DIGITAL FORENSIC ACCESS TOOLS:
IMPACT AND USE POLICY

APRIL 11, 2021
### SUMMARY OF CHANGES BETWEEN DRAFT AND FINAL POLICY

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<th>Update</th>
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<td>Removed statement that digital forensic access tools do not use artificial intelligence and machine learning.</td>
<td>Public comments highlighted a lack of industry-standard definitions for artificial intelligence and machine learning.</td>
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<td>Expanded upon digital forensic access tools capabilities.</td>
<td>Added language clarifying digital forensic access tools capabilities. Added language describing how digital forensic access tools compliment other NYPD technologies.</td>
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<td>Expanded upon digital forensic access tools rules of use.</td>
<td>Added language clarifying digital forensic access tools rules of use.</td>
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<td>Expanded upon court authorization language for digital forensic access tools.</td>
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<td>Expanded upon digital forensic access tools safeguards and security measures.</td>
<td>Added language regarding information security. Added language to reflect the removal of access to digital forensic access tools when job duties no longer require access.</td>
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<td>Expanded upon digital forensic access tools data retention.</td>
<td>Added language to reflect NYPD obligations under federal, state, and local record retention laws.</td>
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<td>Expanded upon digital forensic access tools external entities section.</td>
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<td>Grammar changes.</td>
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ABSTRACT
While advancements in encryption technology benefit the individual privacy of end users, the same advancements present new and difficult challenges for law enforcement. Even when law enforcement obtains a court ordered search warrant, encryption may make effecting a search impossible. As a result, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) utilizes digital forensic access tools to extract and search data, including encrypted or inaccessible data, from electronic devices.

The NYPD produced this impact and use policy because digital forensic access tools includes equipment and software that may be used to collect, retain, process, or share audio, video, location, or similar information from electronic devices.

CAPABILITIES OF THE TECHNOLOGY
NYPD digital forensic access tools consists of both physical devices and software. The physical devices are used to extract information (e.g., communications, photographs, videos, etc.) from electronic devices, and software is used to process the information contained on those devices. In the event that data is stored in a cloud-based device, the software is also used to extract information from that remote environment.

Digital forensic analysis tools allow NYPD personnel to maintain the integrity of the evidence obtained from electronic devices, and establish a clear chain of custody for that information.

The information that is ultimately accessible to NYPD personnel utilizing this equipment is limited to the information contained on an individual electronic device.

The NYPD does not use digital forensic access tools to engage in unauthorized access or “hacking” of electronic devices. Digital forensic access tools do not use any other biometric measuring technologies. NYPD digital forensic access tools do not use facial recognition technologies and cannot conduct facial recognition analysis. However, still images retrieved using the technologies may be used as a probe image for facial recognition analysis.¹

RULES, PROCESSES & GUIDELINES RELATING TO USE OF THE TECHNOLOGY
NYPD digital forensic access tools policy seeks to balance the public safety benefits of this technology with individual privacy. Digital forensic access tools must be used in a manner consistent with the requirements and protection of the Constitution of the United States, the New York State Constitution, and applicable statutory authorities.

The NYPD does not use its digital forensic access tools to engage in unauthorized access or “hacking” of electronic devices. NYPD personnel may only use digital forensic access tools for legitimate law enforcement purposes.

¹ For additional information on facial recognition, please refer to the facial recognition impact and use policy.
In most cases, NYPD investigators must first obtain a search warrant allowing for the use of digital forensic access tools before the technologies are used during an investigation. The warrant is obtained with the aid of the prosecutor with proper jurisdiction. The NYPD investigator and prosecutor must make an application to a judge for a search warrant. The search warrant can only be issued by a judge. The application must be made under oath. For a judge to grant a search warrant, the judge must find there is probable cause to believe a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, and the use of digital forensic access tools will be relevant to the investigation.

Digital forensic access tools may also be used in the absence of court authorization with individual consent or if exigent circumstances exist. If exigent circumstances exist, an NYPD investigator must have probable cause to believe (1) a crime designated under Criminal Procedure Law Section 700.05(8), Penal Law Sections 460.10(1), 215.57, 215.56, or 240.30 has been committed, is in progress or is about to be committed; (2) an emergency exists as result of the criminal conduct; (3) there is an immediate urgent need for assistance due to an imminent danger of serious bodily injury or death to any person; and (4) the effort to locate a suspect is being undertaken with the primary concern of preventing serious injury or death and is not primarily motivated by an intent to arrest and seize evidence. The possibility of flight of a suspect does not on its own constitute exigent circumstances.

Supervisory personnel must be consulted prior to use of digital forensic access tools. The underlying facts are considered on a case-by-case basis prior to the utilization of the technology, including the legitimate law enforcement purpose to utilize the technology in a given circumstance.

