day by phone, email and teleconferencing; and senior staff teleconference at least once a day to ensure fluid communication to staff on changing policies and approvals.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

The procurement staff accurately reviews quotes, bids and proposals submitted by vendors to ensure conformity to agency, city, state and federal requirements, and ensures that supplies ordered are delivered as specified before submitting payment requests for approval.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

The agency did not identify any substantial public health and/or safety corruption hazards.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

In last year’s report LPC reported that the one area of potential corruption hazard previously identified had been remedied. Previously the agency did not have the ability to fully comply with the Comptroller’s recommendations for internal controls (i.e., separation of duties), which meant that sometimes during the reporting period one person was doing multiple tasks in connection with purchasing or handling money, as opposed to having different people perform each of these tasks. As mentioned in last year’s Corruption Hazards Report, at the end of November 2018 the agency hired an additional person for the Administration Department that has allowed us to be in compliance with the Comptroller’s recommendations for internal controls.

ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

The agency has identified no new corruption hazards.
Law Department (LAW)

James Johnson, Corporation Counsel
Eleonora Rivkin & Andrew Sein, Inspectors General

The Law Department acts as the attorney for the City, the Mayor, numerous elected officials, and mayoral agencies and select non-mayoral agencies, and has charge and conduct of all the law business of the City and its agencies. In this capacity, the Law Department litigates affirmative and defensive cases for the City in all Courts; drafts and reviews local and state legislation; approves leases, contracts, and financial instruments for the sale of bonds and notes; serves as counsel on sales and leases of City-owned property; and provides legal counsel on pensions, restructuring of City government, and City policies.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

The Law Department’s PPE procurements were sourced through Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS) central storehouse, certified vendors in the City’s MWBE program, and through competitive bid, when necessary. The storage and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment was administered and tracked by the Facilities Unit within the Law Department’s Administration Division. All PPE related items procured and received during this period were entered into its Inventory System (WASP). The Internal Audit Unit within the Law Department’s Administration Division has access to the WASP system and periodically reviews and reconciles procured items in compliance with City Comptroller’s Directive 1 requirements and Law Department’s Inventory Policy and Procedures. Internal Audit reviews entail requesting and reviewing the Electronic and preapproval processes within the Law Department (E-Forms Process) for all applicable procurements. The reviews are intended to provide assurance that procured items were appropriately approved, procured, received and entered into our WASP system as required as well as the reconciliation of all documented removals and the inventory balances at the end of the Fiscal Year.
TRANSACTION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

The Law Department instituted a daily reporting requirement whereby staff reported to their direct supervisor when they started working and when they stopped working, along with a list of work accomplished for the day. With this information in hand, supervisors were then able to accurately approve timesheets within CityTime. Team supervisors were encouraged to set up regular video or conference call meetings to monitor assignments and track results.

The Department continues to take pride in safeguarding confidential agency and client information in light of the pandemic. During the transition to remote work environments, the Law Department procured additional Citrix licenses to facilitate a secure work environment as part of the work from home initiatives. The Department will continue to monitor and ensure that all confidential agency and client information remain confidential and safeguarded. Department management communicated the need to be vigilant regarding confidential information while in the home.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

The Department did not engage any contractors to participate in emergency pandemic response outside of procurement and delivery of PPE related items for the Department’s use. As mentioned earlier, these procurements were sourced through DCAS, certified vendors in the Minority and Women Owed Business Enterprises program, or vendors selected by competitive bid. All procurements followed the agency’s regular procedures with customary oversight.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

LEGAL WORK

Legal work, including representing the City in litigation and transactional matters, continues to be the most substantial corruption hazard faced by the department during this reporting period. This includes but is not limited to matters concerning public health and safety. The Department and its legal and support staff continues to be on alert to those trying to gain influence as they conduct their affairs with the City. This may include but is not limited to bribery to gain favorable cash settlement
in a case against the City, the promise of future employment or incentives to approve a lease or contract with terms not in the best interest of the City.

The Department’s mitigation strategies include but are not limited to the executive and senior management involvement with all settlement and contract approvals in addition to oversight agency approvals in most circumstances. These external factors limit the attorneys’ autonomy in litigating and settling cases and thus limit corruption hazards. In addition the Department prides itself in hiring and training seasoned managers to monitor staff output and professional rules of behavior. The Department continues to maintain an internal capacity to investigate allegations of wrongdoing.

PROCUREMENT AND BILLING HAZARD

Emergencies and Pandemics often demand rushed contracts and procurements of significant value, a process that is ripe for abuse. To mitigate risks such as hidden contracts, overpricing, collusion, and bribery, it is essential that transparency, openness, and integrity are preserved and that all public purchases and contracting processes are reinforced during this challenging period.

In light of these hazards, the Law Department continues to ensure a fair and open competition among bidders; as well as use of DCAS approved vendors in addition to certified MWBE companies for applicable purchases. In addition, the Department’s Internal Audit Unit remains vigilant and swiftly reviews applicable pandemic and emergency related procurements and receipts during this period and will continue to do so. The Department will continue to take these hazards and other concerns seriously in support of the citywide efforts for more transparency and accountability measures.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

ETHICS AND OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES

The Law Department’s Chief Ethics Officer continues to address conflict of interest and other ethical issues that confront government lawyers. She conducts ethics training for all newly admitted and lateral attorneys and offers a number of training courses throughout the year which are open to all attorneys. In addition, recordings of past trainings are available on the Law Department’s online database, CE Manager. Access to these trainings helps ensure compliance with continuing legal education requirements, which include two (2) credit hours of ethics training every bi-annual cycle.

The Law Department will continue to measure its progress in achieving our corruption prevention objectives by maintaining an environment alert to corruption risks throughout the year. A discussion of Mayoral Executive Order 16’s mandatory reporting obligations is regularly included in the Department’s ethics training.
Additionally, The Department’s Internal Audit Unit will remain vigilant and continue with its annual Directive 1 reviews, alerting senior management of all corruption risks and dangers. The Department will continue to follow all Procurement Policy (PPB) Rules, monitor bill paying practices, adherence to the Department’s E-Forms preapproval requirements in addition to procedural audits of the entire process.

The Department did not experience any reportable corruption or fraud related incidents during this reporting period.

**ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)**

Not applicable.
It is the mission of Brooklyn Public Library (BPL) to ensure the preservation and transmission of society’s knowledge, history, and culture, and to provide the people of Brooklyn with free and open access to information for education, recreation, and reference. BPL operates 59 neighborhood libraries throughout the borough of Brooklyn.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

BPL has a robust set of procurement protocols that closely adhere to best practices. Specifically, any BPL department seeking goods or service submits a Purchase Order Requisition to the Procurement Department. Up to three written competitive quotes are solicited from vendors for each purchase. Finally, all vendors are vetted prior to any procurement.

In the case of COVID-19 PPE and other pandemic response equipment, BPL made the decision to centralize these purchases in order to ensure that it received best pricing, trusted vendors were used, and inventory was managed efficiently.

TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

Upon closure due to COVID-19, BPL quickly and effectively transitioned to a remote work place model for much of its staff. To support this new work paradigm, BPL trained managers on best practices for supervising remote workers; increased the number of required meetings; expanded the activities that could be accomplished remotely, including virtual programming for patrons; introduced a new tool called the activity tracker which was designed to track the activities employees were engaged in while working remotely; and adjusted the formal attendance tool, so that hours worked could be entered and reviewed no matter where the employee was working. Finally, BPL deployed virtual private network (VPN) technology to mitigate the risk of network intrusions and to safeguard confidential information.
VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

BPL did not utilize any contractors to participate in the emergency pandemic response. BPL’s COVID-19 response was conducted by BPL staff.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

SHORTAGES OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

Initially, during the early phase of its pandemic response, BPL experienced some difficulty in procuring adequate PPE supplies, as supply chains were almost universally disrupted for these in-demand items. BPL noticed that some suppliers increased prices by a few cents per unit. Fortunately, BPL ultimately did not experience any shortage of cleaning chemicals, as inventory control prior to COVID-19 and facility closures during the pandemic ensured that there was ample supply on hand. Orders and deliveries were conducted through the usual channels, minimizing risks of over-charging and ensuring that products were delivered and accounted for per existing guidelines.

COMPUTER RELATED SCHEMES

BPL staff noticed an increase in potential online fraud schemes. Specifically, BPL noticed fraudulent pandemic information resources, an uptick in fake vendors of in-demand supplies, online price gouging for certain products, and an increase in phishing scams. BPL mitigated these hazards by purchasing products from trusted suppliers, creating a BPL COVID-19 online clearing house of pandemic information for staff, and deploying VPN access for staff working remotely, as well as sending frequent reminders regarding cyber fraud to all staff.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

This question is not applicable.

ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

BPL has nothing additional to report at this time.
The New York Public Library (NYPL) has been the lead provider of free books, information, ideas, and education programs to New Yorkers for 125 years. NYPL is the nation's largest public library system, with 88 neighborhood branches and four scholarly research centers, bringing together an extraordinary richness of resources and opportunities to its communities. NYPL closely collaborates with New York City (NYC) agencies to support NYC’s cultural, social, and educational programs and initiatives.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

NYPL’s Procurement, Facilities, and Environmental Health & Safety teams coordinated efforts to procure PPE and related materials, according to procurement policies. Multiple preferred and/or referred suppliers were engaged to confirm capabilities and to obtain quotations for a specified list and assessed quantity of materials. With the support of a key NYPL supplier, a centralized Store Room program was built on-site to secure and manage the inventory of all PPE materials. An online ordering/approval process through the ServiceNow platform, an inventory management process, and an internal delivery network were put in place to fulfill internal demand.

TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

NYPL rapidly increased its remote work capabilities to ensure secure connectivity and data protection. This was accomplished by: (i) increasing capacity of the Virtual Private Network (VPN) infrastructure to handle the increased load as more staff members requested such services; (ii) the rapid adoption and offering of a secure virtual desktop on AWS Workspaces, including cybersecurity tools and protective technologies; (iii) denying access to NYPL network resources to new users using personal devices; (iv) communicating and advocating for greater security awareness, including opportunistic phishing, in the Working from Home...
resources and on the Intranet site; (v) review of shared documents within Google Suite (G-Suite) with communication to key departments to affirm or rescind access as necessary; (vi) review of multi-factor authentication (MFA) and SAML settings and implementation for critical staff facing technology, such as G-Suite, Workday, ServiceNow, etc.; and (vii) enforcement of device location, data locking and a delete tool, Absolute, on all laptops provided for staff home use.

To support Information Technology (IT’s) tiers of data security, Human Resources (HR) developed training for staff on such risk mitigation topics as how to prevent external access to Google Forms and Documents.

In addition, NYPL put into place a COVID-19 Interim Telecommuting Policy defining and reinforcing guidelines in such areas as Timekeeping, Security & Confidentiality, Technology Utilization and the Work from Home environment. All NYPL employees are required and continued to submit bi-weekly timesheets through a cloud-based timekeeping system.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

NYPL’s Facilities team engaged an environmental consultant with which it had an existing contractual relationship to provide epidemiological expertise in reviewing its shutdown and restart processes and procedures. This consultant worked in partnership with and was overseen by NYPL’s Office of Environmental Health and Safety. A defined scope of work was created, agreed to, and monitored.

NYPL’s Security team worked proactively with the contracted security service provider, Securitas, to review and modify our continued security needs in light of NYPL’s physical closure. NYPL Security verified both the staffing needs and hours on a weekly basis by reviewing timesheets submitted by the service provider for completeness and accuracy. Further, NYPL Security leadership engaged in weekly communications with Securitas’ leadership to ensure all COVID-19 requirements were being met.

As the utilization of contractors came to a near halt at NYPL due to the pandemic, the few, additional required service providers were processed through and reviewed by Procurement to ensure proper scope of services, deliverables, funding, general conditions, and contractual structure. The focus was on working with preferred and contracted vendors in place of onboarding new suppliers. Supplier service execution and performance management were monitored by the responsible NYPL stakeholder and/or Procurement.
PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

REDUCE THE SEVERITY OF JOB-RELATED ILLNESSES AND INJURIES

NYPL’s Office of Environmental Health and Safety developed and released the Illness and Injury Prevention Program (IIPP). This program includes a policy document that aims to reduce the severity of job-related illnesses and injuries. Within this document is NYPL’s Communicable Disease Protocol guideline, which defines what a communicable disease is, recommends specific actions to reduce the spread of these diseases, and provides instructions for employees to follow for various scenarios. Part of this program includes compulsory training for all employees, which is completed through our online training application.

In addition to the IIPP, NYPL also released COVID-19 specific information on the employee intranet portal. This information contains links to additional training modules specifically tailored to COVID-19 safety measures, including the use of facemasks and coverings, proper glove use, health screening procedures, and handwashing and hygiene practices. Information is frequently updated as guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), New York State (NYS), and NYC changes.

A NYPL re-opening team was put in place to review and develop key protocols, processes, and controls for NYPL’s multiple programs, functions, and services to ensure a safe and controlled environment for our staff.

DEPLOYING A ‘WORK FROM HOME’ INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY STRUCTURE

Transitioning to a Work from Home model placed heavy demands on NYPL’s remote work infrastructure. NYPL had to rapidly deploy technologies to ensure secure connectivity to the network and applicable resources. Without adoption of modified policies, processes, and technology, at increased cost and with significant change management, NYPL would have had added difficulty providing many of the services and related security mechanisms it required during the pandemic.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

NYPL was neither asked nor required to conduct a report last year.

ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

NYPL has nothing additional to report at this time.
Queens Borough Public Library (QPL)

Dennis M. Walcott, President & CEO
Clinton Daggan, Inspector General

The Library is a legislatively incorporated private non-profit organization, which operates the free library system in the Borough of Queens. The Library is comprised of 63 public service units; a Central Library in Jamaica, New York; and 62 community libraries located throughout the Borough of Queens. The Library’s mission is to provide quality services, resources, and lifelong learning opportunities through books and a variety of other formats to meet the informational, educational, cultural, and recreational needs and interests of its diverse and changing population.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

Regarding the minimization of corruption hazards in the procurement of PPE and pandemic response equipment, the Library’s procurement staff was equipped with laptops and remote access to the Library’s information systems, including access to the Library’s financial, requisition, and purchase order system. This permitted procurement staff to function in the same manner remotely as they did on-site for the Library. All pandemic-related purchases are maintained in a spreadsheet that is routinely presented to both the Library’s Chief Operating Officer and Chief Executive Officer for approval. Furthermore, all such emergency pandemic-related purchases have been made consistent with the Library’s Purchasing Policy.

TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

Regarding the transition to remote work, the Library built upon existing infrastructure, whereby each staff member would need to have virtual private network (VPN) software installed on any home computer device. The software establishes a secure communication line between that computer and the Library’s network via log in with a user ID and password. The Library also added a secondary level of infrastructure to its network with a device called an F5, which monitors internet traffic and, upon detecting any possible breach, denies access.
The F5 technology was already in use at the time of the pandemic, but the Library implemented a redundant F5 to safeguard the Library’s resources and data in response to the sudden and significant increase in staff working remotely.

**VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?*

Regarding contractors engaged to participate in the pandemic response, the Library has not yet engaged any new contractors specifically to participate in the pandemic response. The Library did use Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) contractors with whom it has existing relationships to perform additional services (e.g., power washing, substitution of higher-grade air filters). Those contractors were previously vetted by the Library’s Procurement Department using its standard methods (e.g., background checks, PASSPort).

**PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

*What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period?*

Not applicable.

**REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT**

Not applicable.

**ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)**

None identified.
Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
Jacques Jiha, Ph.D, Director
Clinton Daggan, Inspector General

OMB is an administrative agency that is responsible for advising the Mayor on policy issues that affect the fiscal stability of New York City (NYC), budgetary planning, and providing analysis and guidance to NYC agencies with respect to operating efficiencies.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

OMB is not engaged in front-line interaction with members of the public. OMB’s offices have been closed since March 13, 2020, including to members of the public and all but minimal numbers of essential staff. Therefore, OMB’s need for PPE has been significantly less than that of many other NYC agencies. OMB has received PPE, including gloves, masks, and hand sanitizer, from City Hall and has supplemented those items with additional cleaning supplies and Information Technology (IT) equipment from approved vendors. Additionally, OMB worked with vendors to construct new cubicles as well as to add Plexiglas to existing workstations. OMB followed procurement guidelines including:

- Purchasing from existing Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS) requirements contracts such as WB Mason;
- Purchasing from New York State (NYS) or NYC “preferred source” vendors, such as NYS Industries for the Disabled;
- Soliciting quotes from at least three Minority and Women-owned Business Enterprises (M/WBE) vendors to compare costs; and
- If not available from any of the above vendors, Personnel Management Administration (PMA) procurement/the Agency Chief Contracting Officer (ACCO) compared prices on Amazon.com and selected the lowest prices that were appropriate.

Rates for the cubicle modifications were established as part of the NYC contract with Open Plan and were approved by DCAS. All PPE is stored in a locked storeroom with restricted access. An inventory is kept and shared with City Hall on a regular basis.
TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

OMB employees are able to access the OMB system through a desktop application that does not require that any information, documents, or messages be downloaded or stored on personal devices. Through this system, all information is kept and stored as though the employees were at their workstations in OMB’s offices. OMB employees were instructed to use this system and not to download information onto personal devices. Because this system works well, employees have no need to download information outside the system. With respect to attendance, supervisors are responsible for monitoring their staff members’ time and workflow. Supervisors must review and approve weekly time submissions by staff members to ensure that they accurately reflect the workflow assigned to those staff members.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

OMB does not have emergency pandemic response contractors.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

EMPLOYEES ENTERING OFFICES WITH COVID-19 SYMPTOMS

OMB maintains a system of requiring employees to certify that they do not have COVID-19 symptoms and have not been exposed to others with the virus prior to entering the office. OMB monitors the system to ensure that such certifications have been submitted.

EMPLOYEES NOT FOLLOWING SAFETY PROTOCOLS WHEN IN OFFICE

OMB is developing strict protocols during the pandemic to ensure that maximum office occupancy is not exceeded, that employees maintain social distancing, and that face-to-face interaction among employees is minimized. Interim office guidelines have been distributed to all employees and signage has been placed throughout the office to ensure adherence to office safety.
REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

OMB has continued to focus on risk mitigation in the area of conflicts of interest. OMB continues to have trainings and provide advice to employees on an individual basis to ensure that they do not violate conflicts of interest rules.

ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

OMB has nothing additional to report at this time.
Mayor’s Office

Bill de Blasio, Mayor
Eleonora Rivkin & Andrew Sein, Inspectors General

The Office of the Mayor has primary responsibility for overseeing and coordinating the work of City agencies.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

The Mayor’s Office PPE and equipment procurement is managed by DCAS. The Mayor’s Office did not undertake separate procurements, and put measures in place such as securing hand sanitizer to walls and distributing PPE only for stated needs.

TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

The Mayor’s Office shifted to teleworking in accordance with Personnel Service Bulletin 600-3. This included identifying staff who could work from home, staggering shifts for those who could not, and ensuring that all determinations about work location were made in an equitable manner.

Mayor’s Office units mitigate against the risk of fraud while working remotely, such as time and attendance abuse, though managerial engagement. Teams conduct one-on-one calls, regular staff meetings, and reporting deadlines. The Mayor’s Office collects weekly timesheets and prepares weekly labor allocation reports, ensuring that time and attendance records are received and reviewed promptly. After the transition to work from home, the Mayor’s Office began to send weekly reminders to all staff to turn in timesheets and report their labor allocations and increased one-on-one communication with all individuals to emphasize the need for timely and correct reporting. The Mayor’s Office continues to be vigilant about time and attendance whether individuals are working in the office or from home. For individuals whose main work is difficult to do from home, the Mayor’s Office has reassigned individuals to alternative or additional duties.

To safeguard information, the Mayor’s Office requires all staff to use multi-factor authentication to access their email and files. The Mayor’s Office does not allow
individuals to take confidential information or PII offsite. Individuals must remote in to their desktops to access their files or any client information, which uses a secured VPN connection. As a general practice, staff are also required to save secure documents in their team’s City-protected share folder and reminded staff to refrain from using any public platforms that might compromise the confidentiality of City information.

**VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?*

The Mayor’s Office entered into contracts for senior advisors engaged to work directly with the Mayor on pandemic response; these followed the usual safeguards, such as vetting of potential contractors and the use of City IT to ensure secure access. The Mayor’s Office did not directly engage contractors for any other pandemic response issues.

**PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

*What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.*

**PRIVACY**

The Mayor’s Office systems hold confidential information and PII. To ensure the relevant protections, the Mayor’s Office vets all individuals before providing them access to the agency’s systems. Access must be undertaken through a secured connection, either from an individual’s desktop or by using a secure VPN to access that desktop. In addition, the Agency Privacy Officer and the Chief Privacy Officer are engaged on all appropriate relationships to ensure data is sufficiently protected and the need for access is documented.

**REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT**

Not applicable.

**ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)**

Not applicable.
Office of Chief Medical Examiner (OCME)
Barbara A. Sampson, M.D., Ph.D, Chief Medical Examiner
Clinton Daggan, Inspector General

As the New York City (NYC) medical examiner, OCME determines the cause and manner of death in cases under its jurisdiction pursuant to City Charter Section 557, providing closure to families, important public health information, and critical information for the criminal justice system. In addition, OCME’s laboratories – the largest public forensic biology, toxicology, and molecular genetics laboratories in the country – contribute necessary scientific analysis for autopsies, as well as analysis of evidence for the criminal justice system, and research into the genetic causes of certain otherwise unexplained deaths.

OCME also manages all functions of the NYC mortuary, including the retrieval, processing, and identification of deceased bodies under OCME jurisdiction; preparation for release of decedents to families; and NYC burial of unclaimed decedents, whether under OCME jurisdiction as “Medical Examiner” (ME) cases or pursuant to OCME’s NYC mortuary function.

Pursuant to the City Charter, OCME also provides services in furtherance of investigations “concerning persons both alive and deceased, including but not limited to the performance of autopsies” (approximately 5,500 autopsies per year), “performing deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing and other forms of genetic testing and analysis; obtaining samples and exemplars; performing pathology, histology and toxicology testing and analysis; and determining the cause or manner of injuries and/or death.”

OCME is responsible for mass fatality management pertaining to and following disaster incidents. Until 2020, the agency’s ongoing advanced analysis to identify the remains from the September 11, 2001, attack was its most prominent work in this area. Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, however, OCME’s critical role in NYC’s response to this emergency has been front and center.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

OCME has taken exceptional care to ensure the proper management, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic-related items throughout the pandemic. Because of the rapid rate of increase in demand for these products in the early months of the pandemic, the agency developed and improved its methodology in
real time, and OCME continues to use and benefit from those enhanced processes. Further, OCME continues to acquire and stock an inventory of PPE to support the increased demand for PPE to comply with enhanced agency-wide COVID-19 safety protocols, as well as in anticipation of a resurgence of the pandemic.

**PPE**

At the start of the pandemic in March 2020, because supply rooms at mortuaries were decentralized for normal operations and the supply chain increased to support additional field operations and Disaster Portable Morgue Units (DPMU), it was difficult to obtain accurate inventory counts as supplies started moving more quickly and programs areas were storing extra items for staff use. OCME’s Materials Logistics unit took decisive steps to ensure that supplies were accurately tracked and to prevent staff from taking items for their own future use either at work or at home, although there has never been any evidence or allegations that PPE was taken for personal use or to resell externally. A news story about the theft of PPE from Bellevue Hospital highlighted the risk of such theft and reinforced the importance of ongoing vigilance in this area, so the agency has kept its strict security measures in place.

OCME’s rate of PPE use was also increased by the extensive use of OCME supplies by personnel from other agencies in the initial months of the pandemic. Some minimal quantities of PPE were provided to New York City Police Department (NYPD) officers when they needed to enter premises while OCME personnel recovered decedents but lacked the necessary PPE to perform this mandatory duty. Similarly, hospitals requested and occasionally received pouches, gloves, and masks from OCME. Most significantly, military and other external personnel detailed to OCME refused to perform required tasks unless OCME provided them with full PPE until their own supplies became available weeks after they commenced work at OCME. This allocation of thousands of items each day increased an already accelerated burn rate. Eventually, these other agencies obtained their own sources of PPE, but early usage by others was significant.

During normal operations, burn rates of equipment like PPE are easily ascertained, as they are based on monthly orders submitted by the programs to the OCME central storeroom. Programs would keep the supply at their sites and then reorder the following month when inventory was low. At the beginning of the pandemic, an approximate burn rate could be determined from resupply orders submitted to Materials Logistics by various OCME units, but the dramatic increase in use in March and April 2020 rendered accurate tracking and inventory management more challenging. For example, the agency went from supplying staff with 5,000 Tyvek suits per year to providing 5,000 per day, as the number of decedents increased and operations were bolstered with extra staff, including 300 New York State (NYS) National Guard and other external personnel.
In order to prevent theft and keep track of supplies, Materials Logistics implemented the following initiatives:

- Inventory assessment for all OCME locations was centralized under Materials Logistics with assistance from other units and from the agency’s external logistics contractor, Luios Thinking.

- Rather than relying on on-site program managers to count inventory, Materials Logistics dispatched staff to each location to conduct inventory counts and to organize the physical storage of PPE so that all like items were together, permitting a reliably accurate determination and monitoring of the burn rate and a timely awareness of any dramatic increase in use, which could be an indicator of theft. The agency never had any indication that PPE was being stolen.

- Luios Thinking logisticians were detailed to Materials Logistics and given responsibility for securing, counting, and documenting the inventory at each site. No one else on-site was permitted to access that supply.

- Resupply was effectuated as needed.

- Storage of the primary inventory of PPE and related supplies was and still is centralized and secured at the Hirsch Building, located at 421 East 26th Street in Manhattan. Because the central storage room that was used prepandemic was not large enough to house the surge in supplies, supplementary inventory has been stored in the auditorium, which has not been used as a large gathering space since the start of the pandemic. That space augments storage capacity for items such as N95 masks, which have been in high demand but short supply citywide. The space is kept locked; only the Security Department and the Director of Materials Logistics have access to it. Further, if inventory assessment indicates that any location has more PPE than needed for one week, excess supply is brought back to the central storage room by Materials Logistics for redistribution as required.

- In addition to the measures above, for items in high demand such as hand sanitizers and Clorox wipes containers, Materials Logistics set out a policy that before a program is provided a refill, the program manager has to provide Materials Logistics with the used, empty container. This preempted any possibility of theft or hoarding.

- The following added security measures were instituted and are maintained at the Materials Logistics receiving bay:
  - The policy of keeping the receiving bay door closed when no one is present in bay is strictly enforced.
The office with a large window overlooking the bay has been assigned to a supervisor and is frequently occupied, providing additional visual surveillance.

A new, improved camera with a 360-degree lens was installed in the bay, so clear footage of activity in the bay can be reviewed as needed.

**TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK**

*What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?*

OCME has addressed and continues to monitor both the potential for time and attendance abuse, and the protection of confidential information.

**Time and Attendance Abuse**

On March 16, 2020, an agency-wide email was sent to all employees notifying them that NYC had approved agency allowance of remote work, providing technical instructions and information, and including the following explicit alert:

> Please remember that your responsibilities to OCME will not change while you are telecommuting. You are responsible to be at your workstation during your assigned hours, with the ability to take phone calls, participate in meetings, work on assignments in your agency account using agency applications, and respond to voicemails and emails. If you are away from your workstation for any significant period of time, you must utilize your leave balances.

Throughout the pandemic, supervisors have retained their usual responsibility to review time and leave requests before approving them and to monitor employee productivity and ensure that employees are working appropriate hours. OCME’s Human Resources (HR) Department is aware of only one instance of an employee’s failure to meet work expectations while working remotely; that ongoing situation was initially addressed in real time and continues to be monitored and properly handled. The employee, who is probationary, has been written up, and all appropriate steps are being taken by the program area in consultation with HR.

**Protection of Confidential Information and of Mobile Devices**

At the height of the pandemic, OCME not only had several hundred of its own employees working remotely, but had also brought on approximately 300 external staff, primarily from other government agencies, including the NYS National Guard, United States military, United States Department of Health and Human Services Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team, as well as through a private contractor.
All OCME employees are responsible for complying with the agency’s confidentiality policy, and they sign an acknowledgment to that effect at onboarding. External personnel were all required to sign individual confidentiality agreements, which have been maintained centrally in the agency’s Legal Department. To the best of its ability, the agency has been monitoring the potential for breaches of confidentiality requirements and of excessive use of agency devices for non-agency purposes; no violations of policy have been uncovered in either area.

OCME’s Information Technology (IT) Department distributed over 400 electronic devices to both OCME and external personnel, including 212 agency mobile phones and 205 laptops. All devices were protected by software from usable theft. They were all tracked at distribution and confirmed returned, by both agency and external personnel, with the exception only of devices that are still deployed.

The phones are equipped with a mobile device management solution managed by NYC Department of Information Technology & Telecommunications (DoITT), which enables remote configuration and management, asset inventory, and remote lock and wipe capabilities, among other features. Additionally, these devices were enrolled in the manufacturer’s Device Enrollment Program (DEP), which allows permanent disabling if the device is lost or stolen. The laptops were configured in accordance with NYC Cyber Command directives, including the deployment of end-point protection agents and encryption solutions. Going forward, the agency’s laptops will leverage the same mobile device management solution currently in use on its mobile phones.

**VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?*

Despite the crush of dozens of emergency procurements for items ranging from PPE to 53-foot refrigerated trailers, the OCME Agency Chief Contracting Officer (ACCO)’s office scrupulously maintained its usual checks and balances for procurements processed during the pandemic, including responsibility determinations to ensure business integrity. Written determinations were issued on all procurements within a short time of the processing of the procurement. Additionally, since forensic operations are ongoing 24/7, managers and supervisors were always onsite in real time to review the performance of items and personnel provided through these emergency procurements.
PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

POTENTIAL THEFT OF PRIVATE PROPERTY

As has been reflected in prior years’ anti-corruption reports, access by OCME personnel to private homes when staff recover decedents creates a potential hazard of theft of private property by agency personnel. It bears noting that, at the height of the pandemic, there were fewer such visits by medicolegal investigators (MLIs), many of whom conducted some investigations remotely or were temporarily redeployed to other urgent investigative functions. However, the dramatic increase in number of deaths in NYC did cause a significant increase in the number of scene visits effectuated by the Medical Examiner Transportation Teams. Despite that increase, there was no concomitant increase in allegations of theft; in fact, the only reported instance of an alleged theft from a home concerned outside contractor staff. OCME personnel’s rigorous insistence on the presence of an NYPD officer at the death scene in the home, including throughout the pandemic, may have contributed to this near-elimination of theft from private homes.

THEFT OR MISUSE OF AGENCY PROPERTY

Even during the initial ramping up of operations and continuing high level of activity during the pandemic, there were no allegations of theft of agency property by OCME personnel. As noted above, all 212 mobile phones and 205 agency laptops issued in the pandemic to agency and external personnel were returned unless the devices continue to be used for agency purposes. In preparation for a permanent relocation of storage, nearly all OCME property has now been removed from the storage facility located at 18th Street and the FDR Drive in Manhattan, which was the location of a one-time significant theft some years ago. The sole remaining item, one Dumpster, is scheduled to be removed by the end of October 2020. The other potential area of theft, the agency’s vehicle fleet, was subject to a single instance of theft, by a member of the public, despite the agency’s acquisition by both purchase and rental of a large number of additional vehicles. That single vehicle, a rental car, had the keys left in it by a non-OCME employee. It was taken and driven without authorization to Fishkill, New York, where it was impounded by local law enforcement and eventually recovered. It was difficult at the height of the pandemic for the agency to maintain its usual strict level of fleet safety precautions, but those have been reinstated, included limiting access to certain vehicles, as well as keeping the vehicle keys in a locked box that requires an OCME ID to gain access. The locked box also shows who took a vehicle and when it was taken.
REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

As noted above, the steps that OCME implemented to avoid the potential corruption hazards discussed in this report and those of prior years appear to have been successful in significantly reducing even allegations of theft or misuse.

ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

All relevant potential hazards were addressed above.
Department of Parks & Recreation (DPR)

Mitchell J. Silver, FAICP, Commissioner  
Andrew Brunsden, Inspector General

Parks maintains, operates, and/or cares for 30,000 acres of land including City parks, beaches, and community gardens; nearly 1,000 playgrounds, 800 athletic fields, and other facilities such as basketball and tennis courts, public pools, and nature centers; and 1,200 monuments, 23 historic house museums, and over two million trees.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

Parks ordered PPE and had it stored in a central location. The agency’s Chief of Supply Chain Management determines and formulates the order under the direction of Parks’ Deputy Commissioner for Administration. The quantity of PPE ordered is based on the headcount of front-line staff. PPE entering and leaving the central supply is tracked in the Asset Management Planning System (AMPS) and monitored closely by the Chief of Supply Chain Management. A two-week allotment of PPE is delivered to each division based on a formula of usage. In turn, a two-week supply of PPE is provided to each employee.

TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

Parks issued a teleworkers standard of conduct that includes time and leave policies as well as remote work expectations. At a minimum, employees are expected to provide weekly reports to supervisors regarding assignments and tasks. Agency laptops were issued to staff permitted to work remotely and all were required to sign an Equipment Receipt Form that outlined the terms of usage, confidentiality procedures, and cybersecurity awareness. Parks’ ITT division created a secure connection for remote workers to access office desktop computers remotely using a multi-factor authentication. The agency also began using Microsoft Teams and OneDrive for secure collaboration and sharing of digital files. In addition, agency cell phones were more widely distributed in an effort to improve productivity and simplify communication with staff.
Annual Anti-Corruption Report
Department of Parks & Recreation

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

Parks did not utilize contractors or partake in emergency pandemic response. The procurement of PPE for staff was the only pandemic related procurement undertaken by the agency. Initially some PPE was purchased on the open market, consistent with standard procurement protocols. More recently, Parks has purchased PPE directly from DCAS.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

PROCUREMENT OF PPE

The procurement of PPE was a potential corruption hazards, but the agency rapidly mitigated concerns. The first several purchases of PPE for Parks staff was made on the open market consistent with procurement guidelines. Beginning in May, all Parks purchases of PPE have been processed through the DCAS storehouse.

REMOTE WORKING

Remote working presented potential corruption hazards, but the agency quickly established a telework policy that mitigated the risks. Before teleworking began, Parks established a telework conduct and standards policy that was shared with managers and staff prior to authorizing telework. Staff are reminded of the obligations of remote work each time they log-in and the following message appears: “This system and all data contained herein belongs to the City of New York and are intended solely for users and uses authorized by the City of New York. Using this system constitutes express consent to monitoring of all use of this system, whether such use is for authorized or unauthorized purposes. If such monitoring reveals possible evidence of criminal activity or other unauthorized use, system administration personnel may provide that evidence to law enforcement or other officials”. The employee must acknowledge the statement by clicking “ok” before proceeding.
REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

Parks continues to monitor the potential risks and hazards in those areas described in the agency’s 2019 Anti-Corruption Report:

CONTRACT AND PROCUREMENT FRAUD

Change Order Control

For the period of October 1, 2019 to September 30, 2020, the Change Order Review Panel met and reviewed 124 change orders that exceeded the minimum threshold of $15,000. Most change orders were approved as submitted or when additional documentation was provided. However, the review process did result in some change orders being denied due to errors, or because certain recommended corrections need to be made before resubmission could occur.

Oversight of Contractors

Over the past four quarters, from October 1, 2019 to September 30, 2020, the Construction Quality Assurance Unit (Quality Assurance Unit or QAU) conducted 194 inspections at Parks construction sites throughout the five boroughs. The increase in site inspections as compared to previous years is related to COVID-19. In late March 2020 and early April 2020, the QAU inspected construction sites to confirm that non-essential projects were shut down and left in a safe condition. In June 2020, when work resumed at non-essential projects, the QAU inspected construction sites to confirm that contractors complied with COVID-19 related protocols. The Quality Assurance Unit is currently in the process of collecting data for the fourth quarter of 2020 (October 1 through December 30, 2020). Parks’ Chief of Construction reviews inspection reports and approves them only after any reported noncompliance issues have been remediated.

MISUSE OF AGENCY PERMITS

Due to COVID-19, Parks suspended the issuance of athletic permits beginning on March 16, 2020, and through the fall season that began in early September 2020. This suspension included the entire spring and summer season when most inspections typically occur. When permitting resumed in September 2020, it was limited to youth permits with adult athletic permits remaining suspended. Parks shifted the focus of permit inspections to ensure compliance with COVID-19 regulations and New York State re-opening guidelines for sports and recreation. Parks Enforcement Officers and ballfield staff in each borough conducted field inspections during the Fall 2020 season, which began on September 15, 2020, and will end on November 30, 2020. To date, over 900 inspections have been completed citywide resulting in various warnings being issued to permit holders for observed infractions including, but not limited to, misuse of the permitted facility, social distancing infractions, and failure to comply with mask wearing
requirements. These inspections have not resulted in the removal, reallocation or revocation of timeslots during this period. After the Fall 2020 season, inspections will cease for the winter months and resume in March of 2021.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The Office of the Deputy Commissioner for Administration continues to conduct a monthly analysis of all E-ZPass usage for the Agency. As mentioned in last year’s report, Parks looks for any usage outside of normal business hours (8pm to 6am) and out-of-City travel. Flagged transactions are shared with the respective divisions for follow-up and confirmation of legitimate business use. If improper E-ZPass use is suspected, it is referred to the Parks Advocate’s Office (PAO) for investigation. Cases of stolen or lost E-Z Pass tags are quickly cancelled and also referred to the PAO for investigation.

During the period of October 1, 2019 to September 30, 2020, the PAO began reviewing alerts that were generated through GeoTab fleet management technology. This technology helps to identify the specific driver of a vehicle at any given time which facilitates usage analysis and investigations. In addition to being able to search individual alerts, the PAO receives periodic alerts whenever a vehicle goes out of the specified range (out of the 5 boroughs or over certain bridges) or is traveling at odd hours. This is an automated alert that is sent to PAO and to the relevant manager.

ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

We don’t believe, at this time, that Parks has any additional corruption hazards.
The New York City Police Department (NYPD) is the largest and one of the oldest municipal police departments in the United States. Today, it is responsible for policing an 8.5-million-person city by performing a wide variety of public safety, law enforcement, traffic management, counterterror, and emergency response roles.

The NYPD is divided into major bureaus for enforcement, investigations, and administration. It has 77 patrol precincts with patrol officers and detectives covering the entire city. The Department also has 12 transit districts to police the subway system and its nearly six million daily riders and nine police service areas (PSAs) to patrol the city’s public housing developments, which are home to more than 400,000 residents. Additionally, uniformed civilians serve as traffic safety agents on the city’s busy streets and highways, and as school safety agents, protecting public schools and the over-a-million students who attend them.

### RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

### PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

The NYPD’s Deputy Commissioner of Management and Budget (DCMB) established a “Protocol for Requests to Quartermaster” in March 2020 to ensure streamlined communication, distribution, and inventory tracking of critical COVID-19 related supplies and equipment. Specifically, the Protocol stated that subdivisions within each bureau were required to initiate all supply requests through their chain of command; each bureau chief was to designate a primary point of contact to facilitate all requests; and that bureau chiefs and/or their designee must transmit their requests through a central Quartermaster request electronic inbox. The NYPD Quartermaster coordinated requests for supplies, delivery, and pickup with each bureau point of contact. All PPE and other pandemic response equipment were delivered, accepted, inventoried, stored, and distributed from the NYPD Quartermaster’s central warehouse in Queens. Items that were distributed required signature of the receiving command upon delivery; such receipts were properly filed. Finally, requests and distribution of equipment and supplies were reported out and further coordinated through the chief of Department Operations’ daily COVID-19 meetings to be mindful of global supply chain constraints.
TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

Regarding timekeeping, policies and recommended procedures were put into place to ensure Members of the Service (MOS) working remotely understood their obligations during the work-at-home period. These included the following:

- Continued utilization of the CityTime system to capture their start/end times and in cases where access to CityTime was limited; communicated tour start/end times to supervisors, and in turn, timekeepers.
- Supervisors were instructed to give assignments that could be completed remotely.
- If a member could complete assignments remotely, they were assigned to work remotely.
- Members were required to document the work performed while working remotely.
- Video conferencing/collaboration software (Microsoft Teams) was pushed to all Department cell phones and electronic devices.
- Members were instructed to utilize only Department computers to view/edit work, ensuring confidentiality.
- The Office of Professional Development published a best practices guide for working/communicating remotely.
- An internal COVID-19 intranet site was launched. It provided members with all policies and up-to-date guidance for working from home and COVID-19 precautions.
- Individual bureaus were required to submit weekly spreadsheets listing their active staff and indicate which members worked from home.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

The Department procured PPE and other pandemic response equipment from numerous vendors through Citywide Requirements Contracts established by the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS), the DCAS Central Storehouse, City-certified Minority/Women-Owned Business Enterprises (M/WBEs), and other vendors previously awarded contracts by the Department.
The NYPD’s Contract Administration and Procurement Division (CAPD) also established several emergency contracts with vendors for the purchase of PPE and related items to mitigate the emergency situation. CAPD obtained price quotes from multiple vendors to ensure prices offered were fair and reasonable under the critical circumstances and that delivery terms could effectively address the emergency situation. Additionally, CAPD conducted vendor responsibility checks to ensure vendors could perform the contract requirements and possessed requisite business integrity to be awarded City contracts. All vendors with emergency contracts were required to provide technical specifications and photographs of each item selected for purchasing, which were reviewed and approved by the NYPD Medical Division. Once approved by the Medical Division, CAPD prepared written emergency declaration requests and obtained required approvals from the Mayor’s Office of Contract Services and City Law Department in line with special COVID-19 guidance issued by those respective entities.

**PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

*What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.*

**OVERSIGHT OF PPE ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION**

The Department instituted protocols to ensure that PPE was properly accounted for and distributed to members of the service.

**Donations**

- DCMB transferred a captain from the Office of Management Analysis and Planning (OMAP) to oversee all donations.
- All donations to precincts were mandated to be reported to DCMB (including a picture and description of the item).
- All donations were inventoried, logged and corresponding information sent to DCMB daily (or as new donations came in).

**Procurement**

- The Agency Chief Contract Officer (ACCO) managed all procurement and delivery of purchased items.
- DCMB met twice a week (virtually) with the ACCO and CO of Quartermaster to discuss procurement contracts and pricing.
- COVID-19 intake and delivery were monitored and logged daily by a sergeant in Quartermaster and a report sent to the DCMB daily.
Distribution

- DCMB created a central request email. Precinct commanders could request PPE directly, circumventing borough commands (allowing for fewer touchpoints for PPE and less likelihood of 'loss').
  - Each bureau/command designated a liaison. Only this person could request PPE for their command.
  - All distributed PPE was sent directly to requesting command (rather than overhead commands for redistribution as with previous supplies).
    - Eight trusted investigators from the intelligence division were transferred to Quartermaster to manage the direct delivery of items.
    - Requesting commands were also allowed to send an officer to pick up and sign for the item (after approval and verification from their command liaison).
- DCMB transferred a sergeant and police officer from DCMB main office to manage requests from the field.
  - All requests were logged and followed up to ensure delivery of exact items.
  - The log forwarded to the CO of DCMB daily.

Oversight

- DCMB investigation captain and sergeant were sent to precincts to conduct random inspections and surveys to ensure proper distribution of items.
- The CO of DCMB (Deputy Chief) regularly and randomly visited the Quartermaster distribution centers to observe the intake and distribution of PPE and meet with executives regarding process improvements.
- DCMB transferred a lieutenant from OMAP to create daily distribution electronic dashboards from the Quartermaster’s inventory system to monitor deliveries and burn rate centrally at its office.
  - The dashboard allowed for the identification of bureaus/units that exceeded expected burn rate.
    - If DCMB encountered burn rates that exceeded projected amounts, it conducted an investigative inquiry (in one instance, upon detecting an overly high rate of glove use by traffic agents, DCMB queried the responsible command, eventually establishing that the PPE in question was employed legitimately).
- All requests, regardless of their size and requestor's rank had to be logged into the designated databases and approved by CO DCMB (who directly monitors the request correspondence along with DCMB).
COMPLIANCE WITH CITY POLICY REGARDING EQUIPMENT AND RECORDS

In addition to the risk mitigation strategies discussed earlier with respect to telework, the Department took steps to ensure compliance with City policy regarding department equipment and security protocols for department records, through Finest messages, unit-specific emails, and guidance documents that reminded members of the service that:

- MOS who telework must follow all directed information security protocols when using City electronic equipment and accessing systems.
- MOS must maintain prescribed safeguards to protect agency records from unauthorized disclosure or damage and comply with all privacy requirements set forth by the City.
- Patrol Guide Procedure No. 203-27 (Department Email Policy) prohibits the use of non-Department email systems (e.g., Gmail, Yahoo, etc.) to conduct Department business.
- Members working remotely should make every effort to access and review Department documents from laptops, Department phones, or through remote access to the Department’s system. Department documents should not be printed unless absolutely necessary, and any printed documents must be properly preserved.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

Not Applicable.

ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

Major corruption hazards were discussed above.
DOP helps build stronger and safer communities by supervising individuals who otherwise would be imprisoned. It does so by providing support mechanisms to assist those individuals in obtaining housing, jobs, training and substance abuse treatment, fostering positive change in their decision-making and behavior, and expanding opportunities for them to move out of the criminal and juvenile justice systems through meaningful education, employment, health services, family engagement and civic participation. DOP supplies information and recommendations to the courts on both adult and juvenile cases to help inform sentencing and disposition decisions. DOP improves public safety by motivating clients using evidence based principles and practice, and assisting all probationers in minimizing contact with the criminal and juvenile justice systems. In total, DOP provides intake services, investigations and supervision for more than 50,000 adult and juvenile cases per year, and supervises approximately 19,000 adults and 1,000 juveniles on any given day.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

Having Probation Officer title series employees designated as frontline essential workers created a critical and emergent need to augment existing supplies and purchase and procure additional PPE equipment to ensure their equitable availability, in compliance with health and safety protocols and standards, and ensuring that staff could continue to meet their professional responsibilities without undue interruption and as best and safely as possible.

In the early days of March 2020, when the threat of COVID-19 loomed large, a coordinated effort by various agency divisions was initiated to assess what was needed to confront the then emerging and rapidly changing situation. In a March 6, 2020 email to all staff, Commissioner Bermudez reported that the City was monitoring all developments and that updates via her office and through the email and the Intranet with new information would be forthcoming as details become available. As the threat of the pandemic deepened and awareness of the need for appropriate supplies was realized, research of Vendex and other related databases was mounted to assess the fitness and experience of prospective
vendors; as well as to determine availability, cost and quality of the PPE equipment that DOP endeavored to procure.

Procuring these goods during the early stages of the pandemic was difficult due to supply shortages. DOP took steps to minimize corruption hazards, particularly in instances where goods had to be procured online, through the open market. DOP first attempted to purchase PPE/pandemic response supplies through DCAS contracts or DCAS vendors when possible. When goods were not available through these means, DOP utilized the process as indicated previously, to ensure that the goods were purchased from credible, reputable websites (through research of reviews/accreditations such as Better Business Bureau) and searched for known local NY/NYC vendors where available. Most of these supplies were and are provided via DCAS. All non-DCAS purchases in this category were of small dollar values, such that no large goods purchased were concentrated with one vendor, all purchases were below small and/or micro purchase limits.

All supplies are stored in secured facilities and distribution takes place on a scheduled basis to various DOP offices and other service locations. At each location the supply security and distribution is under the oversight of a senior manager or designee. This staff is also charged with monitoring inventory levels and requesting additional stock as necessary.

**TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK**

_What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?_

As previously stated, the agency has a safety mission and a significant number of the staff are designated as essential workers. As such, the agency employed practices that necessitated ongoing field services; and support services. This effort included alternative supervision and contact protocols to support individuals on probation. Consequently, there was, and continues to be consistent oversight of staff working in the field and remotely.

Throughout the pandemic, DOP has largely operated on a hybrid model that, for most staff, includes both office-based and remote work. This hybrid model helps facilitate the supervision of staff and minimizes the need for confidential information to be accessed off-site, etc. because those functions can be performed in-office or secured remote access. Furthermore, DOP requires that all staff working remotely be reachable either by email or phone during scheduled working hours, and line staff typically check in with their supervisors at the beginning and end of their scheduled shift. Additionally, DOP’s work process and work volume metrics, many of which are embedded in our case management system, provide a useful window into the activity and productivity of all staff. While DOP offices have been largely closed to the public; they have remained open to support internal
Probation operations. They are managed on a rotating schedule by Probation Officer title series staff members who are also available for other field work and enforcement activities including mobile units as agency needs, and maintenance of public safety.

On-going communication with staff utilizing various media, including email and the Intranet, and virtual platforms has been key in attempting to mitigate and normalize the disruptions caused by the pandemic. All agency staff have remote access to email, the Microsoft suite, DOP COVID-19 Sharepoint site and their own dedicated “One Drive.” As before the pandemic struck, employees’ entries to CityTime continued to be reviewed and approved by their supervisors. Through Teams, the supervisors can schedule virtual meetings with their reports. The agency also issued a series of COVID-19 specific policies and procedures that addressed topic including general agency operations, including operation of DOP offices and staff work schedules, and DOP programming; infection prevention strategies; exposure reporting protocol; teleworking policies and procedures; and leave policy. These policies and procedures are supported through DOP’s Chain of Command and structure (operational employees and their Supervisors reporting to their respective Branch Chiefs, to Assistant and Associate Commissioners and Deputy Commissioner.)

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

DOP took the following steps to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response: DOP performed responsibility checks for all emergency contracts, consulting a variety of sources such as debarment, PASSPort, past performance, publicly available media reports, court cases, etc. DOP also monitored performance of these contractors either remotely or in person, depending on mode of service delivery.

The agency has also convened regular check-in meetings of its program management/finance/and contracts units to review information provided by the oversight agencies and discuss and provide recommendations/ solutions/ answers to the pandemic related questions issues raised by the contractors. DOP program management staff continue to check in regularly with the contractors to obtain any programming changes regarding how they engage their clients. Starting in March, 2020, program management has diligently worked to ensure that providers follow the guidance that has compelled all Health and Human Services (HHS) invoices, including those that are managed outside of HHS Financials to submit segregated monthly of their regular non-COVID-19 and COVID-19 related expenses.
PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

BUILDING STAFF MORALE

Although this may not concretely fall within the definition of a public health and safety corruption hazard, coping with the pandemic can have a negative impact on staff productivity and response to how they conduct and address their responsibilities. Staff has dealt with the passing of co-workers and loved ones and the fears emanating from the progress of the pandemic.

In addition to having access to the City’s Employee Assistance Program, DOP’s Behavioral Health Unit issued a variety of resources for staff or clients to utilize. Additionally, Commissioner Bermúdez begins and ends each week with an update message to staff that often includes uplifting morale-building content. These messages further underscore and iterate the agency’s values of equity, embracing diversity, inclusion, acceptance, meaningful justice, peaceful resolution of conflict, and respect.

MAINTAINING OUR COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES

DOP core responsibilities include not only providing supervision services and attending to the needs of people on probation so that they can move out of the justice system but also providing safety and addressing some of the socio-economic issues suffered by other New Yorkers.

As unemployment soared and poverty issues became more chronic, DOP, in concert with the Food Bank of New York City and other partners, continued its efforts to provide food security to many New Yorkers. During the month of September 2020, DOP fed 46,000 people through its NeON Nutrition Kitchens; year to date, DOP fed 247,000 persons, more than double the amount served in all of 2019.

As gun violence increased across neighborhoods during the pandemic, through the DOP Intel Division, DOP worked with NYPD in collaborative operations to take guns off the streets. Additionally, staff in several boroughs have participated in buy-back events and initiated various other anti-violence interventions.

In July, DOP launched NeON Summer and enrolled 2,700 youth for six weeks of online instruction that helped build skills, focused on career goals and expressing creativity. In September, the NeON Summer NYC magazine was released, which included a collection of stories, reflections, poetry, and photos created by participants exploring the ambient COVID-19 and other items.
REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

DOP continues to adhere to all requirements and best practices in administering agency access to the eJusticeNY integrated Justice Portal. Several user audits have been completed and a number are ongoing. In addition to existing safeguards and protocols, DOP has enhanced general security for the system with the introduction of Multi-Factor Authentication. Additionally, DOP oversight of contract management and program monitoring relating to Community-Based Organizations with which the agency works continues with additional audits commencing this year.

ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

Not applicable.
The Office of the Bronx County Public Administrator has eight employees. The office is responsible for the administration of the estates of deceased Bronx residents, when there is no one else who has the legal authority to do so. The office is responsible for finding and marshalling all assets left by the decedent. An investigation is conducted to find the decedent’s assets. Physical and financial assets are collected and secured in the decedent’s financial account.

**RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

**PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?*

The staff was given 20 face masks by the building custodian, DCAS. Hand sanitizer and disinfectant wipes have always been maintained in the office, even before COVID-19. These items were purchased from local vendors using Imprest funds and are still being used. They are maintained in a secure office closet.

**TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK**

All employees have been given a work schedule indicating what days they must be present in the office. Each week, half of the staff works from the office and the other half works from home. Three laptops were purchased to be used remotely from home. The laptops are used by the Commissioner, the Deputy and the employee who handles payroll and HR issues. All time sheets must be submitted weekly by all employees.

**VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?*

The office did not have the need to use outside vendors for emergency pandemic response. A request to DCAS to remove very old office rugs, which were a health hazard to the staff, was immediately answered and the floors were cleaned to help maintain a clean work environment. The building custodian also provided and installed plastic dividers to keep the staff safe from the public.
### PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

*What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.*

The office has not faced any substantial public health or safety corruption hazards.

### REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

Not applicable.

### ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

None identified.
Kings County Public Administrator

Richard Buckheit, Public Administrator
Eleonora Rivkin & Andrew Sein, Inspectors General

The King’s County Public Administrator’s primary duty is to administer estates that would otherwise remain un-administered; to protect the decedent's property from waste, loss, or theft; to make appropriate burial arrangements when no close relative is available to make the decisions; to conduct thorough investigations to discover all assets; to liquidate assets at public sale or distribute assets to heirs; to pay the decedent's bills and taxes; and to locate persons entitled to inherit from the estate and ensure that the legal distrubees receive their inheritance.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

Shortly after Governor Cuomo’s shutdown order, the agency immediately took steps to obtain pandemic-response equipment knowing that such items were in short supply. First, the agency reached out to the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS) to obtain masks and gloves for all staff members to have available when they returned to the office. Second, the agency ordered as much PPE as was available from the regular supply vendors for staff to safely return to the office and for staff to resume investigations into decedent residences. Finally, the agency utilized new vendors to order PPE which was unavailable from the regular vendors.