In accordance with the Public Oversight of Surveillance Technology Act, an addendum to this impact and use policy will be prepared as necessary to describe any additional uses of digital forensic access tools.

NYPD investigations involving political activity are conducted by the Intelligence Bureau, which is the sole entity in the NYPD that may conduct investigations involving political activity pursuant to the Handschu Consent Decree.

No person will be the subject of police action solely because of actual or perceived race, color, religion or creed, age, national origin, alienage, citizenship status, gender (including gender identity), sexual orientation, disability, marital status, partnership status, military status, or political affiliation or beliefs.

The misuse of digital forensic access tools will subject employees to administrative and potentially criminal penalties.

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2 A crime is: 1) any crime as defined by N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 700.05(8); 2) any criminal act as defined by N.Y. Penal Law § 460.10(1); 3) Bail Jumping in the First and Second Degree as defined by N.Y. Penal Law §§ 215.57 and 215.56; or 4) Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree as defined by N.Y. Penal Law § 240.30.
SAFEGUARD & SECURITY MEASURES AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS

Digital forensic access tools are securely stored in NYPD facilities when not in use, in a location that is inaccessible to the public. Additionally, a supervisor must periodically inspect and account for the equipment. Access to NYPD digital forensic access tools and the associated software is limited to authorized users who are authenticated by username and password. Access to the technologies is limited to NYPD personnel with an articulable need to use them in furtherance of a lawful duty. Access to digital forensic access tools is removed when the technology is no longer necessary for NYPD personnel to fulfill their duties (e.g., when personnel are transferred to a command that does not use the technology).

Information obtained by using digital forensic access tools is retained within an NYPD computer or case management system. Only authorized users have access to this information. NYPD personnel utilizing computer and case management systems are authenticated by username and password. Access to case management and computer systems is limited to personnel who have an articulable need to access the system in furtherance of lawful duty. Access rights within NYPD case management and computer systems are further limited based on lawful duty. Access levels are only granted for functions and abilities relevant to individual commands.

The NYPD has a multifaceted approach to secure data and user accessibility within NYPD systems. The NYPD maintains an enterprise architecture (EA) program, which includes an architecture review process to determine system and security requirements on a case by case basis. System security is one of many pillars incorporated into the EA process. Additionally, all NYPD computer systems are managed by a user permission hierarchy based on rank and role via Active Directory (AD) authentication. Passwords are never stored locally; user authentication is stored within the AD. The AD is managed by a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) to restrict/allow port access. Accessing NYPD computer systems remotely requires dual factor authentication. All data within NYPD computer systems are encrypted both in transit and at rest via Secure Socket Layer (SSL)/Transport Layer Security (TLS) certifications which follow industry best practices.

NYPD personnel must abide by security terms and conditions associated with computer and case management systems of the NYPD, including those governing user passwords and logon procedures. NYPD personnel must maintain confidentiality of information accessed, created, received, disclosed or otherwise maintained during the course of duty and may only disclose information to others, including other members of the NYPD, only as required in the execution of lawful duty.

NYPD personnel are responsible for preventing third parties unauthorized access to information. Failure to adhere to confidentiality policies may subject NYPD personnel to disciplinary and/or criminal action. NYPD personnel must confirm the identity and affiliation of individuals requesting information from the NYPD and determine that the release of information is lawful prior to disclosure.

Unauthorized access of any system will subject employees to administrative and potentially criminal penalties.
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**POLICIES & PROCEDURES RELATING TO RETENTION, ACCESS & USE OF THE DATA**

Access to digital forensic access tools is limited to NYPD personnel with an articulable need to use the technology in furtherance of a lawful duty. Access to NYPD digital forensic access tools is removed when the technology is no longer necessary for NYPD personnel to fulfill their duties (e.g., when personnel are transferred to a command that does not use the technology).

Information obtained by using digital forensic access tools may only be used for legitimate law enforcement purposes or other official business of the NYPD, including in furtherance of criminal investigations, civil litigations, and disciplinary proceedings. Relevant information is stored in an appropriate NYPD computer or case management system. NYPD personnel utilizing computer and case management systems are authenticated by username and password. Access to computer and case management is limited to personnel who have an articulable need to access the system in furtherance of lawful duty. Access rights within NYPD case management and computer systems are further limited based on lawful duty.

The Retention and Disposition Schedule for New York Local Government Records (the Schedule) establishes the minimum length of time local government agencies must retain their records before the records may be legally disposed.³ Published annually by the New York State Archives, the Schedule ensures compliance with State and Federal record retention requirements. The NYC Department of Records and Information Services (DORIS) publishes a supplemental records retention and disposition schedule (the Supplemental Schedule) in conjunction with the Law Department specifically for NYC agencies in order to satisfy business, legal, audit and legal requirements.⁴

The retention period of a “case investigation record” depends on the classification of a case investigation record. The classification of case investigation records is based on the final disposition of the case, i.e., what the arrestee is convicted of or pleads to. Further, case investigations are not considered closed unless it results in prosecution and appeals are exhausted, it results in a settlement, it results in no arrest, or when restitution is no longer sought.

Case investigation records classified as a homicide, suicide, arson (first, second or third degree), missing person (until located), aggravated sexual assault (first degree), course of sexual conduct against a child (first degree), active warrant, or stolen or missing firearms (until recovered or destroyed), must be retained permanently. Case investigation records classified as a fourth degree arson or non-fatal (including vehicular accidents) must be retained for a minimum of ten (10) years after the case is closed. Case investigation records classified as any other felony must be retained for a minimum of twenty-five (25) years after the case is closed. Case investigation records classified as a misdemeanor must be retained for a minimum of five (5) years after the case is closed. Case investigation records classified as a violation or traffic infraction must be retained for a minimum of one (1) year after the case is closed.

⁴ See NYC Charter 3003.
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child attains at least age fifty-five (55). Case investigation records connected to an investigation that reveals no offense has been committed by an adult must be kept for a minimum of five (5) years after the case is closed. Case investigation records connected to an investigation that reveals the individual involved was a juvenile and no arrest was made or no offense was committed must be kept for at least one (1) year after the juvenile attains age eighteen (18).

Personal information data files on criminals and suspects must be retained for at least five (5) years after the death of the criminal or suspect, or ninety (90) years after the criminal or suspect’s date of birth as long as there has been no arrest in the last five (5) years, whichever is shorter. Personal information data files on associated persons, such as victims, relatives and witnesses must be retained as long as, or information as part of relevant case investigation record.

The misuse of any information will subject employees to administrative and potentially criminal penalties.

POLICIES & PROCEDURES RELATING TO PUBLIC ACCESS OR USE OF THE DATA

Members of the public may request information obtained from NYPD use of digital forensic access tools pursuant to the New York State Freedom of Information Law. The NYPD will review and evaluate such requests in accordance with applicable provisions of law and NYPD policy.

EXTERNAL ENTITIES

In the event the NYPD is unable to access information extracted from electronic devices using digital forensic analysis tools due to complex encryption and device security, the NYPD may make the device accessible to certified digital forensic experts of the private vendor of the technology to obtain their assistance in accessing the information.

If digital forensic access tools obtain material related to a criminal case, the NYPD will turn it over to the prosecutor with jurisdiction over the matter. Prosecutors will provide the material to the defendant(s) in accordance with criminal discovery laws.

Other law enforcement agencies may request material contained in NYPD computer or case management systems in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and New York City and NYPD policies. Additionally, the NYPD may provide material to partnering law enforcement and city agencies pursuant to on-going criminal investigations, civil litigation, and disciplinary proceedings. Information will not be shared in furtherance of immigration enforcement.

Following the laws of the State and City of New York, as well as NYPD policy, information may be provided to community leaders, civic organizations and the news media in order to further an investigation, create awareness of an unusual incident, or address a community-concern.

Pursuant to NYPD policy and local law, NYPD personnel may disclose identifying information externally only if:

1. Such disclosure has been authorized in writing by the individual to whom such information pertains to, or if such individual is a minor or is otherwise not legally competent, by such
individual’s parent or legal guardian and has been approved in writing by the Agency Privacy Officer assigned to the Legal Bureau;
2. Such disclosure is required by law and has been approved in writing by the Agency Privacy Officer assigned to the Legal Bureau;
3. Such disclosure furthers the purpose or mission of the NYPD and has been approved in writing by the Agency Privacy Officer assigned to the Legal Bureau;
4. Such disclosure has been pre-approved as in the best interests of the City by the City Chief Privacy Officer;
5. Such disclosure has been designated as routine by the Agency Privacy Officer assigned to the Legal Bureau;
6. Such disclosure is in connection with an investigation of a crime that has been committed or credible information about an attempted or impending crime; or
7. Such disclosure is in connection with an open investigation by a City agency concerning the welfare of a minor or an individual who is otherwise not legally competent.