Specifically, since PPE was not available through previously used vendors, W. B. Mason and Staples, due to their being out of stock during height of the pandemic and shutdown, the agency was forced to use vendors such as Amazon, which had PPE in stock and available. The regular vendors now have the PPE that the agency utilizes in stock, and we are back to ordering exclusively through them.

TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

Access to agency databases was restricted to essential staff only in order to minimize the possible breach of confidential estate and proprietary information. A VPN is utilized by staff to access databases remotely. Access was set up by DoITT and is password protected. Databases were not stored on personal laptops. Staff members working remotely are required to clock in and out via CityTime.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

The agency continued to utilize our vendor bidding to perform estate related work as well as to install plexiglass partitions and disinfect the office.
PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

SAFE RESUMPTION OF INVESTIGATIONS

Investigators could not enter residences until they were disinfected. The agency established procedures for the safe resumption of investigations.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

Not applicable.

ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

With respect to COVID-19, remote working makes it difficult to monitor staff and ensure staff members are available and engaged in work activities. Also, the agency’s ability to obtain PPE for investigators to conduct investigations safely was a challenge initially. Because items were not available from vetted vendors, the agency was forced to use vendors it would not ordinarily utilize, calling into question the cost and integrity of the items.
New York County Public Administrator

Dahlia Damas, Public Administrator
Eleonora Rivkin & Andrew Sein, Inspectors General

The Public Administrator is an agency of the City of New York. Each borough of the City of New York has its own Public Administrator. The Public Administrator of the County of New York administers the estate of New York County residents who die without a will and no one else is eligible or willing to administer the estates. The Public Administrator's primary duties include collecting and distributing the assets of the deceased person, arranging appropriate funerals, and administering estates that would otherwise remain un-administered. The agency is primarily charged with protecting the assets of any estate it is administering.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

The storage of PPE equipment is kept in a secured room and an inventory list is kept by the agency heads. All distribution of PPE is done by the agency heads.

TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

Confidentiality Agreements are signed by all individuals who have remote access. All employees must report at the beginning and end of their shift and throughout the workday. Specific duties and projects have to be completed throughout the work day and agency staff must copy the agency head on all emails to verify the work that they are performing.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

There were no contractors used for any emergency pandemic response by the agency. The agency will always obtain multiple quotes from various contractors to minimize fraud.
### PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

*What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.*

Not applicable.

### REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

Not applicable.

### ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

Not applicable.
The Queens County Public Administrator administers the estates of those who have died as residents of Queens County and who have no one eligible or willing to administer their estates.

**RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

**PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?*

From March 23, 2020 to June 9, 2020, the agency received one 50-unit box of masks, one carton of eight boxes of gloves, and one carton of 48 units of hand sanitizer from DCAS. Since all staff were working from home, those items were delivered to the home of the Public Administrator and secured in her home. The supplies were then distributed by the Public Administrator to employees working from home. Once the courthouse opened, the agency received additional masks, gloves, and sanitizer, which are stored in the supply room of the Public Administrator.

**TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK**

*What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?*

The Public Administrator’s Office was at the epicenter of the COVID-19 epidemic. Every single death in Queens County of a person who did not have a close or known relative was reported to the office of the Public Administrator. From March 23 to June 9, 2020, the office processed in excess of 700 estates. The Office of the Chief Medical Examiner instituted a protocol that the Public Administrator should be notified of every single death where there was no known family member or immediate contact was not made with a family member. The agency received reports of death from hospitals, nursing homes, the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, funeral homes, landlords, attorneys, and out-of-town family members who did not know where to turn. These reports came by phone, mail, and email. Once reports were received, the agency arranged funerals or located where decedents were interred for future disinterment; obtained death certificates; changed the address for mail to our office; obtained EIN numbers; collected assets; and looked for claims (which included queries to the Department of Social
Services). Agency staff worked tirelessly during this period of time under incredibly difficult circumstances. Every employee is fully aware of the confidential nature of agency estates. All work was completed. All staff were given tasks and all work was processed. Some staff worked 9 to 5, and some worked after their children’s Zoom school day was done. The amount of work processed could not have been done if staff were not working. Both the Public Administrator and Deputy Public Administrator monitored all employees on a daily basis either by phone or email.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

The agency had no vendors with regard to the pandemic response, either ordering supplies online from Amazon and Quill or receiving them from DCAS.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period. [List two or more. Each hazard identified should have its own sub-header as below, and include a discussion of the hazard as well as any risk mitigation strategies.]

UNABLE TO COMPLETE MANDATED TASKS

Agents could not enter the decedent’s residence(s) during the Governor’s executive order shutting down the city. The work was delayed until the restrictions were relaxed. During the same period of time, and for the same reason, agents could not enter the decedent’s safe deposit boxes.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

Not applicable.

ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

Not applicable.
The Office of the Richmond County Public Administrator is responsible for the management of estates of persons who die as residents of Richmond County, are without a will, and have no one eligible to manage the decedent’s money or property.

**RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

**PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?*

The agency did not store or distribute PPE equipment not directly used for office purposes. All PPE procured was either donated by local elected officials as part of their community outreach, or purchased from Amazon using the agency’s suspense funds and directly sent to the office. Nothing was available for take home use. Items included face shields, shoe covers, and over-the-sleeve gloves for estate entries, as well as a safety shield for our front desk.

**TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK**

*What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?*

Employees were required to attend mandatory check-in calls daily and provide updates on their work progress. The same rules applied in the sharing of confidential information, and all work was done through government-issued emails.

**VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?*

The agency did not utilize any additional contractors to participate in the emergency pandemic response. Funeral Directors were used in the same capacity as normal and procedures remained constant.
PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

INITIAL ENTRY OF ESTATES

Due to COVID-19, staff could not immediately enter residences of decedents to search through belongings for pertinent information and valuables.

- Entries involving COVID related deaths should not occur until 10 days after a person was removed from the location.
- No more than two staff members are to conduct each estate entry.
- Regardless of the cause of death, the same equipment requirements shall be followed for all estate entries.
- During each entry, RCPA employees must wear a provided face shield, face mask, protective shoe coverings, and over clothing latex gloves.
- All equipment will be purchased by office prior to resuming estate entries.

BURIAL OF DECEDEANTS WHO HAVE DIED FROM COVID-19

Typically, this includes publicly attended burials for decedents.

- All work to be done through the funeral homes directly.
- No public attendance at burials.
- As per DOHMH guidelines, no bodies were to go more than 14 days unclaimed.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

A new report was done this year to reflect the COVID-19 risks.

ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

None identified.
Office of the Public Advocate

Jumaane D. Williams, Public Advocate
Eleonora Rivkin & Andrew Sein, Inspectors General

The Office of the Public Advocate is charged with acting as an ombudsperson for all residents of New York City, serving as a connective link between residents of the City and their government to ensure that services are provided in a timely manner and that their needs and problems are addressed.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

The Office of the Public Advocate stores PPE (disinfecting wipes, sanitizers, masks) in a locked supply closet. The Office of the Public Advocate maintains a complete inventory record of its physical assets inventory. This includes a record of all PPE supply requests.

TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

During the transition to remote work, existing Office systems were in place that allowed work to be conducted remotely while maintaining records on agency email, document, and case management systems at the pre-pandemic level.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

Contractors that were engaged during the emergency pandemic underwent extensive vetting to ensure adequate protections and control existed for agency product material while also safeguarding any potential fraudulent attempts.
PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

The Office of the Public Advocate has not faced public health and safety corruption hazards.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

Not applicable.

ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

Not applicable.
Annual Anti-Corruption Report
Department of Records

Department of Records (DORIS)

Pauline A. Toole, Commissioner
Ann Petterson, Inspector General

DORIS was established in 1977. The agency’s mission is to foster civic life by preserving and providing access to the historical and contemporary records of New York City (NYC) government and to ensure those records are properly maintained in accordance with best practices in the archival and records management fields.

The agency consists of eight organizational units. Three are charter mandated: the Municipal Archives, Municipal Library, and Municipal Records Management Division. The Municipal Archives preserves, catalogs, and makes available, in multiple formats, NYC government historical records dating from 1645 to the present. The Municipal Library provides the public with published documents from NYC agencies and about public policy through an online portal and hard copy materials. Original publication dates range from the 17th century to the present. The Municipal Records Management Division develops and enforces NYC government’s record management policies and operates records storage facilities in three locations. The other divisions are the Executive, Administration, Information Technology (IT), Operations, and External Affairs Units.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

As news of the pandemic spread and Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) guidelines were distributed, DORIS determined that it would need to assess the quantities of PPE and sanitizing material on hand and develop an estimate of what would be needed to comply with the guidelines. The agency took two key actions to ensure health and safety and to avoid corruption hazards around the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE: centralizing the inventory and stockpile of PPE and procuring realistic quantities from reliable vendors and central supply offices.

- DORIS inventoried the stock of N95 and surgical masks and gloves at its three locations and secured them in locked cabinets or storerooms. Additional PPE supplies were inventoried upon receipt and secured in a locked storage room with restricted access at 31 Chambers Street in Manhattan and in locked cabinets in the warehouses. DORIS requires senior staff to provide monthly schedules showing the number of staff who will be on-site and the frequency of their on-site work. One person is
assigned to perform a monthly distribution of PPE supplies. That staff member updates a distribution log that is shared with the Administration Unit, which maintains the master inventory. Supplies for the off-site warehouses are secured and distributed by an assigned staff member at each site who reports distribution.

- At the outset, when it was not clear how on-site operations would be affected, DORIS estimated the quantity of supplies needed to follow the health protocols, including wiping down commonly touched surfaces, distributing hand sanitizer, and sanitizing work stations. The agency’s administrative and operations staff scoured known resources and placed orders with reliable vendors in early March 2020. The purchases were received and were available to prepare workspaces and provide PPE to staff when the agency resumed partial operations in July. Thereafter, the agency began utilizing the process for obtaining these supplies from the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS) Central Storehouse, through the Deputy Mayor’s Office.

**TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK**

*What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?*

In transitioning to remote work, DORIS focused on ensuring that staff had the same, accurate information; that processes were in place to track time, attendance, and work production; and that data and systems would be secure.

**Misinformation**

There was a good deal of uncertainty and ever-changing information at the outset of the pandemic. DORIS mitigated this by providing consistent information to staff. The Administration Unit disseminated internal and external communications to all staff so they had accurate information about time and leave and telework policies. In addition, senior leadership sent all-staff emails about the agency’s plans and resources. Finally, the division heads met remotely with staff, using Microsoft Teams or Webex, on a daily basis at the outset of the telework period and continue to meet on a regular basis as circumstances evolve.

**Compliance with Time and Attendance and Work Requirements**

The agency developed a web-based time clock that was used by employees without remote access to CityTime. The web-based time clock was also used by interns and contractors. The web-based time clock was the primary timekeeping tool until the deployment of CityTime web-based access on April 16, 2020. Employee time records were input into CityTime by the timekeeper every week. During utilization of the web-based time clock, the timekeeper reviewed the time records with division heads and employees to correct any discrepancies in time.
records. Employees are required to submit weekly work reports to unit heads. Initially, division heads held daily calls with the staff to ensure they were completing assignments as expected.

In addition, it was important for the agency to identify work assignments that could be completed remotely. Supervisors and division heads reviewed operations in order to identify work assignments that could be completed by teleworking staff. The work ranged from transcribing the contents of archival documents, researching and writing short essays for the #20000by2020 catalog of inspiring women, and responding to patron requests by emailing digitized vital records. In addition, the “support” divisions such as Administration and IT were remotely providing guidance and tech support to the remote workforce. Division directors provided weekly summaries of the work that had been completed by staff. The reports were reviewed by senior leadership and the administration director to ensure compliance with agency work expectations.

Secure Access to Data and Agency Systems

There were many steps taken to manage and mitigate risks and ensure that the agency’s assets were safeguarded during the teleworking period.

In February 2020, the agency transitioned to Microsoft 365 so users’ files were available in the Department of Information Technology & Telecommunications (DoITT)-secured cloud. Staff who required access to NYC systems also used secured remote access to reach their desktops. The IT division deployed Microsoft Teams and other tools to provide remote support to users and also provided laptops to staff who required them. Microsoft Teams and OneDrive were used to collaborate on agency work assignments.

As directed under NYC Directive 01-20: Remote Access Cyber Security Controls, all DORIS users have been enrolled into Multi Factor Authentication (MFA). Agency users with remote access authorization were required to use MFA to access the agency’s shared drives and city platforms. Working with DoITT and NYC’s Cyber Command, the agency implemented critical security updates to all agency-provided laptops deployed to teleworking staff.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

DORIS had limited vendor engagement during this period. At the outset, DORIS worked with known vendors to acquire PPE and other materials that were reliable products and not off-brands. DORIS also contracted with a vendor to provide sanitizing and cleaning at its warehouse locations. In doing so, DORIS followed the Procurement Policy Board (PPB) rules. Finally, DORIS was in the midst of a negotiated acquisition to locate a mover for the historical collections stored in Brooklyn. The agency followed the PPB rules in this process.
PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

LOSS OF AGENCY DATA/RECRODS

During the period of reduced on-site staffing due to COVID-19, agency records were particularly vulnerable to environmental threats, accidents, and theft. In all three locations managed by DORIS, at least one staff person was on-site each week and would perform a walkthrough. At the DORIS warehouse in Queens, a major leak was quickly discovered this way. Staff were called back in to remove wet boxes and a vendor performed freeze-drying and mold remediation. All agency locations also had full-time security.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

In its 2019 report to DOI, DORIS identified four areas for risk mitigation: compliance with NYC conflicts of interest rules; data security; the loss of NYC assets, including time and records; and environmental hazards. DORIS undertook actions in all areas as described below:

COMPLIANCE WITH CONFLICTS OF INTEREST RULES AND AGENCY POLICY:

Corrective Action: During the reporting period, DORIS conducted Conflicts of Interest Board (COIB) and DOI trainings for all staff. DORIS also worked with COIB to provide special, targeted COIB re-training for the two employees determined in the prior reporting period to have violated NYC’s Conflicts of Interest Law. Both employees attended private virtual re-training sessions during the reporting period.

The agency also started circulating all COIB e-newsletters and settlement announcements to all agency staff by email to keep ethics issues on employees’ minds. These emails have supported increased employee awareness of COIB policies and helped employees to better identify instances when there may be a conflict of interest that must be reported.

DORIS also circulated reminders to employees regarding agency and COIB policies on “moonlighting” and outside employment. DORIS provided these targeted reminders to prevent employees currently working from home due to COVID-19 from engaging in other outside employment during hours they are scheduled to work for DORIS and NYC. As a result, one DORIS employee did self-report outside employment and the agency worked with the employee to secure a waiver.
DATA SECURITY:

The agency’s business depends on a large amount of critical data which includes digital images, archives, and city records. Loss of this data would jeopardize the agency’s mission.

Corrective Action: The agency launched an effort to safeguard and back up data stored on portable drives in 2016. Over the last three years, DORIS consolidated its storage environment, created local backups, and performed regular replication at DoITT. From 2019 to 2020, DORIS replicated real-time differential data to Site-B in New Jersey and copied a substantial amount of archival data to the AWS cloud storage. These redundancies will allow the agency to recover the data, should there be a loss. The agency is in the process of retiring various end-of-life storage servers and replacing them with new storage servers and moving data to the cloud.

LOSS OF CITY ASSETS:

Corrective Action: DORIS continues to guide agencies in accurately inventorying both hard copy and digital records and planning for disposal, storage, or the transfer of appropriate records to the Municipal Archives.

The agency monitors time and leave on a daily basis. The hand scanners previously deployed at two locations at 31 Chambers Street were discontinued due to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, DORIS developed a web-based time clock that was used by employees without remote access to CityTime to accurately track time and leave.

ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS:

DORIS determined that the environmental conditions at 31 Chambers Street pose a risk of the degradation of historical records due to fluctuations in temperature and humidity.

Corrective Action: The agency received a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) to assess environmental and storage conditions at 31 Chambers Street, the location of NYC’s most valuable historical records. The evaluation will be completed in October 2020 and will provide data and recommendations to improve long-term preservation. The report will position DORIS to apply for a follow-up implementation grant, also from the NEH.

ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

LOSS OF HISTORICAL RECORDS:

The transition to new technologies, such as Microsoft 365, OneDrive, Teams and cloud-based storage, has many benefits. However, one risk is that records that should be transferred to the Municipal Archives in the current format may be lost.
in this transition. A corrective action would be for all entities to ensure that records have a designated retention period and that digital records are given a retention period and backed up.
Department of Sanitation (DSNY)

Edward Grayson, Commissioner
Andrew Brunsden, Acting Inspector General

DSNY keeps New York City healthy, safe and clean by collecting and disposing of refuse and recyclable waste, cleaning streets, cleaning vacant lots, and clearing snow and ice. DSNY operates 59 district garages and manages a fleet of collection trucks, mechanical brooms, and salt spreading equipment. DSNY cleans litter and clears snow + ice from approximately 6,000 miles of City streets and removes debris from vacant lots and abandoned vehicles from City streets.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

In order to minimize the risk of corruption hazard during the process of procurement, storage, distribution of PPE and other pandemic related supplies and equipment, the agency took, the following steps:

- To minimize corruption in procuring and securing PPE all bureaus/units were instructed to request PPE supplies centrally from the Bureau of Cleaning and Collection Operations Office (BOO) and were instructed against making direct orders to vendors.
- BOO reviewed, tracked, monitored, and approved or denied all requests as necessary. Once orders were authorized, deliveries of limited quantities (1-2 weeks supply) were sent to the individual bureaus based on the employee headcount assigned to the respective unit/bureau.
- Each bureau/unit was then responsible for storing, safeguarding and distributing their supply daily.
- During the critical period when supplies were difficult to obtain, all agencies were then required to submit their requests through the Mayor’s office and supplies were distributed by NYC’s central warehouse at the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS).
TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

As the agency’s employees transitioned to remote work, several measures were instituted to mitigate the risk of fraud or abuse and to safeguard confidential agency and client information. Such measures include:

- The adoption and implementation of NYC’s Public Service Bulletin (PSB) 600-3 guidelines which required all city agencies to institute policies and procedures for teleworking. (See attached copy of PSB 600-3).
- The agency issued city-owned laptops, phones, and mobile devices with restricted access to agency networks.
- DSNY worked closely with the Department of Information Technology and Telecommunications (DoITT)/Cyber to utilize existing citywide secure Remote Access methods.
- Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for remote users was implemented to ensure that only the actual user was logging in.
- DSNY utilized DoITT Juniper Pulse Secure SSL VPN, and Remote Desktop Functionality to get users working remotely quickly. By utilizing Remote desktop, all data resides within the City’s network and only screen updates were transmitted between remote users and City desktop.
- Since use of Remote Desktop and/or VDI, none of the medical documents or information was transmitted and stored on remote laptop/desktop. Only the screen was transmitted via encrypted link.
- DSNY instituted daily teams/conference calls to ensure attendance and assignments were completed in a timely fashion.
- In some units, management staff were also directed to make spot calls to ensure people were at their workstations.
- Remote working staff from some units were directed to complete daily logs to account for work performed during the day.
- Teleworking staff were expected to perform their normal duties remotely with the same security measures and precautions as in the office.
- Teleworking staff were expected to work their normal business hours and adhere to their work schedules, utilizing CityTime as a daily record of their time.
Attendance at regularly scheduled daily/weekly videoconferencing and teleconferencing was required.