Government agencies at the local, state, and federal level, including law enforcement agencies other than the NYPD, have limited access to NYPD computer and case management systems. Such access is granted by the NYPD on a case by case basis subject to the terms of written agreements between the NYPD and the agency receiving access to a specified system. The terms of the written agreements also charge these external entities with maintaining the security and confidentiality of information obtained from the NYPD, limiting disclosure of that information without NYPD approval, and notifying the NYPD when the external entity receives a request for that information pursuant to a subpoena, judicial order, or other legal process. Access will not be given to other agencies for purposes of furthering immigration enforcement.

The NYPD purchases digital forensic access tools and associated equipment or Software as a Service (SaaS)/software from approved vendors. The NYPD emphasizes the importance of and engages with vendors and contractors to maintain the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of NYPD technology systems.

Vendors and contractors may have access to NYPD digital forensic access tools associated software or data in the performance of contractual duties to the NYPD. Such duties are typically technical or proprietary in nature (e.g., maintenance or failure mitigation). In providing vendors and contractors access to equipment and computer systems, the NYPD follows the principle of least privilege. Vendors and contractors are only allowed access on a “need to know basis” to fulfill contractual obligations and/or agreements.

Vendors and contractors providing equipment and services to the NYPD undergo vendor responsibility determination and integrity reviews. Vendors and contractors providing sensitive equipment and services to the NYPD also undergo background checks.

Vendors and contractors are legally obligated by contracts and/or agreements to maintain the confidentiality of NYPD data and information. Vendors and contractors are subject to criminal and civil penalties for unauthorized use or disclosure of NYPD data or information.

If information obtained using NYPD digital forensic access tools is disclosed in a manner violating the local Identifying Information Law, the NYPD Agency Privacy Officer, upon becoming aware,
must report the disclosure to the NYC Chief Privacy Officer as soon as practicable. The NYPD must make reasonable efforts to notify individuals effected by the disclosure in writing when there is potential risk of harm to the individual, when the NYPD determines in consultation with the NYC Chief Privacy Officer and the Law Department that notification should occur, or when legally required to do so by law or regulation. In accordance with the Identifying Information Law, the NYC Chief Privacy Officer submits a quarterly report containing an anonymized compilation or summary of such disclosures by City agencies, including those reported by the NYPD, to the Speaker of the Council and makes the report publicly available online.

TRAINING
NYPD personnel utilizing digital forensic access tools receive command level training on the proper operation of the technology and associated equipment. NYPD personnel must use digital forensic access tools in compliance with NYPD policies and training.

INTERNAL AUDIT & OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS
The use of digital forensic access tools, including the reasons for its use, must be discussed with a supervisor. Supervisors of personnel utilizing digital forensic access tools are responsible for security and proper utilization of the technology and associated equipment. Supervisors are directed to inspect all areas containing NYPD computer systems at least once each tour and ensure that all systems are being used within NYPD guidelines.

All NYPD personnel are advised that NYPD computer systems and equipment are intended for the purposes of conducting official business. The misuse of any system or equipment will subject employees to administrative and potentially criminal penalties. Allegations of misuse are internally investigated at the command level or by the Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB).

Integrity Control Officers (ICOs) within each Command are responsible for maintaining the security and integrity of all recorded media in the possession of the NYPD. ICOs must ensure all authorized users of NYPD computer systems in their command understand and comply with computer security guidelines, frequently observe all areas with computer equipment, and ensure security guidelines are complied with, as well as investigating any circumstances or conditions which may indicate abuse of the computer systems.

Requests for focused audits of computer activity from IAB, Commanding Officers, ICOs, Investigations Units, and others, may be made to the Information Technology Bureau.

HEALTH & SAFETY REPORTING
There are no known health and safety issues with digital forensic access tools or the associated equipment.

DISPARATE IMPACTS OF THE IMPACT & USE POLICY
The safeguards and audit protocols built into this impact and use policy for NYPD digital forensic access tools mitigate the risk of impartial and biased law enforcement. Digital forensic access tools are only capable of accessing information contained on a specific electronic device. Digital forensic analysis tools are only used by NYPD personnel after obtaining a court ordered search.
warrant, individual consent, or under exigent circumstances. Digital forensic access tools do not use any biometric measurement technologies.

The NYPD is committed to the impartial enforcement of the law and to the protection of constitutional rights. The NYPD prohibits the use of racial and bias-based profiling in law enforcement actions, which must be based on standards required by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, Sections 11 and 12 of Article I of the New York State Constitution, Section 14-151 of the New York City Administrative Code, and other applicable laws.

Race, color, ethnicity, or national origin may not be used as a motivating factor for initiating police enforcement action. When an officer’s decision to initiate enforcement action against a person is motivated even in part by a person’s actual or perceived race, color, ethnicity, or national origin, that enforcement action violates NYPD policy unless the officer’s decision is based on a specific and reliable suspect description that includes not just race, age, and gender, but other identifying characteristics or information.