Schedules were periodically adjusted to accommodate teleconferences or virtual meetings that occurred outside of normal business hours.

Some units were able to access secure web-based platforms to review or submit their work and performed their routine functions.

For units that regularly deal with confidential agency or client information, the access to these documents were limited to in-office access only; employees who needed access to agency or client information were required to physically report to the office, retrieve them and return them to their original place.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

In order to minimize the risk of fraud by contractors/vendors involved in the pandemic response, the agency followed all pertinent agency and city rules, regulations and guidelines required during the procurement and contracting process. Specifically, DSNY performed the following functions:

- The agency changed all the service procurements from time and material to fixed fee.
- DSNY obtained samples of products before making substantial purchases.
- DSNY also conducted videoconference meetings to ensure that all work was on target and all participants were aware of the ongoing work.
- In addition, the agency ensured that warehouses were staffed appropriately in order to receive and account for all the shipped and received goods in a timely manner.
- DSNY ensured that the NYC Comptroller’s Directive 1 & Directive 24, which include internal control and payment audit review, were adhered to for each emergency contract resulting from the pandemic.
- Extensive background checks were conducted for each of the companies and their principals.
- While the DOI Vendor Name Check (VNC) was not officially required, DSNY requested the VNC report as an additional layer of due diligence to ensure that each selected contractor had the business integrity to justify the award of public tax dollars.
DSNY contacted vendor’s references to discuss vendors’ past performances.

The agency checked the following vendor information sources: Dun & Brad, Clear, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), New York State Department of Finance (DOF), New York State Department of Labor (DOL), Doing Business, SAM: System for Award Management, and PASSPort: Procurement Solution Portal.

DSNY has required all contractors involved in the procurement and contracting process to certify their understanding of New York City’s procurement rules and prohibitions.

Disclosures were sent to the Conflict of Interest Board (COIB) for review as necessary.

Each vendor was instructed regarding the zero-tolerance gift policy towards City employees.

DSNY has strictly followed the guidance provided by the Mayor’s Office of Contract Services (MOCS) in connection to pandemic emergency contracting.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

WORKPLACE SAFETY DURING COVID-19

Since the COVID-19 pandemic started to affect New York City back in March 2020, there has been a lot of concerns about safety and controlling the spread of the virus in the workplace. Like many agencies that were closed throughout the City, DSNY has provided several of its employees the option of teleworking or working from home.

However, there are many employees who are unable to telework either because of their job functions or, are required to report to their office or work locations. As a result, this has created some health and logistical concerns in terms of ensuring that there is social and physical distance, as well as maintaining a safe and healthy environment.

Furthermore, it has impacted the number of staff that the agency can have physically present in a facility or office at any given time, and its ability to return to its normal work capacity.

In order to address the concerns stated above, the Agency has adopted several measures, including the following:
- Limited the number of employees in the office by staggering shifts and scheduled teleworking each day.
- Installed protective, plexiglass barriers at many employee desks/workspaces.
- Required both employees and visitors entering DSNY facilities to answer COVID-19 questions before being allowed access into the facility.
- Have bottles of hand sanitizer and facemasks readily available, if necessary, in the office for those returning to work.
- Require that all employees wear masks in the office when 6 feet of physical distancing cannot be maintained.
- Installed the “maintain safe distance” markers throughout the building and on elevators.
- Restricted building doorways to one-way entrances and one-way exits.
- Bathroom facilities usage have been restricted to odd number or even number sequencing of urinals and stalls by “Do Not Use “signage, in order to encourage social physical distancing. Also, some faucets have been retrofitted with automated hands-free faucets.

**DRIVING AND WORKER SAFETY**

The DSNY Safety Division continues to investigate collisions and enroll employees into the Driver Education and Evaluation class. Drivers who were involved in collisions with pedestrians or cyclists that resulted in significant injury and/or property damage, or had multiple chargeable collisions are referred to the class. In this class, employees are exposed to lessons regarding DSNY safety rules and regulations, safe and defensive driving practices, videos from actual collision investigations and a Vision Zero module. Operators are also subject to a minimum of one day of driving evaluation. Depending on the circumstances, some operators may be referred to the DSNY Health Care Facility for a medical examination to ensure they are fit to drive department vehicles. DSNY has seen a year over year reduction in collisions for the past five fiscal years.

**VEHICLE SPEEDING DURING HEIGHT OF PANDEMIC**

During the height of the pandemic, while most businesses were shut down and roadway traffic was significantly reduced, there were instances of excessive speeding observed occasionally on roads. Due to the use of vehicle information obtained through installed Geotab devices, DSNY was able to detect an increase in speed from some of our vehicles. Operators of vehicles reported to be speeding were identified and counseled about obeying speed limits. Repeat offenders were enrolled in the DSNY Driver Education class. DSNY saw a decrease in the number of speed alerts after these measures were implemented. DSNY continues to
monitor Geotab, counsel and educate operators on safe driving and obeying speed limits.

**ENFORCEMENT VIOLATIONS**

The Enforcement Division is tasked with monitoring the daily duties of sanitation police officers (SPO) and sanitation enforcement agents (SEA). These duties include but are not limited to the issuance of Notices of Violations (NOV’s) for infractions of the Health and Administrative Code as well as other Rules and Regulations set forth by the City of New York. The Office of Administrative Trials and Hearing (OATH) is charged with adjudicating and collecting the fines associated with all NOV’s issued. OATH is also responsible for tracking and reporting data regarding these summonses, including those that were dismissed for errors in issuance or service. A loss of revenue incurs upon the dismissal of NOV’s. The Enforcement Division has implemented additional training and guidance in NOV issuance in order to mitigate these errors.

All newly assigned SPO’s and SEA’s attend a DOI anti-corruption training, as well as internal anti-corruption trainings during their employment with DSNY. There is an obvious risk of respondents who receive fines as a result of infractions of the Health and Administrative Codes and Rules imposed by the City of New York to offer bribes or gratuities to our SPO’s and SEA’s. This is more so the case in recent times as the agency lives through the COVID-19 Pandemic and the financial strain it has put on New York City. The Enforcement Division instructs its ranking officers to closely monitor their respective staff to avoid any instance of corruption. The Enforcement Division continues to rotate its members of all ranks to different work locations and assignments periodically per our Anti-Corruption Policy in order to prevent the likelihood of establishing entrenched corrupt relations with residents and commercial business owners in New York City.

Many of the Enforcement Division’s SPO’s and SEA’s were reassigned in March in response to the COVID-19 Pandemic. The SEA’s and SPO’s were called upon to staff the various Food Distribution Sites across the city as well as participate in COVID-19 relief outreach and education inspections. More recently our SPO’s have been conducting COVID-19 Cluster Business and Indoor Dining inspections and issuing summons’ accordingly. Given the sensitivity of these inspections and the hefty fines associated with certain infractions all supervisors of the Enforcement Division remain on constant alert to ensure no wrongdoing occurs.

**COLLECTION VIOLATIONS**

DSNY uniformed personnel in the Bureau of Cleaning and Collection (BCC) provide essential refuse collection and cleaning services throughout the City. The long-standing risks of bribery and shakedowns for unauthorized collection of commercial waste and the removal of bulk refuse that should be collected without charge, continue to present potential corruption opportunities.
In addition to DSNY General Order 2012-25 and Operations Order 2012-25 regarding trade waste and District Risk Assessment maps denoting potential areas of concern, regular Department messages are issued to all field locations and are read at all roll calls on the first Tuesday of each month. While a continuing source of concern for the DSNY managers and supervisors of this Department are constantly aware of this issue, the Field Inspection Audit Team (FIAT) ensures compliance with the related orders by requiring that geographical areas of concern are updated annually, and that those areas are given appropriate attention. F.I.A.T. maintains regular rotating audits and periodic visits/inspections.

All managerial and supervisory personnel in the Department are reminded to be cognizant of illegal collection activities and to immediately report such behavior to the proper authority. Supervisors and managers are questioned periodically regarding their anti-corruption efforts in such venues as promotional interviews and staff meetings.

**REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT**

DSNY rolled out, ServiceNow, an electronic IT Asset Management system and has expanded its functionality to the mobile telecommunication assets. DSNY also instituted a formal staff disengagement policy that reclaims electronic physical and software assets in much faster fashion and permits quicker access shutdown.

**ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)**

**ALLEGATIONS OF TRADE WASTE AND / OR CORRUPTION**

In response to the many cases of various types of corruption that the FIAT Office investigates (trade waste, gratuities, not properly representing the Department etc.), FIAT has instituted an Allegation of Trade Waste and/or Corruption interview process. Even in cases where FIAT cannot substantiate an allegation, we consider the possibility that the allegation may still have merit. Therefore, as a precautionary measure all parties involved in such allegations are now counseled by a superior officer and borough staff. They review orders on trade waste, gratuities, anti-corruption procedures and the importance of properly representing the Department always. A counseling session sheet is completed and sent to the FIAT office for review.

**CORRUPTION PREVENTION AUDIT**

In January 2003, DSNY initiated a Special Overt Audit Program to be conducted by FIAT as a pre-emptive measure towards mitigating potential district payroll timekeeping corruption activities. The audit is conducted by two FIAT officers, as opposed to one, and involves cross-referencing more payroll-related documents than referenced during an ordinary audit.
The CPA is categorized as "Special" because it is not a regular audit and does not occur as frequently. It is also is categorized as "Overt" because it is an intentionally open audit. District personnel are made aware in advance of the in-depth review process involved with this audit. The overt nature of this audit is deliberate in order to utilize the existing "word of mouth" network in the field to expeditiously communicate, beyond District and Borough boundaries, the existence, intent and scope of this audit, prior to its actual start date. CPA audits may commence after all locations have been routinely audited.

**DISTRICT AUDITS**

During standard audits FIAT officers review policy and procedure compliance regarding military and jury duty leave, physical inventories of such items as portable radios, EZ-pass tags, lubricants and petroleum products. The equitable allocation of overtime is also monitored during such audits.

Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic and still ongoing, there is nothing standard about the way audits are currently being conducted by FIAT. Due to the ever-changing way the Department has been forced to conduct business and the Operation adjustments that are being made daily, the focus of FIAT has been to aggressively audit work locations day on day. This is to ensure that payroll practices are being conducted properly and that the emergency coding being used to track work directly related to the pandemic and or any related overtime generated, is being entered and paid correctly.

**CITYTIME**

CityTime is a secure, web-based time and attendance system for the 80 Mayoral and other Agencies of the City of New York. It is a multifunctional system which records employees' arrival and departure times and consistently applies citywide compensation rules in, processing pay and leave transactions. It interfaces with the Payroll Management System (PMS) and can be adapted to agency specific business practices.

DSNY has installed and started using various methods such as a web clock, biometric device (hand scanners), and managed time sheets at several of its locations. However, due to COVID-19 concerns, the use of biometric hand scanners have been suspended at DSNY locations.

CityTime uses various methods to capture the arrival and departure times of employees and compares them with predetermined worked schedules. It also allows employees to use their desktop computers to submit timesheets, leave and other requests which can be reviewed/approved by a supervisor. Supervisors and timekeepers have varying levels of responsibility and authority to approve or make changes to employees or subordinates records.
There is a continuing effort by FIAT and the CityTime personnel to modify a computerized audit feature for the system. This should provide an additional layer of oversight and security for the timekeeping and payroll function. FIAT met with the Office of Payroll members in September of 2016 to review submitted requests and provide background for longstanding and new requested revisions. FIAT maintains open contact with the CityTime team but to date the auditing feature has not been realized.

**LOST/STOLEN BADGES**

FIAT has updated its procedures regarding the handling of lost/stolen and reissued badges. A revised badge receipt, DS 385, has been instituted, which now requires the confirmation of a police report for lost/stolen badges. It also requires authorized signatures and other pertinent information which is exchanged between FIAT, Human Resources, and Fiscal Services. The DS 385 adds further control of badges related to promotions and retirements. These revised procedures increase the Department's ability to combat identity theft and thwart corruption by reducing the possibility of impersonating Sanitation personnel.
NYC School Construction Authority (SCA)

Lorraine Grillo, President & CEO
Felice Sontupe, Inspector General

SCA is responsible for planning, designing, and constructing new schools and the repair and modernization of existing facilities in a cost-effective manner while achieving the highest standards of excellence in safety, quality and integrity.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

Immediately prior to the declaration of emergency in New York State/City, the SCA worked with its existing vendor pool/contracts to procure quantities of disinfectant, hand sanitizer and sanitizing wipes. Throughout the emergency/pandemic, the SCA has continued to utilize SCA, NYC DCAS and NYS OGS contracts to procure PPE including masks, gloves, sanitizing liquid, spray and wipes as well as air filtration devices and replacement filters for the office HVAC systems. The SCA also procured significant quantities of PPE directly from NYC DCAS (with coordination handled by the Mayor's Office and SCA Chief of Staff), at no direct cost to the SCA. Secure storage, inventory control and distribution of PPE are managed directly by select staff members in the SCA Administrative Services Division.

TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

SCA, with more than 600 active projects, has long had an IT infrastructure that supports secure, remote work. Pre-pandemic, about 30% of SCA staff regularly worked remotely and SCA IT had already deployed 626 laptops and 672 smart phones.

At the onset of the New York City COVID19-related city-wide shutdown, the SCA took immediate action to transition the remainder of our employees to remote working (telework).

The SCA issued an additional 342 laptops, along with mobile devices, headsets, docking stations and large screens, where warranted, to enable employees to telework efficiently. We launched a series of live, web-based Citrix/remote desktop
and Microsoft Teams trainings to provide technological support to the workforce. We monitored the use of Citrix and ensured that all our network protections remained in place for all of our external facing systems.

We also created the Telework and COVEX timekeeping codes enabling employees to properly log hours worked remotely or paid time off due to a COVID-related leave of absence. Department heads and managers scheduled daily check-in meetings with their teams and managed productivity through work product accomplishments. Various methods were used to monitor productivity including requiring employees to submit daily task lists at the end of each day to ensure that all assigned tasks were being completed and monitoring transaction volume for those employees whose work functions are transaction based.

Senior management meets daily mid-day to review COVID-related guidance and status updates, projects in the pipeline, and discuss preparation and plans to implement safety protocols at all field locations as well as at the 30-30 Thomson Avenue main office location.

The SCA implemented telework for our employees with the following guidelines:

- maintaining regularly scheduled work hours;
- remaining accessible during the telework work schedule;
- checking in with supervisor(s)/manager(s) to discuss status and open issues;
- being available for any teleconferences, which may be scheduled on an as-needed basis;
- being available to come into the office if a business need arises;
- requesting supervisor approval to use vacation, sick, or other leave in the same manner as when working at a regular work location;
- alerting supervisor(s)/manager(s) when inaccessible during regular working hours;
- agreeing to complete tasks assigned by the manager in the agreed-upon timeframe or informing the manager of delays to delivery of completed tasks in a timely manner; responding to communications from SCA supervisors in a timely manner during work hours.

Our actions enabled the agency to successfully increase our teleworking workforce from 30% to 98% within the first five days of the quarantine mandate while mitigating the risk of fraud.
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VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

To minimize fraud by our contractors engaged in emergency pandemic response, we have created the requirement that all work associated with the pandemic must have time-and-materials (T&M) backup information.

In most cases, our emergency pandemic responses were executed under the SCA emergency/on-call program and based on the contractual requirements that payment must be supported by T&M documentation. The SCA has developed protocols to scan and store all the T&M backup information for future reference.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH NYS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES DURING THE COVID-19 PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY

At the time all construction was stopped by Executive Order 202.6 and Guidance on Executive Order 202.6, the SCA had over 600 projects at various stages of construction and many more in the design phase. Subsequent guidance on Executive Order 202.6 deemed school construction essential and authorized school construction to resume. The following documents were issued by NYS and NYC regarding construction during the COVID-19 emergency:

- NYS Dept. of Health - Interim Guidance for Construction Activities During the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency
- NYS DOH – NY Forward Safety Plan Template
- NYS - Reopening New York Construction Guidelines for Employers and Employees
- NYC DOHMH – Reopening NYC- Frequently Asked Questions: What the Construction Industry Needs to Know

The hazard to public health and safety is how to restart the construction projects and be in compliance with the Executive Order, Interim Guidance and FAQs.

What have we done

The Authority has created “New York State (NYS) Department of Health Interim Guidance for Construction Activities during the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency (To be implemented on SCA construction projects sites only when
When a Contractor is notified by the SCA to restart their project, they are required to submit a NYS Department of Health NY Forward Safety Plan Template to SCA Construction Management. The Safety Plan is reviewed by SCA Construction Management and the SCA Safety Unit; work will not commence until the SCA approves the Safety Plan.

ENSURING OUR CONTRACTORS ARE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF BUILDINGS REQUIREMENTS DURING THE COVID – 19 SHUTDOWN PERIOD AND WHILE THE PROJECT IS STILL ON PAUSE BY SCA

At the time all construction was stopped by Executive Order 202.6 and Guidance on Executive Order 202.6, the SCA had over 600 projects at various stages of construction. We have directed our contractors to follow guidelines issued by the Department of Buildings under Buildings Bulletin 2020-006 issued on April 22, 2020 on maintaining our active worksites.

The hazard to public health and safety is how to ensure our contractors are in compliance with the DOB bulletin before we issue any payment on general conditions.

What we have done

The Authority has established a protocol to perform weekly site visits by our project team to review and document site conditions to ensure compliance with the Department of Buildings bulletin. In addition, to ensure photos and site visits can be distributed easily internally and stored centrally we have created a new software application for our mobile devices that can take photos and document site conditions.

Payment of any general conditions under our contract is based on the weekly site visits by our project team as well as the contractor’s daily report for site activities. This protocol ensures that we will pay only for work that is actually performed by our contractors.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

The SCA continues to be mindful about the various corruption hazards at the SCA and in the construction industry, including bribery, prevailing wage fraud, and false submissions. The SCA continues to improve its processes to prevent these hazards, including prevailing wage enforcement, corruption prevention lectures, and numerous checks and balances in its procurement and payment systems.

All SCA construction (more than 660 active projects) was paused in March 2020. Construction resumed in phases based on OMB authorizing the projected cash
flow from various categories of projects. As of November 2020, nearly all of the paused SCA projects have been restarted. During the pause period, which lasted more than 7 months for most SCA projects:

- The SCA’s Office of the Inspector General continues to work with the various departments and divisions of the SCA to prevent fraud, corruption and waste in the SCA’s programs, including its joint efforts in the SCA’s prequalification process and monitoring all bids and awards.
- Inspections were conducted at all SCA worksites to ensure compliance with DOB and SCA safety protocols, as well as NYS guidance on COVID-19 related site safety.
- Labor Law Compliance inspections were suspended while construction was paused, but are now resuming as SCA projects have unpaused.
- The SCA and the Building Construction Trades Council (BCTC) executed a new Project Labor Agreement (PLA) in September 2020. The new PLA will apply to projects that are awarded prospectively. During the pause period from March through October, the field-related activities supporting PLA enforcement were suspended.
- SCA developed protocols for ensuring COVID-19 related safety at construction sites that is consistent with NYS and DOB guidance for construction sites.
- SCA implemented the DOI computer-based training module with more than 99% of SCA staff having completed the training.

During 2020, SCA issued an RFP and awarded a three-year contract to KPMG to conduct internal audits for SCA. SCA’s Internal Audit function continued in 2020 to develop and implement a risk-based audit plan based on an annual risk assessment resulting from surveying SCA senior and middle management.

With the resumption of nearly all construction projects by November 2020, SCA’s Safety Division has assumed the additional role of reviewing each contractor’s COVID–19 Related Safety Plan. The submission and approval of the Safety Plan are prerequisites for the Construction Management Department’s authorizing the contractor to proceed.

**ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)**

None identified.
The New York City (NYC) Office of the Sheriff enforces mandates for the New York State (NYS) Court System, which includes the collection of debt owed to NYC and other private judgment creditors. The Office of the Sheriff also executes the apprehension of individuals pursuant to warrants of arrest issued from various courts. Deputies and detectives also make arrests and issue summonses pursuant to the NYS Penal Law, NYC Administrative Code, and Mental Hygiene Law during the course of civil and criminal investigations. In the course of their law enforcement duties, deputy sheriffs seize cash and impound property. The deputies also oversee and enforce the NYC Pretrial Electronic Monitoring Program for candidates who are fitted with an electronic ankle device for 24/7 monitoring after being released from jail by the courts. Electronic monitoring is used by the courts as a non-monetary condition of release where necessary to reasonably assure a defendant’s return to court, consistent with the NYS Bail Law. During the pandemic, the Office of the Sheriff has been tasked by the Mayor’s Office to provide services in the field to assist NYC with containing the spread of COVID-19. The Office of the Sheriff has performed tasks such as conducting checkpoints at the bridges and tunnels between New York and New Jersey; distributing educational material to out-of-town travelers regarding the quarantine rules for New York; patrolling the streets, parks, and beaches to enforce crowd gathering limits and distribute masks and educational material to the general public; conducting enforcement operations relating to illegal fireworks being transported into NYC; ensuring social distancing for bars and restaurants; and visiting schools and businesses in hot zones to ensure compliance with regulations.

**RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

**PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?*

All PPE, including masks, hand sanitizer, gloves, and disinfecting wipes, was kept in a locked area and distributed to the staff by supervisory staff as needed. All PPE was procured either via the WB Mason NYC requirement contract or from the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS) Central Storehouse.
### TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

*What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?*

Staff followed all NYC and Department of Finance (DOF) guidelines for remote work. The remote staff included tax auditors and clerical staff. The tax auditors had daily meetings via Microsoft Teams with their supervising tax auditors to sort out work and interact with each other on cases. The senior clerical staff were given access to their desktops via remote access to perform their duties at home. Staff were required to log in to CityTime to enter their daily work hours and submit their timesheets on a weekly basis. When needed, staff came to office to pick up work and perform their duties on-site.

### VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

*What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?*

The Office of the Sheriff’s contract with Republic for booting was paused on March 17, 2020, due to COVID-19.

### PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

*What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.*

**BUSINESSES BRIBING LAW ENFORCEMENT STAFF**

Deputy sheriffs and investigators were tasked with assisting NYC in containing the spread of COVID-19, including by conducting checkpoints, distributing educational materials, and enforcing crowd gathering limits and social distancing. There is a now a potential for business owners to lose their liquor licenses for violating executive orders. With such risk, owners could potentially attempt to bribe staff from the Office of the Sheriff. This risk is paralleled with any enforcement work conducted currently by deputies and investigators. Pre-existing protocols to guard against bribes are still in place to ensure that no one works alone in the field, all teams are required to prepare NYS incident investigative reports detailing operations, and supervisors are present at all significant operations.

### COVID-19 TRAVELER VEHICLE CHECKPOINT OPERATIONS

The Office of the Sheriff has been tasked with conducting checkpoints at entryways into NYC at major bridge and tunnel crossings for compliance with the NYS COVID-19 Traveler Form. There is a concern that motorists and bus operators could bribe deputy sheriffs during vehicle stops to be exempt from quarantine restrictions and requirements. All operations are overseen by extensive
supervision and detailed documentation of every vehicle stop is collected and maintained in a database and reviewed by audit staff.

**REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT**

**LAW ENFORCEMENT BUREAU**

The Law Enforcement Bureau carries out orders of execution, protection, attachment, and seizure of property; serves process and levies; and performs evictions and makes arrests. Fees are collected related to the performance of these services. In addition, trust account money may be collected as a result of executions and seizures. Deputies in all five boroughs boot vehicles to enforce parking debt and can seize vehicles and other property of a debtor following a successful lawsuit. When a vehicle exceeds the threshold amount for outstanding parking judgment debt, it can be booted, towed and, if not redeemed, sold at auction by the Office of the Sheriff. If a person arrives before the vehicle has been booted, they can secure the release of the vehicle by paying the judgment amount, plus the agency fees. This payment is processed directly through the vendor, Republic. Deputy sheriffs do not accept cash payment for scofflaw vehicles that are booted.

**Corruption Risk:** Vehicle owners can pay a deputy sheriff in cash at the moment of seizure to have their vehicle released to them. There is a risk that deputy sheriffs could inappropriately keep the cash and not record the satisfaction of the judgment. There is a risk that deputy sheriffs could solicit or accept bribes to refrain from booting or seizing a scofflaw vehicle.

**Controls:** All cash payments collected by deputies in the field are documented and reviewed within the Office of the Sheriff. Specifically, a lieutenant verifies and approves these documents. All envelopes containing monies collected by the deputy must have a breakdown by denomination. This breakdown is indicated on the outside of the envelope, along with other information. The Payment in Field (PIF) is processed at the County Office and reviewed by a supervisor. The written receipt and payout record of every PIF transaction is maintained in Civil Serve. In addition, deputies are accompanied by a partner who witnesses the transaction. The Office of the Sheriff uses NYCServ (Scofftow) to track the amount of judgments, fees due, funds collected, and number of vehicles seized. The deputy sheriffs submit a daily report listing the vehicles that have been seized. This list can be crosschecked with Boot View, the system used by the vendor to record all vehicles that are booted and, if necessary, towed. Tow truck companies prepare weekly listings for redeemed vehicles and the number of vehicles in their inventories. Personnel from the Office of the Sheriff regularly check the inventory of vehicles at each facility to reconcile records. Deputies are subject to two layers of supervision by sergeants and lieutenants. These supervisors review and reconcile all booting records at the end of each tour/shift. In addition, all processes
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are directed and managed by an undersheriff (chief) and are monitored by supervisors at the Finance Information Technology (FIT) and the Scofftow data entry units.

**Corruption Risk:** The risk of injury to deputy sheriffs in one manned booting cars.

**Controls:** As per a DOI recommendation, the booting teams are now staffed with two deputies per vehicle. This increases the safety to the booting teams by having a second deputy present in the event a motorist attempts to either prevent their vehicle from being booted or attack the deputy.

**Corruption Risk:** Auditors from the Office of the Sheriff reconcile individual county bank accounts, in addition to having the ability to issue checks to refund payments. There is a risk that the auditor can issue a check payable to them and reconcile the account without having a second or third party review the transaction.

**Controls:** Paper checks from the individual county offices have been destroyed and the accounts have been closed to prevent the unauthorized issuance of a check. In addition, independent reconciliations are being done by the Citywide Payment Services and Standards (CPSS) unit.

**Corruption Risk:** Law Enforcement Bureau staff may wrongfully steal cash they have received.

**Controls:** Staff are required to issue a receipt for any cash collected for filing fees. Most monetary judgments and fees are paid in the form of a check or money order. Occasionally, a respondent may make a payment in cash. Receipts are only given for cash payments. If cash is received, a supervisor will verify the amount and the money is immediately placed into a drop safe pending deposit at the bank on a daily basis. No one person has complete control over a cash transaction. Deposit slips for cash transactions are held by a supervisor. DOF’s Treasury Division receives deposit tickets and monthly account statements from the bank. Receipts are given for all trust account collections.

**Corruption Risk:** A deputy sheriff could use their status as a Peace Officer with arrest powers to threaten a private citizen for personal gain.

**Controls:** Sheriffs’ vehicles were stenciled with identification numbers in visible areas. The locations and activities of deputy sheriffs are monitored through a radio system and by field supervision activities performed by sergeants, lieutenants, and chiefs.

**Corruption Risk:** There is a risk that employees may manipulate auctions for the benefit of particular bidders.

**Controls:** An independent auctioneer licensed by the Department of Consumer and Worker Protection (DCWP) auctions property that is confiscated by the Office of the Sheriff and is subject to sale to satisfy judgment debt. This helps eliminate the potential risk of an employee manipulating the auction for the benefit of
particular bidders. The Office of the Sheriff has selected one auctioneer through standard bidding and contracting processes in order to further diminish the potential for conflicts or risks. In addition, DOF employees and their families are not permitted to bid at these auctions.

**Corruption Risk:** There is the risk that a deputy could be bribed to not perform an execution.

**Controls:** If a deputy were to accept a bribe and return the case to the files, another deputy could pick up the case and attempt to serve and collect the amount owed. Once a deputy marks a case closed, the borough supervisor will review the case for completeness and accuracy. Typically, more than one deputy is present at a seizure. Furthermore, if the seizure is considered large or unusual, a supervisor will also be present.

### KENDRA’S UNIT

**Corruption Risk:** There is a risk that deputy sheriffs could take cash from Kendra’s Law patients whom they are transporting to the hospital.

**Controls:** If a patient has money in their possession at the time of transport, the money is counted by a deputy in front of the patient and sealed in a clear plastic bag along with their other possessions. The counting of the cash is done in front of other deputies and often with a Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) clinician. The sealed plastic bag is taken by the deputy to the hospital and is given to hospital security when the patient is admitted. The name of the hospital security guard is noted in the report for future reference. In most instances, the patient has very little cash, if any, on their person. If a patient has a large amount of money on their person, it will be noted in the email report prepared for that patient’s case.

### SHERIFF BACK OFFICE UNIT

**Corruption Risk:** There is a risk that an employee of the Marshal Vehicle Seizure Program could fraudulently post a non-existent check payment as a favor or after receiving a bribe.

**Controls:** The marshals collect applicable fees and judgment amounts from funds remaining after vehicle auctions and then issue individual checks to the Marshal Vehicle Seizure Program. The Check Application Unit applies the payment directly to NYCServ to note the receipt of funds. The Marshal Vehicle Seizure Program has implemented a policy of performing quality control checks on 100 percent of transactions. This ensures that every employee in the Check Application Unit accounts for every transaction they perform during the day. In addition, a supervisor reviews close outs of the day’s summons application. The reviewing supervisor is not the same one who applies the checks or signs off on the checks for deposit.
Corruption Risk: Until October 31, 2019, Paylock was the vendor for the booting contract. In their system, vehicles had a drop-down screen with the names of deputy sheriffs, marshals, and other users that access their boot view system. The system receives scofflaw summons data information from the DOF STARS/NYCSERV system. The system has the ability to place what are known as “Tow/Boot, Boot Enforcement Holds” on vehicles that can prevent a scofflaw vehicle from being seized. Users had the potential to use someone else’s name to screen vehicles and potentially make illegal deals with respondents without the actual law enforcement officer knowing.

Controls: As of November 1, 2019, Republic, the new booting vendor, resolved this risk with the Office of the Sheriff by having a password-based access assigned to each individual.

BUREAU OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (BCI)

BCI determines whether taxpayers have complied with both the criminal and civil provisions of NYC’s tax laws. BCI investigates and performs field and office audits through on-site review of taxpayers’ books and records, interviewing taxpayers and third parties, and using computerized data matches as a basis for office and/or field investigations. The District Attorney’s offices located within NYC prosecute criminal cases when such action is warranted. BCI also conducts inspections of tobacco retailers and wholesalers to determine compliance with the Tobacco Tax laws.

Corruption Risk: Detectives and auditors have frequent contact with taxpayers. This creates the risk of receipt and/or solicitation of bribes.

Controls: Individual field auditors and detectives cannot open their own audits or investigations. Audits and investigations are not permitted to proceed without documented justification. BCI maintains daily "location sheets" to monitor the location and activities of field employees, which are delivered to unit managers daily for review. Staff are required to submit written reports before and after field operations. Field assignments are conducted with a minimum of two people. Supervisors regularly review audits and investigations. There is additional supervisory review before cases are approved for closing. At least two senior supervisors must approve case closings. Regular supervisory review, including review by the Sheriff, is also conducted concerning assessments and criminal plea negotiations. Lectures are provided on corruption prevention, conflicts of interest, and disciplinary matters. Auditors and investigators are required to document their activities in the Business Tax System (BTS) case tracking system; this provides an additional method for tracking and verifying work performed on specific cases. Supervisors are instructed to regularly review the time records of auditors or investigators assigned to them. Unit managers and/or the Chief of Detectives of BCI review all time accounting records on a weekly basis. Failure to properly utilize
or complete the prescribed time accounting procedures constitutes grounds for disciplinary action.

**Corruption Risk:** Auditors in the field can accept checks from taxpayers in payment of a determined or negotiated tax liability. Since auditors handle these payments at the initial stage before deposit, there is the potential for diversion.

**Controls:** BCI does not accept cash. All checks received for payment of NYC taxes are restrictively endorsed upon receipt. Each check is photocopied, and the copy is placed in the case folder. The receiving auditor or investigator records the check amount and date of receipt into the BTS case tracking system. All checks are forwarded to the division's Administrative Support Unit, which logs and forwards the checks to the appropriate DOF division or lockbox for deposit. The BCI Administrative Support Unit verifies that all checks are properly posted to the correct taxpayer accounts.

**Corruption Risk:** Field investigations may result in the seizure of evidence or cash, especially cartons of cigarettes. This creates the risk of improper use of seized materials.

**Controls:** All evidence or cash seized as a result of BCI action is vouchered at the time of seizure. Receipts are issued to taxpayers when evidence is seized, and an evidence logbook is maintained that is reconciled monthly with the physical inventory of evidence, which has copies of the seizure receipts attached. Seized cash is handled by the field supervisor; the monies are counted by a two-person team, during the seizure and after returning to the office.

**Corruption Risk:** "Buy and bust" cigarette tax field operations provide money to investigators or auditors, which is used to buy counterfeit and/or untaxed cigarettes.

**Controls:** The following accounting and safeguarding procedures are followed when “buy and bust” is utilized:

- The detective or auditor sends a memo to the Chief Detective requesting funds;
- The Chief Detective forwards the request to the First Deputy Sheriff;
- After obtaining the Sheriff's approval, the First Deputy Sheriff requests the funds from the appropriate BCI account;
- The funds are given to the detective or auditor, who signs a receipt;
- Upon completion of the operation, a detailed accounting report of all expenses incurred during the operation is prepared by the detective or auditor and reviewed by the Chief Detective;
- Appropriate receipts are attached to the report and all unused funds are returned to the BCI account; and
Expense reports are prepared and submitted to the Budget Office and Treasury Division for review and auditing on a quarterly basis.

**Corruption Risk:** The First Deputy Sheriff has authority to waive penalties when a taxpayer who is a non-filer agrees to file. There is a risk that penalties could be waived in exchange for a bribe.

**Controls:** For civil cases, the First Deputy Sheriff is not in direct contact with taxpayers or their representatives. The taxpayer submits a written request for abatement of the penalty, the auditor discusses it with the audit manager, and then it is presented to the First Deputy Sheriff for approval. Either the auditor or the manager speaks with the taxpayer or the representative regarding penalty waivers. Criminal cases are referred to the District Attorney for prosecution, which may result in a Criminal Plea Agreement, filed with the court, which is approved by the judge. While the Office of the Sheriff submits its settlement recommendations to the District Attorney, the settlement is neither negotiated nor approved by DOF management.

**ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)**

The Office of the Sheriff has nothing additional to report at this time.
SBS helps unlock economic potential and create economic security for all New Yorkers by connecting New Yorkers to good jobs, creating stronger businesses, and building thriving neighborhoods across the five boroughs. SBS supports small businesses as they start, operate, and grow. The agency trains prospective employees with in-demand skills and helps them to land quality jobs with growth potential. SBS fosters thriving neighborhoods by actively investing in neighborhood organizations to build stronger business communities and improve commercial corridors.

**RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

**PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?*

As most SBS staff generally works from the agency’s offices and not in field work, it was not necessary to regularly provide PPE to most staff. Accordingly, there has not been a significant corruption hazard in PPE response equipment. A limited number of staff have been going to the office. In those cases, they are required to get pre-approval from supervision, Human Resources and facilities management. Employees going to the office are required to respond to a health screening questionnaire. They also go through a temperature screening operated by the building management at 1 Liberty Plaza; and comply with building procedures in accordance with prevailing New York State Executive Orders and State and City guidelines.

The agency also secured additional cleaning services through a cleaning services vendor to ensure a safe environment for staff coming to the office. Planning continues in terms of space design, signage, cleaning and scheduling to gradually increase staff coming to the office in a safe and coordinated manner.

At various times, SBS was able to assist in the distribution of PPE that had been donated to the City to small businesses, The agency worked with its network of business improvement districts, chambers of commerce and community based organizations.
TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK

What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?

The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has been felt throughout the City and had a severe impact on the City's small businesses. SBS agency staff was transitioned to remote work in order to continue to provide services to our community of small businesses, including minority and woman-owned businesses. SBS services have been provided via remote and online technology as appropriate. SBS IT Unit works to ensure the agency's network is secure and works with New York City Emergency Management and DoITT cyber command.

The initial challenge was to organize the agency’s workforce of approximately 320 employees to operate remotely. Beginning in mid-March, SBS implemented an effort to distribute laptops to all agency staff. Agency administrative units worked together to coordinate acquisition, preparation and distribution of hardware to staff. Human Resources surveyed staff regarding their technology needs, including programs used and applications needed to perform their work. Budget, Fiscal and Procurement Units worked to ensure expeditious purchase and delivery with many laptops secured through the Department of Information & Technology. The SBS Information Technology team worked to format laptops with necessary operating software, security programs and antivirus software. SBS facilities team managed distribution and safe delivery to agency staff.

Staff was provided with Microsoft Teams to enable meetings, messaging features and sharing of documents on an intra-agency basis. Training was provided to ensure optimal use of Teams and other programs by staff.

For remote access to documents and CRM databases, SBS employees were enabled to access their office desktops using the system in accordance with DoITT standards. A double layer of authentication/verification was established to access the system.

The SBS Helpdesk was and continues to be available to assist with all technology issues involving equipment, program operation and access.

VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

The pandemic arrived and remote work began in mid-March, late in Fiscal Year 2020. SBS Fiscal Units worked closely with OMB to adhere with new mandates to reduce spending and carefully scrutinize invoices prior to payment. Active SBS contracts were reviewed for activity during the pandemic and to determine which contracts had services that could be continued through remote services. The goal
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Department of Small Business Services

was to continue to provide information and assistance to the small business community through remote access and virtual programs. In person trainings are normally a critical part of SBS work and services to the small business and M/WBE community. Wherever possible, services that could be provided remotely were implemented. In addition, SBS system of Workforce1 Centers and the network of Business Solutions Center were transitioned to remote services. SBS worked to engage with contracted community-based organizations, a network of 76 Business Improvement Districts and a community of over 9,000 certified M/WBEs.

An important aspect of small business assistance during this time was guiding access to federal assistance in form of grant and loan programs. SBS was able to provide guidance, assistance and support to businesses applying for federal aid - particularly the PPP program. Through its website and social media, SBS ensured that businesses were aware of the available programs and eligibility requirements. Much of this work was supplemented through agency service providers.

Where a scope of contract services could not be delivered remotely or could not be provided due to the pandemic, contract services were suspended or terminations negotiated. SBS continued transitioning into MOCS’ PASSPort during this time. With PASSPort, the agency can better standardize procurement and fiscal procedures.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

WORKFORCE CENTER OPERATIONS

SBS manages the New York City Workforce System through contracts with service providers procured in accordance with the City’s Procurement Policy Board Rules and consistent with New York State and Federal requirements to operate the Workforce1 Career Centers (WF1CCs). Most of the funding for the WF1CCs is provided by the United States Department of Labor through the federal Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA).

A significant corruption hazard that SBS continues to remain vigilant about involves the performance payments of the Agency’s contracts with vendors of the WF1CCs.

As detailed in prior reports, the agency implemented a comprehensive approach to reduce vulnerabilities in the WF1CC job performance validation process. The agency continues to closely monitor these contracts and ensure that work continues during the pandemic with services provided through remote access.

FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO BUSINESSES

As businesses seek government financial assistance through federal grant and loans programs, ensuring integrity and reducing risks of fraud is essential. SBS
provides guidance and support to businesses in pursuing available programs. Using a CRM database, SBS works to verify information on businesses employment numbers, revenues and areas of service. This data can help in counseling businesses on their potential eligibility and provide a preliminary vetting for programs. SBS also works with DOI, and other law enforcement and administrative agencies in investigation of potential fraud.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

SBS continues to work on implementing measures discussed in the last report. Specifically, within our workforce division, SBS continues to validate placements to ensure compliance with vendor contracts. With the pandemic impacting businesses, SBS workforce has found expanded employment opportunities in healthcare, commercial driving, cable installation and other sectors with hiring needs. Validation is part of the placement process and is accomplished by SBS through a dedicated internal validation unit.

To continue to ensure the integrity of employees – SBS is working to see that all employees go through Conflict of Interest Board training. The legal division has been providing counseling for employees on conflict questions. SBS will work with DOI in order to provide anti-corruption training for SBS staff. SBS has also made the DCAS training guide available to employees to access remote training opportunities that will allow the development of skills for job performance and supervisory techniques.

To better manage data, SBS has been implementing Dynamics as its agency-wide Customer Relationship Management system. Previously, agency divisions operated on different systems developed at different periods of time. The introduction of Dynamics ensures that all data on businesses served is shared with all programmatic units of SBS and they are working from the same information.

ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)

None identified.
The BSA is an integral part of the City's system for regulation of land use and development and construction. The Board was established as an independent board to grant "relief" from the zoning code. BSA currently consists of five New York City Charter mandated full-time Commissioners appointed by the Mayor, and 21 staff members. As authorized by the New York City Charter, the Board reviews applications for zoning variances, special permits and appeals of agency determinations, primarily those made by the DOB. Applications to amend/renew earlier decisions are also reviewed by the Board. BSA collects revenue from the filing of applications, as well as miscellaneous fees for the copying and the preparation of transcripts of public hearings. The Commissioners conduct an independent review and rendering of decisions of all applications during a public hearing process. BSA protects the ability of the City's government to regulate development of private property.

**RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

**PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?*

DCAS handles processes procurement requests, which mitigates risk through their review and vetting. As for storage, BSA keeps PPE in a secured storage space. BSA continues to have its staff work remotely; however, DCAS police officers monitor and secure the entrance to BSA’s offices at 22 Reade Street.

**TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK**

*What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?*

BSA continue to log in and out of CityTime as necessary to log hours. BSA’s senior staff is in frequent contact with employees to ensure no time or attendance abuse occurs and frequently holds virtual meetings by webcam. BSA uses the citywide VPN and Microsoft 365 secured cloud services to ensure that agency information continues to remain confidential. Confidential agency paper records are stored in BSA’s offices, which are secured by DCAS police officers.
VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE

What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?

Not applicable because BSA does not engage contractors to participate in the emergency pandemic response.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

WORKING IN THE OFFICE

BSA immediately recognized the threat to public health and safety posed by COVID-19 and transitioned all employees to remote work to prevent the spread of COVID-19 between employees. Relatedly, BSA has transitioned its application materials to fully digital files and now only accepts applications digitally. BSA archives are also now digitally available by request, which further eliminates the need for in-person interaction at BSA’s offices.

HOLDING PUBLIC HEARINGS

BSA has conducted its public hearings remotely through videoconferencing software and solicited the public to participate in them by computer or by telephone. These virtual hearings protect both BSA employees and the public from the spread of COVID-19 that might otherwise occur with in-person gatherings.

REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

RECEIPT OF REVENUE

BSA continues to successfully use the protocols identified last year, which mitigate the risks arising out of the proper collection of revenue by assigning four designated staff members to manage revenue receipt. Under BSA procedures, moneys can only be accepted when in check or money order form, written out to the agency specifically. Once accepted, checks are entered into a logbook, placed in a locked safe, and are subject to bi-weekly reconciliation reports. Checks, along with these bi-weekly reconciliation reports, are delivered to DCAS for deposit.

IMPROPER BOARD COMMUNICATION

BSA also mitigates the risks of improper Board communication through a set of internal procedures. Once an application has been filed with the Board, the staff serves as the point of contact for the applicant and all members of the public. Outside of the public hearing process, the commissioners do not discuss a filed
application with any member of the public, including elected officials or applicants, to ensure an independent review of the application. Any attempt at an improper communication with BSA commissioners, such as improper attempts to communicate by email or telephone, are immediately forwarded to the Board’s executive director. In addition, the Board participates in mandatory training from the Conflict of Interests Board and the Department of Investigation.

**ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)**

Not applicable.
TLC licenses and regulates more than 304,000 entities, consisting of approximately:

- 181,330 drivers
- 105,379 vehicles
- 3,966 businesses (bases, agents, brokers, and meter shops, etc.)

All of these licensees require TLC authorization to operate lawfully and, in turn, they make a substantial contribution to the City’s economic activity. With over 100,000 licensed vehicles operating, including 13,529 medallion taxicabs, TLC licensees complete hundreds of thousands of trips every day. TLC’s critical objectives are chiefly to protect public safety by licensing, establishing, and enforcing standards for the safe and legal operation of:

- Medallion Taxicabs (street-hailed service)
- For-Hire Vehicles (prearranged service, including electronic dispatch)
- Paratransit (service for people with disabilities)
- Commuter Vans (shared ride services)
- Bases and businesses that operate the above services or support them, such as medallion brokers and meter shops
- E-Hail Applications and Dispatch Service Providers

**RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

**PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?*

TLC orders such equipment from the Department of Citywide Administrative Services' (DCAS) Central Storehouse, vendors on citywide requirements contracts, and vendors who have State/Federal contracts.

TLC has taken the following to address this risk factor:

- PPE and pandemic response equipment is checked against what was ordered and billed to ensure accuracy, and centrally stored with limited access.
A distribution policy was enacted which centralized PPE storage and distribution under TLC’s Administrative Services.

Distribution of PPE is tracked by location as well as by individual.

A weekly inventory of opening and closing amounts is reviewed by executive management with Administrative Services to find discrepancies, possible theft and other potential corruption hazards.

**TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK**

*What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?*

The primary purpose is to ensure staff have the necessary equipment and resources to properly work remotely and to assist with issues which may arise.

TLC has taken the following steps to address this risk factor:

- Supervisors were instructed to check in with their staff regarding projects and assignments.
- All remote access into TLC’s network was fortified by adding an extra layer of security called Multi Factor Authentication (MFA). With MFA applied to major applications and TLC’s main access portal, TLC was able to increase the security for accessing any resource or computer hosted at TLC or the Department of Information and Technology Telecommunications (DoITT).
- All cellphones distributed to users were outfitted with the AirWatch Mobile Device Management (MDM) agent which gave TLC the ability to centralize the management of all cellphones.
- TLC installed McAfee Endpoint Security and CrowdStrike on all laptops distributed to users for teleworking purposes. TLC has also deployed McAfee Management of Native Encryption (Bitlocker) on additional machines with the intentions of expanding the deployment to all laptops hosted by TLC. The Bitlocker application is designed to protect data by providing encryption for entire volumes. By default, it uses the AES encryption algorithm in cipher block chaining (CBC) or XTS mode with a 128-bit or 256-bit key.

**VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?*

As part of TLC’s emergency pandemic response and reconstitution, enhanced cleaning and disinfecting regularly occurs throughout the day at all TLC facilities.
TLC has taken the following steps to address this risk factor:

- Cleaning contractor staff are required to complete a log each time they perform a cleaning.

- The log sheets, which are maintained at a centrally kept location at each facility, include the date, time, location and area cleaned or disinfected, and are reviewed to ensure accuracy.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

UNDERMINING OF COMPUTER-BASED INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Protection of Records

TLC databases and other records indicate who holds proper TLC credentials and who owns taxicab medallions. These records contain personal identifying information that must be secured from unauthorized users. Further, TLC recordkeeping must be accurate in order to reflect which licensees have pending summonses, judgments against them, and which fines, if any, are owed.

TLC has taken the following steps to address this risk factor:

- Implemented a Data Loss Prevention Solution, which detects and protects all information deemed confidential/sensitive from being misused or accessed by unauthorized users.

- An Information Security Response Plan (ISIRP) was created to outline the responsibilities pertaining to responding to information security incidents within the agency. The ISIRP is aligned to cyber security and DoITT security policies. ISIRP is designed to focus on rapid response to security violations or incidents that are suspected or occur and, in either case, affect or degrade the agency information resources or disrupt normal business operations.

MAINTAINING A CULTURE OF INTEGRITY

Bribery and Improper Relations with Regulated Entities

TLC’s core mission is to regulate a variety of for-profit entities as they deliver services to City residents, visitors, and others. In order to be a credible and effective regulator, TLC staff should never place themselves in a position where their decisions may have the appearance of being influenced improperly. Of particular concern are staff members who work in divisions where they have direct contact with regulated entities, who perform inspections or other evaluative services, who handle or issue credentials, or who handle currency.
TLC has taken the following steps to address this risk factor:

- Continued periodic anti-corruption training, including information about the role of DOI as well as TLC’s no-gift zero-dollar rule for all employees.
- Established the Licensing Applications, Renewals and Summonses system (LARS), that limits monetary interactions between staff and the public, by allowing licensees to pay summonses, settlements, Medallion renewal fees, etc., through this online system.
- New TLC Driver and/or Vehicle license applications must be utilized via LARS.

**REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT**

As an issuer of credentials necessary for public safety, TLC has a responsibility to ensure that these credentials are only issued to qualified persons who meet all TLC rules and regulations. To mitigate the corruption hazard of unqualified individuals obtaining TLC Driver licenses, TLC had selected a new testing vendor to provide software, testing facilities, and to administer the TLC Drivers License Examination. Following protocols to verify the identity of students taking exams and monitoring the testing rooms with the use of proctors and cameras, TLC, with the assistance of the education vendor, has caught numerous individuals attempting to cheat on the examination and, thereby, prevented unqualified persons from obtaining TLC Driver licenses.

**ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)**

None identified.
Department of Transportation (DOT)

Henry Gutman, Commissioner
Andrew Brunsden, Inspector General

DOT seeks to provide for the safe, efficient, and environmentally responsible movement of people and goods in the City of New York and to maintain and enhance the transportation infrastructure crucial to the economic vitality and quality of life of City residents. DOT is responsible for the condition and operation of 6,000 miles of streets, highways and public plazas, 794 bridge structures, and the nine boats for the Staten Island Ferry program. DOT operates 12,700 traffic signals and over 315,000 streetlights, and maintains over 200 million linear feet of markings on City streets and highways. DOT oversees the City’s bike share system and maintains over 1,180 miles of the cycling network, including over 95 miles of on-street protected bike lanes. DOT also manages the Joint Traffic Management Center; pedestrian ramp and sidewalk repair; and oversees the on-street parking meter system.

RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS

PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?

DOT has taken steps to minimize potential corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment. The majority of the orders for PPE items were procured based on guidelines provided by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Requests by agencies were procured through the New York City Emergency Management (NYCEM), Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH), Deputy Mayor, or the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS) with the exception of a few orders that were placed at the onset of the COVID-19 crisis as the need for an immediate and broad range of PPE items surfaced. DOT’s Office of Safety and Health (DOTOSH) established standards for the type and amount of PPE for each field employee. Based on this standard, orders for PPE were placed to NYCEM and City Hall based on the projected number of field staff expected to work each month. These procurements were reviewed by the agency Minority and Women-Owned Business Enterprise (MWBE) officer and a wide outreach was made to the MWBE vendor community. All price quotes were carefully evaluated before awarding the Purchase Orders. The Deputy Mayor’s Office, DOHMH and/or DCAS reviews DOT’s orders and in turn DOT coordinates with the DCAS Central Storehouse for distribution amounts. PPE orders are obtained from DCAS on a
The PPE inventory is stored in two secure centralized locations accessible only to limited DOT Facilities staff. Facilities coordinates with respective liaisons from each of the operating DOT Divisions and distributes a month’s supply of PPE based on the number of field staff projected to work within the next month’s distribution cycle. Ordering, storing, and distribution is tracked using a centralized database and a simple excel spreadsheet. The spreadsheet is used exclusively by the Facilities management team while the database is used by each Division to provide weekly distribution figures of the type and amount of PPE provided to their employees. All PPE is subject to the same annual inventory controls and reporting required by the NYC Comptroller’s Office.

**TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK**

*What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?*

DOT has continued to use CityTime for time and leave reporting, as this was the process pre-COVID-19. All manual reporting that needed to be made due to connectivity issues or lack of access required two-signature validation before being submitted in CityTime. All leave requests which require supporting documentary evidence, including excused absences, require multiple levels of review before submission and two levels of approval in CityTime.

To further strengthen controls to mitigate potential time and material abuse, Guidelines for Managing Remotely, issued by DCAS on March 17, 2020, has been provided to all supervisors and managers. This guideline provides best practices for communication, including daily check-in meetings between supervisor/manager and staff.

Controls over system access to Payroll & Timekeeping data and databases remain the same as pre-COVID-19, specifically all users required Agency and Office of Payroll Administration (OPA) approval and training before access was granted. It should be noted that there were no new users authorized during COVID-19/Reporting period. User accounts of staff who left the agency or no longer required access to Payroll & Timekeeping databases were deactivated in a timely manner following OPA protocols.

DOT implemented multiple measures that provide the Agency with a firm understanding of the status of each employee, and where each employee is working. Two applications, one reporting platform and a tracking process were established to enhance centralized management of DOT’s workforce. This information is routinely communicated to the Commissioner’s Office via an automated reporting dashboard:

- Facility Assignment Data Management
- Daily Workforce Tracker
DOT’s Information Technology and Telecom Division (IT&T) has taken additional steps to safeguard confidential agency and client information. Multifactor authentication (MFA) is utilized by DOT for remote access to DOT systems. MFA is an authentication method that requires the user to provide two or more verification factors to gain access to a resource such as an application, online account, or a Virtual Private Network (VPN). Remote access by an employee, or authorized user, is logged and time stamped in order to provide an audit trail to facilitate investigations of anomalous activities. Remote Access enforces role based access for all clients.

IT&T has also taken the following steps to increase controls to safeguard confidential agency and client information:

- Enacted new procedures for vendors performing critical work from off-site locations.
- DOT-issued laptops and cellular phones are installed with endpoint security prior to issuance for safe and secure remote access purposes and business operations.
- DOT has provided safe and secure video conferencing solutions for collaboration and business operations that meets all current industry best practice for privacy and security.

**VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?*

For the reporting period, DOT processed emergency PPE procurements in order to support the emergency response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Guidance for these procurements were provided by OMB including:

- Office of the Mayor Emergency Executive Order 100 (EEO-100) issued on 3/16/2020;
- Mayor’s Office of Contract Services guidance issued to City agencies on 3/17/2020, and;
- Mayor’s Office of Contract Services additional guidance (for emergency contracts) issued to City agencies on 3/25/2020.

In April 2020, ACCO’s staff or Divisions staff sent COVID-19/Exposure protocol letters to various DOT vendors and contractors (Construction, resurfacing, thermoplastic, security, etc.). Contractors were asked to develop and manage safety measures in compliance with the guidance issued by US Department of
Labor Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and other respective agencies.

The agency completed background checks in Federal, State, and City databases to certify contractors that participated in the emergency pandemic response were responsible and appropriate. The ACCO's Vendor Responsibility Unit (VRU) checked the City’s PASSPort database (formally known as VENDEX) for cautions, warrants, liens, tax status, and past performance evaluations. Additionally, VRU checked the Federal SAM database to ensure solicited vendors were not debarred. Furthermore, ACCO reviewed State and City Comptroller databases for prevailing wage violations and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) for safety and health violations. The ACCO’s Contract Compliance Unit reviewed the vendor's past performance regarding compliance with city, state, and federal subcontracting goals and to determine if there were any active prevailing wage violations and investigations. Once the ACCO identified a vendor for award, a responsibility determination was completed. This process entails oversight reviews with DOI via a Vendor Name Check request and Tax Status determination by Department of Finance (DOF) via PASSPort.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

FIELD ENGINEERING SUPERVISION

Lack of engineering supervision, proper health care protocols, and monitoring of capital infrastructure projects could potentially lead to specifications not being followed, and contractor employees not correctly logging time, resulting in fraudulent charges and substandard work.

Mitigation Effort: In an effort to continue vital infrastructure capital projects and ensure contract compliance, DOT directed that the Resident Engineering Inspection firm responsible for monitoring the contractor on a daily basis always have an engineer present in the field to confirm the contractor is performing work according to specifications, and all time is correctly accounted. ACCO and Division staff sent COVID-19/Exposure protocol letters to various DOT vendors and contractors (Construction, resurfacing, thermoplastic, security, etc.) requesting that they develop and manage safety measures in compliance with the guidance issued by US Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and other respective agencies.

BID OPENINGS WHILE MAINTAINING SAFETY PROTOCOLS AND BID INTEGRITY DURING THE PANDEMIC.

Mitigation Effort: Implementing the guidance distributed by MOCS for bid openings entailed creating a system to allow virtual, recorded, real time bid openings. Two
ACCO staff are present, while all interested bidders watch via their computer or phone, in real time. ACCO staff receives the bids two days prior to bid opening, building security is present to allow for the drop off directly to the BID window, manned by ACCO staff. Bids are date and time stamped and locked in the safe until bid opening.

**REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT**

The New York City Department of Transportation (DOT) conducted a risk mitigation assessment of the corruption hazards identified in the 2019 report. This self-assessment, the full results of which are found below, indicate that DOT has taken steps to identify, assess, prioritize, and track four significant corruption hazards/risks as part of its ongoing implementation of risk mitigation efforts. The results presented below will reflect the hazard and risk mitigation measures previously reported as well as the current progress for the current reporting period.

**POTENTIAL FOR CONTRACT FRAUD**

In order to maintain and enhance essential infrastructure of the City such as bridges, roadways, sidewalks, ferries, streetlights and traffic signals, as well as DOT information technology and telecommunications, DOT enters into contracts with construction companies, consultants, and other vendors to deliver required goods and services. For the period from October 1, 2019, through September 30, 2020, DOT awarded and registered 3,970 items, totaling $415,529,327.37. The ACCO continues to monitor the previously reported resources and controls that are implemented to address potential risks associated with contract fraud. Additional mitigation strategies have since been implemented to further enhance the control environment. Such controls include, but not limited to:

- Review of bids where there is limited competition to determine if the specifications need to be amended or clarified to expand the contractor base, and;
- Appointment of a Chief Diversity Officer/Chief MWBE Officer, as required by Executive Order 59.

**GRANTS ELIGIBILITY COMPLIANCE CONTROLS**

DOT Grants Administration staff oversees compliance with state and federal grant eligibility and accountability requirements. Operating divisions receive grants from Federal Highway Administration, Federal Transit Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and Department of Housing and Urban Development funds. This area presents risks relating to misinterpretations or noncompliance with grant requirements, lack of coordination between operating divisions, or inadequate review based on grant procedures. DOT Grants Administration staff has continued the implementation of the previously reported
resources and controls put in place to mitigate potential misinterpretations or potential non-compliance with grant requirements. These controls and resources, including the appointment of a Grants Compliance Officer, have not been modified in any way during the subject reporting period.

**CONTROLS OVER INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY**

DOT identified potential risks concerning data storage and breaches, access of former DOT employees, and IT security vulnerabilities. IT&T continues to monitor the previously reported resources and controls that were implemented to address potential associated risks. Additional mitigation strategies have since been implemented to further enhance the control environment. Such controls include, but not limited to:

- Limiting access to all information assets;
- New procedures for external vendor access to DOT information assets;
- Endpoint security solutions to protect all systems against malicious software and malware;
- Employee cybersecurity awareness and phishing simulation campaigns;
- Data Loss Prevention solution (DLP) which recognizes new devices attempting to access DOT’s network”, and;
- Multi-factor Authentication (MFA) that requires the user to provide two or more verification factors to gain access to a resource such as an application, online account, or a Virtual Private Network (VPN).

**USAGE OF FLEET VEHICLES, ZIPCARS, E-ZPASS, FUEL AND PURCHASE OF AUTOMOTIVE PARTS**

NYC Department of Transportation (DOT) is one of the largest fleet owning agencies of the City. The Fleet Services Division (Fleet) maintains DOT’s fleet of vehicles across the five boroughs. Fleet maintains vehicle repair and garage operations for DOT, which require a high volume of auto parts ordering, and usage to maintain the fleet of vehicles. Additionally, Fleet administers programs required for operating DOT’s fleet including E-ZPass, Fuel Usage and a car share program (Zipcar) for Agency staff requiring the use of a vehicle. These programs are intended to make DOT operations more efficient and cost-effective. Fleet continues to monitor the previously reported resources and controls that were implemented to address potential associated risks. Additional mitigation strategies have since been implemented to further enhance the control environment. Fleet, in conjunction with DOT’s Risk management Working Group, finalized operating procedures to strengthen controls over Zipcar, E-ZPass, and Fuel Usage (issued in Q3 2020). Additionally, operating procedures have been issued for parts inventory adjustments (issued in Q1 2020), and review of auto parts and services
billing (issued in Q3 2020). This includes monthly oversight of GPC for proper billing for parts acquired.

**ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)**

The COVID-19 pandemic has presented challenges to DOT operations. DOT would like to underscore the hazards referenced in this report, continued mitigation efforts and required diligence during this emergency response period.
The mission of the Department of Veterans’ Services is to connect, mobilize, and empower New York City’s veteran community in order to foster purpose-driven lives for New York City service members – past and present – in addition to their caregivers, survivors, and families. DVS fulfills this mission by connecting New York City’s 210,000 veterans with essential services and programs focused on pivotal areas such as economic empowerment, housing security, benefits, health and wellness, and culture.

**RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

**PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?*

**Procurement**

All PPE items (i.e., wipes, masks, and thermometers) are purchased via required contracts and NYC Storehouse. All PPE purchases have two levels of approval from the agency’s Chief of Staff office and Budget Director.

**Storage**

All PPE items are set aside in boxes, within designated storage closets. Additionally, the agency actively maintains an inventory tracker of all items purchased and received.

**Distribution**

Mass PPE distribution has not occurred, as the agency’s workforce continues to telework.

**TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK**

*What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?*

**Time and Attendance**

The entirety of agency’s workforce is outfitted with the equipment necessary to effectively telework. This includes employees being issued a laptop, cellular phone, and personal hotspot for internet connection. During the transition to
teleworking, the agency reinforced the update provided by the Office of Payroll Administration (OPA) to allow employees with working CityTime credentials to account for work shifts. This includes entries for Time-In, Time-Out, Meal-Out and Meal-In using the CityTime Webclock function. Employees can access this function from any device that is connected to the internet.

**Client Information**

Sensitive documents that are received from constituents for the purposes of providing a service are stored electronically on agency-issued devices. In the cases where hard copies of sensitive documents are received or need to be printed, those hard copies are destroyed following usage or are stored in a locked file cabinet within the agency’s main office or an agency-approved satellite office.

Agency staff were issued a memo on how to store and preserve electronically stored information on their work devices while working remotely. This memo includes how to store and preserve client information.

**VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?*

All PPE purchases had two levels of approval from the agency’s Chief of Staff office and Budget Director.

**PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

*What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period. [List two or more. Each hazard identified should have its own sub-header as below and include a discussion of the hazard as well as any risk mitigation strategies.]*

DVS did not have any public health and safety contracts during the reporting period.

**REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT**

Not applicable.

**ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)**

Not applicable.
DYCD is a mayoral agency which funds and administers programs for youth and low-income adults, primarily through contracts with non-profit, community-based organizations. The funds are derived from federal, state, and City sources. In Fiscal Year 2020, DYCD funded approximately 3,300 contracts aggregating more than $726,000,000.

**RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COMMON CORRUPTION HAZARDS**

**PROCURING AND SECURING PANDEMIC-RESPONSE EQUIPMENT**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize corruption hazards in the procurement, storage, and distribution of PPE and other pandemic response equipment (e.g., disinfecting wipes or hand sanitizer)?*

DYCD followed the City’s PPB rules in purchasing PPE at the start of the pandemic for staff who were working in the office and to prepare for staff returning to the office. Once the DCAS storehouse increased its inventory to meet agency needs, PPE was purchased through DCAS. PPE was properly stored, locked, and secured in DYCD’s storage space at 2 Lafayette Street, and distributed by the Administrative Services team, which keeps track of all agency supplies. No other staff had access to PPE storage. DYCD also purchased diapers and formula for parenting residents of Runaway & Homeless Youth Program (RHY) transitional living facilities. Those supplies were distributed to the providers at those facilities by RHY staff who required they sign off on the supplies received.

By mid-summer, the Mayor’s Office began supplying PPE for providers in the Youth Services, Workforce and Community Development program areas. Due to the large quantity involved, the PPE for providers was stored in the auditorium and on all DYCD floors at 2 Lafayette Street; these spaces are protected by the building security system whose main doors require card access. In addition, the spaces are monitored by cameras and DCAS fire monitoring security staff, who conduct hourly walk-throughs. DYCD program staff coordinated with providers to determine the quantity of PPE needed, tracked the distribution of supplies to providers, and required providers to sign off on the supplies received.
To facilitate the agency’s move to telework, IT purchased laptops, and other necessary telework related items, as follows:

- **Laptops** – At the beginning of the crisis, 50 laptops were purchased to allow critical staff to telework. Shortly thereafter, DoITT provided the agency with an additional 60 laptops for high need staff. As the crisis lengthened, IT purchased an additional 80 laptops to support staff. All hardware purchased was added to inventory; staff was required to sign for the hardware they received.

- **Peripherals** – For staff that would be working from the office during the pandemic or once staff returned to the office, webcams and headsets were purchased to facilitate video conferencing.

- **Collaboration Software** –
  - Microsoft 365 - In conjunction with DoITT, DYCD’s IT unit migrated DYCD’s email platform to Microsoft 365 prior to the pandemic. This allowed the agency to access email and use features such as OneDrive, SharePoint and Teams for document storage and collaboration.
  - Audio Conferencing – Additional lines were added to the agency’s Audi Conferencing capabilities (Infinite Conferencing) to facilitate communications both internally and with providers. The lines have no additional cost, only for usage and were only used temporarily as staff was trained on newer technologies such as Teams and WebEx. DYCD also purchased 100 Teams Audio Conferencing Add-on licenses that replaced the usage of Infinite Conferencing bridge lines.

- **Reporting** – DYCD purchased 5 licenses for PowerBi, a cloud-based data visualization tool, to support the ability of program staff to remotely monitor programs.

**TRANSITION TO REMOTE WORK**

*What steps did the agency take to mitigate the risk of fraud when employees transitioned to remote work (e.g., time and attendance abuse, or safeguarding of confidential agency or client information)?*

Supervisors continue to manage their staff work assignments, attendance, and hold virtual meetings in lieu of in-person meetings. If needed, staff have come to DYCD offices to pick up documents and work with their supervisor’s approval. Staff are able to access CityTime remotely to complete timesheets for supervisor approval. Human Resources assists staff who have issues with completing their timesheets with their supervisor’s approval to ensure hours reported are accurate. The timekeeping unit continues to review timesheets to ensure accuracy and that staff are adhering to the time and leave regulations while working remotely. Staff
are submitting doctor’s notes electronically for approved sick leave. There are additionally two levels of approval for overtime requests. All requests for entitlement-based leave, e.g., under the Family and Medical Leave Act, Families First Coronavirus Response Act, and Paid Family Leave, are submitted electronically and are reviewed by Human Resources to determine whether appropriate documentation has been provided. All requests for leave taken as a matter of entitlement require a supervisor and Human Resources manager approval.

As staff were transitioning to telework, IT provided both in-person (initially) and then remote training via WebEx to staff. During these trainings, the need to maintain security regarding passwords and to keep data secure was enforced.

- Passwords – Existing policies regarding 90-day password expiration and account lockout policies remain. IT had, prior to COVID, implemented a Self Service Password Reset tool that is accessible via the DYCD Connect platform, that internal users could use to reset passwords during Telework.
- Multi Factor Authentication – MFA was enabled for all internal and external users when accessing City systems via Juniper SSL VPN.

Users were instructed via trainings and emails that files could only be stored on DYCD approved locations, namely on internal network shares and Microsoft 365.

In addition to the training noted above, guidance has been provided to staff and CBOs on remote work; related materials have been maintained as a resource on online platforms.

**VENDORS IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE**

*What steps did the agency take to minimize fraud by contractors engaged to participate in the emergency pandemic response?*

DYCD has followed procurement rules, as modified in the pandemic to allow emergency procurements, and has worked closely with the Mayor’s Office of Contract Services and New York City Law Department on the agency’s emergency procurement needs.

In terms of monitoring, DYCD established targeted approaches to oversee particular categories of providers: those deemed essential by the City, such as shelters and food programs, those offering services virtually, and those tasked with providing referrals to available services. The agency communicated expectations to providers, including how the monitoring would impact year-end performance evaluations. New job aids and professional development on monitoring programs virtually was provided to DYCD staff monitoring programs.

For food pantries, deemed to be essential programming, DYCD discretionary staff conducted in-person, virtual, and desk reviews to account for services. All in-person visits were conducted with COVID-19 safety guidelines implemented.
RHY services, also deemed essential, have been monitored remotely in accordance with guidance from the New York State Office of Children and Family Services, which is the oversight agency for these programs. RHY program staff have also been holding biweekly calls with providers.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY CORRUPTION HAZARDS

What are the most substantial public health and safety corruption hazards the agency faced during the reporting period.

SAFETY IN RESIDENTIAL PROGRAMS

Probably the greatest public health and safety risk DYCD faced was in connection with continued operation of runaway and homeless youth (RHY) programs funded by DYCD, which include drop-in centers and residential programs. All DYCD-funded residential RHY programs have continued to operate and every drop-in center has continued to offer in-person services during the pandemic. Of the 778 beds funded Citywide, 93 percent are online, with the remainder offline due to social distancing protocols. For isolation of symptomatic and asymptomatic youth DYCD has partnered with NYC Health and Hospitals to refer youth to a hotel identified by the City. H&H provides all needed medical care and works with DYCD providers on intake and discharge of youth, and return to RHY residence, once youth have been cleared for return.

GENERAL SAFETY

Another challenge for DYCD, as a funder of social services, was the quick pivots involved in, first, having most services begin to be provided remotely, and then returning to in-person services. Remote services involve their own safety and confidentiality concerns, especially given that so many of the people served by DYCD-funded programs are youth under the age of 18. To support this effort, as noted above, guidance was prepared for DYCD staff and providers to ensure that programming was, even when remote, conducted professionally and with appropriate attention to the safety of participants and safeguarding of confidential information. In addition, where possible, additional contract terms to address COVID-19 specific concerns was added to contracts.

As the City began to reopen, DYCD communicated to providers the need to follow City and state health guidance in operating programs in person. This has been done both at the program level and agency wide. For example, in September, with the City entering Phase Four of reopening, DYCD sent an email from the Commissioner to all funded organizations with active contracts, sharing with them applicable state guidance and notifying them of the need to follow the guidance, including the need to develop a safety plan, as per state directive. Providers were also reminded that the Mayor’s Office of Special Enforcement is coordinating with
several City agencies to conduct inspections and ensure compliance with the NYS guidance.

**REFLECTION ON 2019 CORRUPTION HAZARDS AND RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT**

Changes necessitated by COVID-19 have occupied a lot of the Agency’s attention over the past year. Nevertheless, DYCD continues to work towards improving its processes and systems and its goal of having all programs working in the same reporting systems. This will result in greater transparency, increased efficiencies, and ultimately stronger programming for City residents.

**ADDITIONAL AGENCY IDENTIFIED CORRUPTION HAZARD(S)**

Not applicable.